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MODEELLINEi A NEW ECONOMIC EiROWTH THOUGHT FOR 
DEVELOPINra ECONOMIESWITH PARTICULAR CE TO 
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 
The objective of this research work is to model a new economic growth thought for 
developing economies by mainly taking into account the complex structure of the 
economies in transition. The post-war debate on an age-old problem of growth and 
development has once again gained a momentum with the demise of the socialist 
system in the former Soviet Union and in the Eastern and Central European nations. 
The dynamism of these economies in transition woulddepend largely on the working 
of capitalist-market mechanism, to which they have allied themselves. While designing 
new economic growth strategies, we consider the economic variables which need to 
integrate socio-cultural phenomena. The economic policy imperative is based on the 
conviction that the fusion of the way of thinking of the people and the way of acting of 
the economic agent results either in economic development or in economic stagnation. 
The whole work is divided into three main sections with chapters in sequence. The 
opening chapter of every section designs a composition of place. The composition of 
place examines the historical, geographical and the existential relevance of the section 
in analysis. Once we have placed ourselves in that particular scenario, it is easy for us 
to delve into the investigation proper. We conclude each section by making a critical 
assessment of the subject-matter. 
The Theoretical Growth Path 
Our first section deals with the theoretical growth path. Ihe path we tread in this 
section is the capitalist-market economy oriented development path. The economic 
growth models are theoretical in nature but applied in varying degrees to enhance the 
operation of market performance with an objective of development. Therefore as we 
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outline the theoretical growth path, it is important to capture the historical context and 
to visualise a composition of place of growth economics in its relevant global setting, 
as we have done in chapter one. The description of the basic concepts like growth, 
development, sustainable development etc., is given in the second chapter of this 
section. From chapter three to seven of section one, we have designed a particular 
framework to determine the engines of economic growth and their motivating forces. 
In chapter three, we analyse the economic growth model with an emphasis on physical 
capital and human labour by following the Harrod-Domar model. We proceed to 
analyse in chapter four the growth model with an emphasis on technological progress 
as proposed by Solow. In chapter five, we concentrate on the economic growth model 
with an emphasis on human capital. The shift of emphasis from exogenous technical 
innovation to human capital accumulation as the key source of growth and 
development is one of the major themes of the new economic development literature. 
The new growth theories are proposed by Romer, Barro and others. We proceed to 
analyse the economic growth model with an emphasis on the research sector in chapter 
six. The new direction given by the endogenous growth models enables us to 
understand better the 'unexplained growth' by endogenizing the determinants of 
economic growth. Following this path of direction, we shall try to introduce a noval 
factor into the mechanisms of economic growth. The identification of a growth 
influencing knowledge sector is our prime objective in chapter seven. We conclude 
section one of our study by introducing a dual knowledge sector, namely, the macro 
knowledge sector and the micro knowledge sector and we propose the idea that it is 
the integration of these two sectors that would account for any further economic 
growth. 
The Applied Growth Path 
The second section of our research deals with the applied growth path. The path that 
we tread here is the socialist - command economy oriented development path. We caH 
this section the applied growth path because of the fact that there have been a 
conscious development and application of an ideology oriented growth models. The 
socialist-planned economies developed their own growth economic models for their 
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countries' economic development. ne socialist ideological structure and dynamism 
have been endogenized in these applied growth models. 
The composition of place of the socialist system within a global framework, as we 
have done in chapter eight, enables us to delve into our particular form of search, 
namely, the motives and engines of economic growth process in the socialist 
economies. Every economic growth model has a specific structure and a dynamism and 
the application of such a model could either stagnate development or ignite the 
economy forward, as we have shown in chapter nine. To understand the nature of the 
socialist system better, we proceed to examine the features of forced growth in the 
light of the diverse theoretical literature on growth. We begin by analysing the socialist 
economic growth model with an emphasis on primitive accumulation in chapter ten. 
Primitive socialist capital accumulation , as described by Preobrazhensky, simply 
cannot go on unobstructed for a long period. Since the adherents of the socialist state 
were convinced of the role of capital formation, they decided to follow the model of 
investment, as we have shown in chapter eleven. Fel'dman's growth model is based on 
a Marxist foundation and it may be of use in unravelling a few puzzles in Soviet 
economic development and in achieving a better understanding of Soviet economic 
thinking. More investment coupled with less consumption raises the issue of savings. 
The role of savings in a socialist state is a new phenomenon in the theory of economic 
growth, as we have shown in chapter twelve. If the socialist state has to survive, the 
household consumption has to be improved. The priority to consumption over 
production goods resulted in a new debate, as we have described in chapter thirteen. 
Our analysis of the model developed by Brus and Laski, which is based on the works 
of Kalecki, shows not only the interplay of consumption and production but also the 
inherent problems of a socialist system. In chapter fourteen we proceed to make a 
critique of the socialist economic system based on the applied core economic growth 
models which we have analysed in our study. We conclude section two of our 
investigation by proposing the idea that the applied model of socialism can be 
considered as a form of micro knowledge; but it is the victory of macro knowledge 
that led to the demise of applied socialism. 
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The Transition Growth Path 
The new thinking that an evolving transitional and developing economy assimilates in 
its process of economic growth would have far reaching developmental consequences. 
The third section of our research deals with the transition growth path. The economies 
in transition are simultaneously engaged in dismantling the legacies of a socialist - 
planned economic system and building up a structure of market-oriented capitalist 
economic system. The economic Objective of growth and development remains a top 
priority during the period of transition. This section also begins with the composition 
of place of the economies in transition. While in chapter fifteen we concentrate on 
central and eastern European nations, chapter sixteen treads the transition path of the 
former Soviet Union. Our analysis of the transition process of these economies unfolds 
the complexity of the nature of the task that is ahead. As we try to have a conceptual 
understanding of the term transition, we realize that the economies in transition need 
to follow certain strategies., as we have discussed in chapter seventeen, to accomplish 
the desired economic objective of growth and development. Analysing the interlocking 
wheels of transition points to the necessity of having strategies like macroeconomic 
stabilization, liberalization of prices, privatization of the economy, and a market- 
supporting institutional infrastructure. Though we cannot at this stage establish a 
unique optimal path of transition, most now argue that macroeconomic stabilization, if 
not a necessary condition for transition, greatly facilitates it, as we have shown in 
chapter eighteen. We have followed the case studies of Russia and Baltic states in this 
regard. Our analysis outlines the relevance of macroeconomic stabilization as a primary 
condition for the emergence of capitalism. At this stage, the economies in transition 
would be applying economic growth models that would bring about the desired 
growth. From the ashes of historical socialism emerges the hopes of the economies in 
transition. These hopes are to be translated into reality by providing a new vision to 
their economic objective. We begin chapter nineteen by formulating a new vision- 
growth path and we move to design a solution-growth path. This is a new vision of 
economic growth and development and its realization depends on a new perspective of 
the knowledge sector of a new growth model. The economic modelling that we 
undertake identifies a growth influencing knowledge sector and we integrate into this 
knowledge sector the hitherto unintegrated macro knowledge variables, namely, 
vi 
-freedom, democracy and human rights. We hope this will also contribute to the new 
attempts at creating alternate economic growth models. 
We conclude this investigative-research work by placing the vision-solution growth 
path into a global growth path. 
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MODEWNG A NEW ECONOMIC GROWTH THOUGHT FOR 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIESWITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO 




'Me invisible hand that works in any economic action is the invisible thought that exists 
among the people of a nation. Since the beginning of civilization we have been in the 
pursuit of taming the nature. 'Me technique of processing that took place on the face of 
the earth is termed as economic action. As the civilization process is conscientized, the 
spirit of the economic being emerged to be called as culture. Cultural development is the 
process of praxis civilization. 'Me moment the economic agent becomes aware of the 
culture in which he is situated, he turns also to be an agent who develops and remoulds the 
culture. 'Me way of thinking that exists in the micro-agent expands and spreads into the 
macro level. The outcome would be the birth of a national philosophy, which penetrates 
into every comer of the whole nation and its every action. Every nation needs to become 
aware of the existing way of thinking - macro knowledge - that motivates its people to act. 
To a great extent, it is this awareness that brings change and in the economic sphere, this 
conscientized change is termed as economic development. How much a nation is truly 
aware of the existing philosophy that motivates the economic agent is very influential in 
any economic reforms. It is this consciousness of the nation that becomes the conscience 
of the people. If the existing thought is a distorting phenomenon for human progress, then 
we need to re-evaluate the influencing or motivating thought that benefits only a few 
citizens to develop and the rest of the nation to be at the mercy of these chosen few. But, 
if the existing thought helps a large majority of the nation to achieve its designed goal, it is 
still important to focus on the way of thinking that did influence the outcome and it is 
necessary to recharge the same with a conscious-push and try to eliminate the national 
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energy wasting element, that subsists in it with a conscious-pull. Thus, we can safely state 
that economic development is greatly influenced by the way of thinking Of the people or 
the national philosophy. As any person is motivated to act because of his/her deep-rooted 
convictions, a nation will act according to its convictions. 
The following research mainly takes into account the complex structure of the 
economies in transition (and of developing economies in general) and their need for 
modelling a new economic growth thought. This research attempts to shed a new light on 
an age-old problem of economic inquiry: the problem of growth and development. We 
shall particularly consider the economic variables which need to integrate socio-cultural 
phenomena while framing economic policies. The fusion of the way of thinking of the 
people and the way of acting of the economic agent results either in economic 
development or in economic stagnation. '111us this research will also be an attempt at 
creating a philosophy of political economy as we design an alternate model of economic 
growth. 
Ad. 
'Me methodology that we employ in this research is more of a descriptive nature than of 
an analytical one. In the theoretical growth path we have used some analytical tools. In the 
applied growth path and in the transition growth path, the method of description is more 
applicable. The descriptive method is followed mainly due to the fact that the regimes and 
portfolios and events described are existential in nature. Economics, as a social science, 
when trying to explain the raw events of economic mechanisms of birth, growth, decay, 
collapse and transition-evolution, descriptive method is more suitable to explain the 
economic behaviour. 'Me economic agent to whom it is addressed would find it easy to 
identify oneself with this scenario of events. 
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A. H. Executive Summaa 
In the introductory chapter we outline the objective of this research work and the 
executive summary of its content. The whole work is divided into three main sections with 
chapters in sequence. The opening chapter of every section designs a composition of 
place. The composition of place examines the historical, geographical and the existential 
relevance of the section in analysis. Once we have placed ourselves in that particular 
scenario, it is easy for us to delve into the investigation proper. 
A. iii. The Theoretical Growth Path 
Our first section deals with the theoretical growth path. The path we tread in this section 
is the capitalist-market economy oriented development path. The economic growth 
models are theoretical in nature but applied in varying degrees to enhance the operation of 
market performance with an objective of development. Therefore as we outline the 
theoretical growth path, it is important to capture the historical context and to visualise a 
composition of place of growth economics in its relevant global setting, as we have done 
in chapter one. The composition of place of growth economics in its global framework 
raises certain inevitable questions. Which were the economic growth models that the 
developed and developing economies followed thus far? What are the determinants on 
which these models were grounded? But before we answer such questions, we need to 
clarify certain basic concepts of our study. The description of the basic concepts like 
growth, development, sustainable development etc., is given in the second chapter of this 
section. From chapter three to seven of section one, we have designed a particular 
framework to determine the engines of economic growth and their motivating forces. In 
chapter three, we begin analysing the economic growth model with an emphasis on 
physical capital and human labour by following the Harrod-Domar model. We proceed to 
analyse in chapter four the growth model with an emphasis on technological progress as 
proposed by Solow and Swan. A new wave of research on economic growth was 
stimulated by Romer and Lucas. Their work relies on Arrow's mechanism of learning -by- 
doing. But, more importantly, by following Uzawa [1965], Romer and Lucas have 
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redirected its application to the accumulation of knowledge and human capital rather than 
the accumulation of plant and equipment. In chapter five, we concentrate on the economic 
growth model with an emphasis on human capital. The shift of emphasis from exogenous 
technical innovation to human capital accumulation as the key source of growth and 
development is one of the major themes of the new economic development literature. We 
proceed to analyse the economic growth model with an emphasis on the research sector in 
chapter six. The new direction given by the endogenous growth models enables us to 
understand better the 'unexplained growth' by endogenizing the determinants of economic 
growth. Following this path of direction, we shall try to introduce a noval factor into the 
mechanisms of economic growth. The identification of a growth influencing knowledge 
sector is our prime objective in chapter seven. We conclude section one of our study by 
introducing a dual knowledge sector, namely, the macro knowledge sector and micro 
knowledge sector and we propose the idea that it is the integration of these two sectors 
that would account for any further economic growth. 
A. iv. The Applied Growth Path 
The second section of our research deals with the applied growth path. The path that we 
tread here is the socialist - command economy oriented development path. We call this 
section the applied growth path because of the fact that there have been a conscious 
development and application of an ideology oriented growth models. The socialist-planned 
economies developed their own growth economic models for their countries' economic 
development. r1lie socialist ideological structure and dynamism have been endogenized in 
these applied growth models. 
The composition of place of the socialist system within a global framework, as we have 
done in chapter eight, enables us to delve into our particular form of search, namely, the 
motives and engines of economic growth process in the socialist economies. Every 
economic growth model has a specific structure and a dynamism and the application of 
such a model could either stagnate development or ignite the economy forward, as we 
have shown in chapter nine. Our survey of the structure and dynamics of the socialist state 
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unveils the nature of a veiled economic system. To understand the nature of the socialist 
system better, we proceed to examine the features of forced growth in the light of the 
diverse theoretical literature on growth. We begin by analysing the socialist economic 
growth model with an emphasis on primitive accumulation in chapter ten. Primitive 
socialist capital accumulation , as described by Preobrazhensky, simply cannot go on 
unobstructed for a long period. There is neither unlimited supply of labour nor is it 
advisable to follow an unbalanced growth path. Therefore, new devices had to be 
formulated to fulfil the economic objectives. Since the adherents of the socialist state were 
convinced of the role of capital formation, they decided to follow the model of investment 
as we have shown in chapter eleven. Fel'dman's growth model is based on a Marxist 
foundation and it may be of use in unravelling a few puzzles in Soviet economic 
development and in achieving a better understanding of Soviet economic thinking. More 
investment coupled with less consumption raises the issue of savings. The role of savings 
in a socialist state is a new phenomenon in the theory of economic growth, as we have 
shown in chapter twelve. Savings in a centrally planned economic system is a non-existent 
phenomenon. In a literal sense, there is no savings. Since planned investment is the 
controlling force, the role of savings is irrelevant as far as economic decisions are 
concerned. The decision of the central planners to reduce the consumption of the 
households is no alternative mechanism for savings mechanism. It is -this misunderstanding 
among the socialist planners that derailed the investment in the long-run and thereby 
stagnated the growth of the economy. If the socialist state has to survive, the household 
consumption has to be improved. The priority to consumption over production goods 
resulted in a new debate, as we have described in chapter thirteen. Our analysis of the 
model developed by Brus and Laski, which is based on the works of Kalecki, shows not 
only the interplay of consumption and production but also the inherent problems of a 
socialist system. In chapter fourteen we proceed to make a critique of the socialist 
economic system based on the applied core economic growth models which we have 
analysed in our study. We conclude section two of our investigation by proposing the idea 
that the applied model of socialism can be considered as a form of micro knowledge; but it 
is the victory of macro knowledge that led to the demise of applied socialism. 
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A. v. The Transition Growth Path 
The new thinking that an evolving transitional and developing economy assimilates in its 
process of economic growth would have far reaching developmental consequences. The 
third section of our research deals with the transition growth path. The economies in 
transition are simultaneously engaged in dismantling the legacies of a socialist - planned 
economic system and building up a structure of market-oriented capitalist economic 
system. The economic objective of growth and development remains a top priority during 
the period of transition. This section also begins with the composition of place of the 
economies in transition. While in chapter fifteen we concentrate on central and eastern 
European nations, chapter sixteen treads the transition path of the former Soviet Union. 
Our analysis of the transition process of these economies unfolds the complexity of the 
nature of the task that is ahead. As we try to have a conceptual understanding of the term 
transition, we realize that the economies in transition need to follow certain strategies., as 
we have discussed in chapter seventeen, to accomplish the desired economic objective of 
growth and development. Analysing the interlocking wheels of transition points to the 
necessity of having strategies like macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of prices, 
privatization of the economy, and a market-supporting institutional infrastructure. Though 
we cannot at this stage establish a unique optimal path of transition, most now argue that 
macroeconomic stabilization, if not a necessary condition for transition, greatly facilitates 
it, as we have shown in chapter eighteen. We have followed the case studies of Russia and 
Baltic states in this regard. Our analysis outlines the relevance of macroeconomic 
stabilization as a primary condition for the emergence of capitalism. At this stage, the 
economies in transition would be applying economic growth models that would bring 
about the desired growth. From the ashes of historical socialism emerges the hopes of the 
economies in transition. These hopes are to be translated into reality by providing a new 
vision to their economic objective. We begin chapter nineteen by formulating a new 
vision-growth path and we move to design a solution-growth path. This is a new vision of 
economic growth and development and its realization depends on a new perspective of the 
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knowledge sector of a new growth model. 'Me economic modelling that we undertake 
identifies a growth influencing knowledge sector and we integrate into this knowledge 
sector the hitherto unintegrated macro knowledge variables, namely, freedom, democracy 
and human rights. We hope this will also contribute to the new attempts at creating 
alternate economic growth models. 
We conclude this investigative-research work by placing the vision-solution growth path 
into a global growth path. 'Me economic convergence on a global scale is possible only if 
we dare to face future challenges and reap opportunities with a desire for further and 
deeper integration between developed and developing nations. 
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SECTION ONE 
THE THEORETICAL GROWTH PATH 
The economies in transition aim to transform their societies into a more humane one by 
reinterpreting the political ideologies, economic institutions, and social values. They aim to 
transform their politics into a more freer and democratic-oriented scenario, which 
promotes a new set of social values. They aim to transform their economies into a 
capitalist one based on the market mechanism of the developed world. The fulfilment of 
these objectives involves a thorough designing of a theoretical framework and its concrete 
application to the economies in transition. It has to be a praxis approach of designing, 
applying, and re-designing the objectives and the re-formulation of their necessary theory. 
In this section, we shall analyse a few relevant theoretical models that have been followed 
in the market-oriented economies, and we propose the integration of these models of 




EVOLUTION OF THE THEORETICAL GROWTH MODELS 
The new thinking that an evolving transitional and developing economy assimilates in its 
process of economic growth would have far reaching developmental consequences. 
History of economies shows that all the growth process need not necessarily lead to 
permanent development. Our perspectives on growth would be an indication of our desire 
for development. Our frame of reference would be the blueprint on which national 
economic policies would be drawn. Therefore as we outline the theoretical growth path, it 
is important to capture the historical context and to visugise a composition of place of 
growth economics in its relevant global setting. We shall begin with history. 
I. l. i. The ffistorical Setting 
The big increase in trade between the countries of Western Europe and North America 
and the rest of the world dates from the second half, and more precisely the last quarter, of 
the nineteenth century. Trade links existed before then, but were quantitatively less 
important. Nineteenth-century innovations led to increased demand for materials such as 
rubber, copper and other minerals, while the spread of railways after the 1850s and the 
rapid drop in ocean freight costs after 1870 opened up new areas to trade by reducing 
transport costs. Exports from tropical countries grew by 4 per cent a year from the 1880s 
to 1914, establishing an interdependent world economy. The economies of the exporting 
regions were transformed, but economists showed little interest in these changes. The 
tropical regions were participating in a global division of labour and sharing the gains from 
trade, just as the classical economists predicted. Lack of interest in issues of growth and 
development also reflected the dominance since the 1870s of neo-classical economics, 
with its emphasis on resource allocation rather than on macroeconomic or dynamic 
issues. ' We note that the classical economists such as Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, J. S. 
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Mill and Marx had written about long-term economic change, but they limited their 
analysis almost exclusively to European economies. 
Several influences during the 1930s stimulated thought on economic development. First, 
the economic depression hit some less developed countries (LDCs) very hard as the drop 
in commodity prices from their 1928 peak was more severe than the fall in price of 
manufactured goods (Cuba, for example, is estimated to have suffered a loss in per capita 
income of at least a third). The benefits from entering the international division of labour 
were reversed, and disillusionment with the market mechanism and with free-trade policies 
set in. This effect was strongest in Latin America, where most independent LDCs were at 
the time. A particularly influential individual was Raul Prebisch, who had pursued laissez- 
jaire policies as the Argentinean Under-Secretary of Finance during the 1920s but around 
1930 shifted to advocating shielding domestic industry by trade barriers. Meanwhile, 
Western economics was experiencing the Keynesian Revolution. Keynes challenged the 
neo-classical orthodoxy by advocating more interventionist policies to cope with the 
economic depression. Also, his mode of analysis encouraged ad hoc theorising as opposed 
to the universal theories of classical and neo-classical economists. Western economics 
could be seen as appropriate to the special case of the Western economies, while different 
assumptions would be needed for development economics. Finally, there was a common 
sentiment that economic forces had contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War 
and that a better post-war economic order could be designed. Among the Anglo-American 
architects of the post-war economic order, most of the discussion had little to do with 
LDCs. Rosenstein-Rodan's paper (1943) was the first to analyse 'underdeveloped 
countries' and it focused on East and South-East Europe, but the rapid move to political 
independence of former colonies in Asia spread interest in development economics across 
the world. 2 
These simultaneous threads in world economic history and in economic theory created 
the background for the emergence of development economics as a distinct subject. 'Me 
revulsion of many Latin Americans with the workings of the market system after 1928, the 
inevitability of Indian independence and the break-up of the colonial empires, and the 
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coming to power in Turkey, China, Egypt and else-where of modernizing rulers, all 
created an environment in which policy-makers were eager for ideas on how to achieve 
economic development. In such an intellectual and political ferment, with both analysts 
and policy-makers reacting to the same world background, it is difficult to identify how 
much the theorists influenced the practical people and how much they were simply 
rationalizing the policies which would have been adopted anyway. The writings of the 
pioneers in development economics, do, however, capture most clearly the central 
themes. 
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The dominant economic systems of our century resulted in the creation of super-powers 
and the epicentres of economic activity. The 1990s witnessed the collapse of the socialist 
planned model and the strength of market economy models. The collapse of an economic 
system necessitated the shift of developmental activity to a new world, hitherto, hidden in 
the bosom of socialist paternalism. Any application of capitalist growth models to these 
transitional economies which are now part of the developing world, and have undertaken 
their own developmental paths, has to be carefully designed within the framework of a 
global economy. 
MAL The Composition of Place of Growth Economics 
Macroeconomics theories of economic growth explain the determinants of the wealth of 
nations and try to analyse why the fortunes of nations change over time. Various economic 
growth theories developed as a response to the historical events that unfolded on our 
planet. The new realisation of a wounded and divided world of South and North or of 
developing and developed or of centrally planned or transitional or of poor and rich had a 
shattering economic effect. Effective ways of integrating the world economy has become 
the concern of economists. Interest in growth economics revived as a result of an immense 
practical concern with development after the Second World War. We could state that the 
real motivating power behind the establishment of the present international economic 
system arose due to the following factors. "The war-damaged economies were trying hard 
to reconstruct fast, the underdeveloped countries were attempting to initiate economic 
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development, the advanced capitalist countries being relatively free from periodic slumps 
were trying to concentrate on raising the long-run rate of growth, and the socialist 
countries were determined to overtake the richer capitalist economies by fast economic 
expansion. A Piecemeal responses of the international community to the under- 
development issues of the planet threaten the partial growth of the developed nations. As 
it is said, poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere. "The challenge of finding 
sustainable development paths ought to provide the impetus-- -indeed the imperative --- for 
a renewed search for multilateral solutions and a restructured international economic 
system of co-operation. These challenges cut across the divides of national sovereignty, of 
limited strategies for economic gain, and of separated disciplines of science. v, 5 The new 
challenges posed by the quest for growth and development need to be viewed 
wholistically. We can no more measure development by a single economic indicator as 
growth. The human family is becoming more and deeply aware of its need for creating 
sustainable survival strategies within the framework of development. 
We are concerned not just with socio-economic dimensions of development alone but 
with the historical and political and cultural implications and above all very much worried 
about the sustainability of our planetary system itself. "In the middle of the twentieth 
century, we saw our planet from space for the first time. Historians may eventually find 
that this vision had a great impact on thought than did the Copernican revolution of the 
sixteenth century, which upset the human self-image by revealing that the Earth is not the 
centre of the universe. From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by 
human activity and edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils. 
Humanity's inability to fit its doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, 
fundamentally. Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new 
reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognised - and managed. 9)6 This new 
vision of the world is, fortunately, coincided with more positive developments new to this 
century. "We can move information and goods faster around the globe than ever before; 
we can produce more food and more goods with less investment of resources; our 
technology and science gives us at least the potential to look deeper into and better 
understand natural systems. From space, we can see and study the Earth as an organism 
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whose health depends on the health of all its parts. We have the power to reconcile human 
affairs with natural laws and to thrive in the process. In this our cultural and spiritual 
,, 7 heritages can reinforce our economic interests and survival imperatives. We see the 
possibility for a new era of economic growth which is more prosperous, more just, and 
more secure and this form of growth is essential to relieve the great poverty that is 
deepening in much of the developing world. 
I. l. iii. Growth Policies: Stories of Success and Shadow of Failures 
To ensure both sustainable human progress and human survival, we need to understand 
the global challenges in the light of successes and in the shadow of failures. Our growth 
policies which led to success are signs of hope and they are many: infant mortality is 
falling; human life expectancy is increasing; the proportion of the world's adults who can 
read and write is climbing; the proportion of children starting school is rising; and global 
food production increases faster than the population grows. But the same processes that 
have produced these gains, have led to failures of 'development'. On the development 
side, in terms of absolute numbers there are more hungry people in the world than ever 
before, and their numbers are increasing. So are the numbers who can-not read or write, 
the numbers without safe water, or safe and sound homes, and the numbers short of 
woodfuel with which to cook and warm themselves. The gap between the rich and poor 
nations is widening-not shrinking-and there is little prospect, given present trends and 
institutional arrangements, that this process will be reversed. 
According to the report of The World Commission on Environment and Development, 
there are also environmental trends that threaten to radically alter the planet, that threaten 
the lives of many species upon it, including the human species. Each year another 6 million 
hectares of productive dryland turns into worthless desert; more than 11 million hectares 
of forests are destroyed yearly, and much of this forest is converted to low-grade farmland 
unable to support the farmers who settle it. In Europe, acid precipitation kills forests and 
lakes and damages the artistic and architectural heritage of nations; it may have acidified 
vast tracts of soil beyond reasonable hope of repair. The burning of fossil fuels puts into 
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the atmosphere carbon dioxide, which is causing gradual global warming. This 
'greenhouse effect' may by early next century have increased average global temperatures 
enough to shift agricultural production areas, raise sea levels to flood coastal cities, and 
disrupt national economies. Other industrial gases threaten to deplete the planet's 
protective ozone shield to such an extent that the number of human and animal cancers 
would rise sharply and the ocean's food chain would be disrupted. Industry and 
agriculture put toxic substances into the human food chain and into underground water 
tables beyond reach of cleansing. 
There has been a growing realisation in national governments and multilateral 
institutions that it is impossible to separate economic development issues from 
environment issues; many forms of development erode the environmental resources upon 
which they must be based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic 
development. Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental problems. It is 
therefore futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems without a broader 
perspective that encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international 
inequality. "Many present development trends leave increasing numbers of people poor 
and vulnerable, while at the same time degrading the environment. How can such 
development serve next century's world of twice as many people relying on the same 
environment? This realisation broadened our view of development. We came to see it not 
in its restricted context of economic growth in developing countries. We came to see that 
a new development path was required, one that sustained human progress not just in a few 
places for a few years, but for the entire planet into the distant future. Thus 'sustainable 
development' becomes a goal not just for the 'developing' nations, but for industrial ones 
as well. ý., 8 
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I. Liv. Global Economy versus Global Ecolo 
Until recently, the planet was a large world in which human activities and their effects 
were neatly compartmentalised within nations, within sectors (energy, agriculture, trade), 
and within broad areas of concern (environmental, economic, social). These compartments 
have begun to dissolve. This applies in particular to the various global 'crises' that have 
seized public concern, particularly over the past decade. These are not separate crises: a 
development crisis, an environmental crisis, an energy crisis. They are all one. The 
question is how are we going to deal with all these interlocking crises. The planet is 
passing through a period of dramatic growth and fundamental change. Our human world 
of 5 billion must make room in a finite environment for another human world. The 
population could stabilise at between 8 billion and 14 billion sometime next century, 
according to UN projections. More than 90 per cent of the increase will occur in the 
poorest countries, and 90 per cent of the growth in already bursting cities. 
Uonomic activity has multiplied to create a $13 trillion world economy, and this could 
grow five-or tenfold in the coming half-century. industrial production has grown more 
than fiftyfold over the past century, four-fifths of this growth since 1950. Such figures 
reflect and presage profound impacts upon the biosphere, as the world invests in houses, 
transport, farrns, and industries. Much of the economic growth pulls raw material from 
forests, soils, seas, and waterways. A mainspring of economic growth is new technology., 
and while this technology offers the potential for slowing the dangerously rapid 
consumption of finite resources, it also entails high risks, including new forms of pollution 
and the introduction to the planet of new variations of life forms that could change 
evolutionary pathways. Meanwhile, the industries most heavily reliant on environmental 
resources and most heavily polluting are growing most rapidly in the developing world, 
where there is both more urgency for growth and less capacity to minimise damaging side 
effects. These related changes have locked the global economy and global ecology 
together in new ways. We have in the past been concerned about the impacts of economic 
growth upon the environment. We are now forced to concern ourselves with the impacts 
of ecological stress - degradation of soils, water regimes, atmosphere, and forests - upon 
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our economic prospects. Ecology and economy are becoming ever more interwoven - 
locally, regionally, nationally, and globally - into a seamless net of causes and effects. 9 
All the recent research has shown the inter-relationship between development of an 
economy and ecology. Flourishing the economy at the expense of perishing the ecology is 
disastrous. It is time to realize that impoverishing the local resource base can impoverish 
wider areas. Studies again proved beyond doubt that deforestation in Latin America and 
Asia is causing more floods and more destructive floods, in downhill, downstream nations. 
Acid precipitation and nuclear fallout have spread across the borders of Europe. Similar 
phenomena are emerging on a global scale, such as global warming and loss of ozone. The 
1986 discovery of a hole in the ozone layer above the Antarctic suggests the possibility of 
a more rapid depletion than previously suspected. 10 Countrysides are coming under 
pressure from increasing numbers of farmers and the landless. Cities are filling with 
people, cars, and factories. Developing countries are operating in a world in which the 
resources gap between most developing and industrial nations is widening, in which the 
industrial world dominates in the rule-making of some key international bodies, and in 
which the industrial world has already used much of the planet's ecological capital. This 
inequality is the planet's main developmental as well as environmental problem. 
Most of the poor countries face enormous economic pressures, both international and 
domestic, to overexploit their environmental resource base. The recent crisis in Africa best 
and most tragically illustrates the ways in which economies and ecology can interact 
destructively and trip into disaster. Their roots extend to a global economic system that 
takes more out of a poor continent than it puts in. Debts that they cannot pay force 
African nations relying on commodity sales to overuse their fragile soils, thus tuming good 
land to desert. Aid from donor nations has not only been inadequate in scale, but too often 
has reflected the priorities of the nations giving the aid, rather than the needs of the 
recipients. As a consequence of the 'debt crisis' of Latin America, that region's natural 
resources are now being used not for development but to meet financial obligations to 
creditors abroad. This approach to the debt problem is short-sighted from an economic, 
political and environmental standpoints. "During the 1970s, twice as many people suffered 
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each year from 'natural' disasters as during the 1960s. The d&asters most directýy 
associated with environmentldevelopment mismanagement - droughts and floods - 
affected the most people and increased most sharpýy in terms of numbers affected. Some 
18.5 million people were affected by drought annualýy in the 1960s, 24 4 million in the 
1970s, and we have seen 35 million afflicted b drought in Africa alone during the 
1980s. There were 5.2 million flood victims yearýy in the 1960s, 15.4 million in the 
1970s. Numbers of victims of cyclones and earthquakes also shot up as growing numbers 
of poor people built unsafe houses on dangerous ground. Floods have poured off the 
deforested Andes and Himalayas with increasing force. The 1980s seem destined to 
sweep this dire trend on into a crisis-filled 1990s. "" Overexploitation of the natural 
resources coupled with the negative public spending impel the countries concerned to re- 
evaluate their strategies for development, if any. A majority of developing countries now 
have lower per capita incomes than when the 1980 decade began. Yet most of the affected 
governments still spend far more to protect their people from invading armies than from 
the invading desert. Globally, military expenditures total about $1 trillion a year and 
continue to grow. In many countries, military spending consumes such a high proportion 
of gross national product that it itself does great damage to these societies' development 
efforts. Studies suggest that the cold and dark nuclear winter following even a limited 
nuclear war could destroy plant and animal ecosystems and leave any human survivors 
occupying a devastated planet very different from the one they inherited. 
The composition of place of growth economics in a global framework brings before us a 
reality as well as a conviction that the security, well-being, and very survival of the planet 
would depend on a conscious action. Over the course of this century, the relationship 
between the human world and the planet that sustains it has undergone a profound change. 
When the twentieth century began, neither human numbers nor technology had the power 
radically to alter planetary systems. As the century closes, not only do vastly increased 
human numbers and their activities have that power, but major unintended changes are 
occurring in the atmosphere, in soils, in waters, among plants and animals, and in 
relationships among all of these. The rate of change is outstripping the ability of scientific 
disciplines and our current capabilities to assess and advise. It is frustrating the attempts of 
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political and economic institutions, which evolved in a different, more fragmented world, 
to adapt and cope. It deeply worries many people who are seeking ways to place those 
concerns on the political agendas. The onus fies with no one group of nations. All nations 
will have a role to play in changing trends, and in righting an international economic 
system that increases rather than decreases inequality, that increases rather than decreases 
numbers of poor and hungry. The time has come to break out of past patterns. The 
changes in human attitudes that we call for depend on a vast campaign of education, 
debate, and public participation. 12 
I. Lv. PoveEjj as a Result of Prosperi 
The failures that we need to correct arise both from poverty and from the short-sighted 
way in which we have often pursued prosperity. The prosperity attained in some parts of 
the world is often precarious, as it has been secured through farming, forestry, and 
industrial practices that bring profit and progress only over the short term. Our hope is 
grounded on the fact that people can cooperate to build a future that is more prosperous, 
more just, and more secure; that a new era of economic growth can be attained, one based 
on policies that sustain and expand the Earth's resource base. But for this to happen, we 
must understand better the symptoms of stress that confront us, we must identify the 
causes, and we must design new approaches to managing environmental resources and to 
sustaining human development. 13 Environmental stress has often been seen as the result of 
the growing demand on scarce resources and the pollution generated by the rising living 
standards of the relatively affluent. But poverty itself pollutes the environment, creating 
environmental stress in a different way. Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy 
their immediate envirom-nent in order to survive: They will cut down forests; their 
livestock will overgraze grasslands; they will overuse marginal land; and in growing 
numbers they will crowd into congested cities. The cumulative effect of these changes is 
so far-reaching as to make poverty itself a major global scourge. There are more hungry 
people in the world today than ever before in human history, and their numbers are 
growing. In 1980, there were 340 million people in 87 developing countries not getting 
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enough calories to prevent stunted growth and serious health risks. The World Bank 
predicts that these numbers are likely to go on growing. 14 , The number of people living in 
slums and shanty towns is rising, not falling. A growing number lack access to clean water 
and sanitation and hence are prey to the diseases that arise from this lack. There is some 
progress, impressive in places. But, on balance, poverty persists and its victims multiply, 
as shown in UNDP reports. The comparative indicators of economic development based 
on 1994 UNDP Report is given in Appendix 1.1.1. The pressure of poverty has to be seen 
in a broader context. At the international level there are large differences in per capita 
income, which ranged in 1984 from $190 in low-income countries (other than China and 
India) to $11,430 in the industrial market economies, as shown in Table 1.1.1. The global 
disparity in economic development remains the same in 1994. 
TABLE 1.1.1 
Population Size and Per Capita GNP by Groups of Countries 
Country Group Population Per Capita GNP Average Annual Growth 
(million) (1984 dollars) Rate of Per Capita GNP, 
1965-84(per cent) 
Low-income Economies 611 190 0.9 
(excl. China, India) 
China and India 1,778 290 3.3 
Lower Middle-income 691 740 3.0 
Economies 
Upper Middle-income 497 1,950 3.3 
Economies 
High-income Oil Exporters 19 11,250 3.2 
Industrial Market 733 11,430 2.4 
Economies 
Source: Based on data in World Bank, World Development Report 1986 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). (See also, Appendix 1.1.1. ) 
Such inequalities represent great differences not merely in the quality of life today, but 
also in the capacity of societies to improve their quality of life in the future. Most of the 
world's poorest countries depend for increasing export earnings on tropical agricultural 
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products that are vulnerable to fluctuating or declining ten-ns of trade. Within countries, 
poverty has been exacerbated by the unequal distribution of land and other assets. The 
rapid rise in population has compromised the ability to raise living standards. 
I. Lvi. Improvements in Living Standards 
In some parts of the world, particularly since the mid-1950s, growth and development 
have vastly improved living standards and the quality of life. Many of the products and 
technologies that have gone into this improvement are raw material- and energy-intensive 
and entail a substantial amount of pollution. Where economic growth has led to 
improvements in living standards, it has sometimes been achieved in ways that are globally 
damaging in the longer term. Much of the improvement in the past has been based on the 
use of increasing amounts of raw materials, energy, chemicals, and synthetics and on the 
creation of pollution that is not adequately accounted for in figuring the costs of 
production processes. "If people destroy vegetation in order to get land, food, fodder, 
fuel, or timber, the soil is no longer protected. Rain creates surface runoff, and the soil 
erodes. When the soil is gone, no water is retained and the land can no longer produce 
food, fodder, fuel, or timber, so people need to turn to new land and start the process all 
over again. All major disaster problems in the Third World are essentiall unsolved ýy 
development problems. Disaster prevention is thus primariýy an aspect of development, 
and this must be a development that takes place within the sustainable limits. 
TABLE 1.1.2 
Distribution of World Consumption. Averages for 1980-82. 
Developed Developing 
countries (26 countries (74 
percent Of per cent of 
population) population) 
Commodity Units of Per Share in Per Capita Share in Per Capita 
Capita World World 
Consumption Consumption Consumption 
I 
(per cent) (per cent) 
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Food: 
Calories Kcal/day 34 3,395 66 2,389 
Protein gms/day 38 99 62 58 
Fat gms/day 53 127 47 40 
Paper kg/year 85 123 15 8 
Steel kg/year 79 455 21 43 
Other Metals kg/year 86 26 14 2 
Commercial 
Energy 
mtce/year 80 5.8 20 0.5 
Source: WCED estimates based on country-level data from FAO, UN Statistical Office, 
UNCTAD, and American Metal Association. 
Over the past century, the use of fossil fuels has grown nearly thirtyfold, and industrial 
production has increased more than fiftyfold. The bulk of this increase, about three- 
quarters in the case of fossil fuels and a little over four-fifths in the case of industrial 
production, has taken place since 1950. The annual increase in industrial production today 
is perhaps as large as the total production in Europe around the end of 1930s. 16 The 
impact of growth and rising income levels can be seen in the distribution of world 
consumption of a variety of resource-intensive products. The more affluent industrialized. 
countries use most of the world's metals and fossil fuels. Even in the case of food 
products a sharp difference exists, particularly in the products that are more resource- 
intensive, as shown in Table 1.1.2. The Human Development Report of the UNDP 1994 
also points to the same trend as it is in 1980-82. 
In recent years, industrial countries have been able to achieve economic growth using 
less energy and raw materials per unit of output. This, along with the efforts to reduce the 
emission of poRutants, wifl help to contain the pressure on the biosphere. But with the 
increase in population and the rise in incomes, per capita consumption of energy and 
materials will go up in the developing countries, as it has to if essential needs are to be 
met. Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present 
without compromising the ability to meet those of the future. Far from requiring the 
cessation of economic growth, it recognizes that the problems of poverty and 
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underdevelopment cannot be solved unless we have a new era of growth in which 
developing countries play a role and reap large benefits. 
The composition of place of growth economics in its global framework raises certain 
inevitable questions. Which were the economic growth models that the developed and 
developing economies followed thus far? What are the determinants on which these 
models were grounded? Before we answer these questions, we shall clarify certain basic 
concepts of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DESCRIPTION OF BASIC CONCEPTS 
Only in designing a world economic order to follow the Second World War and in 
considering the situation of countries which would be making their own economic policies 
for the first time, did expressions like the under-developed countries and the Third World 
come into use. Once the subject was identified, there arose a separate field of economics 
known as 'development economics'. The ideas of the first development economists were 
tremendously influential and are crucial to understanding actual policies adopted by LDCs 
in the 1950s, many of which remain in place today. 'Their main concern was to understand 
the economies of the less-developed countries and to stimulate the process of economic 
development by which these countries could be transformed from LDCs into 'developed' 
countries. Semantics aside, there remains a real definitional problem of the various 
concepts, which we shall try to assimilate. 
I. 2. i. Economic Growth and Development 
rl- 
F-A; onomics is about 'What? How? and For Whom? ' Development economics is 
especially about for whom. What is the relationship between growth and development? 
Economic growth takes place when there is either an increase in the national income of a 
country, or in the country's productive capacity, (this productive capacity being a 
country's ability to generate national income). Economists have a theoretical tool known 
as a production possibility curve (PPQ which can be used to analyse these concepts of 
2 growth. (See Appendix 1.2.1). 
A country which chooses a higher level of investment in the short run can expect, if the 
new capital is effective and productive, to experience a more rapid shift of the PPC than a 
country which prefers immediate consumption. This leads us to one definition of economic 
growth, which is sometimes described as the process of increasing the productive capacity 
of a country. This type of growth would be shown by a rightward shift of the PPC, and is 
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sometimes called potential groWth. 3 Potential growth is the rate at which a country's 
economy could grow, if all its resources (workers, machines, factories, etc. ) were fully 
employed. Potential economic growth can be increased by such methods as increasing or 
discovering new resources: by increasing population, or by mining for newly discovered 
minerals, for instance. It can also be increased by improving the productivity of existing 
resources: by training workers, inventing new technology, improving organization, or 
adopting better production methods. 
Figure: 1.2.1: A Production Possibility Curve 
A Production Possibility Curve 
Good Y 
M 
Potential growth can be distinguished from actual growth. This is the annual rate of 
change of national output; that is, the growth of goods and services actually produced. 
This depends on the degree of utilisation of productive capacity. Statistics referring to 
growth rates refer to actual growth; when statistics are produced showing a recession or 
unemployment, then these indicate a gap between actual and potential growth. If growth 
in the short run is to be sustained in the long run, then both actual and potential growth 
are necessary. Actual growth tends to fluctuate in a cyclical fashion. Market economies go 
through periodic phases of 'boom' and 'recession', often referred to as the 'trade cycle'. 
Keynesian economists stress the importance of short-run influences on aggregate demand 
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and suggests ways in which governments can attempt to achieve steady actual growth 
while also attempting to achieve other macro-economic objectives such as full 
employment, stable prices and equilibrium in the balance of payments. These are known as 
'demand management' policies. The growth of potential output tends to be less cyclical 
and more stable, and it is this type of growth which is specially relevant to development 
economics. Attempts to achieve potential growth focus less on demand management and 
more on the 'supply side' of the economy. 4 
After distinguishing between actual and potential growth, we shall define 'development': 
is it the same thing as growth? The word 'development' signifies changes which are 
permanent. It is true that actual growth can sometimes lead to a 'ratchet' effect, where a 
country continues to achieve a progressively higher level of welfare. However, it is quite 
possible for actual growth to be short-lived: during a war, for example, a country might 
achieve remarkably high growth rates; but its physical output would be turned to dust 
immediately as bombs and missiles are exploded, and at the end of this growth period the 
country as a whole could well be worse off than before. 
'Development' signifies that growth in one sector has substantial effects on other sectors 
as well. As far as Potential growth is concerned, however, a country's productive capacity 
might be expanded by growth in just a single sector - for example, an oil-producing 
country which expands its oil-related industries and discovers new reserves will experience 
potential growth. Growth, whether actual or potential, is a concept which centres on 
'quantity', whereas development also considers 'quality 9.5 Growth takes place when there 
is an increase in the per capita income or output of a country; development occurs when 
the costs of growth are minimised, and when the benefits of growth are distributed among 
the whole population. Development cannot be said to have taken place unless there have 
been improvements in the quality of life; improvements such as better living conditions, 
health care., improved diets, increased literacy and lower infant mortality rates. Cultural, 
recreational, and social amenities are also widely regarded as essential components of the 
quality of life. 
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Many development economists today agree that in the past too much attention has been 
paid to economic growth, and not enough attention has been paid to the reasons for 
encouraging development: reducing poverty, increasing life expectancy, improving health, 
allowing people the freedom to take part in decision-making, feeding the people. The 
Indian economist, Amartya Sen, for example, has argued that starvation arises out of a 
lack of income with which to buy food, rather than a lack of availability of food, and that 
raising the incomes of the poor is the most efficient way of reducing undernourishment. 
Sen refers to development as the 'expansion of people's capabilities', 6 and has encouraged 
economists to broaden their view of development, to include value judgements about what 
ought to be (i. e. normative economics as well as positive economics) and to argue that 
development policies should be 'capabilities-orientated' as well as 'goods-orientated'. We 
will consider two views of development; they are not incompatible with each other, but 
one is broader than the other, and we shall refer to them as economic development and 
human development. 
Economic development can be regarded as a process of growth and change aimed at 
raising people's living standards. It involves growth in total and in per capita income; and 
is accompanied by fundamental changes in the structure of an economy. This corresponds 
closely to the view of development adopted by the World Bank, which charts development 
progress each year in the annual World Development Report, which puts nations in order 
of rank according to their economic success. The order is based on GNP per head, and its 
rate of change. Within this ranking it is possible to place a fairly arbitrary dividing line 
between countries which can be regarded as more developed countries (MDCs) and those 
which are less developed countries (LDCs); and economists following the World Bank 
view would generally accept that this line occurs at a level of about $5000 of GNP per 
capita. But, not only there remains disputes over where exactly to draw the line between 
rich and poor nations, but also there is widespread scepticism over whether average 
7 income adequately captures the level of economic development. (Ref. Appendix 1.2.2) 
Yet, the commonest, the most convenient, measuring rod of economic development is per 
capita income. 
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1.2. ii. Three Percgpfions of Economic Development 
Three types of approaches to this conflict between observed per capita income levels 
and perceptions of economic development can be identified with the writings of Seers., 8 
Kuznets9 and Lewislo. For Seers, development 'means creating the conditions for the 
realization of human personality' (1972), which has three interrelated criteria: reducing 
poverty, reducing unemployment and reducing inequality. Fhgh income levels indicate 
potential for development, but if it is not shared by all then development has not occurred 
- the Kuwait and South Africa inconsistencies could be explained by this reservation. A 
related approach is to define economic development in ten-ns of the satisfaction of 
universal basic needs for food, shelter, health care, education and so forth just to start a 
list suggests the huge measurement problem. 
For Kuznets, LDCs are countries which have not experienced modem economic growth 
(MEG), which he defined in terms of observed regularities in the economic history of 
more-developed countries. One component of MEG is accelerated growth in per capita 
income, but there are also structural transformations, such as the shift or production from 
agriculture to other activities and changes in the scale and technology of production. Thus, 
oil or other resource-dominated economies may be rich but are not necessarily 
economically developed. These contributions are important because income distribution 
and structural change are both part of the common understanding of economic 
development. 
Lewis has provided the most cogent positive defence of the use of per capita gross 
national product. He recognizes the limitations of any single policy objective, but the case 
for putting increased output as the prime goal is that 'it gives man greater control over his 
environment and thereby increases his freedom' (Lewis, 1955, p. 421). Lewis emphasizes 
the social and environmental costs incurred if growth is too fast for society to cope with 
or if it is accompanied by greater inequality. 
In spite of the fact that every country's national accounts statistics contain weaknesses 
and biases, GNP data represent the best available (approximate) measures of the level of 
economic activity and, using the GNP-=GNI identity, of per capita income levels. 
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Generally, the data quality has been improving significantly over the last five decades, and 
using United Nations or World Bank sources gives the added advantage that the best 
available figures have been selected for each country and any obvious adjustments to 
ensure better international comparability have been made. 
In 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched a new Human 
Development Index (HDI) which is published each year in the Human Development 
Report (HDR) with information about each of 160 countries. The Human Development 
Index represents a new attempt to assimilate into a single measure Seer's contention that 
there is more to development than GNP alone. It is based on the three measures in 
columns 3-5 of (Appendix 1.2.2) but the specific weights used, by giving little weight to 
purchasing-power-parity adjusted gross domestic product per capita above a poverty cut- 
off (around $5,000), produce some counter-intuitive results. 
The UNDP defines human development as a 'process of enlarging people's choices. 
Three choices are deemed to be critical: access to resources (purchasing power, which is 
calculated from GNP per capita and a calculation of the cost of living); a long and healthy 
life (as reflected by figures for life expectancy); and education (measured by the adult 
literacy rate). Figures are available for each of these, and they are combined to give a 
number which varies between 0 and 1: the closer to 1, the higher the level of human 
development. " The UNDP intends to refine the way in which it calculates HDI in the 
years ahead. (Ref. Appendix 1.2.2). An ambitious aim is that of finding ways to quantify 
other social achievements which the UNDP sees as important for the quality of life: such 
things as political freedom and human rights. 
I. 2. iii. The Concgpt of Sustainable Developmen 
The old understanding of achieving economic welfare through the process of growth 
and development has taken us to a new challenge of opting for sustainable development. 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
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compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within 
it two key concepts: 
* the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and 
9 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on 
the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. 
Thus the goals of economic and social development must be defined in terms of 
sustainability in all countries - developed or developing, market-oriented or centrally 
planned. Development involves a progressive transformation of economy and society. A 
development path that is sustainable in a physical sense could theoretically be pursued 
even in a rigid social and political setting. But physical sustainability cannot be secured 
unless development policies pay attention to such considerations as changes in access to 
resources and in the distribution of costs and benefits. Even the narrow notion of physical 
sustainability implies a concern for social equity between generations, a concern that must 
logically be extended to equity within each generation. In a long term perspective, this is 
the essence of the concept of sustainable development. The satisfaction of human needs 
and aspirations is the major objective of development. The essential needs of vast numbers 
of people in developing countries - for food, clothing, shelter, jobs - are not being met, 
and beyond their basic needs these people have legitimate aspirations for an improved 
quality of life. A world in which poverty and inequality are endemic will always be prone 
to ecological and other crises. Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs 
of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life. 
Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are sustainable only if consumption 
standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability. Yet many of us live beyond 
the world's ecological means, for instance in our patterns of energy use. Perceived needs 
are socially and culturally determined, and sustainable development requires the promotion 
of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of the 
ecological possible and to which all can reasonably aspire. 12 
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Meeting essential needs depends in part on achieving full growth potential, and 
sustainable development clearly requires economic growth in places where such needs are 
not being met. Hence sustainable development requires that societies meet human needs 
both by increasing productive potential and by ensuring equitable opportunities for all. 
"We now know that what unites us is vastly more important than what divides us. We 
recognize that poverty, environmental degradation and population growth are 
inextricah? y related and that none of these fundamental problems can he successfulýy 
addressed in isolation. We will succeed orfail together. Arriving at a commonýy accepted 
definition of 'sustainable development' remains a challenge for all the actors in the 
development process. "13 In essence, sustainable development is a process of change in 
which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of 
technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both 
current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations. How are individuals in 
the real world to be persuaded or made to act in the common interest? The answer hes 
partly in education, institutional development, and law enforcement. 14 
1.2. iv. Reviving Growth as a StratgWc Imperative 
The above analysis points to the fact that the world must quickly design strategies that 
will allow nations to move from their present, often destructive, processes of growth and 
development onto sustainable development paths. This will require policy changes in all 
countries, with respect both to their own development and to their impacts on other 
nation's development possibilities. As indicated earlier, development that is sustainable has 
to address the problem of the large number of people who live in absolute poverty - that 
is, who are unable to satisfy even the most basic of their needs. Poverty reduces people's 
capacity to use resources in a sustainable manner, it intensifies pressure on the 
environment. Most such absolute poverty is in developing countries; in many, it has been 
aggravated by the economic stagnation of the 1980s. A necessary but a sufficient 
condition for the elimination of absolute poverty is a relatively rapid rise in per capita 
incomes in the Third World. It is therefore essential that the stagnant or declining growth 
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trends of this decade be reversed. While attainable growth rates will vary, a certain 
minimum is needed to have any impact on absolute poverty. It seems unlikely that, taking 
developing countries as a whole, these objectives can be accomplished with per capita 
income growth of under 3 per cent. 
The poverty line is that level of income below which an individual or household cannot 
afford on a regular basis the necessities of life. The percentage of the population below 
that line will depend on per capita national income and the manner in which it is 
distributed How quickýy can a developing country expect to eliminate absolute poverty? 
The answer will vary from country to country, but much can be learned from a typical 
case. 
Consider a nation in which hatf the population lives below the poverty line and where the 
distribution of household incomes is asfollows: The top one-ji-fth of households have 50 
per cent of total income, the nextfifth have 20 per cent, the nextji'fth have 14per cent, 
the next Jifth have 9 per cent, and the bottom ji'fth have just 7 per cent This is a fair 
representation of the situation in many low-income developing countries. 
In this case, if the income distribution remains unchanged, per capita national income 
would have to double before the poverty ratio dropsfrom 50 to 10per cent. If income is 
redistributed in fa vour of the poor, this reduction can occur sooner. Consider the case in 
which 25 per cent of the incremental income of the richest one-fifth of the population is 
redistributed equalýy to the others. 
The assumptions here about redistribution reflect three judgements. First, in most 
situations redistributive policies can on? Y operate on increases in income. Second, in low- 
income developing countries the surplus that can be skimmed off for redistribution is 
available onýy from the wealthier groups. Third, redistributive policies cannot be so 
preciseýy targeted that they deliver benefits only to those who are below the poverty line, 
so some of the bene/lis will accrue to those who arejust a little above it. 
The number of years required to bring the poverty ratio down fi-om 50 to 10 per cent 
rangesfrom: 
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18-24years ifper capita income grows at 3per cent, 
26-36years ýf it grows at 2 per cent, and 
51 -70years if it grows only at I per cent. 
In each case, the shorter time is associated with the redistribution of 25 per cent of the 
incremental income of the richest fifth of the population and the longer period with no 
redistribution. 
So with per capita national income growing onýy at I per cent a year, the time required 
to eliminate absolute poverty would stretch well into the next century. If, however, the 
aim is to ensure that the world is well on its way towards sustainable development by the 
beginning of the next century, it is necessary to aim at a minimum of 3 per cent per 
capita national income growth and to pursue vigorous redistributive policies. '5 
Given current population growth rates, this would require overall national income 
growth of around 5 per cent a year in the developing economies of Asia, 5.5 per cent in 
Latin America, and 6 per cent in Africa and West Asia. Are these orders of magnitude 
attainable? The record in South and East Asia over the past quarter-century and especially 
over the last few years suggests that 5 per cent annual growth can be attained in most 
countries, including the two largest, India and China. In Latin America, average growth 
rates on the order of 5 per cent were achieved during the 1960s and 1970s, but fell well 
below that during the 1980s, mainly because of the debt crisis. 16 A revival of Latin 
American growth depends on the resolution of this crisis. In Africa, growth rates during 
the 1960s and 1970s were around 4-4.5 per cent, which at current rates of population 
growth would mean per capita income growth of only a little over 1 per cent. 17 Moreover, 
during the 1980s, growth nearly halted and in two-thirds of the countries per capita 
income declined. 18 Attaining a minimum level of growth in Africa requires the correction 
of short-term imbalances, and also the removal of deep-rooted constraints on the growth 
process. 
Growth must be revived in developing countries because that is where the links between 
economic growth, the alleviation of poverty, and environmental conditions operate most 
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directly. Yet developing countries are part of an interdependent world economy; their 
prospects also depend on the levels and patterns of growth in industrialized nations. The 
medium term prospects for industrial countries are for growth of 3-4 per cent, the 
minimum that international financial institutions consider necessary if these countries are 
going to play a part in expanding the world economy. Sustainable development requires a 
change in the content of growth, to make it less material-and energy-intensive and more 
equitable in its impact. These changes are required in all countries as part of a package of 
measures to maintain the stock of ecological capital, to improve the distribution of 
income, and to reduce the degree of vulnerability to economic crises. "People have 
acquired, often for the first time in history, both an idea of their relative poveny and a 
desire to emerge from it and improve the quality of their lives. As people advance 
materialbý, and eat and live better, what were once luxuries tend to be regarded as 
necessities. The net result is that the demand for food, raw materials, and power 
increases to an even greater degree than the population. As demand increases, a greater 
and greater strain is Put on the finite area of the world's land to produce the products 
needed. "19 All the nations of the world need to take responsibility for redesigning the 
growth strategies. The growth strategies followed by the market-oriented economies, both 
developed and developing, resulted in certain growth and development. Our definitions of 
the relevant terminologies of this section allow us to proceed to analyse the determinants 
of those growth models which have brought about uneven results on a global scale. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DETERMINANTS OR ENGINES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
THEIR MOTIVATING FORCES 
Each of the following chapters in this section is designed within a particular framework 
to determine the engines of economic growth. Macroeconomics theories of economic 
growth explain the determinants of the wealth of nations and try to analyse why the 
fortunes of nations change over time. Classical economists, such as Smith, Malthus, and 
Ricardo, treated the problem of development as part of a general inquiry into the causes 
and consequences of economic growth. They sought to explain the basic forces that could 
account for an economy's dynamic as well as static performance and thus explain the 
observed pattern of wealth accumulation and productivity growth across nations. The neo- 
classical theory of economic growth has been mostly concerned with capital accumulation. 
Recent research has shown that increases in the stock of labour and capital could explain 
only a relatively small fraction of observed economic growth in industrial countries. This 
finding stimulated much research into the factors determining the unexplained sources of 
growth. It produced the conventional wisdom that technological progress and human 
capital are the main factors which account for the historic gains in the productivity of 
labour and physical capital. Neo-classical growth theory allowed for technological change, 
but did not make it an endogenous outcome of profit-maximizing behaviour of agents who 
invest in knowledge creation. Extensions of the neo-classical growth theory made 
technological progress endogenous. The New Growth Theory builds on and changes these 
existing theories, giving new orientations in areas of research and revealing wider horizons 
of the growth economics. The major objective of this section is to discuss the determinants 
or engines of growth and their motivating forces. Therefore, the following chapters focus 
on one important class of mechanisms that sustain long-run growth, a small number of 
models that employ them, and a limited number of issues that demonstrate the usefulness 
of viewing economic growth in this particular way. 
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1.3. i Stages of Growth 
The birth of new nations, as an aftermath of a global war, was heralded with joy. But the 
joy did not long last because the new born could not make it to an infancy stage due to the 
economic malnutrition into which it was born. The new realization of a divided world of 
South and North or of developing and developed or of poor and rich had a shattering 
economic effect. Effective ways of integrating the world economy has become the concern 
of economists. Interest in growth revived as a result of an immense practical concern with 
development after the Second World War. The war-damaged economies were trying hard 
to reconstruct fast, the underdeveloped countries were attempting to initiate economic 
development, the advanced capitalist countries being relatively free from periodic slumps 
were trying to concentrate on raising the long-run rate of growth, and the socialist 
countries were determined to overtake the richer capitalist economies by fast economic 
expansion! The central idea that evolved at this juncture of discussion about post-war 
development policies was to stimulate transfers of capital goods from rich to poor 
countries. The basic model that has shed some light into this way of thinking is that of 
Harrod and Domar. 
The economic historian, Walt Rostow [19601 suggests that all of the more developed 
countries have passed through the following five stages of economic growth. In 
traditional society land is the basis of wealth, most of the population works in agriculture, 
investment is low. In the preconditions period increased agricultural productivity permits 
some economic diversification, and social and political changes occur. The take off is a 20- 
30 year period of accelerated growth characterized by an increase in BY from 5% to 10% 
and the development of one or more leading sectors. In the drive to maturity, the new 
political and social framework and the higher BY make growth self-sustaining and new 
sectors emerge to complement the leading sector. This culminates in the age of mass 
consumption when a diversified economy supports ever increasing per capita income. 2 
Rostow's concept of unidirectional economic growth proceeding in stages had a 
widespread appeal, but also encountered criticism. Lewis [1954,1958], Rostow [1960] 
and Fei and Ranis [19641 had pinpointed the raising of the savings ratio as the key to 
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understanding the process of development and the 'take-off ' into sustained growth. 
Development economists needed a more dynamic approach, which would also take into 
account the longer-term effects of increases in investment, which add to the capital stock 
and hence accelerate economic growth. This was provided by the Harrod-Domar growth 
model. 3 In response to the basic question of what determines the rate of growth of an 
economy's output, Harrod and Domar came up with a clear two-part answer: the savings 
rate and the incremental capital/output ratio . Harrod-Domar growth theory sanctioned the 
overriding importance of capital accumulation in the quest for enhanced growth. 
UAL 
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN EMPHASIS ON PHYSICAL 
CAPITAL AND HUMAN LABOUR 
Growth Formula One: G, = f(PK,, HLd 
Harrod-Domar Model 
While analysing growth economics, Harrod raised the following issues. First, the 
possibility of steady growth in a model of a fixed capital-output ratio C and a fixed 
savings-output ratio s is noted. A unit of capital will produce unit of output, which in its 
turn will generate s1C units of net savings (i. e. addition to capital stock), so that the rate of 
growth of the capital stock will equal s1C Since output is proportional to capital, that will 
be the rate of growth of output as well. This highly simple version of the so-called 
'Harrod-Domar model' has provided the theoretical underpinning of an enormous volume 
of literature including some practical growth plans of developed and under-developed 
countries. Harrod's second point is concerned with showing the instability of this path of 
steady growth. In the simple Harrod-Domar model, it is assumed that investment is 
determined entirely by planned savings and there is no independent investment function 
based on the expectations of the future. Expectations of additional effective demand 
determines the level of investment in the Harrod model and that investment, through the 
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, multiplier', generates a certain level of effective demand in a Keynesian manner. 4 Harrod's 
questions in this field are the following: 
a) when will the investor's expectations be realized? and 
b) what will happen if they are not realized? 
Given the capital-output ratio C which is treated as an 'accelerator', investment It in 
period t will equal C times the expected additional flow of output. The latter equals the 
difference between the expected demand for output Xt and the actual output in the last 
period YI. And through the multiplier process the actual demand in year t will equal the 






Yt = (I /S) it 
It is easy to check from 1 and 2 that the ratio of actual demand to expected demand in 
penod t wiH be given by the following: i 
Yt1xt = CIS (Xt -Yt-l Ixt) (3) 
The expression within the brackets in the right-hand side is really the expected rate of 
growth, which we may denote as gt^ (cap) , as a proportion of X, So that we can also 
write this as: YWX, = (Cls) g, ^ 
From 4 it is obvious that expectations will be realized, LeX, will equal Y, if and onýy if the 
expected growth rate g, ^ equals the s1C This rate of growth s1C, which is realized if 
expected Harrod called the 'warranted' rate of growth. What if the expectation is for some 
rate of growth other than sIC? Defining the actual rate of growth g, as (Yt-Yt-, )IYt, 
analogously to gt^, a little manipulation yields the following functional relationship 
between actual growth and expected growth. 
gt =I -(I -g, ^)Slc 
It is clear that gt gt^ according as gt^ -> s1C 




I. 3. iii Harrod's Instabifily Problem 
Harrod's instability problem can be explained as follows. If the investors anticipate more 
than the warranted rate of growth s1C then the actual growth rate of demand will exceed 
even the high expected growth rate, so that instead of feeling that they expected too much 
they are likely to feel that they expected too little. Similarly, if they anticipate a growth 
rate lower than the warranted growth rate, then the actual growth rate will fall short of 
even the expected growth rate and the investors may decide that they expected too much 
rather than too little. The market thus seems to give a perverse signal to the investor, and 
this is the source of Harrod's problem. 5 
From the growth equation 5, a model of instability can be generated by making the 
assumption that the expectation of growth in this period be raised or lowered from last 
period's expectation depending on whether growth in the last period was respectively 
over-fulfilled or under-fulfilled. 
gt^ = gt_l A+ X (9t-l - gt-, ^), with X>0 (7) 
The combination of 5 and 7 is a highly unstable system. If actual demand Yt falls short 
of expected demand Xt, there may not be much problem, since capacity may be under- 
used, but should Y, exceed the expected demand for which just enough capacity was 
created, how would this actual demand be met? One idea is to assume that this is done by 
dehoarding some existing inventory, but that raises the question as to what happens when 
the existing stock is exhausted as it surely will if Harrod's cumulative divergence from the 
warranted growth path continues indefinitely. The model will then need supplementation 
in some way. An alternative is to assume that any excess of Y, over Xt is met by an 
unforeseen rise in the price level. Then the expected sales will always be eventually 
realized except that the price level will be different from the one anticipated unless the 
growth expectation was warranted. Then Harrod's model will be one of a knife-edge 
balance between cumulative inflation and cumulative deflation., and the adjustment 
equation will have to be interpreted as raising or lowering growth expectations in response 
to prices being, respectively, larger or smaller than anticipated. 
40 
1.3. iv. Harrod's Knife-edge Problem 
The problem of a 'knife-edge' balance between 'warranted' and 'natural' rates of 
growth that was introduced by Harrod and Domar, has attracted a number of comments in 
the recent years. Harrods's 'warranted' rate was given by: 
Gw = s1C, where s stood for the saving propensity and C the relevant capital-output ratio. 
The 'natural' rate of growth (Gd was given by population growth and the progress of 
technological knowledge. What if the two rates do not coincide? Briefly, the adjustment 
mechanism suggests that if G,,, > G, an economy will experience diminishing returns to 
capital, a relative rise in the wage rate and a relative fall in the profit rate, which will make 
the most profitable technique a more capital-intensive one. This rise in C will reduce G, 
and this process will continue until G-,, = G, A similar argument holds in the case where 
G,,, is less than G,, to start with. 'At any other point [other than one where the warranted 
and natural rates of growth are equal] the wage rate and the profit rate are moving in such 
a way as to induce entrepreneurs to adjust the capital-output ratio in the direction which 
will bring the warranted and natural rates of growth together. '7 
I. 3. v. Accumulation and the Labour Force 
The story told so far has been totally concerned with capital accumulation. But there are 
other factors of production as well, in particular labour. Labour is recognized to be an 
integral requirement of production. Either one can use a full-fledged multifactor 
production relation with specific substitutability assumptions, or else one can discuss the 
process as one given by the accumulation of capital subject to a constraint related to the 
supply of labour. While most of the modem works on growth have favoured the former 
approach, Harrod's analysis was expressed in terms of the latter. Growth proceeds pari 
passu with capital accumulation with a given capital-output ratio as long as the labour 
requirement at the current level of productivity does not exceed the size of the potential 
labour force. This imposes a long run ceiling on the rate of growth which could be 
exceeded for a while, but sooner or later the economy would run into the full employment 
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barrier. Harrod's 'natural' rate of growth is the maximum sustainable rate of growth in the 
long run given by the rate of growth of the labour force n and the rate of labour-saving 
technical progress M8 IThe labour-saving technical progress as visualized by Harrod 
(sometimes referred to in the literature as 'Harrod-neutral technical progress') is much like 
an expansion of the labour force. When Y is output, K capital and L the labour force, the 
production relation takes the form of Y= f(KA WL), where AW is an increasing function 
of time. For Harrod-neutral technical progress to be steady, AW must take the form B, 
where B and m are constants and e is the base of natural logarithm. ) 
Here, we encounter another problem. If the warranted rate of growth given by s1C and 
the natural rate of growth given by n+m equal each other, people live happily ever after; 
but what if rates don't? If the economy is having steady growth at the warranted rate and 
if that rate exceeds the natural rate, the full-employment barrier will be encountered once 
the initial slack is absorbed and the economy would no longer be able to grow at the 
warranted rate, and this may trigger off a cumulative departure of the kind that we 
discussed earlier. On the other hand, if the warranted growth rate falls short of the natural 
rate, then a growing proportion of unemployment will emerge. Is the world really like this 
or is there something missing in this picture? Are there any adjustment mechanisms that 
can bring the 'natural' rate closer to the 'warranted' so that the economy can grow at full 
employment (or at a constant proportion of unemployment)? The required condition 
being s1C = n+m, any of the four variables can individually or jointly serve the cause of 
adjustment. Many of the later models concentrated on this issue and developed the 
adjustment mechanisms. An increase in the growth rate can be achieved either by saving 
(and investing) a higher proportion of GNP or by using the additions to the capital stock 
more efficiently. 
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1.3. vi. Critique of the Model 
The Harrod-Domar growth model, although underlying much thinking on economic 
development during the 1950s, had some shortcomings. 'o If capital and labour have to be 
combined in technologically given fixed proportions, then the equilibrium growth rate 
AY1Y = s1C is a 'knife-edge' solution; if the labour force grows faster than the capital 
stock, then there will be more and more unemployed workers, and if the capital stock 
grows faster than the labour force, there will be labour shortages and cost-push inflation. 
Also, there is no place in the model for technical change. The Harrod-Domar model did 
not fit the actual data in the 1950's when LDCs' growth rates were more rapid than those 
implied by their savings rates and incremental capital-output ratios. 'Me difficulty with 
this-classical model of growth is the absence of an investment function and the consequent 
failure to assign a major role to entrepreneurial expectations about the future. Harrod was 
concerned with the instability problem in equilibrium growth precisely in this context. 
The emphasis on the role of capital in determining the rate of economic growth 
dominated the thinking on economic development in the late 1940s and 195 Os. The 
differences that this neo-classical approach makes to how one views economic growth 
were spelt out by Robert Solow in a simple macroeconomics growth model , which 
contrasts sharply with the Harrod-Domar model in its conclusions and in its policy 
implications, to which we shall proceed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN EMPHASIS ON 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
GROWTH FORMULA 7WO: G2= f(PK2,. HL2, TP2) 
I. 4. i. The Solow Growth Model 
In the previous chapter, we noted that the neo-classical theory of economic growth has 
been mostly concerned with capital accumulation. Here, we shall discuss how technology 
has become a crucial determinant in the economic growth model. The introduction of the 
neo-classical growth model, especially in the contributions of Solow [19561 and Swan 
[19561 provided the necessary antidote to the excessive claims made for capital 
accumulation. What the early Harrod-Domar and neo-classical formulations of growth 
theory possessed in common was the belief that the third ingredient in growth, namely 
technical progress, was an exogenously determined, fortuitous and costless occurrence- 
descending like manna from the heavens. The findings of Robert Solow [19571 showed 
that increases in the stock of labour and capital could explain only a relatively small 
fraction of observed economic growth. ' This finding led to further research into factors 
determining the unexplained sources of growth and resulted in basing on technological 
progress as the new pillar that spurs economic growth. Solow devised a framework for 
distinguishing the contributions of labour, capital and technical change to economic 
growth. The Solow growth formula focused attention firmly upon the role of technical 
progress. Advocates of technical progress pointed to the possible role of education and 
training where government policy might be expected to exert a major impact. 
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1.4. ii. Mathematical Exposition 
We shall begin with a simple mathematical exposition of Solow's model .2 If Q represents 
output and K and L represent capital and labour inputs in 'physical' units, then the 
aggregate production function can be written as: 
F(KL; t) (1) 
The variable t for time appears in F to allow for technical change. Solow uses 'technical 
change' as an expression for any kind of shýft in the production function. 'Mus 
slowdowns, speed-ups, improvements in the education of the labour force, and all sorts of 
things will appear as technical change It is convenient to begin with the special case of 
neutral technical change. Shifts in the production function are defined as neutral if they 
leave marginal rates of substitution untouched but simply increase or decrease the output 
attainable from given inputs. In that case the production function takeý the special form: 
A(t)f (K, L) (1 a) 
and the multiplicative factor AW measures th6 cumulated effect of shifts over time. 
Differentiate (1a) totally with respect to time and divide by Q and one obtains: Q*/Q = 
A*/A +A (afK*/aKQ) +A (aff */aLQ) where dots indicate time derivatives. Now define wk = 
(aQ/aK)(IC/Q) and wL. = (aQ/aL)(L/Q), the relative shares of capital and labour, and 
substitute in the above equation (note that (aQ/aK)= A(aflaK), etc. ) and there results: 
QO/Q = AO/A + wk (KO/K)+ wL (LO/L) (2) 
If all factor inputs are classified either as K or L, then the available figures always show 
wk and wL adding up to one. Assume that F is homogenous of degree one. This has the 
advantage of making everything come out neatly in terms of intensive magnitudes. 
Ut WL = q, K/L = k, wL = 1- wk; 
note that (q*/q) = (Q*/Q) - (UAL) etc., and (2) becomes: 
(q*/q) = (A*/A) + wK (K/K*) (2a) 
We need to disentangle the technical change index A(t) as series for output per man hour, 
capital per man hour and the share of capital. It can be shown, by integrating a partial 
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differential equation, that if (F*/F) is independent of K and L (actually under constant 
returns to scale only (K/L) matters), then (1) has the special form (1a) and shifts in the 
production function are neutral. If in addition (F/F) is constant in time, say equal to a, 
then A(t) = e" or in discrete approximation A(t) = (1+a)' 
The case of neutral shifts and constant returns to scale can be graphically presented. 3 
rMe production function is completely represented by a graph of q against k. In the figure 
below, we note that every ordinate on the curve for t=1 has been multiplied by the same 
factor to give a neutral upward shift of the production function for period 2. rMe problem 
is to estimate this shift from knowledge of points P, and P2 Obviously it would be 
misleading to fit a curve through raw observed points like P, and P2 and others. But if the 
shift factor for each point of time can be estimated., the observed points can be corrected 
for technical change, and a production function can then be found. 




The natural thing to do, for small changes, is to approximate the period 2 curve by its 
tangent at P2 (or the period I curve by its tangent at PA. This yields an approximately 
corrected point P12 and an estimate for AA/A namely Pj2PIql. But kIP12 = q2-(aqlak)Ak 
and hence 
P12P, = q2. - ql-(aqlak)Ak = Aq-(aqlak)Ak, and 
AA/A -= P12PI1qj. = Aqlq - (aqlok) (klq)Aklk = Aqlq-wkAklk 
4 
which is exactly the content of (2a) . 
If output growth is constrained to be at the same rate as labour force growth, can per 
capita output ever be increased in the long run? The way out of this dilemma is to change 
the production function. As long as the functional relationship between inputs and output 
remains unchanged, then the economy is in a steady state with zero growth in per capita 
income, but if the relationship changes so that more output results from the same quantity 
of inputs, then the growth rate of output will exceed n, the labour force. Defining technical 
change as such a shift in the production function, then the rate of growth of per capita 
output will be determined by the pace of technical change. In this formulation, technical 
change is totally responsible for long run growth in per capita output. Capital formation 
plays no role. 5 Salter [19601 modified this extreme conclusion by allowing that technical 
change may need to be embodied in new machines; the gross investment rate determines 
the speed with which the capital stock is modernized, and capital formation can thus be 
associated with a shift in the production function as well as a movement along it. The 
embodiment hypothesis reinstates capital formation as a source of long-run growth, but in 
a less dominant manner. 
I. 4. iii. Exogenous Technical Pr2gress 
Leaving aside the case of overlapping generations, recall the role that technical progress 
can play in the neo-classical theory. With labour augmenting technical progress the 
production function takes the form: 
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y= F(K<AL), where A represents the state of technology. Technical progress raises A and 
thereby the marginal product of capital. Higher marginal productivity of capital leads to a 
higher real interest rate. In steady state the rate of capital accumulation equals the rate of 
technical progress and the real interest rate remains constant. This describes the case of 
exogenous technical progress that leads to exogenous long-run growth. 6 
The economic growth model associated with Solow, Swan and Denison [19611 has its 
basic features, a closed economy with competitive markets, identical rational individuals, 
and a production technology exhibiting diminishing returns to capital and labour separately 
and constant returns to both inputs jointly. Population and labour growth are exogenous 
to the model, as is disembodied technological change, and no distinct productive role is 
assigned to human capital or to government policy. Under these assumptions, the model 
give rise to a "balanced" growth path in which capital per capita is accumulated at the 
same rate as output or consumption per capita, and in which the savings rate and the real 
rate of interest are constant along the equilibrium path. In this regime, the rate of growth 
of per capita income and consumption is strictly proportional to the rate of technological 
change. Put differently, technology, although exogenously given, is the only force that 
accounts for growth in per capita income. The determinants of the propensity to save have 
no bearing on the equilibrium growth rate, although they do affect the per capita level of 
income and ConSUMption. 7 The same holds, implicitly, for government policies that affect 
the propensity to save. Indeed, as Lucas (1988) points out, by assigning a predominant 
role to an exqgenousýy determined technology as an engine of growth, the theory assigns a 
comparatively little role to any other factor. Accordingly, one is well justified to expect 
that growth rates across different countries would tend to converge on a common steady- 
state value and that the actually observed rates would differ mainly by virtue of transitory 
differences in capital accumulation relative to its balanced growth path ("transitional 
dynamics 9., ). 8 Furthermore, because of the treatment of population growth as exogenous to 
the economy, the neo-classical model cannot address the interaction between economic 
and population growth in the process of development, although the stylized facts of the 
demographic transition that characterizes that process indicate a systematic association 
between declining mortality and fertility rates and per capita income growth during an 
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economy's takeoff from a state of stagnant, low-level income to a regime of persistent 
growth. 
Again, the most well known basic neo-classical model of adjustment in response to the 
Harrod problem of the divergence between 'natural' and 'warranted' growth is that of 
Solow and Swan (1956). The burden of adjustment falls here on the capital-output ratio, 
and as such this is the polar opposite of the Kaldor model, where the burden falls entirely 
on the savings side of the picture. If the warranted growth rate given by s1C exceeds the 
natural rate given by n+m, the economy tries to break through the fun employment 
barrier, thereby making the labour more expensive vis a vis capital, inducing shifts to 
labour-saving techniques. This raises the capital-output ratio and pulls down the value of 
s1C, until it coincides with n+m This is, of course, the same as Joan Robinson's 'creeping 
platinum age', 'O but instead of being just one possibility, as in Robinson model, this is the 
onýy possibility in the neo-classical model. This result follows from the assumption of 
substitutability, coupled with perfect foresight and the absence of constraints on the real 
wage rate and the interest rate. 
The major contribution of the Solow-Swan growth model is to establish the stability of 
neo-classical growth equilibrium in terms of an extremely simple adjustment mechanism. 
The inevitability of equilibrium growth is demonstrated in this model with the aid of an 
adjustment process that has been used before for neo-classical analysis of non-growth 
problems. 
I-4. iv. Endogenous Technical Progress 
One of the first attempts to render technical progress endogenous in growth models was 
the seminal paper by Kenneth Arrow (1962) incorporating the concept of learning by 
doing and was generalised and extended by Levhari (1966) and Sheshinski (1967). In this 
framework, the level of knowledge is itself a productive factor which depends upon past 
levels of investment. Each firm within the economy is assumed to operate with constant 
returns to scale. A doubling of labour and capital inputs with a given state of knowledge 
(assumed constant by the firm) will double output. However, the very act of increasing the 
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capital stock through investment by the firm raises the level of knowledge elsewhere. The 
economy as a whole, therefore, is operating subject to increasing returns. The concept of 
knowledge being a factor in the production function renders increasing returns inevitable. 
This follows because a doubling of all tangible factor inputs and productive processes 
should double output in an environment with a constant level of knowledge. When 
knowledge is permitted to vary as well in consequence of enlarging the capital input, 
increasing returns follows automatically. Although the Arrow-Levhari-Sheshinski models 
rendered technical progress endogenous and explained economic growth in the context of 
aggregate increasing returns being consistent with competitive equilibrium, the steady 
state solution remains, growth of the economy being equated with the autonomously 
determined rate of growth of the labour force. In other words, within these models 
endogenous technological change is reflected in a level effect (via an upward raising of the 
production function) as opposed to a growth effect-to adopt the terminology of Lucas 
[19881. " King and Robson [19891 invoke a technical progress function which emphasises 
'learning by watching'. The significance of their analysis lies in its conclusion that multiple 
steady state growth path exists, even for economics which have similar initial 
endowments, and that tax policy can influence the ultimate growth path attained by the 
economy. Tax policy can accordingly have real and permanent effects upon the level and 
growth rate of income. 
Following Arrow's analysis of learning-by-doing, however, some growth theorists have 
linked the state of technology to cumulative investment experience. With this view the 
state of technology parameter A becomes a function of the economy's capital stock AW 
12 (Sheshinski [19671). The effect of capital on productivity is assumed to be external to an 
individual investor. For this reason the real interest rate equals the private marginal 
product of capital FKP[KA(K)LI It follows that with this form of endogenous technical 
progress an economy can sustain long-run growth as long as the state of technology is 
sufficiently responsive to capital accumulation. Now that we have identified the 
mechanisms of long-run growth in the neo-classical theory, we may turn to the more 
recent innovation-based theories of economic growth. 
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1.4. v. Innovation-based Models of Growth 
Innovation-based theories of economic growth can be seen as an off-shoot of 
technological progress. 'Mese models of Grossman and Helpman [1991b] show that the 
rate of investment increases with the rate of output growth while the latter increases with 
the rate of innovation. Combined with the results concerning the determinants of the rate 
of innovation, these relationships imply, for example, that countries with low rates of time 
preference innovate faster, experience faster output growth, and have a higher rate of 
investment. Importantly, however, investment is not a primary source of growth in these 
economies. 13 Rather, the primary sources of growth are a variety of factors (such as the 
rate of time preference and the degree of monopoly power) that affect the incentive for 
industrial research, while the rate of investment adjusts so as to keep the rate of expansion 
of conventional capital in line with the growth rate of output. In terms of causality, the 
investment rate and the rate of growth are simultaneously determined by technological 
progress that affects them in essentially the same direction, while the pace of technological 
progress is endogenously determined by more primitive factors. We have seen that in the 
neo-classical model technical progress raises the marginal product of capital, thereby 
raising the profitability of investment in plant and equipment. In the event capital 
deepening, that ceterisparihus depresses the marginal product of capital, can nevertheless 
continue indefinitely. The same applies here, except that now "technical progress is driven 
by profit seeking entrepreneurs. ý 14 In other words, the invention of new brands generates 
the incentive to install more plant and equipment. 
Ihe new wave of research on economic growth was stimulated by Romer [19861 and 
Lucas [19881. Their work relies on Arrow's [1962a] mechanism of learning -by-doing. In 
an important paper, Arrow [1962] formalizes the problem of learning in a somewhat 
different manner, making learning a function of the sum of past gross investments. Under 
these assumptions Arrow shows the possibility of steady growth at a rate that is a multiple 
of the rate of growth of population, the size of the multiplier depending on the precise 
form of the learning parameter. But following Uzawa [19651, Romer and Lucas have 
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redirected its application to the accumulation of knowledge and human capital rather than 
the accumulation of plant and equipment. They have changed the focus towards 
explanations of sustained long-run growth and cross country variations in growth rates. 
Following Arrow they have taken the view that aggregate production exhibits increasing 
returns to scale. But the returns to scale are external to single economic agents and 
internal to a sector or larger parts of the economy. Consequently competition can prevail. 
The integration of imperfect competition with innovation-based growth was first achieved 
by Judd [19851. '5 His main interest was in issues of industrial organization . Romer 
[1990a] combined Judd's approach with learning-by-doing in innovation and thereby 
developed a model that sustains long-run growth at an endogenous rate. 16 This was an 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN EMPHASIS ON HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
GROWTH FORMULA THREE. G3=f(PK3HL3, TP3, HC3) 
1.5. i. Human Capital as Productivity Augmenting Factor 
All the endogenous growth models share with the neo-classical model the view that 
physical capital accumulation, by itself, is insufficient to produce growth since all 
production, including investment in physical capital, is subject to diminishing returns in the 
capital input alone. Consequently, the catalyst of growth is traced to other productivity- 
augmenting factors. The endogenous growth models identify that catalyst as knowledge in 
either its embodied form (human capital) or its disembodied manifestations (technological 
innovations). Even when innovations are identified as the engine of growth, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, innovative activity is assumed to be influenced directly by the 
economy's endowment of human capital. The shift of emphasis from exogenous technical 
innovation to human capital accumulation as the key source of growth and development 
[cf. Schultz 19611 is one of the major themes of the new economic development 
literature. 1 
The models of endogenous growth generally rely on either a privately controlled engine 
of growth or a combination of such factors and some external economies in production. 
For Becker et al., King and Rebelo, and, implicitly, Rosenzweig as well, the engine of 
growth is human capital. Its distinct role is justified generally by the assumption that 
knowledge is valuable not just in the production of goods, but even more so in the 
production of new knowledge [cf. Lucas 19881. Becker et al. specify the latter as a linear 
function of the human capital accumulated by previous generations, which augments the 
productivity of parental time inputs devoted to children's education. King and Rebelo 
56 
postulate a similar mechanism for the production of human capital, except that both 
human and physical capital participate in its production. 
The shift of emphasis from accumulation of physical capital to investment in human 
capital has brought in a new revolutionary understanding of the engine of economic 
growth. Although it is obvious that people acquire useful skills and knowledge, it is not 
obvious that these skills and knowledge are a form of capital. Recent research has shown 
that increase in human capital is in substantial part a product of deliberate investment. It 
has grown in industrialized societies at a much faster rate than conventional (nonhuman) 
capital and this has become a distinctive feature and a ma or explanation of the fact of 
faster economic development. Investment in human capital can be understood as direct 
expenditures on education, health, and internal migration to take advantage of better job 
opportunities; earnings foregone by mature students attending school and by workers 
acquiring on-the-job training; the use of leisure time to improve skills and knowledge. 2 In 
this sense, much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital. By 
this, the quality of human effort can be greatly improved and its productivity enhanced. 
I. 5. ii. Human Beings as Capital Goods? 
According to J. S. Mill, the people of a country should not be looked upon as wealth 
because wealth existed only for the sake of people. 3 The notion of treating a human person 
as a commercial good or a marketable asset is something that we abhor due to our own 
moral and philosophical understanding of a free being. Therefore, the mere thought of 
investment in human beings is offensive to some and in this sense economists too have 
shied away from analysing this form of investment. Hence, economists did not stress the 
simple truth that people invest in themselves and that these investments are very large 
though they knew all along that people are an important part of the wealth of nations. 
Measured by what labour contributes to output, the productive capacity of human beings 
is now vastly larger than all other forms of wealth taken together. By investing in 
themselves, people can enlarge the range of choice available to them. It is one way free 
economic agent can enhance their welfare. 
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The philosopher-economist Adam Smith boldly included all of the acquired and useful 
abilities of all of the inhabitants of a country as a part of capital. So did H. von Thunen, 
who then went on to argue that the concept of capital applied to man did not degrade him 
or impair his freedom and dignity, but on the contrary that the failure to apply the concept 
was especially pernicious in wars. 4 Irving Fisher also clearly and cogently presented an all- 
inclusive concept of capital. 5 Yet the main stream of thought has held that it is neither 
appropriate nor practical to apply the concept of capital to human beings. MarshaI16 held 
that while human beings are incontestably capital from an abstract and mathematical point 
of view, it would be out of touch with the market place to treat them as capital in practical 
analyses. "The failure to treat human resources explicitly as a form of capital, as a 
produced means of production, as the product of investment, has fostered the retention of 
the classical notion of labour as a capacity to do manual work requiring little knowledge 
and skiff, a capacity with which, according to this notion, labourers are endowed about 
equally. 0 This classical notion of labour is proved wrong. Labourers have become 
capitalists not from a diffusion of the ownership of corporation stocks, but from the 
acquisition of knowledge and skill that have economic value. 8 This knowledge and skill are 
in great part the product of investment and, combined with other human investment, 
predominantly account for the productive superiority of the technically advanced 
countries. The observed growth in productivity per unit of labour is simply a consequence 
of holding the unit of labour constant over time although in fact this unit of labour has 
been increasing as a result of a steadily growing amount of human capital per worker. 
The rapid post-war recovery of countries that had suffered severe destruction of plant 
and equipment during the war., demands that we take account of all capital and in 
particular human capital and the important part that it plays in production in a modem 
economy. The expressed judgements in making capital available to developing economies 
and their ability to absorb the additional capital "slowly and gradually" are to be re- 
evaluated. 9 The widely held impression that countries are poor fundamentally because they 
are starved for capital and that additional capital is truly the key to their more rapid 
economic growth is at variance with experience and the reconciliation is to be found in 
emphasis on particular forms of capital. The new capital available to these countries from 
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outside as a rule goes into the formation of structures, equipment and sometimes also into 
inventories. But it is generally not available for additional investment in people. 
Consequently, human capabilities do not stay abreast of physical capital, and they do 
become limiting factors in economic growth. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that 
the absorption rate of capital to augment only particular nonhuman resources is necessarily 
low. The Horvat'O formulation of the optimum rate of investment which treats knowledge 
and skill as a critical investment variable in determining the rate of economic growth is 
both relevant and important. 
1.5. iii. Scope and Substance of These Investments 
Human resources obviously have both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The 
number of people, the proportion who enter upon useful work, and hours worked are 
essentially quantitative characteristics while skill, knowledge, and similar attributes that 
affect particular human capabilities to do productive work are considered as quality 
components. How can we estimate the magnitude of human investment? While any 
capability produced by human investment becomes a part of the human agent and hence 
cannot be sold; it is nevertheless "in touch with the market place"" by affecting the wages 
and salaries the human agent can earn. The resulting increase in earnings is the yield on the 
investment. In principle, the value of the investment can, be determined by discounting the 
additional future earnings it yields just as the value of a physical capital good can be 
determined by discounting its income stream. According to Schultz, there are five major 
categories that improve human capabilities: (1) health facilities and services, broadly 
conceived to include all expenditures that affect the life expectancy, strength and stamina, 
and the vigour and vitality of a people; (2) on-the-job training, including old-style 
apprenticeship organized by firms; (3) formally organized education at the elementary, 
secondary, and higher levels; (4) study programmes for adults that are not organized by 
firms, including extension programmes notably in agriculture; (5) migration of individuals 
and families to adjust to changing job opportunities. 12 Both the magnitude and the rate of 
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increase of this form of human capital could be an important key to the riddle of economic 
growth. 
King and Rebelo 13 developed a model with particular emphasis on human capital. Their 
model belongs to an important class of endogenous growth models based on work by 
Uzawa [19651 and retains the following key properties on the basic neo-classical model of 
Solow [19561, Swan [19641, Cass [19651, and Koopmans [19651: (1) the existence of a 
constant asymptotic growth rate and (ii) the coincidence of competitive and optimal 
allocations in the absence of public interventions. The crucial attribute of this class of 
models is that there is a "core" of capital goods that can be produced without the direct or 
indirect contribution of nonreproducible factors. (This class of models is very large, 
including structures with many capital stocks in the growth "core" and with 
nonreproducible factors outside the growth "core" [Rebelo 19871, or with steady states 
that are only asymptotically obtained (Jones and Manuelli 1990). 
1.5. iv. Economic Growth through Human Capital Accumulation 
We are interested in models of endogenous growth that accord with the major facts of 
economic development. We require that the production of both physical and human capital 
goods be governed by constant-retums-to-scale technologies so that there are feasible 
steady-state growth paths. The model economy [cf. Uzawa (1965), Rebelo (1987), and 
Lucas (1988)] highlights the societal allocation of resources between current consumption 
and comprehensive accumulation (physical and human capital) under constant returns to 
scale. (An important assumption in our approach is that the changes in productivity 
summarized by the evolution of the composite human capital good are embodied in the 
rePresentative worker. ) 
The Core Elements: To study the accumulation of physical and human capital, King and 
Rebelo use a two-sector endogenous growth model. As in the neo-classical model, there is 
a single consumption/physical investment good. This good is produced in sector I 
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according to a constant returns-to-scale production technology with physical and human 
capital as its inputs. Hence, one technical constraint for the economy is : 
Ct + It. = Yit. = Fi(KnARd; Ct and It denote consumption and physical investment. 
Output of this commodity is Ylt, and physical capital and labour (human capital) inputs into 
this sector are denoted, respectively, by Kjt' and NjtHt The human capital investment 
good, which we call IHt, is produced in the second sector with another production 
technology that is constant returns to scale in the two inputs, that is, IHt. = Y2t- 
F2(K2t, N2tHd. 
The physical capital goods are taken to obey standard neo-classical accumulation 
, t,,. - 
Kj 
, t. = 
Ijt - avKjt, equations, that is, Kj 
where aq is the depreciation rate in sectorj Aggregate physical capital investment is then 
the sum of the sectoral investments, that is, I, = Ilt+I2t 
Our specification of the evolution of human capital embodies diminishing point-in-time 
capacity to grow, as in Rosen [19761: 
Ht+i - Ht. =0 (IHt1HdHt--8HHt, with DO >0 and 
D28 < 0. 
(By Dg(,, ), we mean the derivative of the function g with respect to x, correspondingly, 
D2g(x) denotes the second derivative. ) 
This specification of "adjustment costs" permits steady-state growth if IHt and Ht grow at 
the same rate. Further, combined with IHt = Y2t = F2(K2tN2, Hd, our set-up is consistent 
with the view that growth in human capital combines labour and other inputs according to 
a production function as in Heckman [19761. We assume that both physical and human 
capital investment are irreversible. Finally, the sectoral allocations of labour must sum to 
the available stock, N. - Nlt+N2t !ýN. Since human capital is embodied in workers' time, this 
allocation also determines the sectoral allocation of human capital. 
With this specification of intertemporal technology, our model has a range of feasible 
balanced growth equilibria in which consumption, physical investment, sectoral. outputs, 
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and capital stocks all grow at the same rate; this rate, which we denote by yHis the human 
capital growth rate. 14 
[Model Component: 
Sector 1: consumption/physical investment: F, = AIKI 
0 -a I) (N1H) aI 
Sector 2: human capital investment: F2= A2K2(1 '2) (N2H)a2 
Evolution of physical capital stocks: Kjt, l - Kj t= IjtkKjt 
Evolution of human capital stocks: Ht, j - H, =0 (jH, 1Ht; 0) H, - 8HHt 
Prderences :U= Z' =o ß 
'u (c, - er) AL %l 
Initial rates: After-tax real interest rate R(t); real growth rate yH; and sectoral tax rates 
(r]) J 
I. 5. v. Cross-Counta Eaerience 
The role of human capital in the process of economic growth has been emphatically 
proved by cross-country studies. Robert J. Barrow (1989,1990,1991), while researching 
on human capital and economic growth, analysed 98 countries in the period 1960-1985, in 
order to show that the growth rate of real per capita GDP is positively related to initial 
human capital (proxied by 1960 school-enrolment rates) and negatively related to the 
initial (1960) level of real per capita GDP. The study reveals the following. Countries with 
higher human capital also have lower fertility rates and higher ratios of physical investment 
to GDP. Growth is inversely related to the share of government consumption in GDP, but 
insignificantly related to the share of public investment. Growth rates are positively related 
to measures of political stability and inversely related to a proxy for market distortions. 
These findings are presented in his article titled "Economic growth in a Cross Section of 
Countries. , 15 There is a force that promotes convergence in levels of per capita income 
across countries. Barro and Sala i Martin (1990) show that the tendency for poor 
countries to grow faster than rich countries, termed P-convergence, need not imply a 
reduction in the dispersion of income levels, termed a-convergence, if each country's level 
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of income is continually subj ect to random disturbances. The main element behind the 
convergence result in neo-classical growth models is diminishing returns to reproducible 
capital. Poor countries, with low ratios of capital to labour, have high marginal products 
of capital and thereby tend to grow at high rates is reinforced in extensions of the neo- 
classical models that allow for international mobility of capital and technology. The 
hypothesis that poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries seems to be 
inconsistent with the cross-country evidence, which indicates that per capita growth rates 
have little correlation with the starting level of per capita product. Human capital plays a 
special role in a number of models of endogenous economic growth. Barro also shows 
that human capital is the key input to the research sector, which generates the new 
products or ideas that underlie technological progress. Thus, countries with greater initial 
stocks of human capital experience a more rapid rate of introduction of new goods and 
thereby tend to grow faster. In multicountry models of technological change, the spread of 
new ideas across countries (or firms or industries) is also important. A larger stock of 
human capital makes it easier for a country to absorb the new products or ideas that have 
been discovered elsewhere. Therefore, a follower country with more human capital tends 
to grow faster because it catches up more rapidly to the technological leader. In this 
setting, increases in the quantity of human capital per person tend to lead to higher rates of 
investment in human and physical capital, and hence, to higher per capita growth. Using 
recent theories of economic growth as a guide, Barro's study brings out some empirical 
regularities about growth and investment. 
1.5. vi. Note on Poli 
Human capital deteriorates when it is idle because unemployment impairs the skills that 
workers have acquired. Losses in earnings can be cushioned by appropriate payments but 
these do not keep idleness from taking its toll from human capital. There are many 
hindrances from the free choice of professions. Tax laws everywhere discriminate against 
human capital. Human capital depreciates. Racial and religious discrimination are 
widespread. It is indeed elementary to stress the greater imperfections of the capital 
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market in providing funds for investment in human beings than for investment in physical 
goods. Long-term private and public loans to students are warranted. Internal migration, 
notably the movement of farm people into industry, made necessary by the dynamics of 
our economic progress, requires substantial investments. The low earnings of particular 
people have long been a matter of public concern. 
is there a substantial underinvestment in human beings other than in these depressed 
groUPS? 16 This is an important question for economists. Underinvestment in knowledge 
and skill, relative to the amounts invested in nonhuman capital would appear to be the rule 
and not the exception for a number of reasons. The strong and increasing demands for this 
knowledge and skill in labourers are of fairly recent origin and it takes time to respond to 
them. In responding to these demands, we are heavily dependent upon cultural and 
political processes, and these are slow and the lags are long compared to the behaviour of 
markets serving the formation of nonhuman capital. Where the capital market does serve 
human investments, it is subject to more imperfections than in financing physical capital. 
Should the returns from public investment in human capital accrue to the individuals in 
whom it is made? The policy issues implicit in this question run deep and they are full of 
perplexities pertaining both to resource allocation and to welfare. Physical capital that is 
formed by public investment is not transferred as a rule to particular individuals as a gift. It 
would greatly simplify the allocative process if public investment in human capital were 
placed on the same footing. When transfer of resources is made available to developing 
nations, measures have been taken to pave the way for the investment of more private 
(nonhuman) capital. This one-sided effort is under way in spite of the fact that the 
knowledge and skills required to take on and use efficiently the superior techniques of 
production, the most valuable resource that we could make available to them, is in very 
short supply in these underdeveloped countries. Some growth can be had from the 
increase in more conventional capital even though the labour that is available is lacking 
both in skill and knowledge. But the rate of growth will be seriously limited. It simply is 
not possible to have the fruits of a modem agriculture and the abundance of modem 
industry without making large investments in human beings. Truly, the most distinctive 
feature of our economic system is the growth in human capital. Without it there would be 
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only hard, manual work and poverty except for those who have income from property. 17 
Economists have long suspected that there is a link between national policies and long- 
term rates of economic growth. Schultz [19811 suggests that many public policies contain 
disincentives for growth because they reduce the rewards to accumulation of a 
comprehensive concept of capital encompassing human as well as physical capital. King 
and Rebelo proposed a model of economic growth in which a comprehensive measure of 
,, technical progress" is made endogenous along the lines suggested by Uzawa [19651, 
Rebelo [19871, and Lucas [19881. Barro's study concretely shows the role of human 
capital in the process of development. By interpreting this comprehensive measure as 
18 social investment in "human capital" , our analysis provides a potentially valuable 
forrnalization of the ideas of Schultz [1961,1981] on economic development. We find new 
promise for the hypotheses of Schultz [19811 that incentive effects of policy can influence 
economic activity: taxation can readily lead to development traps and growth miracles. 
Models of endogenous economic growth thus provide new analytical paths for studying 
old problems in the economics of development. There is an early morning scene in 
Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust, of a poor, solitary cultivator at work in a field . We shall 
conclude this section by paraphrasing that line, "The man without skiffs and knowledge 
leaning terrifically against nothing. " 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE 
RESEARCH SECTOR 
GROWTH FORMULA FOUR: G4 =f(PK4, HL4, TP4, HC4, 
RS4) 
1.6. i. The New Growth Theo 
While considering the research sector as a determinant or engine of economic growth, 
we can formulate a hypothesis with reference to the recent Romer-Barro type models of 
endogenous growth which states explicitly that "though the rate of technological change is 
sensitive to the rate of interest, a subsidy to physical capital accumulation may be a very 
poor substitute for direct subsidies that increase the incentive to undertake research, in 
order to promote economic growth. " The New Growth Theory (NGT) 1-7 distinguishes 
between physical capital (K) , labour 
(L), human capital (H), and knowledge or technology 
(A). These four factors are inputs in the aggregate production function Y= F(KLHA), 
where Y is national output. The crucial point in the NGT is its treatment of knowledge as 
an input that is different from the three others. 
I. 6. ii. Ka Elements and Premises 
Paul M. Romer [1986,1989,1990,1991,19931 while exploring and analyzing the problem 
of economic development, presented a new vision of growth through endogenous 
technological change. Again, knowledge is taken as an input in the production function 
and competitive equilibrium is rendered consistent with increasing aggregate returns 
owing to externalities. Romer demonstrates that the three key elements of his model 
namely externalities, increasing returns in the production of output and decreasing returns 
in the production of new knowledge are consistent with competitive equilibrium. Thus, 
endogenous technical change is explained in terms of the acquisition of knowledge by 
rational profit maximizing economic agents. r1lie argument presented by Romer is based 
on three premises. rMe first is that technological change - improvement in the instructions 
for mixing together raw materials - lies at the heart of economic growth. The second 
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premise is that technological change arises in large part because of intentional actions 
taken by people who respond to market incentives. Thus the model is one of endogenous 
rather than exogenous technological change. The third and most fundamental premise is 
that instructions for working with raw materials are inherently different from other 
economic goods. Once the cost of creating a new set of instructions has been incurred, the 
instructions can be used over and over again at no additional cost. Developing new and 
better instructions is equivalent to incurring a fixed cost. This property is taken to be the 
defining characteristic of technology. Once these premises are granted, it follows directly 
that an equilibrium with price taking cannot be supported. 
1.6. iii. Features of Knowledge in NGT 
EA; onornists studying public finance have identified two fundamental attributes of any 
economic good: the degree to which it is rivalrous and the degree to which it is excludable 
[Comes and Sandler 19861. Rivalry is a purely technological attribute. A purely rival good 
has the property that its use by one firm or person precludes its use by another; a purely 
nonrival good has the property that its use by one firm or person in no way limits its use 
by another. Excludability is a function of both the technology and the legal system. A good 
is excludable if the owner can prevent others from using it. Conventional economic goods 
are both rivalrous and excludable. They are privately provided and can be traded in 
competitive markets. By definition, public goods are both nonrival and nonexcludable. The 
distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good 
nor a public good; it is a non-rival, partially excludable good. Two features of knowledge - 
unbounded growth and incomplete appropriability - are generally recognized as being 
relevant for the theory of growth. 
In the New Growth Theory developed by Romer, knowledge is considered to be a 
partially excludable" and "nonrival" input factor. Partial excludabilhy describes the 
property of knowledge which permits its creators to appropriate only a fraction of its total 
economic value. What is crucial to the model is the assumption that patents exclude only 
partially the use of some aspect of the knowledge in other economic activities. In other 
words, the R&D activities are assumed to involve a positive externality. Nonrivalry 
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characterizes an idea or insight which can be used by someone in an economic activity 
without reducing the usefulness of the idea or insight used by someone else. Knowledge 
can be used by an infinite number of firms and in an infinite number of periods without 
additional costs and without reducing the value of this factor. Marginal costs of using a 
new product design or a new idea are assumed to be or near zero. NGT assumes in 
addition that the low cost of using existing knowledge also lowers the cost of producing 
new knowledge. As a result, knowledge capital formation is subject to dynamic scale 
economies, which earlier models did not consider. To the extent that these dynamic 
economies accrue to others than the investors in the original R&D, nonrivalry implies the 
existence of intertemporal positive externalities from private R&D. 8 
1.6. iv. Description of the Model 
'Me model presented here is essentially the one-sector neo-classical model with 
technological change, augmented to give an endogenous explanation of the source of the 
technological change. The four basic inputs in this model are capital, labour, human 
capital, and an index of the level of the technology (KLH, and A). The formal model of 
the economy has three sectors. The research sector which uses human capital and the 
existing stock of knowledge to produce new knowledge., an intermediate goods-sector 
which uses the designs from the research sector together with forgone output to produce 
the large number of producer durables that are available for use in final-goods production 
at any time, and a final goods sector which uses labour, human capital, and the set of 
producer durables that are available to produce final output. Output can be either 
consumed or saved as new capital. 
Final output Y in this model is expressed as a function of physical labour L, human capital 
devoted to final output Hy, and physical capital. 
Let, x= (xd-ýj=I., is the list of inputs used by a firm that produces final output. A simple 
functional form for output is the following extension of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
Y(Hy, L, x) =HayLp t 
y-, 
=, Xii-a-P (1) 
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But in this model, henceforth, the index i for the different types of goods is treated as a 
continuous variable, and the sum in equation (1) is replaced by an integral: 
Y(Hy, L, x) =WY, Lß ft 
fo-X(i)i-a-ß (11) 
This production function differs from the usual production function only in its assumption 
about the degree to which different types of capital goods are substitutes for each other. 
Thus K(t) evolves according to the rule: 
K0W=Y (t) -C (t) 
where C(t) denotes aggregate consumption at time t. 
Because it takes rl units of forgone consumption to create one unit of any type of durableý 
this accounting measure K is related to the durable goods that are actually used in 
production by the rule K= Tll'i=l xi = TjXAj=j xi 
H and L are fixed, and K grows by the amount of forgone consumption. It remains to 
specify the process for the accumulation of new designs, that is, for the growth of A W. As 
noted above, research output depends on the amount of human capital devoted to 
research. If the researcherj possesses an amount of human capital 9 and has access to a 
portion Ai of the total stock of knowledge implicit in previous designs, the rate of 
production of new designs by researcher j will be 81", where 8 is a productivity 
parameter. Growth in A by itself increases the productivity of human capital in the 
research sector. The output of researcherj is therefore WA. If we sum across all people 
engaged in research, the aggregate stock of designs evolves according to 
A 8HAA., (3) 
where HAhas the obvious interpretation of total human capital employed in research. 
Equation (3) contains two substantive assumptions and two functional form 
assumptions. The first substantive assumption is that devoting more human capital to 
research leads to a higher rate of production of new designs. The second is that the larger 
the total stock of designs and knowledge is, the higher the productivity, for instance, of an 
engineer working in the research sector will be. The two functional form assumptions are 
70 
that the output of designs is linear in each of HA and A when the other is held constant. 
The crucial feature of the specification used here is that knowledge enters into production 
in two distinct ways. A new design enables the production of a new good that can be used 
to produce output. A new design also increases the total stock of knowledge and thereby 
increases the productivity of human capital in the research sector. The owner of a design 
has property rights over its use in the production of a new producer durable but not over 
its use in research. If an inventor has a patented design for widgets, no one can make or 
sell widgets without the agreement of the inventor. On the other hand, other inventors are 
free to spend time studying the patent application for the widget and learn knowledge that 
helps in the design of a wodget. The inventor of the widget has no ability to stop the 
inventor of a wodget from learning from the design of a widget. This means that the 
benefits from the first productive role for a design are completely excludable, whereas the 
benefits from the second are completely non-excludable. In an overall sense, this means 
that the nonrival design inputs are partially excludable. What matters is that the knowledge 
is a nonrival good that is partially excludable and privately provided. At the aggregate 
level, HAand Hy are related by the constraint Hy + HA= H. According to these equations, 
any person can devote human capital to either the final-output sector or the research 
sector. 9 
Let r denote the interest rate on loans denominated in goods. Let PAdenote the price of 
new designs, and let wHdenote the rental rate per unit of human capital. Because of the 
assumption that anyone engaged in research can freely take advantage of the entire 
existing stock of designs in doing research to produce new designs, it follows from 
equation (3) that PAand wHare related by wH= PAM. 
Once a design has been produced, a large number of potential suppliers of the new good 
bid for the right to do so. Each of these firms takes the price PAfor designs, the price of 
one for capital goods, and the interest rate as given, but if it begins production it sets 
prices to maximize profits. Let L and Hy be the total amounts of labour and human capital 
that are used in the production of final-output goods. Given values for Hy Y and L, it is 
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possible to derive the aggregate demand for the durables from a maximization problem 
that is conclitional on them: MaXx-f 0- [IrYLPX(i) 1-a-p_p (i)X(j)]di. 
Differentiating under the integral sign leads to an inverse demand function 
p(j) = (4) 
The demand curve in equation (4) is what the producer of each specialized durable takes 
as given in choosing the profit-maximizing price to set. Faced with given values of Hy, L 
and ra firm that has already incurred the fixed-cost investment in a design will choose a 
level of output x to maximize its revenue minus variable cost at every date: 
it = max., p(x)x-rqx = max., (l _CC_ 
p)jlayL PX (i) I -a-P_rTX. (5) 
The flow of rental income is p (x) times x. The cost is the interest cost on the-TIx units of 
output needed to produce x durables. The monopoly pricing problem specified in equation 
(5) is that of a firm with constant marginal cost that faces a constant elasticity demand 
curve. The resulting monopoly price is a simple mark-up over marginal cost, where the 
mark-up is determined by the elasticity of demand, p rqffl-a-p). The flow of 
monopoly profit is x =. (a+ 
p)plrXbar, where x(bar) is the quantity on the demand curve 
(4) implied by the price P (bar). 
The decision to produce a new specialized input depends on a comparison of the 
discounted stream of net revenue and the cost PA of the initial investment in a design. 
Because the market for designs is competitive, the price for designs will be bid up until it 
is equal to the present value of the net revenue that a monopolist can extract. At every 
date t, it must therefore be true that 
ft w e-ft t r(s)ds : t(r)dT ý PA (6) 
If PAis constant, this condition can be put in a more intuitive form. Differentiating with 
respect to time (t) yields a (t) -r(t) f, ' e-ft 
t r(s)ds 
it(-r)d-r=O 
Substituting in the expression for PAfrom equation (6) yields x(t) = r(OPA. 
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This equation says that at every point in time, the instantaneous excess of revenue over 
marginal cost must be just sufficient to cover the interest cost on the initial investment in a 
AA * 10 
. SlgrL 
Incentive to Undertake Research in a Model of Growth 
Since A determines the range of durables that can be produced and sinceTI of capital are 
required per unit of durable goods, x(har), it is possible to solve for x(har) from the 
equation K= r)Ax (bar). Then output Y can be written as: Y(HA., L, x) = H"yL ýf O'X (i) 
1' Odi 
= H"yLW"'-a-P 
= H"yLWK1,94)"ý (7) 
(H A)a(LA)P(K)I-a-P a+p-l y Ti 
The last line of this equation shows that the model behaves just like the neo-classical. 
model with labour and human capital augmenting technological change. An examination of 
the expression for final output: 
y=HayLpfo-ýýI-a-pdi = HaYLPAXbarl-a-P (8) 
from equation (7) shows, that output grows at the same rate as A if LHy, and xb" are 
fixed. If xb" is fixed, then K must grow at the same rate as A because total usage of capital 
is &b"TI. Let g denote the growth rate of A Y, and K Since KIY is a constant, the ratio: 
Cl Y=I- Wl Y) =I- WIK) (KI Y) (9) 
must also be constant. The common growth rate g for all these variables is therefore: 
g= C'1C = Y'1Y = K'1K = A'/A = 8HA. (8HAis to be understood as follows: 
Hy = 1/8[(a/(I-a-p)(a+p)jr. (10) 
For a fixed value of HA= H-Hy the implied exponential growth rate for A is 8HA) 
Together with equation (10), the constraint Hy = H-HA implies a relation between the 
growth rate g and the interest rate r. - 
8HA= 8H -[(a/(I-a-p)(a+p)lr (11) 
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which can be simplified as g 8HA= 8H-Ar, where A is a constant that depends on the 
technology parameters a and 
A= [(aI(1-a-Ii)(a+13)]. (12) 
implicitly, the allocation of H between the two sectors is constrained by the requirement 
that HAmust be nonnegative and that Hy can be no larger than H. This implies that g is 
nonnegative. To close the model, it remains to impose the relation between the growth 
rate g and the interest rate r implied by the preference side of the model, g= OIC = (r- 
Q)lc. Combined with equation (11), this gives an expression for g in terms of the 
fundamentals of the model, g= (8H-AQ)/cyA+I), where A is as defined in equation (12). 
Almost all the content of the model is contained in equation (11), which summarizes the 
effects of the technological side of the model, including the effects of imperfect 
competition in the market for producer durables. The opportunity cost of human capital is 
the wage income that can be earned instantaneously in the manufacturing sector. The 
return to investing human capital in research is a stream of net revenue that a design 
generates in the future. The benefits of research come largely in the future and that the 
costs are incurred immediately. If the interest rate is larger, the present discounted value of 
the stream of net revenue will be lower. Less human capital will be allocated to research, 
and the rate of growth will be lower. From a policy point of view, the difference between a 
reduction in tj and a reduction in the equilibrium interest rate is very important. A direct 
subsidy to investment in physical capital financed by a lump-sum tax is mathematically 
equivalent to a reduction in q. The intuition that subsidies to physical capital accumulation 
will also speed up growth in A was reinforced by the first generation of endogenous 
growth models. " 
The present model of Romer shows that when the decision to invest in physical capital is 
uncoupled from the decision to invest in research, the effects of a subsidy to physical 
capital are quite different from the effects of a reduction in the market interest rate. If the 
fundamental policy problem is that we have too many lawyers and MBAs and not enough 
engineers, a subsidy to physical capital accumulation is a weak, and possibly 
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counterproductive, policy response. An increase in scale as measured by total human 
capital H has the effect of speeding up the rate of growth. Human capital is the relevant 
scale variable in this model because it is the input that is used most intensively in research. 
The effects of a subsidy to capital can be contrasted with a policy designed to encourage 
research. But we notice that too little human capital is devoted to research due to the 
externalities and monopoly pricing. Both of these effects cause human capital to be 
undercompensated. From equation (11) it follows that an increase in total human capital 
would lead to an increase in the amount of human capital employed in the research sector. 
As a result, a second-best policy for a government that cannot affect the allocation of 
human capital between different sectors would be to subsidize the production of human 
capital. Within the confines of the model, the social optimum can be achieved by 
subsidizing the accumulation of A. The model here suggests that what is important for 
growth is integration not into an economy with a large number of people but rather into 
one with a large amount of human capital. Since growth seems to be correlated with the 
degree of integration into world-wide markets but not closely related to population size or 
density, the results from this model seem promising. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, Robert J. Barrow [1989,1990,19911 also 
shows that human capital is the key input to the research sector, which generates the new 
products or ideas that underlie technological progress. The above analyses of economic 
model of endogenous growth developed by Paul Romer allows us to conclude that 
"though the rate of technological change is sensitive to the rate of interest, a subsidy to 
physical capital accumulation may be a very poor substitute for direct subsidies that 
increase the incentive to undertake research, in order to promote economic growth. " This 
model incorporates the various determinants of economic growth in its process of 
integration of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IDENTIFICATION OF A GROWTH INFLUENCING KNOWLEDGE SECTOR 
I. 7. i. The New Direction 
The economic growth is a dynamic process. The various determinants of economic 
growth determines the pace and effectiveness of this process. The objective of our analysis 
was to see the development of each of the determinant, ( physical capital, human labour, 
technological progress, human capital and research sector), and their integration into the 
growth process. Our understanding of each determinant as an engine of growth broadens 
as we move from one functional factor to another. Though we have focused on each of 
the determinants through a particular model, our analyzis show that all the determinants 
together bring about the desired growth. They are not competing against each other, 
rather they are complementing each other in the process. This has been clearly brought out 
by Romer's endogenous growth model. Though the explicit question in our analysis was 
to determine the determinants of economic growth, the implicit question was to determine 
the motivating forces in this process of determining the determinants. In our discussion we 
have also noted some of the motivating forces like the profit motive. The new direction 
given by the endogenous growth models enables us to understand better the 'unexplained 
growth' by endogenizing the determinants of economic growth. Following this path of 
direction, we shall try to introduce a noval factor into the mechanisms of economic growth 
1.7-ii. The Role of Basic Research 
The New Growth Theory demands a further leap into the knowledge sector. It is 
important to note that the economics literature and public policies have long recognized 
the existence of externalities arising from "basic research". Such research has the 
characteristics that its findings have no expected commercial applications but that it can in 
turn stimulate and raise the return to R&D aimed at the development of commercially 
valuable products. When we consider basic research in social sciences to further economic 
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development, one area that we need to integrate into this research is that of the cultural- 
philosophical orientation of a nation. Many of the developmental policies do not seem to 
succeed due to a lack of integration of a way of thinking of a nation into its framework. 
Basic research of this area is a must and this will give birth to another crucial determinant 
of economic growth. The relevance of the research sector as we have outlined in the 
Romer's model of economic growth is of vital importance in our study. 
1.7. iii. The Micro-Knowlede 
The recent development in the growth models focus on knowledge or research sector as 
an endogenous factor in growth. The identification of growth influencing knowledge 
sectors have raised difficulty and this section deals specifically with that aspect of growth 
economics. Our survey of the various models clearly brings out the relevance of investing 
in human capital which results in various micro-forms of knowledge. This micro 
knowledge can be developed or moulded or given shape to according to the existing 
research knowledge which produces designs or enables a person with various skills. Micro 
knowledge thus has the characteristic of an 'acquired knowledge'. As the person imbibes 
this micro knowledge, s/he becomes progressively dynamic. 
U. N. The Macro-Knowledg 
But, there exists another form of knowledge which economists tend to by-pass for fear 
of trespassing the discipline. If economics is to deal with economic policies, neither can we 
justify this approach nor can we pretend of not being able to give a theoretical base; 
especially, when we try to identify growth influencing knowledge sectors for long-term 
development. We have familiarized ourselves with micro knowledge and its dynamic role 
in growth, while analyzing the various models of economic growth formulae. There exists 
the other sector of knowledge known as macro knowledge. Macro knowledge has the 
characteristic of an 'inherent-natural knowledge' which one inherits by being born into a 
particular culture or philosophical system. This is the a-priori micro knowledge (in the 
sense that all forms of micro knowledge is introduced into the macro knowledge). It is the 
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inherent knowledge due to the particular way of thinking one moulds. In a sense, macro 
knowledge is static-conservative and hard-inner-core. An analysis of the macro knowledge 
would enable us to understand the different pace of growth of various developed and 
developing nations. Hence, British growth rate is different from Japanese or Japanese 
growth rate is different from Indian and so on ... Macro knowledge is peculiar to each 
nation. 
A nation as an entity has a unique culture and philosophy of its own, eventhough at 
times it seems derived. But even a derived or dependent cultural-philosophical knowledge 
is integrated, interpreted and assimilated soon into the already existing macro knowledge. 
The interpretation-integration process is done primarily through the national (patriotic) 
institutions, such as government (political), judiciary (legal), church (religious), schools 
(educational), press (media) and so on. Macro knowledge is a positive embodiment of 
knowledge and therefore the institutions that conveys this knowledge have to be positively 
related to the national well-being of all its people. Institutions need to develop a self- 
critique approach or a praxis approach in this regard. Otherwise, an institutionalized 
negative knowledge could be communicated, and thereby defeat the original purpose of 
the creation of institution itself. An analysis of the existing institutions (original purpose 
and its current mechanism) could provide the institutionalized negative knowledge (if any) 
against the positive macro knowledge. During the formational stage of a person, one 
assimilates macro knowledge (it would be misleading to use the terminology of 'taught' in 
this context, particularly in comparison with micro knowledge). Here, a distinction can be 
drawn between macro knowledge and its implicit variables (generalization: concepts like 
capitalism, socialism, etc. ) and micro knowledge and its explicit variables (specific: market 
mechanism, planning, etc. ). Every explicit micro knowledge variable is tested in the 
crucible of implicit macro knowledge variable. While micro knowledge can be taught or 
imported and therefore broadened, macro knowledge tends to remain the same and seek 
depth. This is so because even when we import a 'pure-macro knowledge' of another 
nation, it becomes a micro knowledge when it crosses the boundary of its origin. Often, 
macro knowledge challenges the validity of micro knowledge. This would become more 
clear when we analyze the transitional economies later. Micro knowledge can blossom 
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only in the bosom of macro knowledge. Here, let us limit our search to understand the 
relationship between micro knowledge and macro knowledge in relation to economic 
growth. 
1.7. v. The Relevance of Micro-Macro Knowledge in Economic Growth 
There exists a relationship between micro knowledge and economic growth as well as 
macro knowledge and economic growth. It is the existing national macro knowledge 
which determines the use of micro knowledge while formulating the economic policies. 
Everybody knows about the need and importance of economic growth (macro knowledge) 
but only a few knows about the means (micro knowledge) that would bring about growth 
and development. Before adapting the means or implementing the micro knowledge, we 
should test it within the framework of macro knowledge and verify its acceptability. How 
much aware are policy makers in this respect is debatable. rMe more policy makers are 
aware of the macro knowledge, the probability of the success of the economic policy is 
higher and vice versa. Thus, merely deten-nining the determinants of growth (micro 
knowledge) alone would not necessarily lead to economic development. Also, macro 
knowledge alone cannot account for economic growth. Here lies the necessity for the 
integration of the knowledge sector. As long as there exists a contrast, i. e., micro 
knowledge versus macro knowledge, the result would be stagnation or slow growth. Only 
an integration of the knowledge sector, i. e., micro knowledge plus macro knowledge, 
would lead to short-run growth and permanent development. 
While formulating economic policies, the thinking that should govern is to be that of 
macro knowledge. Macro knowledge is, thus, a system which supports a nation. It is the 
breath that gives life to the economic policies. Macro knowledge exists in all or at least in 
the majority of the people of a nation without any inherent contradiction. The 
contradiction exists only between nations and this we note only in their viewpoints. This 
need not be a problem for national policy makers. Their main pre-occupation should be to 
know how much a nation and its people desire progress. No nation wants to make 
progress by any means. For each nation, the determination of this means to achieve 
80 
economic progress is of vital importance. Here, the primary role of macro knowledge in 
economic growth is to be acknowledged. As we have noted already, macro knowledge is 
the hard-core and therefore static. 'Me dynamism depends on the application of micro 
knowledge. Yet, we should acknowledge that micro knowledge plays only a secondary 
role in economic growth and development. 
This explains why, inspite of , applying the same economic growth models in various 
market economies (both developed and developing), we are not able to derive the same 
result. This explains why, inspite of, investing in physical capital formation, physical 
labour, technology, human capital and research and development, (as the engines of 
growth), we are not achieving the economic growth targets. This explains why there exists 
policy conflicts: between government and people; policy makers and implementers. The 
contradiction lies not in the formulation of economic policies but at the heart of ignoring 
the relevance of macro knowledge. Only after understanding the local, regional and 
national ethos of existing macro knowledge, we can possibly start contemplating the 
formulation of economic policies for the development of peoples. Without this venture, 
policy collapses, system stagnates, and a nation breaks down. In this scenario, as we note 
in many developing countries, economic growth is slow and development is impossible 
within this framework of performance. Recently, many developed countries try particularly 
through the media to evoke and understand the existing macro knowledge before they 
launch an application of a particular micro knowledge in the framework of a policy for 
growth and development. In order to have a deeper and better understanding of the super- 
success of macro knowledge over micro knowledge, we shall proceed to analyse the 
socialist system in the following section. 
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SECTION TWO 
THE APPLIED GROWTH PATH 
THE planned economies as well as the market economies have a single objective as they 
pursue differing economic growth models, namely, economic development. In section one 
of our study, we were following the capitalist-market economy growth models with a view 
to determine the engines of growth and their motivating forces. We have seen the 
prospects and limitations of those models within a global framework. We have tried to 
identify and endogenize a growth influencing knowledge sector as an extension to such 
models. In this section, we limit our objective to the socialist framework. The socialist 
economic system was a new venture with lot of fears and hopes. The socialist-planned 
economies developed their own growth economic models for their countries' economic 
development. (Appendix H. 8.1 gives a short description of the concept of model which we 
apply in this research). The socialist scenario enable us to familiarize ourselves with an 
applied growth path. The socialist ideological structure and dynamism have been 
endogenized in these applied growth models. A critique of the socialist system by means 
of the dual knowledge sector, which we have developed, can have a normative effect on 
the economic development policies. We shall analyse only certain basic socialist growth 
models with a view to generalize the socialist application criteria. But before we delve into 
the models proper, let us compose the place of the application criteria. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE COMPOSITION OF PLACE OF THE APPLICATION 
CRITERIA 
FOR any in depth study, it is of immense value to compose the area of research. Once 
we specify the area of research, it is easy to apply the analytical tools in order to 
understand the existing mechanism of the area of study. Since our present concern is that 
of the socialist system, let us compose our spectrum of global socialism. 
H. 8-i. The Emergence of the Socialist System 
The characteristic note that heralded the dawn of a new economic system was the 
principle of socialism. The idea of socialism was in the offing (horizon) for centuries. The 
ancient civilizations and cultures while preaching socialism alienated themselves from its 
lofty ideals and romanticized with the pragmatism of capitalism. Karl Marx, the eminent 
proponent of socialism of our century, was born into the bosom of market capitalism. 
Though his writings made him the enemy of capitalism, it could be argued that he is 
indirectly the 'saviour' of capitalism. It is his writings that put a rein to the wayward 
capitalistic behaviour, that saved capitalism. It is pointed out that most of Karl Marx's 
scientific work was concerned with capitalism; he wrote little about the future socialist 
society. "Marx, as a revolutionary critic of capitalism, invariably spoke very highly of the 
ability of capitalism to develop the forces of production, eliminate medieval backwardness, 
promote technical progress, and bring to production better organization and greater 
concentration. Marx argued that this process takes place amid the exploitation of the 
proletariat. The accumulation of capital is accompanied by the increasing poverty of the 
exploited class. In the end the process leads inevitably to a revolution: the power of the 
capitalists is overthrown and the expropriators expropriated. "' 
This form of Marxian thought includes the idea that socialism will "supersede" 
capitalism. Capitalism is seen as a mechanism that would provide the material conditions 
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necessary for socialism. The replacement will occur once the capitalist system has fully 
developed and become not just mature but overripe. "It will have made these preparations 
by causing the bulk of production to be undertaken on a large industrial scale, with 
modem technology and a high degree of organization within the company. This high 
degree of organization and concentration of production will leave only a handful of 
capitalist proprietors, who will be swept aside so that the proletariat can take over the 
running of production. ýý2 According to this image of socialism, controlling production is a 
fairly simple matter. There is a close logical connection in this line of thinkiýg between the 
high standard of the production forces reached under capitalism and the smooth and 
simple way the socialist form of economic activity win operate. Marx considered it self- 
evident that the socialist order would take power first in the most highly developed of the 
capitalist countries. Though history proved his prediction wrong, socialism did emerge on 
a global stage. 
MAL Socialist Countries 
Appendix 11.8.2 lists all the countries where the Communist party was in power for a 
fairly long period (at least several years). The undivided power of the Communist party is 
the sole criterion for inclusion in the table and henceforth, they will be referred to as 
'socialist countries'. Despite all the individual attributes that distinguish each of these 
socialist countries from all the others, they resemble one another and exhibit important 
attributes in common. Even though their actual systems differ in many details, they are all 
members of a broader, clearly identifiable class of social-political-economic systems that is 
referred to as 'socialist system'. Just as the individual members of a biological species 
differ from one another while remaining members of it, so the various socialist countries 
differ while remaining members of the same species of systems. 3 
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11.8. iii. InteEpretation of the Term "Socialism" 
The association of ideas evoked by the expression socialism points in two directions: on 
the one hand conveying certain ideas, and on the other conjuring up certain formations in 
existing societies. A term frequently used by politicians and by the press outside the 
socialist world is 'communist system' or simply "communism". However, Marxism- 
Leniniism, the official ideology of the Communist party, uses the expression "communist" 
in a quite different sense. It terms communist the unattained Utopian society of the future, 
in which all will share in social production according to their needs. The adherents of the 
Communist party in power never referred to their own system as communist. So it would 
be awkward to attach this name to it "from outside. ,4 The following are some of the 
interpretations. 
p. WileS5 (1962) calls "socialist" an economy with considerable public ownership, and 
"communist" a country where the Communist party rules. Others, for instance, R. W. 
CampbeI16 (1974; 1981) and J. Winiecki7 (1988), use the term "Soviet-type. " From the 
German "ientrale Verwaltungswirtschaft" we get the term "centrally administered 
economy" used in W. Eucken's8 (1951) discussion of the Nazi economy and often applied 
to socialist economies. United Nations statistics refer to "centrally planned economies. " 
The term "command economy" is often used to distinguish the system from a market 
economy (see, for instance, P. R. Gregory, 9 1990). More sociologically oriented writers, 
such as V. Nee and D. Stark, 'o eds. (1988), often refer to "state socialism. " 
H. 8. iv. The Socialist Economy 
Marx and Engels had no detailed blueprint for the socialist economy. More detailed 
features of an actual socialist economy emerged in the Soviet practice: the problems of 
transition to socialism, the organization of planning, accounting and control, money and 
banking, exchange and distribution were discussed soon after the October Revolution. 
Lenin, " Bukharin 12 and Preobrazhensky 13 led the thinking during this period. Stalin YS14 
later pronouncement is representative of the economic orthodoxy and dogmas of the 
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s ,Q talinist era. More recent developments in socialist theory and practice are put forward by 
LiberMan15 and KoSygin. 16 
Despite wide differences in the economic institutions of the socialist countries and their 
respective stages of development, fairly similar patterns of economic organization have 
emerged. The main common features are: 1. public ownership of the means of production; 
2. centralized control of the rate of accumulation and the principles guiding the directions 
of economic growth; I the existence of a market for consumption goods (though not 
necessarily of 'consumer sovereignty') and for labour; 4. Prices, price limits or price fixing 
criteria, for all goods sold by the state are decided by the planning authorities and prices 
cannot change spontaneously. 'Me main economic differences between these countries and 
between their stages of development depend on the degree of central control over the 
functioning of the economy, and are concerned with the decision-making agencies and 
their relations, the use of money and value (as opposed to physical) indicators, the relative 
scope of plans and markets and the nature of incentives and of methods of plan 
implementation. 17 
The most recent process of economic reform which ended with the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc could be duly attributed to the perestroika and glasnost of Gorbachev. 18 
II. 8. v. The Historical Setdng 
Let us now look at the actual course of history, beginning with a description of the 
social system preceding the socialist revolution. The first question to ask is how similar the 
internal conditions in the various socialist countries were when each society embarked on 
building a socialist system. The following Table 11.8.1 lists fourteen of the twenty-six 
countries featured in Appendix 11.8.2 in whose cases scholars largely agree that the part 
played by external assistance was relatively smaller than the part played by internal forces; 
the Communist party largely came to power due to internal forces. 
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TABLE 11.8.1 
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: Revolution Largely by Internal Forces 
Before Communist Party Attained Power 
Serial Country Year Power Level of 1ýype of Type of 
Number was Attained Economic External Armed 
Developmen Dependence Combat 
t, GDP per 
Capita' 
(USA=100) 
1. Soviet Union 1917 21.8 b Independent World War I 
State 
2. Albania 1944 - Independent World War 
State, Italian IL war of 
Occupation liberation 
3. Yugoslavia 1945 14.0' Independent World War 




4. China 1949 Independent World War 
State, II, 
Japanese revolutionar 
occupation y wars 
before and 
after the war 
of liberation 
5. Vietriam 1954 French World War 
colony, II, war of 
Japanese liberation, 








7. Congo 1963 12.8 French Colonial 
colony until struggles for 
1960 independenc 
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Serial Country Year Power Level of 1ýype of 1ýype of 
Number was Attained Economic Extemal. Armed 
Developmen Dependence Combat 






8. Somalia 1969 5.4 Italian Military 
colony seizure of 
power 
9. South 1969 6.0 British Colonial 
Yemen colony struggles for 
independenc 
e 
10. Benin 1972 5.0 French Military 
colony until seizure of 
1960 power 
11. Ethiopia 1974 4.5 Independent Military 
state seizure of 
power 
12. Mozambique 1975 12.4 Portuguese Colonial 
colony struggles for 
independenc 
e 
13. Nicaragua 1979 21.4 Independent Armed 
state uprising 
14. Zimbabwe 1980 14.7 Fonner Seven-year 




Source: J. Kornai (1992, pp. 24-25) and is based on the following sources: Row 1: S. N. 
Prokopovich (1918, p. 66). Row 3: E. Ehrlich (1960, table 8). All other rows: 1. B. 
Kravis, A. W. Heston, and R. Summers (1978, table 4). 
" It would be more expressive to describe the level of economic development of each 
country by giving the corresponding data for the last year of peace before the revolution, 
but the scarcity of data made that plan hardly feasible. The unmarked data refer to 1970. 
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'The European territory of Russia in comparison to England on the basis of national 
income per capita in 1913. 
'The datum refers to 1937. 
For the countries highlighted in the table, the following are a few of the main attributes 
shared by their social-political-economic systems, which served as antecedents to the 
socialist system. 
First, the countries in the group were poor and economically undeveloped. 19 This is 
clearly demonstrated by the fact that their per capita production before the revolution was 
a fraction of the production of the most developed countries at the time. Second, the 
proportion of industry was low. They were basically agrarian countries in which the 
peasants and landless agricultural workers formed the bulk of the population. Third, the 
modem sector of industry consisting of large factories equipped with up-to-date 
technology and organized in an up-to-date way was relatively small. Fourth, their social 
relations and property forms contained many precapitalist features. Fifth, there was 
striking inequality in the distribution of income, which was far less evenly spread than in 
the developed countries in the same period. The gulf between rich and poor was 
instrumental in revolutionizing the population. Sixth, in terms of their political systems, it 
is notable that not one of the countries listed in the table was a consolidated parliamentary 
democracy. All had systems that to a large extent suppressed political liberties, and more 
than a few were brutal dictatorships. Quite a number, if not all the countries in the table, 
were partial or total dependencies of other states: colonies or semicolonies, countries 
under military occupation, or simply dependent economically and politically on one or 
another stronger, more highly developed country. Consequently, the attainment of national 
independence was on the agenda. In most of these countries there were events in the years 
before the revolution that shook up the institutions of society: war against an outside 
enemy, civil war, or repeated insurrections. 20 
The first four of these attributes clearly conflict with what Marx had expected: socialism 
does not emerge first in countries where capitalism is overripe and has done all it can to 
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develop the forces of production. Socialism does not inherit developed, well-organized 
production concentrated into large units, if one discounts the relatively small modem 
sector. Moreover, it takes control of a society in the stage of upheaval. 'fhe noted points 
constitute a summary of the main attributes common to the social-political-economic 
system before the socialist revolution. The inherited backwardness and the other 
characteristics of the initial state left a deep mark on the forms of socialism that struck 
root in the Soviet Union, China, and other countries that took the socialist road largely as 
a result of internal forces. But the majority of the Eastern European countries occupied by 
the Soviet Union after the Second World War had progressed beyond the low level of 
development that marked the countries in Table 8.1 at the time of the revolution, 
especially, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. 
H. 8. vi. The Transition Staee of Socialism 
The period that leads from the presocialist system to the institutionalized classical 
system can be described as the revolutionary transition stage. The transition took place in 
different ways in each country, but one can discern common features, mainly in the case of 
the countries that took the socialist road basically by their own efforts. The exponents of 
revolution are fired with enthusiasm and a feeling of doing a great deed of historical 
justice. This stage is often seen as the "heroic age" of socialism . 
21 "Expropriation of the 
expropriators" begins at once. Part of the factories, banks, and other institutions are taken 
into state or collective ownership. Work starts immediately on centralizing production and 
distribution. The most important of the measures of redistribution is to confiscate the great 
estates of the landowners and divide them among the landless and the poor peasants. What 
takes place is not simply a wave of nationalization and socialization - it is accompanied 
by a redistribution of property and income. Note the sharp inequality of the pre- 
Revolutionary system; the new regime tries to eliminate them as fast as possible. The 
upper classes are deprived of their high incomes, and most of their property is confiscated. 
In several places poor families actually move into the homes of the rich. Palaces are taken 
over by schools and workers' vacation homes. In most countries this initial revolutionary 
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transformation takes place in time of civil war or war against an external enemy, when the 
economy is in a state of disruption. However grave the economic problems are, a 
campaign of education covering the entire population begins, free basic health care for all 
is promised, rationing is introduced, and vacations for children are organized. 22 
The impulse to dispense historical justice is not expressed exclusively in the 
redistribution of economic goods. 'Me nobility, the wealthy, and the old regime's leading 
politicians and officials are also subjected to persecution. Many of them are imprisoned, 
sent to labour camp, or executed. Physical violence and merciless terror are common 
accompaniments of revolutionary periods. From the outset the country's population is 
divided. The question often arises as to what would have happened if Marx's expectations 
had been fulfilled, if socialism had come to power in the most highly developed countries. 
The historical fact is that no socialist system has ever been installed in power by internal 
forces in any developed capitalist country. Numerous attributes of the revolutionary period 
are understandable in the light of prior events and easily explained by them. No less 
understandable is the fact that this period can be only transitional, since many of the 
factors that sustain this system are temporary. 23 
In very few cases do revolutionary fervour and self-sacrifice last a life-time. The average 
person, inspired by a great cause and a mass movement and confident of approaching 
victory, is capable of self-sacrifice for the community, but only for a short time. After that 
he wants to get back to normal daily life, and sense the connection between his work, the 
sacrifices he makes, and his own material welfare. It becomes vital for society to 
encourage people to perform well by dispensing material rewards and penalties. Once all 
the wealthy have had everything possible confiscated from them, the scope for that kind of 
redistribution is exhausted. Production has been set back by the events preceding and 
following the revolution and the confusion of the transition. Z4 It becomes clear that 
production, not confiscation, is the way to continue improving the population's material 
position. Production, of which the bulk is now in public, coflective hands, requires 
organization and effective control. 
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The pre-Revolutionary system has left the country backward, and before they came to 
power the revolutionaries promised that once in power they would eliminate this 
backwardness. As society emerges from the bloody external and internal warfare and the 
chance comes for peaceful labour, those in power realize they must fulfil these promises by 
rapidly increasing the economy's forces of production. They would like to achieve swift 
and spectacular economic successes. Moreover, they feel the system is threatened 
militarily, and their desire to increase their military power rapidly trains attention on fast 
economic growth. Attainment of these goals is now hindered by the anarchy, the lack of 
law and order, and arbitrary local actions. No society of any kind can function without 
some sort of discipline. There is a growing demand for order to be restored. All these 
altered circumstances prepare the ground for the country to step beyond the socialist 
revolutionary-transitional system. The spirit of revolutionary romanticism and heroism 
gradually fades and then dies, even in those who were enthusiastic about the revolution 
before; the new system becomes institutionalized and bureaucratic, and life normalizes. 
Ihe classical socialist system emerges and consolidates. 25 
At this point it is worth making a short diversion to consider the specific historical 
development of Eastern Europe. 26 Yugoslavia and Albania basically took the socialist road 
by their own efforts, and accordingly, the validity of the model outlined above as a 
summary of the main features of the socialist revolutionary transition can be extended to 
cover them. But, it was the Soviet An-ny that eliminated the German military occupation in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, and occupied East Germany 
after Germany's military defeat; the Soviet military and political presence in these 
countries represented an extremely strong support to the Communist party, which wanted 
to institute a socialist system. The Soviet Union imposed on these countries the socialist 
system, mainly by enforcing a domestic political situation in which the Communist party 
was able in the end to attain undivided power. Multiparty parliamentary democracy 
operated in these countries in the years immediately after the war. They had coalition 
governments in which the Communist party's weight was greater than its share of the 
vote. The economy that emerged was a curiously mixed one, with a "regular" capitalist 
sector on the one hand and socialist elements on the other. A steady process of 
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nationalization took place. Land reform was carried out on a large scale. This period came 
to an end around 1948-49 with the amalgamation of the Communist and Social 
Democratic parties and the elimination of the multiparty system. From then on, 
construction of a socialist system began with fun force, starting straight away with 
classical socialism. The 1945-49 period in these countries had many of the attributes of the 
revolutionary-transitional system described above, but it also differed from it in many 
crucial respects. These differences are explained precisely by the fact that instead of an 
internally induced socialist revolution taking place in 1945, the pre-1945 system was 
demolished by an outside force, the Soviet Union. 30 A new era of socialist economic 
system began in Soviet and Eastern European arena. 
The composition of place of the socialist system within a global framework allows us to 
delve into our particular form of search., namely, the motives and engines of economic 
growth process. in the socialist economies. Every economic growth model has a specific 
structure and a dynamism and the application of such a model could either stagnate 
development or ignite the economy forward. 
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THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC 
GROWTH MODELS 
The socialist principle evolved into a concrete socialist reality through the institution of a 
nation (Soviet and its satellite nations). New forms of socio-economic and political 
structures were to be framed to contain this new reality. The already existing non-socialist 
forms were substantially dismantled to weave a noval design for the structure of the 
socialist state. The utopian abstraction of a principle dictates the norms of this new 
phenomenon. The vision of comprehensive equality and self-sufficiency is to be translated 
into day to day living reality. The agents of socialist state began to frame methods and 
strategies and models to achieve the socialist objective. This chapter tries to clarify the 
socialist objective and tries to understand the factors that deten-nine the rate of growth 
under the classical socialist system, and the social costs of the growth process. ' 
11.9. i. EMansion - Investment Motive 
As we have noted in the previous chapter, by and large, the advocates of socialist 
revolution came to power in countries that had been poor and backward. "In every 
backward country, whether a socialist system is in power or not, the signs can be observed 
of an impatience typical of the 'late arriver, ' an oppressive awareness of having fallen 
seriously behind the more developed, wealthier countries. ,2 This impatience, manifest in 
every developing country, is amplified in the case of socialist countries by a promise the 
socialist revolutionaries made before their victory: they would eliminate the backwardness 
very quickly once they were in power. This is among the ideas that brought broad strata in 
society over to their side. This promise rests on a belief that they can catch up with the 
developed countries quite fast by virtue of the socialist system's superiority. This belief is 
a major constituent of the official ideology. The leaders insist on fast growth because it 
Will provide further evidence of that superiority. Also, the imperative to catch up faster 
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with the more developed countries is reinforced by military and defense considerations. 
Modernization and economic strength are needed to create an army with striking force, as 
desired by Stalin, Khrushchev and Mao [It is worth quoting a speech of Stalin in 193 1.3 
Please refer the note for more details]. The top leaders want to impose with an iron hand a 
policy of the fastest possible growth. This is the leitmotif of the annual and five-year plans. 
it is expressed in the production plans, which are intended to maximize growth in value 
and outrank all other instructions, in the quantity drive apparent also in management, and 
in the highly ambitious plans for investment. 
It should be stressed, however., that a forced rate of growth is not a policy the upper 
leadership need compel the middle-and lower-level leaders to follow against their general 
will. On the contrary, these people already have a strong inner expansion drive. The 
medium-and lower-level members of the bureaucracy are imbued by the same political 
conviction as the leaders. Leaders at all levels of the bureaucracy consider that their power 
and prestige grow in accordance with the expansion of the unit they lead, and so do their 
4 financial rewards in many cases. Under the classical socialist system there is an additional 
major factor: middle-and lower-level leaders recognize the chronic shortage of the 
products or services their ministry, branch directorate, or firm provides. The pressure of 
unmet demand also pushes them to expand. In addition, the difficulties they encounter in 
obtaining their own inputs may prompt them to produce these within the firm or branch, 
which again requires investment. 
Some of the impulses fisted are system-specific, but others apply equally to bureaucratic 
leaders under capitalism, not just socialism. One might add that expansion drive is very 
strong not only among appointed, employed bureaucratic leaders but among capitalist 
entrepreneurs, who expect expansion to bring greater profits, and so greater power and 
prestige. Ilie main system-specific distinction lies not in the actual effort to expand but in 
the internally generated self-restraint that runs counter to it. In the eyes of capitalist firms' 
owners (or managers charged with running them on their behalf), expansion is an 
attraction, but also a big risk. They have to consider carefully whether the products of the 
enlarged company will be saleable, and if so, at what price and profitability. Any loss 
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caused by a faulty investment decision hits them in the pocket. Though they expand in the 
hope of doing good business, the risk of doing bad business limits unbridled expansion. 
This is the curb that the classical socialist system removes. Because of the chronic 
shortage, the extra production resulting from the expansion can probably be sold. Because 
of the soft budget constraint, the firm can reckon that liquidation will not follow any faulty 
investment decisions, however high the costs and financial losses may be. A great many 
people at all levels of the hierarchy have a part in an investment decision, but no loss 
incurred will hit any of them in the pocket. Expansion drive is a fact of life for the 
bureaucracy. This feature of bureaucratic behaviour is seized upon in the models in which 
the objective function of a bureaucrat is to maximize the budget at his disposal. 5 "And 
because this system has only bureaucrats and no real owners, there is an almost total lack 
of internal, self-imposed restraint that might resist this drive. The investment hunger is 
ubiquitous. 9ý6 Among the basic problems of the capitalism described by Keynesian 
macroeconomics, is that entrepreneurs lack a strong enough desire to invest, precisely 
because of the self-restraint. The antidote is to stimulate entrepreneurs' "animal spirits, " 
that is, expansion efforts. 7 This problem is entirely absent under classical socialism, where 
the investment hunger is insatiable. But, there remains a strong and effective curb, and this 
is set by the process of bureaucratic allocation of investment, which fixes investment 
quotas and requires permits for investment projects. 
11.9. ii. AHocation -Investment Tension 
The control of the investment process is far more strictly centralized than day-to-day 
production. On the one hand, the national economic plan distributes investment funds 
among the various ministries in the course of the planning and decision-making process. 
8 The disaggregation of the funds proceeds from the top downward in the customary way. 
On the other hand, the central plan decides case by case which, out of the set of all 
investment projects, will be the priority projects. It is determined centrally what the 
installation resulting from each priority investment project will produce, what technology 
it will use, where it will operate, when it should be ready, and how much it should cost to 
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establish. As for the execution of the investment plans, there is excess demand for 
investment goods and services called in economic parlance 'investment tension. ' Taken 
together, the investment projects that have been officially approved require more inputs 
than are physically available. This is a horizontal shortage that appears in the relation 
between the supplier and the utilizer of investment goods. Normally, no project in 
progress is halted fully, not least because each has its powerful advocates in the 
bureaucracy. Instead, the holdups cause a number of different Projects to slow down 
simultaneously. This practice leads to a dissipation of investment, severe lengthening of 
the approval and completion time, 9 and a large increase in the costs. 
11.9. iii. Structure of the Growth Process 
We shall examine the structure of the growth process. The first problem to study here is 
the breakdown of the expenditure of gross domestic product and the proportion of it used 
for investment. The investment proportion in most periods is appreciably higher in most 
socialist countries than in most capitalist countries. 'O This is illustrated in Table 11.9.1, 
which presents some comparative data. 
TABLE 11.9.1 
SHARE OF INVESTMENT IN GDP: Intemational Comparison 
Investment as Percentage of GDP 
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The proportion of GDP spent under the classical socialist system on maintaining the 
bureaucratic apparatus and funding the armed forces is no smaller than in capitalist 
countries. "More can go on investment only if less is spent on consumption, meaning 
direct, individual consumption by households and collective consumption contributing to 
public well-being. "' I Mention has been made of the country's leaders' impatience to 
achieve the fastest possible growth. Here one should add that they see as the main means 
of achieving it as large a scale of investment as possible. "In the language of growth 
theory, they have dangling before them (even if they never heard of one) a Harrod-Domar 
model with just a single factor of production: capital. To their extremely simplified 
reasoning, the larger the proportion for investment, the faster the rate of growth. 942 
Table 11.9.2 shows that investment in fixed assets grows appreciably faster in the 
socialist countries that feature here than it does in the capitalist countries with which they 
are compared. 
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Source: P. Marer et aL (1991). 
TABLE 11.9.2 
Average Annual Growth Rates, 1950-79 
It is also worth noting that the gap between the growth rates of investment and GDP is 
far wider than in most of the capitalist countries. This confirms indirectly the observation 
made above regarding the forced expansion of investment. The table also records the low 
efficiency of investment: for output to rise over a long period by, say, 4-6 percent a year., 
investment has to grow by 8-11 percent a year. This is among the factors that impel the 
leaders of a socialist economy to enforce a high investment proportion. "The country's 
leadership not only wants a high investment proportion, it is fully able to impose its will. 
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Source: F. L. Pryor (1985, p. 76) 
Never, under any previous system in history, has so small a group of people kept so tight a 
hold on the nation-wide investment-consumption ratio. , 13 
Economists argue about the ex ante causal relationship between investment and saving 
under the capitalist system. What one certainly can say is that both investment and saving 
are thoroughly decentralized processes in the hands of millions of decision makers. Also, 
in a high proportion of cases the two kinds of decision are separate, although voluntary 
saving influences investment and vice versa. This contrasts with the case under classical 
socialism. There investment decision making is extremely centralized and embraces 
decisions on saving as well. The saving, that is, nonconsumption, equals the amount the 
central authorities see fit to withdraw from consumption for investment purposes, whether 
the households, owners of the personal incomes, like it or not. 14 The economic concept of 
saving becomes a negative notion in a socialist model of growth. 
The puzzle to solve is to find out, what, if anything, limits the growth in the proportion 
of investment and the concomitant fall in the consumption proportion? As already shown, 
the classical socialist system lacks an automatic economic mechanism equivalent to the 
one operating under capitalism, namely, the interactions among individual savings and 
investment decisions, the capital market, and the commercial banking system. The 
country's leadership feels at most indirectly the limits to what the public can tolerate. 
15 These tolerance limits restrain the cutback in consumption (public's material welfare). 
Looking at the whole historical tendency of the classical system in the consolidated 
socialist countries, one sees a significant rise in consumption. 16 But even in these 
countries, the consumption growth rate lags a good way behind GDP growth. In some, 
such as China, per capita consumption more or less stagnated for a long period. 17 The 
micro motives of the bureaucracy and the macro policy of the central authorities coincide: 
the central leadership's decision in favOur of a high investment proportion expresses the 
desire and purpose of the whole power elite. 
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The Ideol2gy of Future Orientation 
"The philosophy of historical 'functionalism' would suggest that the institutional system 
of classical socialism and the motivation of the bureaucracy are as they are because that 
best helps a backward country to catch up. The political-economic-ideological mechanism 
indispensable to forcing fast growth emerges out of the impatient haste of a poor, 
undeveloped country. "'8 Given the undivided power and official ideology of the 
Communist party, coupled with bureaucratic public ownership, the combined effect of all 
the factors is a forced rate of growth. Establishing the proportions of investment and 
consumption ties in closest with the problem sphere known in neo-classical economics as 
decision makers' time preference. The official ideology of classical socialism sought to 
proclaim the leadership's "future orientation, " namely, request of a sacrifice from the 
present generation for a better life in the future. MAtyAs Rikosi, 19 Hungary's leader in the 
Stalin period, put it succinctly: "We won't kill today the hen that will lay golden eggs in 
the future. " In characterizing the time-preference system in the age of forced growth, three 
phenomena can be distinguished. These marks of forced growth are extremely grave 
sacrifices by the public and conspicuous postponement and neglect in several development 
areas. The policy is not notably far-sighted: maximizing the growth rate attainable in the 
next decade or two is preferred not only over present and future consumption but over 
laying the foundation in the present for production in the more distant future. 20 [Whereas 
sacrifice concems a flow of consumption, postponement concems the accumulation of 
stocks serving consumption; and neglect occurs particularly in processes that demand 
4 organic' development (fields such as higher education, health, or environrnental 
protection). If in such cases specific tasks are neglected for decades, there is no way to 
compensate later by sudden resource reallocation or remedial campaigns of action --- e. g. 
oil spill and pollution). ] 
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11.9. v, The Priorities of the Sectoral Structure 
An examination of the priorities of the socialist state reveals the structure and dynamism 
of the socialist economic growth models more clearly. The discussion of priorities applied 
in the allocation of investments begins by looking at the 'sectoral structure. 9 
Priority of investment goods: the sectors developed are primarily those that directly 
cause an increase in fixed capital, that is, the production of investment goods. 
2. Priority of domestic production over imports: The development of the sectoral 
structure is stamped by the pursuit of autarky. 21 
3. Priority of the production sphere: a distinction is made in Marxian political economy 
between "productive" and "non-productive" activity. A practical meaning is attached 
to this in the planning and statistics of the socialist countries: manufacture of tangible 
material goods is viewed as the "productive sphere" and provision of most services as 
the "non-productive sphere. , 22 The priority: the productive sphere must have an 
investment advantage over the non-productive, in other words, the production of 
material goods over services. 23 Under capitalism, as far as the aflocation of resources 
for public services is concemed, this is subject to the democratic political process, at 
least in a parliamentary democracy. The public service sphere cannot be neglected so 
long as the parties representing the majority of the public are willing to vote the sums 
for developing such services. By contrast, the allocators under the classical socialist 
system are not subject to any democratic control. 
4. Priority of class-one production: Marxian political economy makes a further important 
distinction, between class-one and class-two production. The former makes means of 
production and the latter consumer goods. 2A The priority: class one must enjoy an 
investment advantage over class two. 
5. Priority of industry: Industry is considered to be the engine of growth. The strategy of 
forced growth primarily means fast industrialization. The priority: industry must have 
an investment preference over all other branches of the economy. The observation is 
illustrated in Table 11.9.3. 
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TABLE 11.9.3 
Industriala Investment as a Percentage of Total Investment: 
international Comparison 
Annual Averages at Constant Prices 
M -------------------- T M 
Socialist Countries 
I 
.................. ............ Bulgaria ....... . 44.5 ................ 42.3 
. 
a6 
................................... 51.5' .......................... 54. Od 
Czechoslovakia 37.6 38.0 
East Germany 50.2 
.................................................................. Hungary .................................. 34.8 .................. 34.2 
.......... 
--------- - --- Romania -------- 47.9 49.3 
Soviet Union 35.0 35.3 
................................................................. ................................... 1965-73 ..................... ....... 1973-80 
................................................................. Capitalist Countries ................................... .................................. 
Belgium 28.7 24.9 
Denmark le 16. 16.7 
............ ..................................................... Finland .................................. 24.6 .................................. 27.1 
.................................................................. France .................................. 24.6 .................................. 23.9 
------- ---- - Ireland ------- 25.9 29.0 
United Kingdom 31.3 32.4 





.................................. Source: J. Kornai (1992, p. 175), on the basis of United Nations (1986c, tables 13 and 
16), and Central Statistical Office, Budapest (1986, p. 28). 
In the socialist countries industry covers manufacturing, energy and fuel-producing 
branches. In capitalist countries industry covers manufacturing, energy, and fuel-producing 
branches, and the electric, gas, and water utilities. 





6. priority of heavy industry: According to the prevalent official view under the classical 
system, mechanization is the prime means of raising productivity and producing technical 
development. Large quantities of steel and other metals are used in both machinery and 
arms manufacturing. The priority: the industrialization preference must be given primarily 
to heavy industry, and within it to machinery and steelmaking. 25 
"Rigid adherence to the priorities listed here leads to a disharmonious, deformed sectoral 
structure. In the early decades of forced growth, the extreme centralization of resources 
appears to succeed in speeding up the rotation of the internal spiral, as the priority sectors 
grow very fast. Meanwhile, other sectors fall behind, some of them very seriously. The 
farther they are from the internal spiral, the less they impede its rotation, at least for a 
time, and the more they are relegated. Sectors mainly producing consumer goods fall 
behind, and so do services, with housing construction, communal services, and trade 
,, 26 affected particularly seriously. Agriculture and transportation fall behind as well . 
Accompanying all this are the three phenomena noted earlier, namely: grave sacrifices by 
the generation living in the period of forced growth; postponement of nonpriority, 
relegated tasks and accumulation of postponed tasks to the detriment of future 
generations; and finally, cases of neglect and irreparable damage. 27 
7. Priority of the arms industry: The investment demands of the armed forces, including 
both the army and the police, receive unconditional priority over civilian development 
tasks . 
28 'Me establishment of factories for purely military purposes receives particularly 
close attention when investment funds are allocated. This can only be gathered in part 
from the published plans, since a high proportion of the investments for military and police 
purposes are kept secret. 
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11.9. vi. Development of the Nficrostructure 
While the above mentioned are priorities to do with sectoral proportions, the following 
priorities apply in the development of the microstructure. 
Priority of new installations: Those running the economy seek to set up as many new 
factories as possible while neglecting properly to maintain the old, existing ones. The 
motivation is mainly political . 
29Establishment of a brand new factory makes a far more 
spectacular example of overcoming backwardness and of achieving fast development 
than the drudgery of carefully maintaining an old factory's machinery and premises. 
The policy of forced growth needs this construction fervour, because the worker's 
enthusiasm is viewed as a production-boosting factor. 
2. Priority of big installations: Those in charge of the economy are attracted to the big, 
and even more to the vast. Often a veritable "cult of scale" and gigantomania 
emerges. 30 Several factors push decision makers in the direction of this priority. The 
first is the expectation of economies of scale from larger size and output volume. 3' But 
in practice, the greater volume is accompanied by extra costs as well as savings. The 
balance of the two determines the optimum size of a factory from the purely economic 
point of view. 32 The factory size most advantageous at a particular place and time 
depends on the nature of the sector, technology, ability of the managers, market 
structure, and many other factors. This explains why organizations of various sizes live 
side by side in market competition. By contrast, in the forced growth process often 
giant firms and institutions appear where several medium-sized or even small units 
would be more efficient. One can certainly say that an indiscriminate preference for 
establishing larger units does not contribute to the fast rate of growth. Considerations 
of power play a part equal to economic criteria or even greater. 
3. Priority products and investment projects: Among the several thousand priority 
products, one can discem a smaller set consisting of "most important products of 
all. 9ý33 nese receive special attention not only in the annual plans and the execution of 
them but in the allocation of investments and the implementation of investment 
decisions. Everything said about the forcing of growth, about rush, and about 
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impetuous haste can be experienced tangibly in the sequence of events surrounding a 
priority investment project. From one point of view the one-sided attention to "priority 
products" and "priority investments" likewise belongs to the postponement sphere. If 
output of a priority product grows fast, the fact can be announced in plan reports. If a 
priority investment project is completed, it immediately supplies a graphic 
achievement. The relative lag in the production of the other, nonpriority products, the 
neglect of parallel construction of the ancillary production apparatus, and the half- 
hearted, less attentive handling of the nonpriority investment projects only make their 
braking effect felt after some, although the effect comes in the end. This breeds a great 
many stoppages in production and is one cause of the chronic shortage. 34 
4. Economic development at the expense of the environment: Production growth takes 
place at the expense of environment. Damaging the natural environment is not system- 
specific. All other social systems are susceptible as well; it is among the grave 
drawbacks of the capitalist system. Many thought envirom-nental damage would be 
ended precisely by the abolition of the greed and selfishness of private property. But it 
did not happen. The bureaucracy of a classical socialist system in the midst of forced 
growth, rush, and importunate haste is even more short-sighted in this respect than the 
decision makers of other systems. This combines with a system-specific disadvantage: 
there is no way of organizing in society independent, strong environmental movements 
capable of confronting the economic decision makers if necessary. We illustrate just 
one example in the following Table. H. 9.4. 
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T, ABLE 11.9.4 
AIR POLLUTION: Intemational Comparison, 1985 
Sulfur Oxides 
(kg per head of population) 
Note: Levels of industrial development and car density, on the one hand, and sulfur oxide 
pollution of the atmosphere, on the other, show a strong positive correlation. It is a sign of 
acute neglect of environmental protection that air pollution began to build up at a 
comparatively low level of economic development. 
'Sulfur dioxide only. 
Failure to protect the environment is among the instances of postponement (and to a 
degree irreversible neglect). It cannot go on forever, for it sooner or later starts slowing 
production too, and its ill effect on the quality of life fuels public discontent. 
One can conclude at the end of this survey of priorities that the list is certainly not 
complete but probably includes the most important of them. For those who like to think in 
a framework of optimization models, the goal of forced growth can be defined as follows: 
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Source: J. Kornai (1992, p. 179). 
The purpose is not maximization of social welfare in the broad sense. The time scale for 
the maximization task is not infinite, and not even truly "long-term" when measured on a 
historical scale. The goal is far more limited and short-sighted than that: to maximize the 
growth rate of aggregate output as recorded in the official statistics, and to do this on a 
historical scale only in the "medium term, " in other words, for the next decade or two. 
This is the purpose served by the priorities outlined above, which are capable of 
promoting a faster growth rate only for a time. 35 As a consequence of these priorities, the 
structure of the economy becomes disharmonious and sets in that disharmonious state. 
11.9. vii. Extensive and Intensive Methods 
Let us now examine the relations between the production factors and output in the 
growth process. We can list the factor-output relationships under two main groups. The 
first group contains the effects caused by the growth of some factor. For instance, the 
stock of capital or the total labour expended on production grows, and that causes output 
to grow proportionally. The second group covers the effects caused by the growth of the 
productivity of some factor. For instance, more efficient use is made of capital or labour, 
and that causes output to grow. "This distinction and the accompanying terminology are 
quite widespread among Western writers, but writers in the socialist countries prefer to 
use another pair of expressions, distinguishing between 'extensive' and 'intensive' 
methods. 'Me two pairs of expressions are synonymous: factor growth equals extensive 
methods, and factor-productivity growth corresponds to intensive methods. , 36 In our 
study, we follow, the "Eastern" terminology. Strict dividing lines between various 
extensive or intensive methods can only be drawn in the framework of abstract analysis. In 
practice, they normally appear together. (See Appendix 11.9.3. ) 
The dominance of extensive methods is explained primarily by the fact that the socialist 
system usual-ly comes to power in backward, slow-growing countries that make poor use 
of their resources from the extensive point of view. Therefore, there are numerous 
opportunities for extending the utilization of them. We note the following: 
1- Growth in the number of employed. 
ill 
2. More shifts and lengthening of working hours. 
3. Growth in the area farmed. 
4. Wider exploitation of mineral wealth. 
The situation that results resembles war-time conditions under other systems. Even in 
peace-time, classical socialism has a 'mobilization economy'. 37 A "war-consciousness" is 
filstilled constantly by the official ideology: building the economy is a battle against 
backwardness and enemies without and within, from which no one and nothing can 
withdraw. ýFhe struggle demands mobilization of all able-bodied men and all material 
resources. 
Let us now turn to the discussion of various intensive methods, with the advance 
comment that they appear in combination with each other in the practice of forced growth. 
1. Intensity of labour. 
2. Technical progress. 
3. Development of manpower skills. 
4. Organizational improvement. 
5. Quantity at the expense of quality. 
6. Overintensive use of service capacity. 
To sum up, under conditions of forced growth, extensive methods predominate, 
complemented by intensive methods, which have sometimes han-nful effects. This general 
qualitative conclusion is supported by numerous econometric analyses. Table 11.9.5 gives 








Rate of Chanze 
Period Output Factor Productivity Share of Factor 
Productivity in 
Growth of Output 
Socialist Countries 
Czechoslovakia 1960-75 3.0 1.0 0.33 
1976-80 2.2 0.7 0.29 
1981-88 1.4 0.1 0.07 
Poland 1960-75 5.1 2.4 0.47 
1976-80 0.7 -0.6 - 
1981-88 0.8 0.2 0.40 
Soviet Union 1960-75 4.6 1.2 0.26 
1976-80 2.3 0.5 0.22 
1981-88 1.9 0.5 0.13 
Capitalist 
Countries 
France 1960-73 5.8 3.9 0.67 
1973-79 2.8 1.7 0.65 
1979-88 1.9 1.5 0.75 
Japan 1960-73 10.8 6.6 0.61 
1973-79 3.6 1.8 0.43 
1979-88 4.1 1.8 0.43 
United Kingdom 1960-73 2.9 2.2 0.76 
1973-79 1.5 0.5 0.60 
1979-88 2.2 1.9 0.95 
Source: J Kornai (1992, p. 187), based on the foRowing sources: Socialist Countries: 
1960-75: P. R. Gregory and R. C. Stuart (1980, pp. 378-79); 1976-80 and 1981-88, 
output: Soviet Union, 1976-80, A. Aslund (1989, p. 15), all other data are from P. Marer 
et al. (1991); factor productivity: A Mejstrik (1991, p. 27). Capitalist Countries: 1960- 
73: J. W. Kendrick (1981, p. 128); 1973-79 and 1979-88, output: OECD (1990, p. 48); 
factor productivity: M. Mejstrik (1991, table 2a). 
Note: The measure of output is GNP, except for capitalist countries in the periods after 
1973, where the measure of output is GDP. 
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From the last column on the right-hand side of the table it is apparent that total factor- 
productivity growth-that is, application of intensive methods - made a relatively modest 
contribution in the classical socialist countries to overall growth. The table shows clearly 
that this is a system-specific characteristic: the growth in factor productivity made a 
conspicuously bigger contribution to growth under the capitalist system in the same 
period. 
11.9. viii. Phenomenon of C Icles-Fluctuations in Growth 
Let us now turn to the considerations of certain dynamic characteristics in growth. 
Three kinds of fluctuation can be distinguished. (See, Appendix H. 9.4. ) 
1. "Calendar" pulsation. (Annual plans) 
2. Endogenous investment fluctuation. 
3. Changes in pohtical line. 
There are successive stages of sudden braking, slowdown and stagnation, cautious 
revival, and unbridled expansion, after which the braking and a similar succession of 
phases return. Then the cycle recommences, repeating itself constantly. 38 The entire cycle 
takes place amid conditions of rush, expansion drive, investment hunger, investment 
tension, and chronic shortage. Also, a change in the political power relations or the stance 
taken by the leader can lead to sudden, dramatic turns even during the same person's 
period in power. Examples include the transition from War Communism to the NEP under 
Lenin, from slow development of co-operatives to swift and aggressive collectivization 
under Stalin, from the liberal policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom" to the "Great 
Leap Forward" under Mao. In other cases the sharp change comes when an old leader dies 
and his successor takes a new policy course. Whatever the case, these sudden changes of 
line have far-reaching effects on the economy, producing great swings in a whole range of 
indices. 39 
The various kinds of fluctuation just described are not mutuafly exclusive. 40 One tbing 
can certainly be said: socialist planning has belied the hope that it would produce smooth 
growth free of the fluctuations, standstills, and setbacks of capitalism. Although the 
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fluctuations under socialism are induced by different mechanisms and have different 
consequences than those under capitalism, wave motions exist and cause damage of a 
great many kinds. 
11.9. ix. The System-Specific Growth lipe: Forced Growth 
We shall conclude this chapter by pointing out the system-specific growth type. The 
literature has given a variety of names to the classical socialist system's specific type of 
growth: forced growth, rush, and haste. 41 In our survey we have already noted a few main 
features of the growth process typical of the classical system, and the sum of these main 
features defines the type of forced growth. The word "forced" implies that the acceleration 
of the tempo, rather than arising from an integral, self-propelled movement in society, is 
compelled from above by the bureaucracy. The word "forced" also implies that the system 
tries to run faster than its legs can carry it. This typical combination of main features may 
be summed up as follows: 
1. very high investment and low consumption proportions. 
2. a specific set of priorities. 
3. accelerated utilization of the obvious potentials for extensive development; quantity 
drive at the expense of quality. One is not justified in calling this combination of main 
features a definite "growth strategy. " "Strategy" implies the kind of plan selected 
consciously by military commanders, whereas the elements of conscious choice in 
forced growth are diluted with spontaneous, concomitant phenomena, and even trends 
that develop in spite of the leadership's wishes. Priorities 1 to 6 (as we have outlined 
above) are applied consciously, influenced by the ideas of Marx and Lenin and other 
contributions to the official ideology. But no one adopts a conscious policy of 
neglecting quality, overstretching utilization of the service sphere, damaging the 
natural environment, in some periods reducing consumption, and so on. Yet the 
combination of main features forms an organic whole: the planned and spontaneous 
priorities, conscious and instinctive methods, and desired and undesired consequences 
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go together. After all, these features were not chosen according to a particular 
planner's own preferences. This type of growth and the accompanying behaviour and 
mutual relations of those taking part are formed largely by their social situation, which 
circumscribes their scope for decision making. A combination of prevalent power 
structure, ideology, property relations, and co-ordination mechanisms, together with 
the system's initial state characterized by poverty and backwardness, sets the process 
of growth on the system-specific path which we have described. 42 
Our survey of the structure and dynamics of the socialist state unveils the nature of a 
veiled economic system. The question that arises at this stage is "how can this happen? " 
There are various ways of answering this question. Our method would be to follow a set 
of basic socialist economic growth models which were shaped to bring about the objective 
of the socialist state. In other words, this would be an examination of the features of 
forced growth in the light of the diverse theoretical literature on growth. 
116 
NOTES 
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budget constraint, socialist economies rely heavily on bureaucratic procedures for pre- 
screening investment projects as their optimal organizational response to the problem 
of investment hunger. As a result of these bureaucratic procedures, projects are 
delayed and promising projects may be rejected. See their manuscript, "Innovation and 
Financial Constraints in Centralized and Decentralized Economies", Cambridge: 
Department of Economics, Harvard University, 1991. Quoted in Komai, p. W. 
10, Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, op. cit. 
pp. 166. 
11. Ibid., p. 167. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
14. In a planned nonconsumption economy, the role of saving is a thorny issue. Of course, 
as Kornai points out, an "investment equals saving" formula applies ex post under both 
capitalism and socialism. But this is a balance-sheet identity that has nothing to do 
with the ex ante causal problem, that is, with the degree to which the investment 
decision makers are influenced by past and expected future savings, and in reverse, 
how the decision makers on saving are influenced by the investment opportunities and 
the incentives connected with them. 
15. In China in the period of the Great Leap Forward, the leadership's position was often 
characterized by quoting an old Chinese proverb: "Horses are required that gallop fast 
but don't need feeding. " Quoted in Kornai, p. 169. 
16. Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, op. cit. 
pp. 302ff. 
17. In China, the real wages of workers in state firms declined by 11.6 percent between 
1957 and 1978. See, State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China, 1985, 
Statistical Yearbook of China, 1985, New York: Oxford University Press. 
18. Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, op. cit. 
p. 169. For a discussion of the issues mentioned here, see the following: A. Nove, 
1964, Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary? New 
York: Praeger; For a survey of recent Soviet debates, see A. Nove, 1989, Glasnost' in 
Perspective, Boston: Unwin and Hyman; In their monumental history of Soviet 
industrialization and collectivization, E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies [1969] 1974, 
implicitly adhere to the point of view that Stalin was the outgrowth of a particular 
growth strategy. See their book, Foundations of a Planned Economy, New York, 
Macmillan; For a discussion of the perceived need for coercion through the eyes of the 
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CHApTER TEN jr_ý 
THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN 
EMPHASIS ON PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 
The age of historical socialism has dawn in. A new design of socio-economic and 
political culture was in the making. Any leap forward from the existing system depends on 
an economic leap. The agents of the socialist state followed a method of primitive socialist 
accumulation. 
II. 10. i. The Emergence of Preobrazhensky 
A sharp debate on growth policy took place in the Soviet Union in the 1920's, ' when 
one of the foremost economists on the "left wing, " Preobrazhensky, put forward his 
notable theory of primitive socialist accumulation. Marx had well-known ideas about 
primitive capitalist accumulation, which was accompanied by brutal expulsion of the 
peasants from their land, enforcement of a high rate of saving, and thereby the first "big 
push" to speed up the growth of capitalism. According to Preobrazhensky, something 
similar must inevitably occur under the socialist system. Investment must be concentrated 
on industry, particularly heavy industry, and retardation of light industry and agriculture 
consciously accepted. Resources needed for investment must be obtained by forced 
saving. Consumption must be kept on a tight rein, or even forced back. Produce must be 
bought cheaply from the peasants, whose purchasing power must be cut further by taxes 
and high industrial prices. There must be accelerated collectivization of agriculture, which 
among other things will free labour required for industrialization. 2 By a tragic irony of 
history, Preobrazhensky and many exponents of his ideas fen victim to the terror of Stalin, 
who then went on to implement some components of his recommendation in a way even 
Preobrazhensky probably did not envisage. 
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H. 1 ii. Preobrazhenskj Mod el 
When accumulation policy was discussed in the 1920s in the Soviet Union more specific 
problems had to be tackled. Preobrazhensky considers the problems of an economy in 
transition to socialism, especially the financing of 'primitive' socialist accumulation, i. e. 
capital accumulation within the state sector of a mixed economy (as opposed to capital 
accumulation in the whole economy where public and private sector still coexist under a 
socialist regime). The methods he suggests for channelling the surplus produced in the 
private sector to the State sector have all been widely used to finance socialist 
industrialization in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. 
H. 10. iii. A Systematic Comparison between the Initial Stages of Capitalist and 
Socialist Mode of Production. 
In order to understand the early phase of development of the Soviet economy it is 
extremely helpful to carry out a systematic comparison between the first steps of socialism 
and the first steps of the capitalist mode of production. This comparison is most 
instructive and will greatly assist us in our analysis. Both the similarity and the difference - 
and the differences are incomparably greater than the similarities - bring out remarkably 
well the special features of the Soviet system of economy. Let us begin with the most 
important difference, which conditions a number of others. 
Capitalist production arises and develops within the womb of feudal society, or of feudal 
society which has been half disintegrated by commodity economy, many decades before 
the bourgeois revolutions. This fully applies to the development of merchant capital, as the 
necessary preliminary stage of capitalist production. It applies also to the first steps of 
manufacture in England and to the first steps of capitalist machine industry on the 
Continent. "Capitalism was able to pass through its period of primitive accumulation in the 
age of absolutism in politics and of simple commodity production and feudal-serfdom 
relations in the economic sphere. ,3 
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Bourgeois revolutions begin after capitalism has gone far in building up its system in the 
economic sphere. 'Me bourgeois revolution is only an episode in the process of bourgeois 
development, which begins long before the revolution and goes on more rapidly after it. 
The socialist system, on the contrary, begins its chronology with the seizure of power by 
the proletariat. This follows from the very essence of the socialist economy as a single 
complex which cannot be built up molecularly within the world of capitalism. "While 
merchant capital could develop in the pores of feudal society, while the first capitalist 
enterprises could function without coming into irreconcilable contradiction with the 
existing political structure and property-forms (rather being nourished by their juices), the 
complex of state socialist production can appear only as a result of a breaking through of 
the old system all along the line, only as a result of social revolution. A This fact is of 
colossal significance for understanding not only the genesis of socialism, but also the entire 
subsequent process of socialist construction. 
H. 10. iv. Rgquisites for Capitafist Accumulation 
For capitalist accumulation to begin, according to Preobrazhensky, the following 
requisites were needed: 
1. A preliminary accumulation of capital in particular hands to an extent sufficient for the 
application of a higher technique or of a higher degree of division of labour with the 
same technique. 
2. ne presence of a body of wage-workers. 
3. A sufficient development of the system of commodity economy in general to serve as 
the base for capitalist commodity production and accumulation. 
Regarding the first of these conditions Marx says: "The basis of the production of 
commodities can admit of production on a large scale in the capitalist form alone. A 
certain accumulation of capital in the hands of individual producers of commodities forms 
therefore the necessary preliminary of the specifically capitalist mode of production. We 
had, therefore, to assume that this occurs during the transition from handicraft to capitalist 
industry. It may be called primitive accumulation - because it is the historic basis instead of 
the historic result of specifically capitalist production. 9. v 5 The question arises of how 
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matters stand in this connection with primitive 'socialist' accumulation. Has socialism a 
pre-history? If so, when does it begin? 
11.10s. Has Socialism a Pre-Hist2r: Y2. 
As we have seen above, primitive capitalist accumulation could take place on the basis 
of feudalism., whereas socialist accumulation cannot take place on the basis of capitalism. 
Consequently, if socialism has a pre-history, this can begin only after the conquest of 
power by the proletariat. The nationalization of large-scale industry is also the first act of 
socialist accumulation, that is, the act which concentrates in the hands of the state the 
minimum resources needed for the organization of socialist leadership of industry. In 
socializing large-scale production the proletarian state by that very act changes from the 
start the system of ownership of the means of production: it adapts the system of 
ownership to its future steps in the matter of socialist reconstruction of the whole 
economy. In other words, the working class acquires by revolution only that which 
capitalism already possessed in the shape of the institution of private property, without any 
revolution, on the basis of feudalism. "Primitive socialist accumulation, as a period of the 
creation of the material prerequisites for socialist production in the true sense of the word 
could begin only with the seizure of power and nationalization. ., 6 
. 
Preobrazhensky distinguishes the concepts of socialist accumulation and primitive 
socialist accumulation in the following words. By 'socialist' accumulation we mean the 
addition to the functioning means of production of a surplus product which has been 
created within the constituted socialist economy and which does not find its way into 
supplementary distribution among the agents of socialist production and the socialist state, 
but serves for expanded reproduction. 'Primitive socialist' accumulation, on the other 
hand, means accumulation in the hands of the state of material resources mainly or partly 
from sources lying outside the complex of state economy. This accumulation must play an 
extremely important part in a backward peasant country, hastening to a very great extent 
the arrival of the moment when the technical and scientific reconstruction of the state 
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economy begins and when this economy at last achieves purely economic superiority over 
capitalism. 
11.10. vi. The Period of Preliminary Accumulation 
It is true that in this period accumulation takes place also on the production-base of state 
economy. In the first place, however, this accumulation also has the character of 
preliminary accumulation of the means for a really socialist economy, and is subordinated 
to this purpose. Secondly, accumulation at the expense of the non-state milieu greatly 
predominates in this period. For this reason, Preobrazhensky called this entire stage the 
period of primitive or preliminary socialist accumulation; and this is the basic law to which 
are subordinated all the basic processes of economic life within the range of the state 
economy. This law, moreover, changes and partly does away with the law of value and all 
the laws of commodity and capitalist commodity economy, in so far as they appear or can 
appear in this system of economy. Consequently, not only can we speak of primitive 
socialist accumulation, we can understand nothing of the essence of Soviet economy if we 
do not discover the central role which is played in this economy by the law of primitive 
socialist accumulation, which determines, in conflict with the law of value, both the 
distribution of means of production in the economy and the distribution of labour power, 
and also the amount of the country's surplus product which is alienated for expanded 
socialist reproduction. 7 
H. 10. vii. The Methods of Primitive Accumulation 
Let us try to analyse how matters were during the period of primitive socialist 
accumulation, as we examine the methods of primitive accumulation based mainly on 
plundering of small-scale production and non-economic pressure upon it. As regards 
colonial plundering, a socialist state, carrying out a policy of equality between nationalities 
and voluntary entry by them into one kind or another of union of nations, repudiates on 
principle all the forcible methods of capital in this sphere. This source of primitive 
accumulation is closed to it from the very start and for ever. According to 
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Preobrazhensky, it is quite different in the case of the alienation in favour of socialism of 
part of the surplus product of all the pre-socialist economic forms. Taxation of the non- 
socialist forms not only must inevitably take place in the period of primitive socialist 
accumulation, it must inevitably play a very great, a directly decisive role in peasant 
countries such as the Soviet Union. 
Another source of socialist accumulation can be taxation of private capitalist profit, that 
is, systematic deduction from capitalist accumulation. When the state imposes heavy taxes 
on private capitalist enterprises it is restoring to the fund of socialist accumulation part of 
the surplus value which would have been received as surplus product by the state if it had, 
all other conditions being equal, been conducting these enterprises itself. In so far as the 
socialist state taxes traders, buyers-up, capitalists, and kulaks who obtain part of their 
income from the peasantry who carry on 'independent economies' we have here 
accumulation at the expense of the peasant economy (accumulation at the expense of the 
semi-proletarian labour of the country side). The persons mentioned constitute both the 
accumulators of capitalist accumulation and the intermediate stage of one of the processes 
of socialist accumulation. As regards state loans, which form a very important channel of 
primitive capitalist accumulation, their role is different in the period of socialist 
accumulation. In spite of having reservations against external loans, these loans can serve 
as a powerful stimulus to socialist accumulation, contributing thereby a larger percentage 
to the socialist accumulation fund than they contribute to the capitalist accumulation fund. 
When the state is at the same time an organ which rules the country and the master of a 
huge economic complex., issue of paper money directly serves as a channel for socic-dist 
accumulation. 8 
H-10-viii. Economic Channels 
The model of Preobrazhensky presents another method of primitive accumulation of 
capital by way of economic channels. Here we must distinguish between accumulation 
which is carried out in production itself, at the expense of the surplus value created in 
enterprises belonging to the proletariat, and, on the other hand the exchange of a smaller 
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quantity of labour by one system of economy or one country for a larger quantity of 
labour furnished by another system of economy or another country 
The difference from the period of primitive capitalist accumulation here consists, first, in 
the fact that socialist accumulation has to take place at the expense not only of the surplus 
product of petty production but also of the surplus value of capitalist economic forms. 
Secondly, the difference here is conditioned by the fact that the state economy of the 
proletariat arises historically on the back of monopoly capitalism and therefore has at its 
disposal means of regulating the whole economy and of redistributing the national income 
economically which were not available to capitalism at the dawn of its history. 'Ilie 
fundamental law of primitive socialist accumulation is the mainspring of the entire Soviet 
state economy. "The more backward economically, petty-bourgeois, peasant, a particular 
country is which has gone over to the socialist organization of production, and the smaller 
the inheritance received by the socialist accumulation fund of the proletariat of this 
country when the social revolution takes place, by so much the more, in proportion, will 
socialist accumulation be obliged to rely on alienating part of the surplus product of pre- 
socialist forms of economy and the smaller wifl be the relative weight of accumulation on 
its own production basis, that is, the less will it be nourished by the surplus product of the 
workers in socialist industry. Conversely, the more developed economically and 
industrially a country is, in which the social revolution triumphs, and the greater the 
material inheritance, in the form of highly developed industry and capitalistically organized 
agriculture, which the proletariat of this country receives from the bourgeoisie on 
nationalization, by so much the smaller will be the relative weight of pre-capitalist forms in 
the particular country; and the greater the need for the proletariat of this country to reduce 
non-equivalent exchange of its products for the products of the former colonies, by so 
much the more will the centre of gravity of socialist accumulation shift to the production 
basis of the socialist forms, that is, the more will it rely on the surplus product of its own 
industry and its own agriculture. "9 
Preobrazhensky's model is aimed at "the nourishment of the state economy at the 
expense of the non-socialist n-dlieu" especially at the early stage of socialist formation of a 
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state in order that it may gain a momentum in its objective of development. If capitalism is 
motion, socialism is still more rapid motion. 'O And what it loses in speed in the period of 
primitive accumulation, in the sense of development of its technical economic base, owing 
to extreme poverty in capital, it is obliged to make up for by intensified accumulation at 
the expense of the non-socialist milieu. This view of economic growth played an important 
role during the period of Stalin. Two more views could be associated with this way of 
promoting the objective of socialist state. 
II. 10. ix. Lewis Model 
One of the main ideas in Arthur Lewis's theory is expressed in the title of a classic 
article of his: "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour' Lewis 
analyzes the growth of capitalist developing countries, where a dual economy operates: a 
modem, fast-growing, capitalist sector coexists with a declining, backward, traditional 
sector. Ilie former absorbs successfully the labour released by the latter. The wages of the 
labour flowing into the capitalist sector are decided by the social norms for living 
standards, not by endogenous market forces. Our socialist analysis makes clear the 
similarities and the differences between the situation Lewis describes and the forced 
growth of classical socialism. In both Lewis's theory and the practice of forced growth, a 
key part is played by extensive method 1, the fast expansion of employment and practically 
unlimited supply of labour - until the scope is exhausted. Here only the major differences 
are mentioned. In our case, the modem sector is socialist, not capitalist. According to 
Uwis's analysis, the capitalist advance and the profit motive are capable of raising a 
stagnant developing country's saving proportion of 4-5 percent to 12-15 percent. The 
motivation described in our analysis, along with the historically unprecedented methods 
available to the socialist bureaucracy, can even force a saving proportion of 30-40 
percent. 12 
11.10. x. Hirschman-Streeten Model 
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The theory of unbalanced growth is associated with A. 0. Hirschman and P. Streeten. 13 
it is a normative theory; those subscribing to it recommend a growth strategy in which a 
few "driving" sectors pull ahead and their excess demand encourages the other sectors to 
catch up. It is debatable whether that is really the preferable strategy for a developing 
country on the capitalist road. But, classical socialism follows this course in practice as we 
have brought about, among other things, by the combination of priorities described in our 
analysis. The pull of "backward linkages" recommended by the adherents of unbalanced 
growth and the chronic shortage of socialist systems overlap as concepts in many respects. 
Primitive socialist capital accumulation , as described by Preobrazhensky, simply cannot 
go on unobstructed for a long period. There is neither unlimited supply of labour nor is it 
advisable to follow an unbalanced growth path. Therefore, new devices had to be 
formulated to fulfill the economic objectives. Since the adherents of the socialist state 
were convinced of the role of capital formation, they decided to follow the model of 
investment to which we shall proceed. 
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CMPTER ELEVEN 
THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN 
EMPHASIS ON NON-CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT 
MECHANISM 
The concept of accumulation has become the keyword of the principle of material 
socialism. In the previous chapter we have described the notion of primitive socialist 
accumulation and noted its limitation. The following analysis of the socialist economic 
growth is based on a remarkable article by the Soviet economist Fel'dman' (1928a and 
1928b). Besides the first five-year plan, the Soviet State Planning Commission was 
working then on a so-called General Plan extending over a period of some ten to twenty 
years. Fel'dman was instructed to prepare a theoretical model as a basis for this plan. 
II. 11. i. Fel'dman Model 
r? - I rel dman, being a Marxist himself, starts with Marx's celebrated division of the total 
output of an economy (W) into Category 1- producer goods (raw materials and capital), 
and Category 2- consumer goods, the production of each category expressed as the sum 
of C (constant capital = depreciation plus raw materials broadly defined), V (variable 
capital = payrolls), and S (surplus value): 
Ci+Vi+Si =Wl 
C2+V2+S2 ýW2 
+V +S =W 
With certain changes, this scheme would approximate our allocation of output by factor 
costs (depreciation, wages and salaries, and property income). 2 Fel'dman, however, was 
not concerned with factor costs; he concentrates all his attention on the distribution of 
currently produced capital goods (a part of the output of Category 1) between the two 
categories. But first he had to modify Marx's scheme once more by redefining the 
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categories. So in his final version, Category 1 produces all capital goods for both 
categories, while all consumer goods, including the corresponding raw materials, are 
produced in Category 2, the output of each category consisting of its respective final 
products only. 3 As a result, the economy is literally split from top to bottom into these two 
categories. Of course any division of an economy by industries, or even of output between 
consumption and investment, is difficult and arbitrary, but it is clear that Fel'dman's 
method creates special difficulties. 4 pigoU, S5 wage-goods industries, Hayek' S6 stages of 
production, Marx' S7 standard scheme, Hicks' S8 induced versus autonomous investment, all 
give rise to models with an elusive empirical content and yet not devoid of interest. The 
empirical content of his model worried FeFdman less than its deviation from the standard 
Marxist scheme. Yet, this is a growth model constructed on a Marxist foundation9 and it 
may be of use in unravelling a few puzzles in Soviet economic development and in 
achieving a better understanding of Soviet economic thinking. It also raises some 
questions regarding economic development in general. 
H. 11. ii. Assumptions of the Model 
Like other growth models, Fel'dman's model is based on a number of simplifýdng 
assumptions, such as: constant prices; capital as the only limiting factor; absence of lags; a 
closed economy; production independent of consumption; 'O absence of government 
expenditures as a separate category distinct from consumption and investment; absence of 
bottlenecks; and several others. The division of the economy between the two categories 
is complete, in the sense that no existing capital can be transferred from one to another 
(there being no other limitations on production). Thus the rate of investment is rigidly 
determined by the capital coefficient and the stock of capital in Category 1. Similarly, the 
output of consumer goods is determined by the stock of capital and the capital of 
coefficient of Category 2. " Hence the division of total output between consumption and 
investment at any given moment depends on the relative productive capacities of the two 
categories, and not on the propensity to save, though the latter can reassert itself by 
causing an underutilization of the capital stock in one category or another, a waste ruled 
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out in the model. The division of total investment (that is, of output of Category 1) 
between the two categories is, however, completely flexible. Indeed, the fraction of total 
investment allocated to Category 1 is the key variable of the model. 12 
11.1l. ni. Mathematical Derivation of the Model 
Let us derive Fel'dman's results by considering the case of permanent assets. (and assets 
subject to wear. also could be considerd. ) 
P-ermanent Assets 
13 
List of Symbols. (In order of their appearance). 
7= fraction of total investment allocated to Category 1. 
I= annual rate of net investment (output of Category 1. 
II .d 12indicate annual rates of net investment allocated to the respective categones, so 
that 11 +12 ý-- 
time measured in years. 
V= marginal capital coefficient for the whole economy. 
V, , dV2 indicate the marginal capital coefficients of the respective categories 
(not to be 
ýconfused with Marx's V). 
C= annual rate of output of consumer goods (not to be confused with Marx's 
Y= annual net rate of output of the whole economy (national income). 
a= average propensity to save (ratio of total investment to national income). 
aI= marginal propensity to save (ratio of the increment in total investment to the 
increment in national income). 
lo, Co, and Yo indicate the respective initial magnitudes of these variables (when t= 0). 
By definition of 7, 
It = 71, (1) 
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and since only 11 increases the capacity of Category 1, 
dI/dt = 11 /Vi. 
rl I- ý, uDstituting 1 into 2, we obtain 
d/I = YI/ Vi, 
A- - die solution of which is 
I= lo. e (ytvl)t 
To simplify all derivations, we set Io = 1; then 
I= (Y/V 1) t; 
in other words, total investment will grow at a constant exponential rate of y/Vi. 
Again, by definition of 
12 ý (1 -Y) I -": 
(1 -7) 
(Y/vl)t 
12 being the only source of increased capacity in Category 2, 
dC/dt -ý 12 N2 --,: (1 -TN2 )e (Y/Vl)t and (7) 
C= Co + (1_Y/y ) Vl /V2 
[te(y/vl)t)-11, 
dY/dt = dC/dt + dl/dt = 
e(y/vl)t/ Vj V2 IVJ_7(Vl_v2 )I, (9) 
I+C = YO +1(1-7/7) VI / V2, + 1] 
[le(ytvl)tl-ll. (10) 
'Mus C and Y each represent a sum of a constant and an exponential in t. 
Their rates of growth will therefore differ from y/ Vi. As time goes on, the exponential will 
dominate the scene and the rates of growth of C and Y will gradually approach T/ Vi. But 
this may take quite a long time, unless of course it so happens that: Co = (1-y/y) V, / V2, in 
which case the constants will vanish and C and Y will grow at the rate of yN, from the 
very begi in , but this is not an interesting case 
from the int of view of this Model. 14 1MM9 Po 
11.1l. iv. The Rate of Growth of Investment 
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Why the rate of growth of investment here differs from the one derived in the earlier 
growth models (cf. Harrod-Domar). The latter was equal to a/V where a indicated both 
the marginal and the average propensities to save and V was the over-all capital 
coefficient. To compare the earlier models with Fel'dman's it is necessary to rework their 
results without the assumption that the average propensity to save, a, equals the marginal 
one, a'. We shall continue to treat a' as a constant, but since a# a', a has now become a 
variable. It can be easily shown that the rate of growth of investment will now be a'/V. '5 
The expression a'/V is of course the ratio of the marginal propensity to save to the over- 
all capital coefficient. In Fel'dman's model, however, we have obtained yN, as the rate of 
growth of investment, where 7 is the fraction of investment allocated to Category 1, and 
V, is the capital coefficient of this category only. 
Let us find a' of the present model. From 5 and 9 we obtain 





(VI/ V2 )-71 VI N2 ) 
-11 
(11) 
In the special case when V, = V2we obtain the not-quite-expected result that 
(12) 
that is, Fel'dman's fraction of investment allocated to Category 1 and Keynes's marginal 
propensity to save become identical. 16 If V1 ý> V2then of course 7> a'. That Fel'dman's 7 
and Keynes's a' should be so closely related, and even identical when V, = V2, may be 
surprising, but it is merely a reflection of the fact that if a certain fraction of the increment 
in national income W) is to be devoted to investment, a corresponding fraction of 
investment (y) must be allocated to capital goods industries to make the production of this 
increment in investment possible. 17 In other words, in a growing economy some capital is 
used to make more capital. The explicit recognition, of this fact is, one of the virtues of 
Fel'dman's model, though ironically enough Fel'dman kept insisting that the final purpose 
of all production is consumption. In a growing economy this is simply not true. 
The relationship between V, and V2on the one hand and V (the over-all coefficient for 
the whole economy) on the other is also simple. The rate of growth of investment being 
independent of the manner in which it is expressed., 
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y /Vi = a'/V. 
Solving 11 for y in terms of a', we have 
y= a'Vl/V2+a'(Vl-V2)., 
and inserting 14 into 13, we obtain 
a'Vi +(l-a')V2, 
that is, V is a weighted average of V, andV2.18 
11.11. v. The Development Decisions 
The development decisions made in terms of a or a' imply corresponding decisions 
regarding the magnitude of y, and vice versa. The average propensity to save (ratio of 
investment to income) a plays a minor role in Fel'dman's model. It can be computed and 
it is relevant to many policy decisions (the level of taxation, for instance), but it has no life 
of its own, so to speak, and is completely determined by the relative productive capacities 
of the two categories, because the underutilization of capital in either category is excluded 
by the assumed absence of any limits to production other than capital. According to 
Fel'dman's model, a closed economy without well-developed metal, machinery, and 
subsidiary industries (the complex of the so-called heavy industries) is unable to produce a 
sizeable quantity of capital goods and thus to invest a high fraction of its income, however 
high its 'potential' saving propensity may be. In Soviet economic thinking the former 
consideration has been predominant; in our recent literature the ability to save has been 
emphasized. Perhaps a synthesis, or more correctly, a return to a synthesis, is in order. '9 
A country's investment can grow very rapidly even with a low average propensity to 
save for some time. The latter does, however, determine the rate of growth of income, and 
a low a will of course result in a slowly growing income. But a low a is not incompatible 
with a high rate of growth of investment for a period of time. Here may be found at least a 
partial explanation of their simultaneous existence in Soviet Russia, as found by Norman 
20 Kaplan, a phenomenon which has puzzled some economists. With capital coefficients 
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1--aing treated as given, the one and only variable which can be varied as an instrument of LJ%' 
planning is our y, the fraction of total investment allocated to Category 1 (capital goods 
industries). Since Fel'dman's model allows complete intra-category flexibility, 7 can vary 
all the way from zero to one. 21 The optimum size of y (and it need not be constant) chosen 
by the planning authorities will depend on what they consider to be the purpose of 
economic development. 
H. 1l. vi. The PuMose of Economic Development 
If the purpose of economic development lies in the maximization of investment or of 
national income (without differentiation between investment and consumption) at a point 
of time, or of their respective rates of growth, or of integrals over time, y should be set as 
high as possible. This is always true for investment, and nearly always for income, the only 
exception being when V, greatly exceeds V2, and even then for only a short period of 
time. 22 A high y does not imply, however, any reduction in consumption. with capital 
assets assumed to be permanent, even y=1 would merely freeze consumption at its original 
level. If assets were subject to wear, consumption would be slowly reduced by failure to 
replace them. Finally, a transfer of resources from consumption to investment industries 
would reduce consumption still further. The latter possibility is, however, excluded from 
Fel'dman's model. 
Such an indifference between consumption and investment irrespective of the magnitude 
of y (or of a) must be rare even among Soviet planners: after all, consumption standards 
affect the ability and the incentive of the populace to work and the willingness to obey. 
Fel'dman, who did not regard labour as a factor limiting production, had no room for such 
considerations, but he insisted time and again that consumption was the sole purpose of 
23 production, the emphasis given to investment in his model being only temporary. He did 
not specify whether the variable to be maximized should be consumption at a point of 
time, or its rate of growth, or its integral over time; whether consumption should be 
discounted or not; and what value, if any, should be attached to the increasing capital 
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stock as such, particularly in Category 1, so important during a war. On the whole, he was 
most concerned with the (relative) rate of growth of consumption, and desired a high 7 
with that end in mind. 
19.1l. vii. The Dual Effect of i on 
The examination of the expression 8 1C=C0+(1-7/7)VI/V2 [[e(y/v1)tj-1J ]quickly reveals that 7 
has a dual effect on C. As the numerator of the exponent of e(y/vl)t, it is related to C 
directly; as a member of the expression (1-y)/y, inversely. As y increases, the latter falls 
very rapidly; thus with y=0.1, (1-y)/y = 9; when y=0.2, (1-y)/y = 4; ay of 0.5 brings it 
down to 1. Over short periods of time C is dominated by (1-y)/y and is therefore depressed 
by a high y. As time goes on, the exponential '("/")twiIl assert itself, and a high y will 
eventually produce a large C. 
When one variable (y) has a dual effect on another (C), it is usually possible to find the 
magnitude of the former maximizing the latter. It can be shown that 7 maximizing C at a 
given point of time is given by the expression 
y= 1- (1-e-(Y/vl)'/(y/Vi (16) 
and that this value of 7, being independent ofV2 , varies inversely with V1, and directly 
with t (it is a direct function of the ratio t/Vi); thus the longer the period in question, the 
higher the value of y should be set. All this presupposes a constant y over time. A variable 
y would be a more flexible instrument. 24 "Since a planning horizon is a hazy notion at best, 
even if expressed in terms of one or more five-year plans, the maximization of 
consumption at some point of time provides no sensible clue to the optimum magnitude of 
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The lower straight line corresponding to y=1 is horizontal: all investment being 
allocated to Category 1, consumption stays at its original level without any increase. This 
example is an extreme and misleading one because even a slight reduction in y (to 90 per 
cent) results in a rapid growth of C (the solid curve) after a few years. The y=0 straight 
fine is more interesting: here all investment is directed to consumer goods industries 
(Category 2); hence the capacity of Category 1 remains constant, as does its output, i. e. 
the total stream of investment. Consequently the capacity of Category 2 increases, but 
only at a constant absolute rate. Its relative rate of growth declines with time. 26 The 
dotted curves on Figure 1 correspond to several reasonable magnitudes of y (10,20, and 
50 per cent), and as expected, the higher the y, the smaller C is in the early years, and the 
more rapidly it grows thereafter. These curves are fairly close to each other and to the 
straight line y=0; they all intersect the latter within a surprisingly narrow period of time, 
in our case between 6 and 8 eight years. This explains why the maximization of C gave 
such an unstable magnitude of 7.27 
The message conveyed by Figure 1 is fairly clear: if the planning authorities have a short 
time horizon, they may just as well leave capital goods industries alone and stay on the line 
y=0. As their horizon expands, a strong effort to develop these industries should be 
made. Not much is gained by playing with small magnitudes of y. If reality only 
corresponded to Fel'dman's model, the presence of so many undeveloped countries would 
be inexplicable. 28 
The maximization of consumption at a point of time may not be a satisfactory objective 
of economic development because it implies an indifference to the behaviour of 
consumption during the intervening period. To remedy this defect, the integral of C over 
the whole period should be maximized instead. 
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As shown on Figure 11.11.2, the dotted (y =50 per cent) curve and the solid (y = 0) one 
are so close together that there is no room for drawing the y= 10 and y= 20 per cent 
curves. (Note, however, the difference in scale between the two charts. ) If drawn, all these 
curves would again intersect the y=0 one in a very narrow range, between 9 and 11 
years, though the range itself is further away in time than it was on Figure IL 11.1 (6 and 8 
years). For a country with a reasonably long time horizon, a high magnitude of y is still 
worth while. This approach, however, turns out to be no more helpful in determining the 
optimum magnitude of 7 than the preceding one did. 29 
H. 1l. viii. Critique of the Model 
These refinements did not bother Fel'dman particularly. To him, the aim of economic 
development lay in the long-run maximization of consumption, and particularly of its 
(relative) rate of growth. As an objective of economic development, the latter can be 
misleading, because it abstracts from the absolute magnitude of C at a given point of time. 
Obviously, a slow growing C can exceed a rapidly growing one, at least for some time, if 
it started from a higher level. This is not important for Fel'dman's model because the 
initial magnitude of C is the same for all time patterns. But the rate of growth of C is not 
constant over time, and as shown on Figure 11.11.1, rapid growth at the beginning is 
achieved at the expense of slower growth later, and vice versa. Fel'dman could justify his 
disregard of these aspects of the model by his concern for the long run only. In the long 
run, which need not be very long, a higher y will, as a rule, result in a more rapidly 
growing consumption . 
30 The notions of time preference and the rate of interest do not 
seem to play any role in this model. 
V- 9 
Ful dman's task was to explain to the Soviet planners the basic principles of economic 
growth and to furnish them with several alternative patterns of development, depending on 
ý1- - Me magnitudes of y and of the capital coefficients. It was up to the planners to choose the 
optimum path, depending on their own objectives, and on their evaluation of existing 
economic and political conditions and possibilities. 31 
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Our survey of the experience of historical socialism reveals the existence of an 
investment-consumption tension which had a retardation effect on economic development. 
Actually, Marx himself, was aware of the problems brought about by the crises of 
underconsumption under capitalism and wanted to solve this problem under socialism. 
While providing explanation of why cyclical crises are destined to occur in capitalism, he 
tried to explain the crises in terms of underconsumption. He noted the effects of 
insufficient effective demand on the part of workers for the commodities they have 
produced. Marx writes: "The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty 
and restricted consumption of the masses, in the face of the drive of capitalist production 
to develop the productive forces as if only the absolute consumption of society set a limit 
to them. 02 The same basic idea is again expressed as follows in his Theories of Surplus 
Value. "The greatest part of the producers (the workers) are non-consumers (non-buyers) 
of a very considerable part of their product, they can only consume an equivalent for their 
product as long as they produce more than this equivalent-surplus value or surplus 
product. They must always be over-producers, must always produce over and above their 
needs, in order to be able to be consumers or buyers within the limits of their needs. 963 
Essentially, the point which Marx makes is that the forces at work under capitalism 
inevitably do not produce an equilibrium between supply and demand for consumers' 
goods, nor an equilibrium between supply and demand for luxuries. The problem of 
underconsumption has not been seriously addressed by Fel'dman; rather he opted to 
provide a model of investment, hoping this model would solve the problem of 
underconsumption in the long-run. Historical socialism proved this fatal to its own 
foundations. More investment coupled with less consumption raises the issue of savings. 
The role of savings in a socialist state is a new phenomenon in the theory of economic 
growth and let us endeavour to examine this aspect in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
A SOCIALIST ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN 
EMPHASIS ON NON-SAVINGS-INVESTMENT MECHANISM 
Modem macroeconomics theories of economic growth outlines the role of savings in 
economic development. The relationship that exists between savings and investment is 
clear in a capitalist-market economy system. But it is not so conspicuous in a socialist- 
planned economy system. The following is an attempt to understand the role of savings 
and the relationship between savings and investment in a socialist economic growth model. 
II. 12. i. Accumulation and Economic Growth 
There is a widespread belief that Marx confined his vision of the realization of socialism 
to the most advanced capitalist countries but it is pointed out that he only postulated that a 
level of capitalist development would have to be reached, sufficient for the creation of an 
industrial proletariat. "The fact that the 'weakest link' of the system turned out to be a 
relatively underdeveloped country vastly damaged by war put a strong emphasis on 
accumulation and growth, first to reconstruct the economy, then to engage the economy in 
a race with the advanced capitalist countries, with an aim to reach and overcome these 
countries and realize the 'higher' stage of communism. "' The emphasis on accumulation 
and growth therefore, as we have seen in the previous chapters, played a crucial role in the 
shaping of the first instance of a socialist economy. The process of capital accumulation is 
enhanced by investment and investment is supposed to be enhanced by saving. 
M. H. Dobb's essay "A Note on Saving and Investment in a Socialist EconoMy,, 2 is an 
important contribution to the general theory of investment under socialism. He points out 
the relation between wages, prices and savings-accumulation policy and discusses the use 
of interest rates in short and long term planning. Hitherto discussion of a socialist 
economy has been preoccupied with the problem of the allocation of a given quantity of 
resources between various uses, and little or no attention has been given to problems 
148 
noted by Dobb. To solve the problem of ideal allocation a number of writers like Lange, 3 
Lerner, 4 and HaI15 have agreed in proposing that decisions as to output and investment in a 
socialist economy should be ruled by the following principles. 
II. 12. ii. Aflocation Principles 
In his essay "On the Economic Theory of Socialism".. 0 Lange suggests that all prices, 
whether in the case of finished goods or of factors of production, shall be fixed by a 
process of trial and error until an 'equilibrium price' is found at which the current supply is 
equal to the demand. If the commodity or factor in question is in surplus supply (e. g. if 
unsold stocks are accumulating) the price will be lowered; if it is in deficit-supply, the 
price will be raised. Secondly, decisions as to output and investment shall be taken by each 
industry on the basis of carrying the utilization of resources to the point where marginal 
cost is equated to price: the output of each plant presumably being extended to the point 
where the short-period (or prime) cost of additional output is equal to the value of that 
output, and new investment in the industry being undertaken if, and only if, the additional 
output resulting from the investment, when valued at current prices, equals or exceeds its 
long-period cost, including the current interest-charge on the capital involved in the 
construction of the new equipment. 6 The advantage of this mechanism that its sponsors 
appear to have in mind is that it would facilitate a considerable decentralization of 
investment and output decisions. "The central planning authority need decide only the 
'total' amount to be invested (thoug how to decide this total still remains unknown) in any 
period: the direction and the form of the investment, and a fortiori the output of existing 
plants, could be left to the managements of the various industries to determine according 
to the second of the above rules. All that the central planning authority would need to do, 
having decided the total investment for the system as a whole, would be to adjust the 
aggregate demand for capital to that supply by appropriate shifts of an interest rate. ,7 
It is pointed out by Dobb that a system controlled in this way may inherit two of the 
principal vices of capitalism. With a price-mechanism of this kind in operation, the only 
way of precluding a large measure of chronic unemployment may be to maintain the rate 
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of investment at a given, 'arbitrary' level, which may be quite different from the level that 
would be dictated by other considerations. Moreover, it is not difficult to show that, 
unless some stabilizing mechanism is introduced, in addition to or as a substitute for this 
pricing-mechanism, a socialist economy may inherit the instability of capitalism in an even 
more pronounced form. "As soon as it is realized that the 'demand for capital' is a 
function, inter alia, of the current rate of investment, and that this demand will vary 
directly, and not inversely, with the rate of investment, ceteris paribus, the existence of a 
powerful de-stabilizing influence inherent in this relationship becomes apparent. q18 In other 
words, the so-called schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is not independent of the 
rate of investment. If the rate of investment is increased (or decreased), so will be the 
inducement to invest; and the situation will be one of unstable equilibrium, where the 
tendency to a Wicksellian9 cumulative movement, with increased investment 'creating its 
own draught, can hardly be controlled efficiently by a trial-and-error process of searching 
for an equilibrium-price for capital. If, moreover, an attempt is made to adhere to the rule 
of equating price and marginal cost, the volume of output from existing plant, and hence 
employment, will be determined by the relation between the price level of finished goods 
and money wages, and this relation is also a function of the rate of investment. If, 
therefore, the rate of investment upon which the State happens to have decided is a 
relatively low one, unemployment may be impossible to avoid, since to intensify the 
utilization of existing plant by employing more labour per unit of equipment would cause 
marginal prime cost to exceed price. (This, of course, is to assume that output is at the 
level at which short-period costs are 'rising'. ) On the other hand, if a condition of full 
employment has already been attained, it win be impossible both to increase the rate of 
investment and at the same time to maintain an equality between price and cost, even 
between price and short-period marginal cost. 'o 
H. 12. iii Assumptions 
To elucidate the reason for these statements let us examine the working of such a 
mechanism as is proposed by Lange and Lerner and Hall, in a simplified situation and in 
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their own terms. To make the task of analysis easier we will start by discussing the 
assumptions employed in these models. (a) We will assume both that the only form of 
personal income consists of wages, " and that wage-earners spend the whole of their 
income in a given period on consumption goods - that their saving is zero. (b) We will 
assume that prime costs of current output consist exclusively of wages (this is plausible if 
we imagine that each industry is vertically integrated, and that production in each plant 
embraces all processes from extraction from the soil to a finished product). We may 
further assume that each industry undertakes the repair and maintenance of its own plant, 
employing permanent repair workers as well as process-workers, and counts the wages of 
the former in its prime or operating costs. (c) We will assume that land is a free good and 
is not priced, so that the only element in total cost other than wages consists of the 
accounting-price of capital, as currently fixed by the State Bank or Investment Board or 
Central Planning Council. (d) We will assume that there is technical homogeneity between 
various industries to the extent of making the ratio of capital to labour approximately 
uniform in the mall. (e) We will assume that the amount of reserve productive-capacity 
that exists, at the outset, in the industries producing consumption-goods is small (i. e. 
short-period costs have a rising tendency). It will be obvious that there follows from 
assumptions (a) and (b) the corollary which can be expressed by saying that: C=W and P 
= (pW where C represents the value of output of consumption goods, W represents the 
total wage-bill of the country, P represents total profits of industry, and y the proportion 
of the total wage-bill which is expended by the State in new constructional work (i. e. yW 
is the rate of investment). 12 
11.12. iv. Four Classes of Decisions 
It will be convenient to distinguish four classes of decisions that the management of 
industry will have to make. 
1- Given a plant of a particular type and size, how much labour to employ in that plant and 
how much output to obtain from it? This we will call the intensity of utilization of a given 
Plant by labour. If the second of the above rules is observed (controlling output in such a 
way as to attempt to equate price and marginal cost), this will depend on the price of 
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output, the level of wages and the extent to which marginal operating cost (MOC) rises as 
the intensity of utilization of the plant is increased. The difference between the price of 
output and the average operating cost (AOQ multiplied by the output will represent the 
profit of that plant. 
2. What should be the size of each plant? This will be determined by the average total cost 
(ATC) of production in plants of different sizes according to the rule that, where the 
plants in the industry are numerous, that size of plant should be chosen which makes ATC 
a rninimum. 13 This can be expressed by Lerner's envelope U-curve, where the envelope 
curve represents the ATC under plants of different sizes, and the smaller curves tangential 
to it represent the cost of producing with a plant of a given size. 
3. What should be the number of plants in an industry? This will generally depend on the 
profit that each plant is making, as defined under 1. If the profit-rate (i. e. the ratio of profit 
to the value of the plant when valued at reconstruction-cost) being earned by a typical 
plant in an industry is greater than the accountmg-pnce of capital, then presumably the 
number of plants will generally be increased, and vice versa. (Note that the economies and 
diseconomies may make expansion or contraction desirable even when the profit-rate is 
equal to the accounting-price of capital. ) 
4. Which of a variety of technical types of plant (irrespective of their size) to choose to 
construct? These types will differ, not only in that operating costs under each type of plant 
will be different, but also in their costs of construction and maintenance. It will follow that 
if the accounting-price of capital is low, plant-types which have a relatively high cost of 
construction, compared to the economies of operating costs that they promise, will be 
preferred to a greater extent than when the accounting-price is high. Changes of this class 
9 14 represent Hawtrey's 'deepening process', as distinct from his 'widening process . 
II-12. v. Wages-Prices-Profit-Saving Mechanism 
Let us suppose that the State, in order to stimulate an increase of investment, lowers its 
accounting-price for capital. There will then be a tendency for changes under 3 and 4 to 
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take place. The increased constructional activity will involve either a transfer of labour 
from making consumption goods to construction jobs, or else the absorption of previously 
unemployed labour into construction work. The net effect win be a rise in the price of 
consumption goods (measured either in money or in wage-units); '5 since, as we have seen 
above, P, which = C-(W-q)W), varies with the rate of investment. In other words, if the 
demand, depending on the total wage-bill, rises relatively to the supply of consumption 
goods, as will be the consequences of increased investment, the consumption price-level 
rnust rise relatively to the wage-level. At a later stage, it is true, as the new plants come 
into existence, the output of consumption goods will increase and their price will tend to 
fall again. But for the time being while the investment is taking place, the price level of 
finished output will inevitably rise, and with it the profits of industry. "This rise will, 
indeed, measure the community's 'saving'; the profits of industry corresponding to the 
rate of investment, so that from a budgetary point of view the State investment 
programme will be self-financing, creating exactly the amount of profit necessary to 
finance the investment. " 16 
But this very rise of price, by increasing profits, has increased the 'demand for capital', 
and hence raised the equilibrium-price of capital above the level at which it originalýy 
stood. If the State delays the raising of its accountig-price (after the initial lowering of it), 
the inducement to expand constructional activity will not only persist, but will grow 
cumulatively greater. If, on the other hand, after initially lowering its rate to stimulate, it is 
too quick to raise it again as a check on the inflationary tendency, it may find itself 
heralding an opposite effect. In other words, the difficulty which today exists in 
influencing long-term investment through changes in the short-term rate may reappear, 
and reappear in an accentuated form. 17 
These results will not appear strange to those familiar with the proposition that 'saving 
equals investment'. Where the State is the investor, its investment decisions will determine 
and create the communal 'saving' necessary to finance it, as will be the case when 
investment is done by private entrepreneurs. But when all (or nearly all) personal incomes 
are spent, this saving must partake of the nature of so-called 'forced saving': the 
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significant effect of the investment will be, not to enhance the money incomes of 
individuals, but the income of the State in the shape of industrial profits. The notion that 
the State 'creates' its own profits by its own investment is, of course, analogous to the 
contention of Kalecki (1937) 18 that, on similar assumptions, capitalists' spending 'creates' 
capitalists' profits (see also van Dorp, 1937). '9 If, therefore, changes in the price of 
output, and in the profits to which these give rise, are allowed to influence the investment 
decisions of industry, a cumulative tendency will be latent in any acceleration or 
deceleration of investment during the short period. 
This characteristic of the situation is more marked in a Socialist economy (unless its 
investment is centrally planned) because, in so far as wages are the only form of personal 
income and little or nothing is 'saved' out of wages, the demand for finished output is 
identified with the short-period cost of output unless State expenditure is taking place. In 
a capitalist society other incomes than wages exist, and to the extent that expenditure from 
these incomes (measured in real ten-ns) tends to alter inversely with the price of finished 
output, a stabilizing element is introduced; and it is on some such assumption as this that 
traditional writers seem to have relied when they have pictured the system as tending 
towards stable equilibrium, and in particular have treated variations in money wages as an 
equilibrating influence. 20 
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H. 12. vi- Sut)erioriU of the Centrally Planned Investment Mechanism 
Dobb rendered centrally planned investment superior to a decentralized system 
operating under the control of an accounting price or interest rate. It is that by the former 
method investment could be more wisely and consistently planned through time, since 
investment decisions could be taken in the light of fuller knowledge of the data on which 
the rightness or wrongness of such decisions must depend. "This would seem to be so 
crucial an element in the superiority of a socialist over a capitalist economy as to render it 
an essential keystone of a planning system. 9., 21 If, on the other hand, questions of plant 
construction were left to be decided decentrally, according to rule-of-thumb responses to 
accounting prices, the industrial managers who decided these things would be largely 
ignorant of future developments, upon which their decisions ought to depend. It follows 
from the situation in which they are placed that these managers could not have all the 
22 relevant data before them; and this is the crucial difficulty. Since investment represents a 
locking up of resources over time, the 'future' price of capital and the future price of 
products would be relevant to any of the decisions of types 2,3, and 4 referred to above. 
The capitalist entrepreneur takes his decision on the basis of 'expectations' as to the future 
trend of these factors, and because these expectations are necessarily mere guesses, 
mistakes and subsequent jerks in development and fluctuations develop. On what is the 
industrial manager in a socialist economy to base his decision? In order to estimate the 
future trend of interest-rates and the price of his product, he will have to guess not only 
what the State policy with regard to investment is going to be, but what the current 
reaction of industrial managements is going to be to the current interest rate - how much 
current construction work is being undertaken in the economy at large, and its results. In 
other words, the future trend will itself be affected by his own decision and that of all his 
fellow industrialists. It seems inconceivable that this guessing-game can be reduced to any 
simple set of rules. Indeed, it is difficult to see how Lange's accounting price for capital, if 
it is to be a long-term rate, can be a 'trial and error' rate in any significant sense of the 
term, since the process of trial and error that is to test it and adjust it necessarily fies in the 
future, and is itself being influenced by current happenings which, under a regime of 
decentralized investment decisions, are outside the planning authority's immediate control. 
155 
it would seem as though the only accounting price for capital that can properly be said to 
1-. a ,, subject to trial and error, and hence have any tendency to be a 'true rate', is a short- 
term ra e. 
23 
Where decisions cannot be quickly revised, as is the case with long-term investment, it 
would seem to be rational that a series of decisions, each of which affects the others, 
should be co-ordinated in a unified decision instead of being separated into a number of 
autonomous decisions. This is possible with a moderate degree of planning with a wider 
vision. In a planned-socialist economic system where wages, prices, consumption and 
profits are directed according to the investment motive, the role of savings mechanism is a 
dubious matter. 
Savings in a centrally planned economic system is a non-existent phenomenon. In a 
literal sense, there is no savings. Since planned investment is the controlling force, the role 
of savings is irrelevant as far as economic decisions are concerned. The decision of the 
central planners to reduce the consumption of the households is no alternative mechanism 
for savings mechanism. It is this misunderstanding among the socialist planners that 
derailed the investment in the long-run and thereby stagnated the growth of the economy. 
If the socialist state has to survive, the household consumption has to be improved. The 
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THE NEO-SOCIALIST ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL WITH AN 
EMPHASIS ON CONSUMPTION 
During the stage of transitional socialism, tighten the belt approach was thought to be 
the right course; where promises of future but imminent prosperity was given. But when 
this method was continued into the classical socialism, the adherents of socialist principles 
were shattered. Their dream of more consumption was translated into the bleak reality of 
shortage and rationing. The socialist mechanism of capital accumulation, investment and 
production, though gave a new and bright face to socialism, in reality it marred the face of 
the household. 'Me following analyzis, based on the research by Brus and Laski (inspired 
by Kalecki's work and by the Polish experience), stresses the conflict between the then 
rate of consumption and growth, and the factors limiting economic growth, anticipating a 
new trend of giving priority to consumption rather than to production goods; and 
therefore this can be considered as a neo-socialist model of economic growth. The model 
of Kalecki, while emphasizing the necessity of a shift towards consumption, also brings 
out the problems in the theory of growth under socialism. 
11.13J. Dimensions of the Factors of Growth 
'Problems in the theory of growth under socialism., written by W. Brus and K. Laski., 1 
outlines a general approach to the factors of growth. According to them realistic models 
of growth in a socialist economy take as their starting-point the problems of the 
dimensions of available factors of growth. Rather than the problems of aggregate effective 
demand, they emphasize 'supply' as limiting the size and the growth rate of production. 
Factors concerning the 'supply-side' can be dealt with in two ways: first from the point of 
view of current labour (labour reserves and their increase; level of productivity and its 
changes). Viewed thus the gross national income (Y) is determined by the product of 




, ondly, we can approach the same problems from the point of view of stored-up labour 
(stocks of means of production and their increase; effectiveness of means of production 
and its changes). Thus the gross national income can be presented as the product of the 
real productive fixed capital (M) by the effectiveness of this fixed capital (E) defined as 
gross value added per unit of capital, or 
Y= ME (2) 
The model of growth formulated by Kalecki2 (p. 174,2) forms a suitable starting-point for 
the following discussion. 
11.13. ii. Kalecki Model 
On the basis of the methodological assumptions expressed by formula 1, the rate of 
growth of the national income (r) during the period t is determined in this model as 
follows: 
AY/Y = a+p (3) 
where AY is the increment of national income during the period t, i. e. the difference 
between gross national income at the period t and the period t- 1; 
Y is gross national income at the period t-1; 
a is the rate of increase in average productive employment at the period t in relation to 
period t- 1; 
is the rate of increase in average labour-productivity at the period t in relation to period 
1. (The product a. P is omitted as negligible). 
Thus the rate of income growth is the sum of the rate of increase in employment and of 
the rate of increase in productivity. But both the increase in employment and the increase 
in productivity assume at the same time a corresponding increase in real productive fixed. 
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capital and in its effectiveness. Thus the rate of income growth should at the same time be 
expressed in terms of the methodological assumption resulting from formula 2: 
r= AY/Y = ix(l/m)-a+u 
where 
(4) 
1: is gross productive investment in fixed capital (the increase in inventories omitted for 
simplicity) at the period t- 1, put into operation at the period t; 
i= I/Y is the rate of investment or the share of gross productive investment in the gross 
national income at the period t-1; 
m: is the investment outlay necessary to obtain an increase in national income by one unit 
or the ratio I/AY', where AY' is the increase in national income due to investment; 
a: coefficient of the decrease in national income resulting from the actual loss of means of 
production or the diminution in their effective functioning due to physical depreciation; 
u: coefficient of the increase of national income resulting from all kinds of improvements 
raising the effectiveness of the existing real productive fixed capital. 
Kalecki stresses the fact that formula 4 cannot be applied in a capitalist economy, as 
A- - 
mere the coefficient V is not an independent variable and fluctuates gently (even in terms 
of + or -) as a result of the business cycle. On the other hand in a socialist economy in 
normal conditions this coefficient is always positive, reflecting the tendency of continued 
improvement of the existing productive apparatus. It results therefrom that the magnitude 
ix(l/m) becomes a strategic factor detennining the rate of economic growth. This 
argument can be reinforced by emphasizing that in a capitalist economy the rate of 
investment also is not independent of the magnitude 'm', which really determines the 
rentability of investments (assuming a given distribution of income between profits and 
wages) - In comparing the fon-nulae 3 and 4 we see that: a+P = ix(l/m)--ýx+u as 
is obvious, 
since the rate of growth in the national income does not change according as we look at it 
from the point of view of labour or of real productive fixed capital. 
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Full Utilization of the National Growth Potential 
The confrontation of these two aspects is important as it enables us to realize some of 
the interrelations needed to define the optimal rate of growth in given conditions. It is 
obvious that first of all the key magnitude I/Y = i, i. e. the rate of investment must be 
properly established. The degree of complexity of the problem of properly defining the 
rate of investment depends on the degree of variability of the remaining factors to which 
the rate of investment should correspond. "Thus, to obtain the optimal rate of growth, it 
would be necessary to do two things only: first, to establish satisfactorily the 
unequivocally determined rate of investment; secondly, to put into operation a mechanism 
to ensure the actual attainment of such a rate of investment and its maintenance at the 
same level. ýA And yet every step toward reality must mean at the same time a progressive 
relaxation of the assumptions regarding the invariability of the factors present in the model 
under consideration. In reality the rate of growth of available labour resources, as well as 
the rate of productivity, are variable. The coefficients m, a and u have different values at 
different stages, especially when account is taken of different time-horizons. "A fun 
utilization of the growth potential requires in reality a variable rate of growth, and 
therefore also a rate of investment that varies at least at certain intervals of time. "5 
This means that the criteria for the evaluation of the conditions, within the given social 
and economic system, for the optimal process of growth, cannot be limited to the 
possibility of attaining once and for all a definite rate of investment. "These criteria include 
also the essential factor of flexibility in establishing the rate of investment, a proper 
relation, that is, of investment to consumption in the national income. And this flexibility 
must be such that it will not cause a lack of effective aggregate demand in relation to 
productive capacities and thus will not cause any waste of the real growth potential. ý96 A 
socialist planned economy creates more favourable conditions for a full utilization of the 
national growth potential than those created by an economy where the general rate of 
investments depends on the private 'propensity to invest. ' 
11.13. iv. Acceleration of Growth with Existing bour Reserves 
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The rate of growth of the national income (r) existing at the starting period to is below 
the limit set by the labour force (there exists a reserve of population able to work and not 
yet employed) and therefore it can be increased. The assumption of stability in the rate of 
increase of productivity (P), in as much as P depends on the coefficient m, is meanwhile 
maintained. (Polish experience, before 1949, can be cited as a case study in this regard. )8 
We shall examine the variability of the rate of growth at the period of acceleration. 
When a' indicates the rate of growth of the labour-force-supply due to the rate of increase 
of the population with a given ratio of active to total population and a'> a, meaning that 
the rate of increase in employment has been less than the rate of growth of the labour 
force, so that the growth potential was not fully taken advantage of, this would necessitate 
a change from the rate r= a+P to the rate of r' = a'+p (assuming that P remains constant, 
which is not precisely true even when the coefficient m remains unvariable). A change, 
however, from the rate r to the rate r' is a very complicated process which cannot follow a 
uniform path. 9 Though the gradual increase of r to r' means a formal equalization of the 
actual and of the potential rate of growth, the absolute increase of employment in this 
situation is still lower than the absolute increase in labour force. If the above-mentioned 
conditions were stabilized, then employment would grow by a', but simultaneously 
unemployment would grow also, at the same rate, by a'. Thus to stabilize the rate of 
growth after n years in the year t,, at the level r' there must be some moment between the 
period to and the period tn during which the rate of growth r> r', in order to bring the 
economy on to the new course of growth. Only after a period during which the rate of 
growth is sufficient both to absorb the whole current increase in labour force and in 
addition the surplus of labour from the preceding periods, can growth be stabilized at the 
level r'. We have, therefore, the following course of the process of changing the economy 
from the rate of growth r', corresponding to the rate of increase of labour force a': 
r-4r9 -4r'9 --->r' while r< r'< r". 
In Figure Il. 13.1 this process is shown diagramatically. 
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Until the year to the economy grows at the rate r with the rate of investment 1. In the 
year t. (intermediate between the year to and the yeartn Ohe economy attains for the first 
time the rate of growth r' with a rate of investment 1'. The line AB shows the 
development between the year to and t. rMe line BC shows the development from the year 
Ln to tn, when the rate of income growth and the rate of investments must temporarily 
increase above r' and i' to r" and i" to secure the elimination of unemployment. In the 
year tn the economy returns to the rate of growth r' with the rate of investment V. This is 
the rate adapted to the equilibrium balance of the labour force. The change to the new 
stabilized growth goes through the points A--->B-4C->B. This analysis of the probable 
course of the process of absorption of the unutilized labour force and of the elimination of 
this source of difference between the actual and the potential rates of growth confirms the 
complexity of this process. The rate of investment must not only increase but even exceed 
temporarily the long-term optimal level and decrease again later. This requires, among 
other things, even a temporary reversal of the direction of the change in the rate of growth 
and in the rate of investment. 'o 
11.13. v. Acceleration and the Dynamics of Consumpti !: on 
The basic problem is the degree of freedom in determining the ratio of investment to 
current consumption in the national income. The current consumption (defined as Y-1) is 
the more affected, the lower is the starting-point, defined as the relative value r and i, and 
also the lower the starting level of consumption per head of population. The lower is the 
figure r in relation to r' (and also r"), so, ceteris paribus, the larger must be the growth of 
I The growth of i diminishes correspondingly the share of consumption in the national 
income 0-0, and during the period of acceleration it restricts the rate of increase in 
consumption. The consequences of this restriction are the more onerous the lower is the 
level of consumption per head of population. From this point of view of course not only is 
the rate of acceleration of fundamental importance, but also the length of time in which the 
economy is to take the new course of growth. The shorter is n, the more violent is the 
growth of i and the fall of I-i, and the slower is the growth of consumption. 
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Let us now consider in detail the problem of acceleration in relation to the dynamics of 
consumption. In order to simplify we shall not take into consideration all the intermediary 
stages of the course between the points A->B->C->B. Before the year to the economy 
grows at the rate r. There is the same growth of consumption, C. This growth is the sum 
of a+P, which means that P is not only the rate of growth of labour productivity but also 
the rate of growth of average real wages. On the other hand population grows by a'> a so 
that consumption per head grows by a+p--a', or slower than labour productivity and 
average wages P, as a+p--a' <P when a' > a. " By the year t,, the economy will have 
attained the stabilized rate of growth r' = a'+ P. Total consumption will thenceforth 
increase at the same rate. Simultaneously the rate of increase in labour productivity and 
that of average real wages will equal the rate of increase in consumption per head of 
population, which will amount to a'+ P- a' = P. The final effect is satisfactory. 
But what happens during the n years between the year to and t,,? Let us assume that the 
decision to increase the rate of growth was taken in the year to . This, assuming one year 
as period of 'maturing' of investment, leads to a change in the rate of investment in the 
year ti, and to a change in the rate of growth of the national income in the year t2.12 
Essential importance to be attached to the fact, that in the year to, when the decision is 
taken to increase the investment rate in the year ti, a given rate of investment already 
exists, resulting from decision taken in the year t-1. Thus the rate of growth of the national 
income in the year ti and the absolute level of the national income in that year are 
determined completely independent of the fact whether and to what degree the rate of 
investment may change. In such conditions, however, any growth of the investment rate 
does not only mean a reduction of the share of consumption in income - which is always 
true - but it also means that the level of consumption is absolutely below the level which 
would have been attained had the acceleration process not been started in the economy 
concerned. 
Let us denote national income, consumption and investments in the year to by Y, C, and 
I correspondingly. Were there no acceleration, in the year tj these figures would amount 
respectively to Y (1 +r), C (1 +r), and 1 (1 +r). If we intend to accelerate growth and establish 
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a share of investment in income amounting to: i' = 1(1+r)+AI/Y(l+r), then consumption 
would amount to: Y (1 +r) -1 (1 +r) -AI <C (1 +r). 
The rate of increase in consumption in the year tj will be therefore smaller than r= a+P, 
and it must be smaller if acceleration is to be achieved. 13 
11.13. vi. The Limiting Factors of Consumption 
The extent of the limitation of consumption depends on several factors, but above all on 
the magnitude Al which in turn depends on the difference r'-r with the given coefficient m. 
If r' is much larger than r, then Al must also be large and it must Emit relatively strongly 
the consumption in the year ti. It depends further on the magnitude r whether this 
limitation takes the form of a slower growth, a stabilization or an absolute decline. The 
lower r, the greater the danger of stabilization or even of absolute decline of consumption 
in conditions in which it is necessary to increase markedly the rate of income growth. 
Independently, however, of different possible quantitative changes, the phenomenon of 
initial losses of consumption in order to raise the economy to a higher growth path of 
national income and consumption always occurs in the process of acceleration. 
It is illustrated in Figure H. 13.2 (on a logarithmic scale). 
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Figure 
Growth of Consumption in the Process of Acceleration 
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Until the year to the economy (national income = Y, real productive fixed capital = M, 
consumption Q has been growing at a stable rate r= a+P lower than the potential rate 
of growth r' a'+P. In the year to the decision is taken to increase the rate of investment 
in order to adapt it to the available labour force. In order to simplify let us assume that 
there has occurred a single increase in the rate of investment to a magnitude sufficient to 
ensure the absorption of the whole labour surplus (the increase of population and those 
unemployed in the preceding period). The rate of investment will increase initially up to i" 
(coffesponding to the rate of growth of fixed capital r"). Assuming, however, that the 
maturing period of investment is one year, then in the year tj national income continues to 
grow at the rate r. "When the rate of investment is increased, this means a decline in the 
rate of consumption, which in case of drastic changes in proportions may lead even to an 
absolute fall of consumption. , 14 In any case, as it is shown in the diagram, the rate of 
increase in consumption in the year tj is lower than the hypothetical one (that which would 
occur were there no acceleration, indicated by a broken line). In the year t2 the rate of 
growth of national income reaches r", consumption grows correspondingly at the rate r", 
which is higher than the rate r at the initial period. Thus at some moment tk actual 
consumption will reach the level of the hypothetical consumption (the point of intersection 
of the continuous line with the broken one). This moment (year) is described as the 
moment (year) of equalization, and the period between this moment and the moment of 
starting the process of acceleration (tk -to) as the time of equalization. 
15 In the following 
period, if growth continues for a period to be at the rate r", actual consumption will 
exceed hypothetical consumption. In the year t, 1-2, foreseeing the exhaustion of the labour 
surplus during the year tn, the planning authorities will decide to decrease the rate of 
investment for the year tn-1 to i', corresponding to the long-term rate of growth r'. Thus 
between the year tn-2 andtn-1 there will occur a phenomenon inverse to the one observed 
during the interval of time from to to tj: income grows still at the rate r", but with a rate of 
investment i' < i" the increase in consumption is more rapid than r". From the year tn, 
national income., consumption and real productive fixed capital grow at the long-term rate 
r9, which is higher than the initial rate r and corresponds (on the basis of the assumptions 
we have made) to the potential rate of growth cc'+ P. The segment hatched horimntally 
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represents relative losses in consumption (in relation to the hypothetical consumption) 
during the period to- tk, the segment hatched vertically represents the relative gain in the 
periodtk- tj . During the period after the year t, the relative gains are proportionate to the 
difference between the rates of growth r' and r. 
11.13. vii. Acceleration and the Role of Lengthening of the nme 
It is important to realize the part played in the process by the length of time over which 
acceleration takes place. At the end of this period the rate of investment must grow from i 
to i". A lengthening of the time over which the process of acceleration occurs is necessary 
to relieve the conflict between the growth of investment and the level of current 
consumption, as it makes it possible to have a higher rate of investment i" when income 
and consumption have also attained an absolutely higher level. This is the problem facing 
socialist planning, since such planning cannot aim exclusively at a maximum shortening of 
the period of under-utilization of the labour reserve (though theoretically it would be most 
advantageous), but it should aim at what is in the given conditions the best compromise 
between growth with future consumption and the needs of present consumption. 16 
H. 13. viii. The Role of Non-Investment Factors 
From the above analysis it is clear that the strategy of growth during the period 
concerned must emphasize the taking advantage of all possibilities of shortening the period 
of under-absorption of the labour force, just so far as that can be done without damaging 
the actual consumption. "Countries at an intermediate stage of development have at their 
disposal a productive equipment which in conditions of capitalism is not fully utilized 
owing to lack of effective demand. We have, therefore, at the beginning of 
industrialization not only an under-utilized labour force but also some under-utilized 
productive capacity, the mobilization of which does not require any investment outlays. , 17 
With the expansion of investment the violently growing internal demand can be met in 
some measure by the elimination of shorter working weeks, the increase of the number of 
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shifts, and similar measures. We have here an example of the importance of the power of 
rnacro-economic calculation under socialism to take advantage of an existing growth 
potential. An analogous part may be played, for a very short period, indeed, by the 
reduction of repair and period outlay maintenance (provided it does not decrease 
immediately output capacity in proportion to the reduction of outlay), and especially by 
refraining from replacing equipment which is out of date from the economic viewpoint. It 
is true that this equipment gives a very low return, in many cases not even exceeding the 
wages of the workers employed. It makes it possible, however, to use productively the 
surplus labour. Thus we can temporarily increase u and decrease a, increasing the 
difference u-a, which means an increase in the rate of income growth independently of 
changes in i. This factor is of special importance since, unlike ffivestment, it produces very 
quick effects merely by increasing income, in which the share of productive investment 
may be expected to be greatly augmented. The increase of the difference u-a, achieved 
mainly by employing gradually a larger labour force on already existing equipment, can be 
considered as an alternative to applying primitive methods of production in order to take 
advantage of the so-called saving potential existing in incomplete employment. After the 
Second World War this alternative was rather commonly used in socialist countries. 18 The 
influence of the change in the difference u-a on the process of setting the national 
economy on a new path of growth can be illustrated in Figure H. 13.3. 
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Figure 11.13.3. 





in comparison with the Figure 11.13.1, we have here an additional straight line at the 
same inclination (1/m) as the line AC, but at a greater distance from the base of the 
diagram. This distance is greater by the segment A(u-a), which expresses the average total 
effect of the increase of u and of the decrease of a during the period (number of years) in 
which this effect occurs. We assume in this connection, as usually happens in practice, that 
workers additionally employed as a result of the increase in A(u-a) stay there permanently. 
In consequence of this effect, the rate of growth r" is temporarily attained due to the rate 
of investment i'(point B'). When the temporary effect A(u-a) ceases, at the rate of 
investment i9, we descend to point B on the straight line AC. But if at that moment 
unemployment is still existing, we must reach point C, that is increase the rate of 
investment to i99, in order to liquidate unemployment and to come to point B. In view of 
the fact, however, that some part of unemployed was absorbed by taking advantage of the 
effect A(u- a), the period of our stay at point C will correspondingly be shorter, which 
brings, of course, an essential advantage from the point of view of actual consumption. 
Independently of it, an extremely important advantage consists in the fact too, that the rate 
of investment grows from i to i' and eventually from i' to i" when there is an absolutely 
higher level of income, and thus also at an absolutely higher level of consumption. This 
schematic process considers the fact of taking advantage of the effect A(u-a) which 
facilitates the acceleration of the rate of growth in the most difficult initial phase of 
socialist economic planning. 
The additional increase of income due to non-investment factors will consist in the first 
place of capital goods and not of consumption goods. Without previous investment no 
growth in agricultural production is to be expected, and in the countries concerned 
agriculture produces the main part of consumption goods. On the other hand labour 
productivity will grow more slowly when non-investment factors are utilized, than if the 
labour reserve were absorbed by new equipment. There occurs therefore a notable trend 
towards the increase of employment to the detriment of the factor of the increase of 
Productivity. This is related, then, to the problem of the appearance of inflationary 
phenomena in the fft-st stage of socialist industrialization. 19 
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II, 13. ix. Function of the Growth of Labour Produc 
The growth of labour productivity, amounting in the initial variant to P, plays an 
important part in the reduction of strains in consumption caused by the acceleration of 
growth. It is easiest to represent it by denoting the rate of investment as the function of 
the level of labour productivity (W) and of real wages W. We have then 
i= IN = IZ(W-W)/ZW}-l-wiw (5) 
it follows therefrom that the rate of investment depends on the ratio of wages to labour 
productivity, assuming that the whole difference W-w is productively invested. The 
increase of i calls for a decrease in the ratio w/W. When productivity grows by P annually, 
some increase in real wages is compatible with a decrease of the ratio w/W provided that 
the rate of increase of real wages is lower than P. If, however, a significant increase of i is 
required, then the increase of real wages must remain far below P. When is large 
enough, real wages can grow, or at least not fall, even if their trend is far below But if P 
decreases, then the possibility of real wage increase, which is far less than P, falls also. 
When P=0 or W is constant, any increase of i requires unconditionally the fall of w to a 
level determined by the postulated magnitude i. Again when P is positive, but relatively 
low, in general the required magnitude of the rate of investment will not be attained 
without a certain decrease in real wages. "Thus the danger of decrease of real wages is 
greater when investment is linked with non-investment than when investment alone is 
imposed (but within definite limits). v, 20 
But the level of real wages should not be identified with consumption per head. If, when 
investment alone is imposed unemployment lasts longer, then employment is lower also at 
the start. With a given consumption fund, wages will be higher the lower is employment. 
With an additional utilization of non-investment factors A (u-a) employment is higher in the 
first stage, while unemployment is lower. With the same consumption fund, wages will be 
lower if employment is higher. This will be the case also, even when the consumption fund 
is greater, provided that employment is still correspondingly greater. 
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it would seem that this last case was characteristic of the first stage of rapid 
industrialization in Poland. At that period real wages increased very little and in the years 
1951-53 they even decreased markedly. But the increase in employment was so great in 
cornparison with the growth of population that consumption per head grew during the 
whole of this period. Even a stabilization, not to speak of a decrease, in real wages is a 
hard nut to crack for a socialist society. On the other hand, when there is a conflict 
between increase in wages and increase in consumption per head, it is in the general 
interest of the economy to solve it to the benefit of consumption. 21 
The Problem of InflationaCy Phenomena 
In these conditions the danger of inflation generally arises. It occurs when real wages 
cannot rise further, while money wages still must rise by a certain percentage even if only 
because of payment by piece rates. If efficiency grows by P, then money wages grow by 
P/p, where p ýý 1/(l/p) is the coefficient of increase of money wages in relation to the 
increase in productivity. But since real wages are to stay fixed, then prices and costs of 
living must rise also by P/p. Naturally this phenomenon operates more acutely if real 
wages have to decrease at some time, and much less acutely if real wages are able to rise 
though to a smaller degree than the 'natural' increase in money-wages. It should be 
remembered that during the phase of rapid industrialization of a country the growth of 
average money wages is strongly influenced by rapid changes in the structure of 
employment arising from the transformation of the general economic structure. 
Employment increases most rapidly in heavy industry and in building, where relative 
wages are high, as is necessary to attract labour in the desired direction. The resulting 
increase of average money wages becomes an inevitable additional factor increasing the 
inflationary pressure. 22 This is the problem of inflationary phenomena in the introductory 
stage of socialist industrialization. 
We have considered the problems relating to the process of the acceleration of growth by 
employing for production unemployed and hitherto surplus labour. The increase of the 
ratio of active participation renders possible growth at a higher rate, but only so long as 
176 
there exist conditions favourable to the increase of this ratio. The ratio of participation of 
the population depends in a great measure on expenditure on social institutions (e. g. 
cr&hes and kindergartens which make possible an increase in the participation ratio of 
women) an in certain other forms (transportation facilities, hostels for workers, etc. ). The 
possibility of allocating funds, to education and professional training of skilled personnel 
and for health measures and other socio-economic purposes, directly by the planning 
authorities according to the criteria of socio-economic productivity - without having to 
depend on private 'propensity' to meet these needs adequately - is widely adopted in 
23 socialist countries. This is shown by many indices reaching, and even exceeding, the 
levels of highly developed capital countries, let alone countries at the same level of general 
development. 
II. 13. xi. Acceleration of Growth and Technical Progress 
The 'rejuvenation' of capital stock, according to Kalecki (1970), is the increase of the 
proportion of new capital in the total of all capital. If we raise the rate of increase in 
employment, a corresponding growth in average labour productivity will follow. It will be 
higher than P, though the incremental labour productivity of the newly employed grows at 
a stable rate P. The effect of the 'rejuvenation' of capital stock will naturally disappear 
gradually as the process advances, but this does not diminish its importance. It is clear, 
therefore, that changes in the rate of increase in employment, and even more so changes in 
the structure of employment, are bound to influence the dynamics of labour productivity. 
"The basic factor in the increase of labour productivity is technical progress, a factor that 
is fundamentally different in character. "24 Change in the rate of increase of labour 
productivity acquires a special importance in conditions when the possibilities of raising 
the rate of increase in employment are exhausted. If the rate of employment growth a' 
cannot be increased, the only way to raise the rate of growth r' is to raise the rate of 
increase in labour productivity P. We shall proceed to the analysis of this question. 
Variability of the rate of growth during the acceleration period can be detennined by the 
technical progress and the choice of the rate of growth. In view of the co-existence of 
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methods of productio, 125 embodying different degrees of mechanization (including also 
degrees of automatization), planning authorities aimmig to accelerate the existing rate of 
growth may decide to raise the degree of mechanization of investment goods. Let us 
assume that, during the period preceding this decision, the process of growth was 
stabilized at a fixed rate of growth r' = a'+p and continued for at least n years, 
representing the average period of life of the different constituents of the real productive 
fixed capital. Included in this assumption is not only the rate of growth of average labour 
productivity, but also the rate of growth of incremental labour productivity, defined as the 
ratio of labour productivity attained in completed investments put into operation in the 
year t. to labour productivity achieved in investments put into operation in the year 
Any increase in labour productivity greater than P and any rate of income growth 
greater than r' will be the result of the above-mentioned decision. But in these 
circumstances, the coefficient m will increase too. An increase of the coefficient m is 
inevitable with increasing mechanization and a given state of technical knowledge. Were it 
possible to increase the rate of growth of labour productivity without any increase of m, 
there would be no reason to choose methods of production absolutely worse than others 
co-existing at that time. The increase of the coefficient m is the price to be paid for a 
higher rate of labour productivity resulting from higher mechanization. Let us assume that 
planning authorities decide on such a single increase of the coefficient m to m' . Let us 
assume that it will lead to a considerable single growth of incremental labour productivity 
by more than P and in the following years the incremental labour productivity will 
continue to grow by p. 26 This will in turn lead to the process shown in Figure 11.13.4. 
178 
Figur 
Acceleration of Growth and Technical ProgLess 
179 
This single increase of the capital coefficient from m to m' is expressed by a lower 
inclination of the straight line having the direction coefficient 11M. We assume that the 
single increase of incremental labour productivity, achieved by this decision, will imply a 
rate of average labour productivity amounting to P'. And accordingly the increase will 
grow for once by r" = a'+P'., but as point B indicates this wiR require an increase in the 
rate of investment from P to i" . It will be impossible, however, to keep up this rate of 
investment with the given assumptions. We have assumed that the realization of 
investment at the coefficient m' gives a rate of growth of incremental labour productivity, 
amounting still to (I Accordingly the increase of average labour productivity, which for 
once was P'.. will decrease and tend to (I It will reach it after n years, during which the 
entire productive equipment will 'change' into a new capital coefficient m. Thus during 
the period of 'change' of the productive equipment we shaH have to deal with a decline of 
the rate of increase of average labour productivity from P' to (ý and together with it, a 
decline of the rate of income growth from r" to r'. This process will be accompanied by a 
fall of the investment rate from i" to P'. At this rate of investment, the rate of growth wiH 
again become r' = a4p, but the absolute increment of income will be larger than were 
they achieved without changing the productive equipment to a new capital coeffiCient. 27 
Thus the whole process follows the line A-ýB-->C, as we have already seen earlier. 
(Kalecki, 1960). 
"In considering whether to accelerate growth by utilizing the labour surplus - that is by 
eliminating unemployment - there is no choice for a socialist state whether 'to accelerate., 
or not to accelerate'. There is no question regarding the advantage and necessity of 
utilizing the possibility created by socialism of accelerating the rate of growth. "2' The 
matters of choice are only the forms and the speed of the process. In emphasizing the 
specific difficulties involved in changing the productive equipment into a higher m, it 
should be remembered at the same time that, after the initial reserves have been exhausted, 
this is the main means to accelerate the rate of growth, and also that we have then to deal 
with an economy that is much more mature in all respects, and with an absolutely higher 
level of consumption. It is thus an economy capable of solving much more complex 
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problems. The experience gained from the second stage of industrialization in Poland fully 
confirms this view. 
H. 13. xii. Three Lýpes of Technical Progress 
We assumed that the single increase of the coefficient m increases labour productivity, 
but the incremental labour productivity at a new capital coefficient amounting to m' 
continues to grow by P, as it did with the previous coefficient m. Whether this will be so 
depends on the type of technical progress, and this cannot be predicted theoretically. It is 
quite possible that the incremental labour productivity with the capital coefficient m' will 
not grow by (ý but by more than [i If this happened after having changed the productive 
apparatus into a new degree of capital intensity, the rate of income growth would be 
stabilized at a level higher than r. The opposite would occur if the single increase of the 
capital coefficient should yield an increase of incremental labour productivity lower than fl 
It is clear, therefore, that the gain from changing the productive equipment to a higher m 
will be different, ceteris parihus, with each of these three possibilities, arising from the 
type of technical progress in the period concerned: if there is a possibility of securing an 
incremental labour productivity greater, than P there will be clear incentives to increase the 
capital-intensity; if the possibility of increasing the incremental labour productivity is lower 
than fý the opposite situation will arise (an this is not only in regard to increasing the 
capital-intensity but even maintaining it); if there is the possibility of securing an 
incremental labour productivity equalling fý there will be no incentive whatever in either 
direction. On the basis of such reasoning, Kalecki deduces his criteria differentiating the 
types of technical progress, defining the first as encouraging capital-intensity, the second 
as discouraging capital-intensity, and the third as neutral. 29 With given preferences, the 
planning authorities will be the more disposed to apply additional mechanization designed 
to increase labour productivity and thus to accelerate the rate of growth, the more capital- 
intensive is the type of technical progress. 
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This brief sketch of the problems of adjusting the rate of growth in the light of technical 
progress seems to confirm the significance of production-relations in taking advantage of 
national growth potential and the favourable conditions in this respect created by 
socialism. The importance is again evident of planned determination of basic macro- 
economic magnitudes and of possible flexibility in adapting the rate of investment to the 
varying requirements of the different stages of the development process. Apart from this 
the problems involved in raising the rate of growth in different conditions of technical 
progress, bring to light the role of the time-horizon in taking advantage of growth 
potential. The broad time-horizon of central planning authorities in a socialist economy 
renders possible the mobilization of such factors of growth of which otherwise advantage 
30 could not be taken. 
H. 13. xiii. Factors Limiting the Rate of Growth 
The examination of the problem enables us to realize better the relevance of some of the 
problems to the strategy of growth and to visualize the opportunities created by socialism 
to apply this strategy. But we cannot overlook some of the inevitable difficulties met in the 
rapid process of growth under socialism. We are concerned not only with obvious issues, 
as frictions and planning mistakes while the rate of growth is being changed and the 
sectoral. proportions involved are changing too. We are concerned with problems of a 
more general character. What are the factors limiting freedom to determine the rate of 
growth. 
H. 13. xiv. Issues of Foreien Trade 
Kalecki was the first to study these problems and he proved that the difficulties 
connected with the acceleration of the rate of growth are related above all to foreign 
trade, and this both directly and indirectly. In countries strongly dependent on imports of 
investment goods and, especially, of raw materials (most countries, including Poland), the 
acceleration of growth implies directly the necessity to increase imports and - with a well- 
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balanced foreign trade - exports. To overcome these difficulties, it may be necessary to 
make some less profitable exports or even to take measures against imports. Thus the 
corresponding investment will have a comparatively high capital coefficient. But this is 
possible only to some degree. In every situation there exists a certain limit imposed by 
foreign trade which cannot be exceeded; it may be nearer or further from the existing rate 
of growth, but it will not allow the rate to exceed a certain maximum magnitude. 31 
It should also be borne in mind that foreign trade is the universal remedy for a number of 
difficulties arising during the acceleration of growth, quite apart from any necessity to 
increase imports. These difficulties are the familiar 'bottlenecks', which determines the 
trend of the whole economy. These 'bottlenecks' may take the form of a shortage of 
natural resources; of a shortage of highly qualified technical personnel and experienced 
workers; or of a shortage of personnel in some regions while there is satisfactory balance 
of supply and demand for the labour force as a whole. They may take the form of delays of 
in planning and completing investment projects in some sectors; of limited production 
capacity in design of office and building enterprises, and so on. Such difficulties may be, 
and are, overcome by widening these 'bottlenecks' and by adjusting them to the needs of 
the national economy rather than by adjusting the economy to them. But it often requires 
additional investment. 
There is no question that the development of co-operation between socialist countries is 
diminishing foreign trade difficulties, especially when acceleration takes place 
simultaneously in all or most of the countries concerned. But since 'bottlenecks' occur, 
none the less, in all socialist countries and since relations between these countries and the 
non-socialist countries exist and are expanding, the difficulties described above emerge 
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sooner or later when it is attempted to raise the rate of growth above some level . 
The increase of the capital coefficient involved in overcoming difficulties in foreign trade 
and in removing 'bottlenecks' plays an essential part in giving effect to decisions 












The planning authority is prepared to introduce some limitation on current consumption 
and to raise the rate of growth from ro to rl, or pass from point A to point B by increasing 
the rate of investment from io to ii. This implies that the capital coefficient grows from m 
to m'l- which increases the average labour productivity from f3o to P1. But to attain the rate 
of growth ri, difficulties in foreign trade must be overcome and 'bottlenecks' must be 
removed - the price to be paid for it is the further increase of the capital coefficient to m". 
Thus the point B is unattainable and the rate of income growth ri is represented by point C 
with the rate of investment i2. But though the planning authorities were willing to increase 
the rate of investment to ii as the price of gaining the rate of growth r1l it is doubtful that 
they would be willing to make a much greater effort, that is to increase the rate of 
investment to i2, to obtain the same result. To simplify the problem we assume that the 
planning authorities are willing to increase io only up to ii - considering for some reason 
that this is the optimum in given conditions - then they will plan a rate of growth indicated 
at point D, that is r2< rl. This means that in the event of foreign trade difficulties and 
'bottlenecks' appearing, the planning authorities choose a lower acceleration of the rate of 
growth rather than the acceleration to which they would have given priority were there no 
difficulties or 'bottlenecks'. Finally, on the vertical axis the magnitude r,,,,, is shown, 
corresponding to the share of investment in the income at the capital coefficient m"' 
which results in these conditions and is sufficient to overcome the difficulties mentioned. If 
the planning authorities were willing to increase the share of investment in the income 
higher than 4., in order to attain a rate of growth higher than r, then this willingness 
would be faced by an impassable Emit (a deadline) of the maximum magnitude of 
acceleration of growth. Thus the real range of choice for the planning authorities, when ro 
is a rate correlated with the balance of labour force at a given magnitude Po, is within the 
magnitudes represented by ro - 
11.13. xv. Comments on Macro-Micro Economic Decisions 
We shall conclude this analysis by making some comments on the relations between 
macro-and micro-economic decisions. In the first place we should mention work designed 
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to improve and develop the techniques of co-ordination calculus and of optimization of 
the plan. We refer here to the work devoted to the analysis of input-output, both from the 
theoretical and the technical point of view, and to work on the theory and the technique of 
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programming. We have touched on the problem of relations of the highest central level 
and the lower levels in a socialist economy. This problem is fundamental from the point of 
view of growth. The starting point of the discussion, on the model of the functioning of a 
socialist economy on the premises of centralization and decentralization, was the thesis 
that, with the raising of the economy to a higher stage of development, the complexity of 
economic problems grows also. With it, there is a growing importance of such factors as: 
the flexibility of adjustment of the structure of supply to the structure of demand (both in 
production and in consumption); economically justifiable substitution of different forms of 
expenditures; expansion of different enterprises and sectors related to their economic 
achievements. It was just from this point of view that excessive centralization was 
criticized, since this takes the form of concentrating nearly all decisions at the highest level 
and passing targets and resources to lower echelons only in the form of orders and 
physical allocations. As a result, the functions of lower echelons (particularly in 
enterprises) were limited to pure execution of orders only. The discussion showed that the 
problem of centralization and decentralization under socialism cannot be considered in 
terms of centralization or decentralization of all economic decisions. It is to be noted that 
the problem of creating institutional conditions favourable to the fun use of potential 
growth does not disappear once the socialist system is built. Socialism overcomes a 
number of fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system; this does not mean, 
however, that it eliminates all contradictions of every kind, nor that it avoids creating new 
contradictions arising from the characteristics of the socialist system as such. This implies 
a necessity for continual search for optimal institutional forms to solve these 
contradictions, and especially to adapt the functioning system of a socialist economy to the 
various stages of development, both from a purely economic point of view and a socio- 
political one. A socialist socio-economic system provides a possibility of different 
solutions of the method of functioning of the economy, thus allowing choice of 
alternatives in this field also, within certain obvious limits . 
34 Our analysis of the model 
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developed by Brus and Laski, which is based on the works of Kalecki, shows not only the 
interplay of consumption and production but also the inherent problems of a socialist 
system. We shall proceed to make a critique of the socialist economic system based on the 
applied core economic growth models which we have endogenized in our study. 
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A CRITIQUE OF THE APPLIED MODELS OF GROWTH UNDER 
SOCIALISM 
Our survey of the socialist growth models together with the dynamics and structure of 
the socialist state reveals the strength and the flaws of the centrally planned economic 
system. We shall proceed to make a critique of the applied socialist economic growth 
path. 
11.14J. A Stream of ThoUgh 
The writings of Marx and Engels illustrate the general features of the two stages of 
communism: socialism, 'the lower phase' in which all the countries mentioned in our study 
can be said to be, and communism, 'the higher phase'. The ABC of Communism, written 
during the civil war, by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, represents an extreme position but 
one that was then held by the majority of party intellectuals, who espoused a moneyless 
economy and a direct leap into socialism. Bukharin also wrote the important Economics of 
the Transition Period, which expressed similar views. He anticipated the imminent 
withering away of economics under socialism: there would be no room for markets and 
prices when goods are allocated consciously by society. Lenin did not go quite so far as 
this. The bitter experience of war communism led him to attach great importance to 
markets, prices and trade in his last years of political life. By 1921 the New Economic 
Policy was adopted, this being a compromise between market forces and peasantry. The 
state kept hold of the 'commanding heights" of the economy (large-scale industry, 
banking, foreign trade) while permitting private enterprise in industry and trade and basing 
its relations with the peasantry on purchase and sale. 
In our analyzis of Preobrazhensky, we note that he highlights the problems actually 
faced by Lenin's successors since they viewed the New Economic Policy differently. While 
Bukharin became the chief protagonist of caution and of an affiance with the peasantry, 
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which meant a moderate rate of capital investment, Trotsky demanded faster growth and 
action against the richer peasants. Preobrazhensky sided with Trotsky and in his New 
Economics, in which he wrote about primitive socialist accumulation, he was advocating a 
more rapid transfer of resources from the private (principally peasant) sector to the state 
sector, as we have noted in our analyzis. The implied challenge to the then dominant 
official policy led him into spirited polemics with Bukharin, who was at that time backed 
by Stalin. But as we have noted, in due course Stalin split with his ally and launched his 
revolution from above, with rapid industrialization and forcible collectivization; also in the 
great purges that followed both Bukharin and Preobrazhensky as did many other 
economists, politicians, generals, writers, perished. In our survey of the socialist growth 
models, we also noticed that Fel'dman, an officer of the Gosplan, was given the task of 
preparing a theoretical framework for a general plan, extending over a period of ten to 
twenty years, to be drafted by Gosplan alongside the first five-year plan. Starting from 
Marx's schemes of expanded reproduction, Fieldman built a two-sector model of 
acceleration of economic growth and thus became a pioneer Marxist growth theorist. His 
model expresses the foundations of the Soviet strategy for economic growth until the mid- 
1950's, based on priority for heavy industry and production goods; the same strategy was 
passively followed by the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe after the war. In our 
study of the dynamics of socialsim, we also noted the view that the state 'creates' its own 
profits by its own investment and discussed the role of prices (including the interest rate) 
in investment planning and pointed out that savings in socialist state is a negative notion. 
Our analyzis based on the research by Brus and Laski (inspired by Kalecki's work and by 
the Polish experience), pointed towards the then existing conflict between consumption 
and growth, and the factors limiting economic growth, anticipating the new trend of giving 
2 priority to consumption rather than to production goods. These chain of thought 
modelled the growth strategy of the socialist state at its various phases of development. 
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Growth Performance Duting the Period of Classical Socialism 
The results of forced growth can be summed up by using the following tables. Tables 
I1.14A, 11.14.. 2, and 11.14.3 give the aggregate growth indices for several socialist 
countries and compare these with similar growth indices for capitalist countries. 
TABLE 11.14.1 
te Output: Intemational Compariso 
Average Annual Growth Rate 
1961-70 1971-80 1981-88 
Socialist Countries 
Bulgaria 5.8 2.8 1.2 
Czechoslovakia 2.9 2.8 1.4 
East Germany 3.1 2.8 1.8 
Hungary 3.4 2.6 1.0 
Poland 4.2 3.6 0.8 
Romania 5.2 5.3 -0.1 
Soviet Union 4.9 2.6 2.0 
Capitalist Countries 
Austria 4.7 3.6 1.7 
France 5.6 3.2 1.9 
Greece 7.6 4.7 1.5 
Italy 5.7 3.8 2.2 
Japan 10.5 4.6 4.0 
Netherlands 5.1 2.9 1.3 
Portugal 6.4 4.7 2.2 
Spain 7.3 3.5 2.6 
United States 3.8 2.7 3.2 
West Germany 1 4.5 1 2.7 1 1.7 
Source: J Kornai (1992, p. 200); compiled by J. Arvay, based on P. Marer et A (1991) 
for socialist countries and OECD (1991) for capitalist countries. 
Note that socialist output data refer to GNP, while capitalist output data refer to GDP- 
TABLE 11.14.2 
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jcth Rate of Aggregate Output in the Soviet Union and the United States 
Average Annual GDP Growth Rates (percent) 
Source: W. D. Nordhaus (1990) based on A. Maddison (1989, p. 36) 
TABLE 11.14.3 
Growth Rate of Aggregate Output: China Compared to Capitalist Countries 
Average Annual GDP Growth Rates (percent) 
Under the classical system, though we note that the growth performance is substantial, it 
is still questionable if it emerges that the data must be revised. (See, Appendix 5, where an 
international comparison of official and alternative estimates of growth are shown). The 
statement that classical socialism certainly took many countries from a state of severe 
backwardness at least to a medium level of development, is again debatable. What we can 
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Source: J. Echeverri-Gent (1990, p. 105). 
observe is that leaders of the socialist countries are inclined to attach high intrinsic value 
to the fast growth or even make a fetish out of growth rate for aggregate output and go 
for its increase at any price. An impartial observer, however, cannot accept this short- 
sighted criterion of evaluation. Even if the rate should be high in some socialist country or 
other, at least for a period, the question remains: what sacrifice had to be made for that 
growth rate? And what kind of economic structure lies behind the aggregate index? The 
price paid for forcing growth is very high. It involves a great deal of abnegation and 
causes contemporaries much suffering. At the same time, this type of growth undermines 
its own economic performance. Even where a high growth rate is attained initially, it 
cannot be kept up; sooner or later, the growth rate starts to fall more and more 
conspicuously. Each generation leaves a baleful legacy for the next - of grave, postponed, 
and increasingly urgent tasks, and of an economy with a disharmonious structure. 3 
H. 14. iii. Growth Poligy During the Period of Classical Socialism 
The policy position on growth under the classical system is unambiguous: as fast growth 
as possible has to be attained in the medium term, regardless of cost or sacrifice. That 
expresses itself in the priorities and methods applied in the strategy of forced growth, as 
we have noticed. During the process of reform, this clear-cut line gives way to 
ambivalence and in many cases downright schizophrenia. The leadership half wants to 
continue the forced growth, and half inclines to slow it in favour of quicker results in 
improving the standard of living and rectifying the previous disproportions. Both these 
conflicting attitudes are backed up by the influence of a range of factors. The leadership in 
several countries is distressed that the growth rate is slowing down, and the sight 
4 strengthens further its determination to combat the declining trend . Among the reasons 
behind the deceleration is that the potential for using the earlier extensive methods of 
attaining fast growth is being exhausted. This primarily relates in the European socialist 
countries to the exhaustion of the surplus of labour. 5The leadership repeatedly announces 
a policy switch to intensive methods of growth, the strategy of "the new road of growth, " 
but it proves impossible to apply under the conditions of the existing economic system. So 
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at times of acceleration, it tries the most immediate method of effecting growth centrally, 
which is to increase investment. That brings us directly to one of the impulses behind a 
source of tension, namely, overheating of investment activity. 
in the discussion of the motives for moving on from the classical system, the first to be 
rnentioned was the slowing of growth, to which the counter-reaction was the "growth at 
any price" attitude just outlined. But no less important a motive behind the reform is the 
dissatisfaction of the general public. Deciding how economic policy should react to that 
poses a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the ratio of accumulation to consumption must 
be altered in the latter's favour, so that the growth in real consumption can speed up at 
last. But on the other hand, people's living conditions and the quality of life are governed 
not merely by the flow of goods consumption, but by the capital accumulated by the 
sectors directly serving consumption: their stock of equipment and buildings. A fast and if 
possible instant increase in consumption requires a fall in the share of investment, while a 
rise in investment is needed in the sectors directly affecting the quality of life. Within the 
general dilemma of investment versus consumption, there arises the specific dilemma of 
how to reallocate the investment among the sectors. The traditional beneficiary from the 
priorities of the classical system is industry, notably heavy industry. It now feels doubly 
threatened and applies more pressure to obtain its accustomed investment "allowances. " If 
development of the previously neglected sectors actually begins, for instance, if the pace 
of housing construction increases, the high capital requirement of this activity draws 
investment resources from the "internal spiral" directly inducing growth and causes 
growth rate to Slow .6 Whereupon the 
dilemma becomes even more acute: should the ratio 
of investment be reduced at all., and to what sectors should the resources be transferred? 
There is no real solution to the problem. There is alternate acceleration and deceleration 
of investment, and an oscillation can also be seen in the reallocation of investment in 
favour of the service sectors! But if either of the constituents of this schizophrenic 
condition does come out on top, it tends to be the element of the ambiguous policy that 
inclines toward forced growth. This behaviour has become a conditioned reflex for the 
bureaucracy. Implanted in the decision makers by the official ideology they have digested 
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is the feeling that the faster production grows, the stronger the system becomes. The 
forcing of growth is a spontaneous inclination, whereas the other attitude of making 
concessions in favour of consumption and investment to serve consumption is suggested 
more by common sense, possibly backed up by fear at the sight of mass dissatisfaction. 
unsurprisingly, the bureaucracy constantly relapses from the self-compelling, pro-living 
standards attitude into its natural, pro-growth behaviour. 8 
11.14. iv. A Socialist-Soul-Searching 
The applied Marxian socialist mechanism of economic growth and development came to 
a historical end with the collapse and demise of the Soviet Union and the COMECON 
community. The dream of the heroes and heroines of the 'heroic age' during the period of 
transitional socialism remained a dream. The initial phase of the classical socialism 
witnessed an economic boom due to the forced application of the extensive methods. The 
illusory stage of socialism resulted in the development of an oasis. The oasis dried up as 
the exploitation of available resources exhausted. The panic-stricken leaders of socialist 
state turned to intensive methods only to realize that they are far behind the developed 
economies of the world. The catch-up urge resulted in brutal and inhuman models of 
development. The revelation of the social cost of socialist growth and development 
undermined the lofty principles of socialism. The guardians of socialist state became 
annihilators of the socialist ideals. In the name of socialism, wars were fought, nations 
were conquered, cultures were dismantled and human dignity was robed and destroyed. 
Nations after nations suffered and people after people were stripped of their human worth 
under socialist regime under the iron curtain. All the brutality of the socialist agents could 
not bend the human spirit to the socialist states' desired motives. The free spirit of the 
human person triumphed over the applied socialism, when the Berlin wall was tom down, 
to the cheers of millions of socialist subjects all over the world. They realized that they had 
nothing to loose except the inhuman chains that controlled them for decades. The 
principles of glasnost and perestroika freed true socialism from being exposed and 
exploited any further. The human ideal and understanding of true socialism could not 
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succumb to the tortures of institutionalised socialism. This is the victory of the human 
culture of macro-knowledge. (Please refer to chapter seven of section one). 
11.14. v. Introduction of Nficro Knowle&e as an Economic System 
In our identification of the Knowledge Sector, in chapter seven of section one, we have 
modelled a dual sector of micro-macro knowledge. Here, we shall try to make a step 
further of our understanding of micro knowledge. As we have already noted, the micro 
knowledge can be developed or moulded and applied. 'Me application of micro knowledge 
could be a reason for dynamism or stagnation in the process of development. In section 
two we have been familiarising ourselves with an applied growth path, that of socialism. 
This applied model of socialism can be considered as a form of micro knowledge. The 
exponents of this applied micro knowledge believed in the efficacy of this as an economic 
system. They thought that by introducing a new form of micro knowledge, they would 
replace the existing macro knowledge and therefore they did not consider the relevance of 
the macro knowledge. They thought that macro knowledge, i. e., national way of thinking 
or philosophy, could easily be replaced by a micro knowledge, i. e., an ideology, namely, 
Marxism and its offshoots. The ulterior objective was to develop the culture of 
communism as the dominant macro knowledge. Here, we encounter a few contradictions. 
The introduction of a micro knowledge through 'one ideology' of Marxism in view of 
'one objective' of communism, to be evolved as a macro knowledge, faces with the first 
contradiction. 
11.14. vi. First Contradiction: Ideologl versus PhilosWhv 
Can we associate the vociferous process of economic development of a nation with the 
philosophical trends that silently reside in the national consciousness? Does the way of 
thinking influence the way of economic behaviour? Does economics determine philosophy 
or vice versa? We are familiar with ideologies which model economics. In section two, we 
have been trying to understand an economic model within the framework of a Marxist- 
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socialist ideology. Even the so-called Marxian philosophy is only a form of micro 
knowledge and therefore an ideology. But philosophy is not an ideology. Philosophy is the 
authentic existing macro knowledge. Falsity cannot exist in philosophy. Ideology results in 
fundamentalism, even economic fundamentalism, which can be detrimental to economic 
development for it cuts the existential human needs. It creates a world of division: North 
vs. South; rich vs. poor; bourgeois vs. proletariat etc. But philosophy is something that 
transcends ideology. Ideology is created in a short time while philosophy evolves in a 
process of internalization of a civilization which happens in the long-run. Thus even an 
ideology that determines or models economics, in the course of time, gives way to 
philosophy. Thus philosophy can give the final judgement about an ideology which has 
become the base for the economic action or inaction of a nation. And while giving the 
judgement, philosophy evolves as a corrective measure of a wrong ideology or an 
evaluative rod which balances ideology and economic advancement. Thus, in our analyzis 
we could apply and evaluate the particular ideology by the macro knowledge and this 
would enable us to understand the relevance of the way of thinking that does influence 
economic behaviour of a nation. 
We shall use the subjective dissimilarities or paradoxes of the socialist economic system 
to prove our point. First, human being as a free economic being is the source of any 
economic action. The experience of the economic individual under a socialist economic 
system, by and large as we have seen, was a stifling one due to the imposition of state 
rigidity. This experience of the 'free economic being versus state rigidity' is a subjective 
one because it is the individual who suffers the contradiction (scale of time-immediate). 
Second, unlimited human wants and scarcity of resources is a fact of economic life. Under 
a regime of ideology, unfulfilled promises become the source of false generosity. Without 
consideration to the truth of the scarcity of natural and other resources, the agents of the 
socialist state (e. g. leaders-planners) act generously by an exploitative mechanism of 
plundering. This experience of the 'scarce resources versus false generosity' is, again, a 
subjective one because it is the leaders-planners who suffer the contradiction (scale of 
time-too late). Third, the growth model of the socialist economic system, as we have seen, 
results in forced-superficial growth. When the real worth is tested, it collapsed with a big 
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bang. The socialist economic system proved itself superficial without any real worth of its 
own. This experience of the 'real worth versus forced superficial growth' is therefore a 
subjective one because it is the system and hence the economy suffers the contradiction 
(scale of time-distant). These subjective dissimilarities unfold the dynamism of the first 
contradiction of the socialist economic system. It is the triumph of macro knowledge 
(philosophy-the national way of thinking) over the micro knowledge of an ideology, 
Marxian socialist system and therefore its coflapse is naturally justified. 
11.14. vii. Second Contradiction: Political Consolidation Vs. Economic Vision 
Marxian socialist model had an inherent structural imbalance. At the dawn of historical 
socialism, this contradiction became more conspicuous. While the consolidation of 
economic mode of production through the proletarian victory made the economic 
consolidation easy, the political consolidation became a stumbling block. Marx did not 
develop a political structure of the proletariat for the fulfilment of the socialist revolution. 
As we have seen in our analysis, the emerging revolutionary leaders designed a political 
structure of consolidation which was detrimental to socialist ideals. The feudafist- 
capitalist-bourgeoise political structure of the socialist state underniined the victory of 
socialism. In this sense, they could not replace political capitalism with political socialism. 
Every step towards the political consolidation resulted in a systemic failure. Gradual 
decaying of a political system inevitably lead to the final collapse of any economic system. 
Socialist political collapse could be described as a systematic failure of a system which 
could not find a resonation between the socialist aspiration of economics and pohtics. 
When the iron curtain was removed, we were able to see the decay and the inherent 
contradiction that exists between the political and economic nature of a socialist system. 
The ideological micro knowledge of an economic system failed to integrate with a macro 
knowledge of common sense. 
11.14. viii. Third Contradiction: Applicational Faults 
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our analysis of the introduction of a micro knowledge based on an ideology of Marxian 
socialism, points out a few applicational faults. The macro knowledge of socialism 
was/is/Will be a living phenomenon. Ancient civilizations and medieval cultures and 
modem nations vied to be socialist. But, true socialist longing came to an end with the 
first victim of applied socialism. The experience of historical socialism was against the 
macro knowledge of socialist ideals. This was due to the faulty application of an ideology 
by an administrative hierarchy who were victims rather than result of a system. A victim 
would never opt to be a master of a system which has made him a victim. S/he would live 
always in that pre-victim stage. The role model of a socialist was a capitalist. The socialist 
model has been interpreted and applied to satisfy the immediate needs, by these longing 
6would-be capitalists' in the mantle of socialists. This contradicts with the eternal vision of 
socialism towards communism. True socialism did not happen. Marxist vision of 
communism would never blossom. Applied socialism removed the vision of communism 
and this in turn corrupted historical socialism. This explains why the micro knowledge, 
rather than being a growth factor, became a non-growth factor in the working of a 
socialist state. Overcoming a stagnant and decaying applied micro knowledge has become 
the sole objective of the 'non-administrative hierarchy' of the socialist state. The vision of 
'one-ideology and one objective' of the socialist state collapsed. The micro knowledge of 
an ideology could not have any impact on the macro knowledge of the way of thinking of 
the people and their aspirations in spite of a whole applied mechanism of fatal apparatus. 
This is the super-success of the macro knowledge over micro knowledge as an ideology 
oriented economic system. At every juncture of the historical socialism, it is the macro 
knowledge which challenged the validity of the application of micro knowledge. The 
failure of historical socialism and Soviet Union and COMECON community, is the success 
story of the strength of macro knowledge that subsists in every nation and cultures. The 
emergence of transitional economies from the ashes of historical socialism have to be 
understood as a true longing of the people to live according to the culture of macro 
knowledge. 
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14. ix. The Arrival of Socialism 
In the existing economic systems which are based on the principles of Capitalism, 
contrary to the general opinion, there is a huge public sector. The bureaucrats and 
technocrats of The Culture of Contentment of Galbraith is a good example. 9 Of course, 
this is being complemented by the private sector. As capitalism ripens, competitive market 
mechanism plays its role. A gradual privatization of the existing public sector is being 
visioned and implemented, as it is happening in Britain and other developed market- 
economy oriented countries. This was the pre-condition for the Marxist vision of 
socialism. Marx hoped that the total capitalist privatization would lead to the emergence 
of the industrial proletariat. This has not yet happened in any of the developed capitalist 
economies. Moreover, industrial proletariat were given a fairer treatment than was 
expected by Marx. This is due to the application of Marxian insights into the capitalist 
mode of production, distribution and consumption. In this sense, contrary to general 
belief, Marx has become the saviour of capitalism. 
When full capitalist-privatization coupled with proletariat-exploitation of the Marxian 
range occurs, socialist revolution could happen. But this is far from reality and is a wishful 
and utopian dream. This is a negative understanding of socialism. Even if capitalist- 
privatization is completed, the exploitation of the proletariat would not happen as Marx 
predicted, because of the post-Marxian approach to welfare. Only if the social welfare 
system collapses, and the discontent of the working-class accumulates, the problem arises; 
strikes and demonstration of a transformatory system echoes; and the entertainment of 
capitalist-privatization comes to an end. From the ashes of capitalist-privatization, a form 
of public ownership is envisaged. But here the lessons of history become the guide to 
further march. A new mode of production is to be envisaged and modelled. The feasibility 
and viability of the public ownership of the means of production coupled with market 
mechanism and all its functions are to be taken into account. This is a new form of 
socialism. It is to be modelled on the existing macro knowledge of each nation which 
wants to participate in this transformatory global economic system. Let me conclude this 
section by a quote which can be applied to any nation in transition. 
202 
"Russia has already gone through many cultural invasions - Mongolia, Dutch, 
German, French, - but Russian culture and language has been preserved. I think 
penetration by foreign culture is a natural process. We are not an island, we are not 
on the planet Mars,, and we are hungry for mass culture. We had a Stalinist mass 
culture, created for, but not by, the masses. Now we want American mass culture, 
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THE TRANSITION GROWTH PATH 
THE economies in transition are making a heroic and challenging march towards 
progress. They are simultaneously engaged in dismantling the legacies of a planned 
economic system and building up a structure of market-oriented economic system. The 
economic objective of growth and development remains a top priority during the period of 
transition. The transition process that began a few years ago in eastern and central 
European countries, after the collapse of socialist economies, moved decisively to 
implement reforms to establish a market economy. "By now, virtually all of the former 
centrally planned economies are, to a greater or a lesser degree, attempting to establish a 
market economy, and most countries have experienced substantial and sustained output 
declines. The experience of the countries of central Europe that first and most boldly 
implemented market reforms clearly show that macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
reform are essential prerequisites for a resumption of growth, and that there is no 
advantage to postponing them. These countries are now growing, or appear to be on the 
threshold of recovery, and prospects for continued growth are good" (EBRD Transition 
Report, 1994). In the theoretical growth path that we have designed, in section one of our 
study, we were following the capitalist-market economy growth models with a view to 
determine the engines of growth and their motivating forces. We have seen the prospects 
and limitations of those models within a global framework. We have tried to identify and 
endogenize a growth influencing knowledge sector as an extension to such models. In the 
applied growth path that we have designed, in section two of our study, we followed the 
economic growth models of a socialist economic system. The socialist ideological 
structure and dynamism have been endogenized in these applied growth models. A critique 
of the socialist system by means of the dual knowledge sector, which we have developed, 
shows the inherent socialist contradictions. From the ashes of historical socialism emerges 
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the hopes of the economies in transition. These hopes are to be translated into reality by 
following a seemingly difficult but unavoidable structural reforms; particularly by treading 
the macroeconomic stabilization path. This win give a new vision to their economic 
oýective. From the vision-growth path of the economies in transition we move to design a 
solution-growth path. As we have done in our previous sections of this study, let us begin 
with the composition of place of the economies in transition. 
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CIL&PTER FIFTEEN 
THE COMPOSITION OF PLACE OF ECONOMIES IN 
TRANSITION 
rMe cosmos is in an ever transitional process. ne physical and metaphysical realities are 
understood in this process of being in transition. In this transitional process, the old is 
given way to the new; and the freshness of this new age is constantly seeking new forms 
and ways of life. In the global economic scenario, this has been existentially more vibrant 
in the continent of Europe. "Europe has entered a new promising era. Central and Eastern 
Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards a 
free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are 
determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic 
liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. "' This 
declaration of the NATO Summit (See Appendix 111.15.1) heralded a promising era. To 
enter into this new promising era, we need to make an archaeological tour of the region to 
find the roots and sources which have geographically knit together the ground of their 
existence. 
IH. 15-i. Geographical Composition 
The imperial-colonial world collapsed at the emergence of new nation states. The most 
significant achievement of the peace treaties of 1919, following the end of World War 1, 
was the creation of a belt of central European states from the buffer zones of the pre-war 
German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Their true independence proved short- 
lived; within two decades the expansion of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had erased 
their autonomy. To understand the geography of Eastem Europe, we need to consider the 
area which lies east of a line from Lubeck to Trieste and is bordered by the Ural and 
Caucasus Mountains. We include, therefore, those central and southem European states 
which came under Soviet influence at the end of World War 11, and also the European 
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republics of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the expression 'Eastern Europe' has 
commonly been used to refer to the arc of Soviet sateflite states established after the 
World War II between the Baltic and the Black Sea. 2 The terms 'central Europe' and 
4east-central Europe' are increasingly used as attention is directed to the political events 
between the Soviet border and the states of the European Community. The region we are 
referring to as Eastern Europe covers an area of 5.5 mifflon square kilometres and 
contains some 330 million inhabitants. 3 The differences in ethnic and religious terms are 
also marked .4 The economies of east-central Europe are in a process of transition and 
therefore they are also known as Transitional Economies (TEs) or Economies in 
Transition. This transition is also from an ideology to which they have been chained for 
decades. 
HI. 15. ii. Ideological Composition 
As we have noted in the previous section, the world's first successful Communist 
revolution, The Bolsheviks' 'October Revolution' of 1917, came as a surprise even to 
most Marxists, since Russia was a relatively backward country economically. Marx had 
always believed that revolution would occur first in the industrially advanced states. 
During the early days, even the Bolsheviks believed that only a Communist revolution in 
. I- - die West could guarantee the success of their movement. 5 At home, the 'Reds' faced 
strong opposition and they had to fight a lengthy and bloody civil war before emerging 
triumphant. As they consolidated their revolutionary success the Bolsheviks grew in 
confidence and came to believe that, far from seeking help from the West, revolution 
could be exported to the rest of Europe-on the bayonets of the Red Army. Although the 
Bolsheviks were heirs to the vast, multinational empire of the Tsars, it took them several 
Years to reconquer and reabsorb a number of the outlying republics which had tasted 
independence and had developed along nationalist lines. Soviet Russia became 
transformed into the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) only following the 
acceptance of the 1923 Constitution. 6 
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The emergence of USSR with a new ideology and a new power structure caused a 
global alarm. Communist Russia was treated with suspicion by the international 
comniunity and remained isolated during the early years of its existence. Only in the late 
1920s, the Western states began to give the USSR grudging recognition. German-Soviet 
co-operation in the military-industrial sphere was extensive during the 1920s and was 
suspended only when Hitler came to power. For a number of years the Nazis' open 
hostility towards Communism made co-operation impossible. Then, in a remarkable 
reversal of policy (which dismayed his Italian and Japanese allies), Hitler agreed to a new 
understanding with the Soviet leader, Stalin, which resulted in 'The Nazi-Soviet Non- 
Aggression Pact' of August 1939. But in 1941 Hitler turned his armies east to attack his 
ally, and the Soviet Union was plunged unexpectedly into a desperate 'Great Patriotic 
War' which costed her over 20 million dead. Immediately Hitler attacked, the Soviet 
leadership found itself allied with Nazi Gen-nany's existing enemies, notably Britain and 
7 USA and the wartime alliance of the Big Three Powers was born. The alliance during the 
World War II gave USSR a strengthening position in compromising deals which are 
reflected in the post-war division of Europe. 
Ul. 15. iii. The Post-war Composition 
The post-war division of Europe can be traced back to the Great Power conferences8 
which took place in the closing stages of the war. Western policy makers realized after the 
Soviet victories of Kursk and Stalingrad that the defeat of Germany was inevitable. 'Mey 
saw, moreover, that the Red Army would liberate most areas of east-central Europe from 
German occupation. Faced with this inevitability, Churchill and Roosevelt attempted to 
meet with Stalin at an early stage to agree on the principles of post-war reconstruction. 
Consequently, there was a readiness to make concessions to Stalin and smooth over any 
Points of conflict. In late October 1944 Churchill had put to Stalin the famous 
6 percentages agreement' concerning the relative influence of the Great Powers in south- 
central European countries expected to be liberated by the Red Army's advance. The 
Soviet's were to have a 90% interest in Romania, 75% in Bulgaria and 50% in Hungary 
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and Yugoslavia. In return, the British were ceded a 90% interest in Greece. Stalin seized 
the Baltic states (to the disquiet of the Western allies, who refused to recognize their 
absorption into the Soviet Union), Bessarabia and northern Bukowina from Romania, and 
part of Czechoslovakia. In fact, Stalin reclaimed nearly all the territory he had occupied 
during 1939 and 1940 as a result of his Pact with Hitler. Two results flowed from this 
deal. rMe first was that Poland, having lost almost half its territory in the east, was 
compensated in the west at the expense of Germany. A large strip of territory from the 
Baltic coast to Silesia became Polsih, including towns such as Stettin (Szczecin) and 
Breslau (Wroclaw). Millions of German inhabitants were expelled to make way for Poles 
being 'repatriated' from the Soviet-occupied eastern regions of the country. The second 
was that after 1945 the Soviet Union had a common border with Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. This was to have considerable significance in 1956 and 1968.9 It is to be 
noted that along with the territorial expansion, Soviet Union made an ideological 
expansion through the new economic ideology of Communism, which resulted in 
unforeseen consequences. 
111.15. iv. The Various Stages of Communist Take-over 
The Communist take-over of east-central Europe between 1944 and 1948 - the 
imposition of one-party rule - took place by stages. The first was that of military 
occupation by the Red Army. With the Soviet forces stalled outside Warsaw in the 
summer of 1944 the offensive moved to the south. Bucharest fell on 31 August 1944. On 
5 September Moscow declared war on Bulgaria and the Red Army crossed the Danube. 
On 19 October Soviet troops were established in Debrecen in eastern Hungary. Only in 
January 1945 was Warsaw eventually taken, and Soviet troops crossed into 
Czechoslovakia in March of the same year. The Soviets were sufficiently subtle not to 
install Communist regimes at the outset. But everywhere '0 the Red Army was able to 
install 'its' people in the local administration and to eliminate potential opponents. The 
second stage of the take-over was marked by the establishment of provisional coalition 
governments, with the participation of both Communist and non-Communist 
210 
representatives. The Communists had, at best, marginal influence in most of these states 
before the war and were given a role which, in importance, far exceeded their support. 
The third stage involved propaganda and terror. In all cases the Communists took control 
of key ministries such as Justice, Internal Affairs or Security, and Defence. This put them 
in an ideal position to break the back of democratic opposition and cloak their actions in 
legality. The Communists habitually made lavish promises, whether or not they were able 
to carry them out. As Communist control of the mass media grew, the population became 
increasingly subject to the Party's line on all matters. Communist ideological censorship 
was more severe than that imposed during the German occupation. The fourth stage 
involved 'salami tactics' to undermine their enemies by subversion, intrigue and bribery. 
Communist support varied widely (from 17% in Hungary to 38% in Czechoslovakia), but 
in all cases they were in a minority in government. The fifth stage involved the elections 
themselves. Although the 1946 elections in Czechoslovakia were fairly conducted, those in 
Poland and Hungary during 1947 were not. The final stage involved the further settling of 
accounts with political opponents once political power had been consolidated. 
In asking why the Communists were successful we have to recognize a number of 
characteristics, in addition to skilful use of propaganda and terror. They were, on the 
whole, better organized than their democratic opponents. During this period the party 
apparatus was highly centralized and extremely disciplined. They were playing the political 
game to a different set of rules from their opponents, who were, in any case, often divided 
among themselves. Indeed, if, between the wars and as a result of the Versailles settlement 
(1919), the newly independent states of central Europe had provided the West with a 
protective barrier against the contagion of Bolshevism, after World War II, they gave the 
USSR a security shield behind which it could recover and arm itself. Hopes that the 'Big 
Three' alliance would last beyond the war were disappointed. " The global political scene 
and even the destiny of humanity itself were tested to the grim reality of an imminent 
annihilative nature of nuclear war and fear. 
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15. v. The Dawn of Cold War Period 
Historians are divided about when the Cold War actually began. Some choose March 
1946, when Churchill attempted to draw the world's attention to what was happening in 
east-central Europe. Churchill had been awarded an honorary degree by a small American 
liberal arts college at Fulton, Missouri. His acceptance speech, delivered in the presence of 
president Truman, echoed around the world. An 'iron curtain', said Churchill, had 
descended across Europe from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic. Behind it the 
Communist parties which were previously very small had 'been raised to a pre-eminence 
and power far beyond their numbers' and were seeking every where to obtain totalitarian 
control. They constituted 'a growing challenge and peril to civilization. ' Churchill, who 
had been in opposition since the July 1945 General Election, had employed the term 'iron 
curtain' in a parliamentary speech, in August 1945, when referring to the expulsion of 
Germans from Poland. But after the Fulton address the term entered into popular usage 
and became part of the vocabulary of the Cold War. By the end of 1947 the division of 
Europe was clearer. The Communists were no longer hiding behind coalition 
governments, but had in most states taken absolute control, had outlawed the opposition 
and were hounding them. 12 The deepening of the Cold War chilled the relationship 
between the West and the Soviet Union, which resulted in varying responses. 
HI. 15. vi. The Western Response 
The West began to respond to Communist expansion during 1947 when in March the 
American President outlined what came to be known in his name as 'Truman Doctrine'. 
Washington would help those countries, which sought to avoid coming under Communist 
domination, to retain their freedom and independence. This policy of 'containing' 
Communist expansion was later superseded under the Eisenhower administration. The 
European Recovery Programme, or Marshall Plan, (named after US Secretary of State, 
George Marshall), was also brought to life during 1947. This was a move to extend 
economic d to rebuild Europe's war-shattered economies, a condition being that the 
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Europeans agreed to economic co-operation ($12 billion dollars was sent to Europe 
between 1947 and 1951). 
Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, Germany had been divided into four occupation 
zones, to be administered by the victorious Allied powers: the USA, Britain, France, and 
the Soviet Union. 13 When moves to fuse the Western zones (after the Potsdam Conference 
agreement of July 1945) were eventually taken in 1947, and currency reform was effected 
in the West without Soviet agreement or participation, the scene was set for a showdown. 
The Soviets retaliated in June 1948 by cutting Western road and rail links which crossed 
the Soviet-occupied territory to the capital, Berlin. The West foiled this by a massive airlift 
of supplies into Berlin. 
Subsequently, the demarcation line with the Eastern, Soviet, zone became virtually a 
state border. The German Democratic Republic-East Germany- became de jure an 
independent state from 1949, with its own parliament and decision to frame a constitution. 
In 1955 it joined the Warsaw Pact. Events like Tito's defection (1948), the Berlin 
confrontation and Atlantic Pact led to decisive moves to consolidate Communist rule in 
A- - the satellite states and to weld them into a political bloc. In the economic sphere, 
industrialization was pushed forward and central planning bodies set up. Tighter 
censorship was imposed, and a greater cultural and artistic conformity demanded. 
Increasing pressure was exerted on the Church; Roman Catholic primates were arrested 
and imprisoned; church property was confiscated and church charitable organizations 
wound up or taken over by the state. The use of secret police to eliminate political 
14 opponents was soon directed towards the ranks of the Party itself . The new political 
scenario also demanded a firm Soviet response due to the Western policies. 
III. 15. vii. The Soviet RMons 
The Soviet response was the Zhdanov Doctrine. An associate of Stalin, A. A. Zhdanov 
expounded his theory of the 'two camps' to delegates at the founding session of the 
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in Polish Silesia in September 1947. 
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According to Zhdanov's vision, the world was divided into opposing camps - the 
, imperialist', 'anti-democratic' camp (headed by the USA) and the 'socialist', 'anti- 
imperialist ', 'democratic' camp led by the USSR. This speech provided a justification for 
the sovietization of east-central Europe. 
In January 1949 the Communist world's trade organization, the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance - known as Comecon or CMEA - was called into being in Moscow. 
The forming of Comecon was regarded by most observers as the Soviet answer to the 
Marshall Plan. The aims of Comecon, as outlined in the communique, were to 'exchange 
economic experience', to extend technical aid and encourage trade between the member 
states. Its stated political aims were to 'strengthen the unity and solidarity of members' 
and encourage co-operation 'in the interest of the building of socialism and communism'. 
The fusing of the Soviet bloc nations in a military alliance did not take place until 1955, 
when the Warsaw Treaty Organization (better known as the Warsaw Pact, See Appendix 
111.15.2) 15 was created. Western analysts have suggested that the formation of the Warsaw 
Pact was an early Soviet gambit to bring about the dismantling of NATO and the 
withdrawal of American troops from Europe - on a quid pro quo basis. Soviet 
justifications for the creation of the Eastern bloc pacts - that they were reacting to 
developments in the West - ignore the reasons why the Cold War began; the aggressive 
methods undertaken by Moscow, especially during the Stalinist period, to enforce 
Communist rule on its Western neighbours. 16 The Soviet bloc nations embraced the 
ideology of Communism to defeat the Western responses to the Cold War. 
HI. 15. viii. The Characteristics of Communist Rule 
The regimes which came into power in east-central Europe after the 1945 called 
themselves 'people's republics' or 'socialist democracies'. In fact they were neither 
socialist in the accepted Western sense of the word nor were they democracies, since they 
did not allow for free choice in competitive elections. Nor were the regimes in any way the 
choice of the people. Misuse of such terms and misinformation about the true nature of 
conditions obtaining under Communist rtýde have been characteristic of Communist 
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regimes. The emerging Communist states did have a number of things in common as we 
have discussed in the previous section. The first is that of an official ideology of Marxism- 
Lemmsm, which had three important elements: it provided a 'scientific' interpretation of 
history in class terms; it explained that the victory of the proletariat and the triumph of 
Communist rule was logical and inevitable; finally, it presented a vision of a more 
egalitarian society, with the elimination of poverty and exploitation. Ihe concept of 
, building socialism' was portrayed as a thorough worthy and progressive exercise. 
Marxism provided the moral and theoretical justification for Communist Party rule in the 
name of the working classes. Another characteristic was the introduction of single-party 
rule. Party control was extended outwards and downwards by means of the 
nomenklatura; Party nominees selected for key posts in all areas of public life - from the 
economy and local government to the media and the diplomatic service. The economic 
systems introduced into east-central Europe were modelled on the Soviet type; that is, the 
market relationship between consumer and producer was largely removed. The result was 
empty shops and queues for basic necessities. Communist economic systems almost 
everywhere failed in terms of the efficiency and the standards of living achieved under the 
successful market economies. Communists everywhere worked to achieve a monopoly on 
the supply of news and information to the public. The post-war Communist regimes 
shared in the elimination of civil society. 17 Our previous analysis in section two reveals 
well the nature of communist rule in the Soviet bloc nations. In spite of the initial 
successes in the accumulation of physical capital and commanding control, the Soviet 
system collapsed into a vacuum of economic chaos. 
What were the factors which led to the break-up of Soviet hegemony over east-central 
Europe? While 'changing of the guard' in the Kremlin in 1985, the mantle falls on the 
shoulders of the representative of a new generation, Mikhail Gorbachev, for whom the 
days of the Red Army's triumphs during World War II were scarcely more than a 
childhood memory. But from his early policy statements there was little to suggest that we 
would see the far-reaching transformation which has occurred, both in East-West relations 
and in those between Moscow and its Eastern European satellites. It seems clear that the 
radical change in policy leading to the Soviet disengagement from central Europe was not 
215 
just a spontaneous process. Influences of an almost irresistible nature on the Krernlin 
leadership forced a reassessment of traditional policies and relationships. These influences 
or pressures came from three areas: pressure for change from within Eastern Europe itself, 
pressures due to developments in Moscow's relationship with the West, and domestic 
Soviet policy considerations. 
111.15. ix. The Unstable Socialist Zone 
The Soviet bloc nations experienced economic growth but at a very high social cost as 
we have explained in our previous section. Unstability has become a constant problem in 
the socialist states. The nations of east-central Europe did not submit happily to 
Communist rule and became increasingly turbulent over the four post-war decades. 
Protests and unrest were apparent from an early stage. The first major upheaval of any 
consequence occurred in East Germany in June 1953 - shortly following the death of 
Stalin. In 1956 came the Polish October - following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin 
at the Soviet Party's Twentieth Congress. ne Polish events were followed by the Rising 
in Hungary. All the revolts were put down by force. An estimated 20,000 people a month 
were flooding across the borders of East Germany by the end of the 1950s, which became 
an embarrassment to the Communist authorities. On the night of 12/13 August 1961, 
barbed wire was put up along the boundary between Soviet and Westem sectors, to be 
replaced within days by a more substantial structure - the Berlin Wall. The Wall became a 
symbol of the post-war division of Europe - and of Communist repression. It illustrated in 
stark form the lost freedoms of the people who lived behind it. 
The erection of the Wall and the storm of international protest which resulted detracted 
significantly from the propaganda value of Yuri Gagarin's first marmed space flight, which 
took place during the same year. The intervention by Warsaw Pact troops and tanks in 
Czechoslovakia, during the Prague Spring (1968), harmed East-West relations, increased 
Warsaw Pact members' suspicion of the Organization, and undermined Moscow's 
standing with previously sympathetic leftist groups in the West. No sooner had the Prague 
Spring been nipped in the bud, than unrest broke out again, this time along Poland's Baltic 
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coast. The 'recurrent crises' afflicted the Communist regime and the central command in 
Moscow. The rise of the Solidarity trade union under Lech Walesa's leadership (1980) 
proved the most serious threat to Soviet control of the region, and the most difficult to put 
down, precisely because it clearly had such huge public support (10 million members). The 
vision of Poland, the largest of Moscow's central European satellites, being ruled during 
the 1980s by a military junta style, (after the introduction of martial law in December 
1981), forced the Soviet leadership to rethink its policy in the region. The 'proletarian 
rule' of a military junta against the very industrial working class, whose interests the Party 
was supposed to be representing, brought shame to Moscow. The unstable socialist zone 
became a liability rather than a 'cordon sanitaire'. Furthermore, the trade costs of 
maintaining the defensive cordon had become prohibitive. But, the subsidy measures 
continued; even after the oil crisis, we note that Moscow was selling its partners valuable 
supplies of oil at below world prices in return for poor-quality manufactured goods. 18 Into 
this unstable socialist zone, some signs of hope was brought in by the development of 
East-West relations. 
111.15. x. Development in East-West Relations 
The socialist zone remained isolated during the Cold War period. Development in East- 
West relations were important in influencing Soviet policy towards Central Europe. One 
of the early moves to defuse tension was the reorientation of West Gerrnan foreign policy 
towards rapprochement with Eastern Europe. This 'Ostpolitik' was set in motion as early 
as 1966 under Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, but flourished under his successor, Willy 
Brandt, with whom it is now chiefly associated. Brandt's Ostpolitik led to the process of 
East-West d6tente in the 1970s. It paved for the Helsinki Conference (1973-75) on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). 19 Appendix 111.15.3 explains the relevance 
of the Summits held in Helsinki and Paris. Soviet policy makers were forced to recognize 
that the stifling of the aspirations of its citizens was a greater threat to stability than 
NATO tanks. The Helsinki talks revealed the need for continuing East-West dialogue, and 
so the Helsinki process was born. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 
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1979) led to the collapse of &tente and the return to a Cold War atmosphere in the last 
years of the Brezhnev period. This, in turn, resulted in a renewal of the arms race. If 
increased military spending was creating imbalance for the US budget, it was making the 
economic prospect bleak in Moscow. 'Me war in Afghanistan constituted a further drain 
on the resources and the international standing of the Soviet Union. Further east, the 
chinese Communists had introduced limited economic reforms and were achieving 
impressive 9% annual growth rates throughout the decade. Not only was Japan now an 
economic super-power, but the nations of the Pacific Rim, with their market economies, 
were making commendable efforts to emulate it. It was against this background that the 
Soviet leadership looked to the West, saw the impressive moves towards economic and 
political union made by the West European states and their prosperity, and realized that 
greater hope for stability lay in courting, rather than confronting, their West European 
neighbours. Also, they could not any more handle by themselves problems like the external 
debt, dependency on imported food etc. Moreover, the decreasing oil price during the 
second half of the 1980's was a blow to the Soviet economy. The Soviet policy in the 
closing years of the decade developed from this scenario: liberalization at home , 
abandonment of the arms race and rapprochement with the West, enunciation of the 
concept of 'Common European home', and, in regard to the central-Eastern European 
satellites, rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine in favour of the so-called 'Sinatra Doctrine' 
of 'let them do it their way. ' 20 The domestic policy considerations together with the 
development of the East-West relations finally led to the loosening of the claws of the 
Soviet central command in relation to the Soviet bloc nations. A series of CSCE summit 
meetings took place such as those on disarmament at Madrid (1983), Stockholm (1984-6), 
Vienna (1986-89), and Paris (1990). 
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111.15. xi. The Realill of Transition 
The realization that the unstable socialist zone could not make any remarkable economic 
growth in the current economic structure was brought home by the recurring upheavals in 
the various regions of East-Central Europe. In both Hungary and Poland change began 
earlier and was altogether more gradual and less dramatic than elsewhere. In the early 
months of 1989 the Party made repeated concessions to an opposition movement headed 
by the Democratic Forum, until the way was eventually cleared for a multi-party 
democracy. The Hungarian Party reshaped itself in preparation for elections in the spring 
of 1990. In Poland too, Solidarity representatives were invited to round-table talks, which 
took place in the spring of 1989. These led to the 'partly free' elections in June and to the 
appointment of the first non-Communist premier of a Warsaw Pact state. During this 
period, the motives of Moscow remained inconspicuous. In the Eastern European capitals 
the message had been received early that the Soviets were prepared for a liberalization and 
a loosening of ties. Gorbachev made his views clear during two key speeches in July 1989: 
one to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and the other at the Warsaw Pact summit in 
Bucharest. In Bucharest, the Soviet leader stressed to his allies his rejection of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine; there was no set model for the building of socialism. Each Communist 
party had the right to pursue its own strategy in line with national conditions. At 
Strasbourg, Gorbachev signalled his desire to 'consign to the archives the postulates of the 
Cold War, when Europe was regarded as an arena of confrontation'. In a final break with 
the doctrine of interventionism, he stated: "The affiliation of the states of Europe to 
different social systems is a reality, and the recognition of that historical state of affairs, 
respect for the sovereign right of every people to choose a social system as it sees fit, is a 
vital prerequisite for the normal European process. 'Ihe social and political orders of one 
country or another changed in the past and may change in the future as wen. However, 
that is exclusively the affair of the peoples themselves, a matter for their choice. Any 
interference in internal affairs, any attempts to Emit the sovereignty of states, both of 
friends and allies, no matter whose it is, is impermissible. 9)21 While Gorbachev gave the 
green light to change it is unlikely that even he realized how rapidly change would come. 
219 
in August and September of 1989 (28 years after the erection of the Berlin Wall) waves 
of East Germans began once more to exercise their choice of political order. East 
Germans flooded to the West via Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the West German 
embassy in Poland. The refugee exodus and the mass demonstration led in October to the 
resignation of Party leader, Erich Honecker, to be replaced by Krenz. 'Me ultimate goal of 
the demonstrators was now the complete removal of the Communists from power. On 7 
November the government resigned, to be followed a day later by the whole Politburo. On 
9 November the Berlin Wall was breached by the authorities, by which time 200,000 East 
Gen-nans (1% of the population) had left the country. On the day after the Berlin Wall was 
breached, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov was toppled by Party colleagues and was 
replaced by Petur Mladenov. Within days, the Czechoslovak regime capitulated and the 
change was complete in early December. Finally, the dramatic and bloody events in 
Romania erupted in the days before Christmas 1989 and the Romanian leader Nicolae 
Ceausescu was executed with his wife after a summary trial. The withering of Communist 
leadership in the Eastern bloc happened so sudden that even an onlooker was surprised by 
the speed with which the old structures of power collapsed. Their frailty shocked even 
those opposition elements responsible for their downfall. The movement for change and 
reform seemed to gather its own irresistible momentum. Though we can elucidate various 
reasons for the sudden Communist collapse of the Eastern European states, we can safely 
state the following reason as a crucial one. In their philosophical, religious, cultural and 
political traditions they identified more closely with the West than with Russia. We can 
also refer to the collapse of belief in Marxist ideology (and therefore in the future it 
promised), the economic failures, the removal of the threat of force (both domestic and 
22 extemal). The Soviet policy of greater openness - glasnost - also had an effect. The 
Eastern and Central European nations asserted their right to be free from any external 
interventions in determining their way of life. 
In the aftermath of revolution, the new free sovereign states were given a job of 
designing a fresh way of life. Whereas the second half of 1989 saw the toppling of 
Communist regimes in much of central Europe, in the first half of 1990 there was a 
consolidation of the reforms that had been set in motion. The most significant events to 
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take place during this period were the democratic elections in most of the east-central 
European states. In the second half of 1990 a good deal of the euphoria and optimism 
generated by the collapse of Communist regimes evaporated, as the states of east-central 
Europe discovered that there is more to democracy than merely holding elections. As one 
east European academic put it, they woke up with a post-revolutionary hangover. The 
necessary strains of rurining a democracy led to the break-up of the Solidarity consensus in 
poland and that of Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia and such other parties. German 
unification occupied the thoughts of policy makers of both East and West during 1990, 
23 
and full unification took place on 2 December after the 'two plus four' treaty was signed . 
One of the most disappointing features of this period of post-Communist rule in central 
Europe has been the resurgence of nationalism, often in its most bigoted and intolerant 
form. 
On the economic front moves have been made to end central planning and introduce 
market mechanisms, to cut spending on the defence, armaments and security forces. Steps 
are being taken to remove state subsidies, to privatize state-owned concerns and to 
encourage foreign investment. Western aid and relaxation of export of advanced 
technology goods to these emerging economies and the interest shown by Western firms 
etc. strengthened the economic prospects. To promote economic development in Eastern 
Europe and to keep a discreet eye on the democratic and human-rights records of 
potential beneficiaries, The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
was opened in London in 1991 with the following purpose: "In contributing to economic 
progress and reconstruction, the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster the transition 
towards open market oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial 
. itiative in the central and eastern European countries committed to and applying the 
principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics. "24 Economic 
forecasts for the region vary widely. The reality is likely to be considerably more complex, 
with possibly significant divergences in economic performance between individual states. 
Political stability is a major factor in determining where foreign investment will be 
directed. There is the further problem in all the new democracies of changing attitudes to 
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work and developing the skills necessary to run a market economy. It is not proving easy 
to develop an entrepreneurial culture rapidly in societies where private trade has been 
condemned for decades as 'speculation'. The collapse of Communist rule in east-central 
Europe also led to a crumbling of the Communist bloc alliances. At the beginning of 1991 
the dissolution of Comecon was announced and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a 
military organization in March 1991. One way of filling the vacuum caused by the collapse 
of the old bloc structures is to forrn regional sub-groupings. The Pentagonale is such a 
grouping and is also perceived in some quarters as providing a 'fast track' for entry into 
the European Community. Appendix 111.15.4 provides the policy document of the 
Pentagonale. Between 19 and 21 November 1990 a CSCE summit took place in Paris 
(See, Appendix 111.15.3). Thirty-four nations took part - all the signatories of the Helsinki 
Final Act. At the Elysee Palace NATO and Warsaw pact members signed an agreement to 
cut arms in Europe. The 'Helsinki process' was also given a new institutional form - in the 
shape of a secretariat to be based in Prague and a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. 25 
The East-Central European nations have definitely entered a new era. "While 1989 was a 
euphoric year of political revolutions in Eastern Europe, 1990 and 1991 saw a growing 
disillusionment with the long-awaited Great Transfon-nation. According to many analysts, 
the big question of the years 1992 and 1993 was whether anything one might be proud of 
from among the achievements of 1989 has survived. ýý26 How to re-invigorate these 
economies in transition is an issue that we would be dealing with as we discuss the 
transition growth path. As though, edified by the adventures of the followers, the leader 
has decided to follow the steps of the followers. No alternative path was on the vicinity. 
We shall proceed to analyse the transitional growth path of the former Soviet Union. 
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NATO Summit (London, 5-6 July 1990), from The Times, 7 July 1990. This quote is 
from the Preamble: point 1 of the 23-point declaration. It is Vven in Keith, Sword, 
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1991, London, p. 272. 
2. There are some questions about the usage of 'Eastern Europe. ' Yugoslavia and 
Albania, which were never subject to Moscow, are sometimes referred to as bemg in 
'Eastern Europe. ' Prague, often during the interwar years taken as being at the heart 
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THE TRANSITION-PATH OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 
While the Central and East European socialist nations decided to determine their 
political destiny by following the democratic path and economic destiny by following the 
njarket mechanism of the capitalist path, the historical socialism upheld by the Soviet 
leadership crumbled. The consequences of turning away from the principles of applied 
socialism, in turn, shattered the confidence of the Soviet strength. The unprecedented 
historical events that happened in the former Soviet Union ultimately resulted in the 
disintegration of the empire and its reconstruction into several newly independent states. 
Since the 'mongol yoke' was lifted in the fourteenth century, there has been one dominant 
power in the region from Poland to the sea of Japan: Russia. "Under the czars, 
russification - one czar, one language, and one religion - characterized a policy that placed 
all political, economic, social and military power in the hands of the leaders in the Russian 
capital. Soviet leaders paid hp service to self determination and preservation of minorities 
but in effect reinforced this historical orientation toward the centre with an emphasis on 
one party leadership, one Russian culture, and a Marxist-Leninist ideological substitute for 
religion. "l The end of the Leninist-Stalinist system and the empire paradoxically came 
through an attempt to reinforce the traditional system of governance by reforming it. As 
Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to strengthen the party's central role with transformation to 
a socialist market, his reforms eroded the power of the party-dominated, command- 
economy system; his political reforms and glasnost eroded the cohesion of the Moscow- 
centred system and challenged the principle of geographic unity. With the abortive 
Moscow coup in 1991, it became clear that the military and police force that had held 
together the old system and empire was unwilling to support the overthrow of Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev, in turn, was unable to hold back the forces that led to the break up of the 
Soviet Union. 2 The end result of this catastrophic phase was the emergence of sovereign 
states. 
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From Russification To Sovereien States 
Yeltsin moved quickly to abolish the Communist Party and to begin the dismantlement 
of the command economy system. As the power of the party, military, and police proved 
unable to maintain the Stalinist system and the empire, the long repressed forces of 
ethnicity and nationalism surged forward. Free to choose, all republics took their own 
sovereignty in preference to subservience to Russia; many minority ups within newly . gro 
sovereign states and between states likewise challenged the authority of the new states 
being formed. "While the change from russification. seemed irreversible, the new 
sovereignty based on self-deten-nination was unstable as the networks of trade, investment, 
infrastructure, and other regional interrelationships were strained or ruptured, and old 
ethnic hostilities were let loose. The creation of new sovereign states weakened the long- 
established economic integration of the region and thereby unden-nined economic 
recovery, development, and the transition to a market system. ,3 The security problems of 
demilitarization, also regional, were complicated by the disintegration of the empire; 
weapons held in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other newly independent states could 
no longer be controlled or dismantled by order from Moscow. The mix of ethnicity and 
nationalism in a new, weak Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has not been 
conducive to regional economic reintegration. The new states need trade, investment, 
infrastructure, and the environment to act as centripetal forces for regional integration if 
they are to make effective transitions to market economies and if they are to join and 
compete successfully in the world economy. Most of the new states favour economic 
integration but not with their neighbours, especially Russia. While the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the OECD draw the various independent states toward the global market 
system by stimulating openness and market-oriented discipline, the indirect conditionality 
they prescribe is not sufficient impetus for regional reintegration. The divorce from Russia, 
as the ruble zone ends and as other economic ties that bound the empire are broken, 
creates a fissure that will be hard to fill or repair. While the international system of 
economic institutions may play a role in integration, it appears at best a marginal factor. 
'Me CIS, multilateral and regional organizations, and bilateral arrangements are all 
potential engines for integration. Private non-governmental institutions might play 
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effective roles. One of those in particular, the "International Committee for Economic 
4 Reform,, " might be effective if taken over by the G-7. The International Committee offers 
a multilateral, but non-governmental framework for identifying practical opportunities for 
the use of international assistance - in full participation with countries of the region and 
properly co-ordinated with the efforts of countries themselves. Such organizational and 
structural umbrellas as the International Committee and the Energy Charter5 could form a 
useful framework for interrelating security, political, and economic issues such as 
payments and environmental protection that Russia and the former Soviet Union republics 
seem to be unable to resolve either bilaterally or through the CIS. If destruction of the old 
command economy has opened the opportunity for a transition to the market, the manner 
in which the empire is disintegrating makes it more difficult to create the broader, regional, 
open economic space so important to successful reform within and among the newly 
6 sovereign states. This has been experienced by all the newly formed sovereign states as 
they find themselves in a state of economic stagnation out of which no immediate recovery 
is foreseen. 
III. 16. ii. Period of Slow Growth and Stagnation 
Although there is controversy and uncertainty over the precise measurement of key 
aspects of the economy of the former Soviet Union, there is widespread agreement among 
specialists regarding the general trends. The Soviet Union was unable to reverse or arrest 
the long term slowdown in growth that began in the 1960s and grew steadily worse. The 
slowdown and accompanying signs of weakness in many sectors of Soviet economy 
resulted in a period of slow growth and Stagnation. 7 The estimates of the World Bank 
show Soviet GNP declined slightly in 1981, and dipped again in 1986 and 1990. Annual 
growth for the 10 year period, 1981-1990, averaged just under 2 percent. 8A downtum 
occurred in 1990 which accelerated over the next 2 years. There was a sharp drop in 
production in both industry and agriculture and output declined in all sectors. Trade 
among the republics was disrupted and foreign trade fell, especially with Eastern Europe 
which could not meet the hard currency terms set by Moscow during the early years of 
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transition. Living standards deteriorated. According to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), real gross domestic product (GDP) in the former USSR went down by 9% in 1991 
and by 18.6% in 1992. The IMF also estimates that consumer prices increased by about 
90% in 1991 and by nearly 1200% in 1992. Export volumes declined by about 24% in 
each of those years. ' The downturn extended., more or less, throughout the region. 
Inflation in Russia was somewhat higher than elsewhere. Retail prices were estimated at 
1400 percent and the ruble plummeted. In spite of all these challenging difficulties, it is 
heartening to note that the newly formed sovereign states boldly opted to tread the path of 
market-economy models. 
III. 16. iii. From Sovietization To Marketization 
As we have already noted, two of the most significant events in recent decades were the 
collapse of the Soviet Empire and the decision by Russia and the other successor states to 
transforrn themselves into market economies. The break up of the Soviet Union left in its 
place 15 independent states, including 3 Baltic nations, Georgia, and the 11 republics that 
made up the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1992 all struggled to 
stabflize their economies and implement market reforms. The transitions were difficult and 
the outcomes still uncertain. But despite severe downturns throughout the region, major 
reform initiatives were underway and governments appeared to remain committed to the 
goal of marketization. In Russia, as in other successor states, both economic policy and 
performance measures are drastically changing in the emerging new system. An economy 
that for seventy five years placed military and protected industrial power at the top of the 
priority scale, is moving to favour consumers needs. 'O This is made possible by the steps 
taken by the government of Boris Yeltsin. 
111.16. iv. From Socialist Mikhail Gorbachev To Cppitafist Boris Yeltsin 
Appendix IH. 16.1. shows the milestones in economic policy and perfon-nance during the 
Gorbachev Era. While Mikhail Gorbachev should be credited with many achievements, it 
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is pointed out that all he wanted was to create a 'socialist market' within the framework of 
a command economy dominated by the Communist Party. Boris Yeltsin, the first president 
of Russia, pressed for a market economy and pledged himself to a transformation to a true 
market system. There were generally good harvests during the Gorbachev years, 1985- 
1991. in that period numerous reforms were introduced. "But there were fundamental 
flaws in Gorbachev's economic plans. The reforms were haphazard and at times 
contradictory. There were no meaningful steps to decontrol prices or to end the effective 
monopolies of the state enterprises. He refused to accept and implement the 500 Day 
Program of radical reform, and end the Party dominated command economy system. He 
sought to perfect Soviet socialism. In the end, he failed to halt the slide into deep 
recession or to prevent price increases from reaching a near hyperinflationary stage. "" 
Yeltsin's approach to economic reform, in the first year of his presidency, was strikingly 
different from Gorbachev's. At the end of 1991, Yeltsin outlined a programme of radical 
change to a market economy and was given the power by Russia's congress to implement 
it. Yeltsin moved decisively to outlaw the Communist Party, dismantle the old ministerially 
directed economy, and liberalize prices. Price liberalization was the clear signal the West 
looked for to make reform credible. The other characteristics of the economic reforms 
would be clear as we proceed with our analysis. 
The debate over economic reforms within Russia can be described in the context of four 
camps: "shock therapy" advocates, conservative gradualists, liberal democrats, and 
reactionary nationalists. 12 The 'shock therapy' approach followed by Yeltsin in 1992 
emphasized stabilization through price liberalization, and restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies. Proponents of this approach wanted to move quickly to achieve a free market. 
They would put safety net programmes in place to help persons in dire need, but would 
tolerate substantial falls in production and increases in unemployment. A number of 
groups pressed for a more gradual approach. They argue that "economies are more like 
giant tankers than they are like rowboats. They cannot be manoeuvred readily or turned 
about quickly. "13 This is the situational experience of transitional economies. The 
conversion of a socialist command economy into a modem, mixed market economy is 
without historical precedent, and much disagreement exists both among economists in the 
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transitional economies and within the Western economic community about how to go 
about the transformation process. Communism and the socialist command economy have 
been repudiated in favour of democracy and the market economy. 'Me conversion of 
democracy has progressed rather more swiftly and successfully than the attempt to convert 
to a market economy, and many observers both in and outside the former Soviet Union 
fear that resistance by vested interests to marketization will ultimately undermine the 
democratization movement too. We need to explore the question of whether the market 
mechanism is still too weak in the CIS and other transitional economies to carry the entire 
burden of allocation, production, and distribution. Enormous external assistance, both 
financial and educational, will be necessary to avoid failure of the economic transformation 
process and backsliding into another variant of the crisis administered economy. 
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of each transitional economy to develop their own 
unique transformation strategies based on their own peculiar economic circumstances, 
histories, and opportunities. 14 The post-Soviet economic reforms are to be seen in this 
perspective. 
III. 16. v. Economic Reforms in Perspective 
The transitional economies are in the midst of an attempted societal transformation that 
is unprecedented in nature and scope. Under the old regime, the economy functioned 
through a system that possessed its own internal logic and through institutions that were 
closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing. 15 In the economic realm, these states 
begin the transition from socialist central planning to capitalist market economies with 
formidable legacies from failed communism. 16 The legacies are found in the remnants of 
the institutions through which the economy was managed for many decades and in the 
mindsets and habits of the people whose behaviour was moulded by those institutions. 
Other legacies stem from the development strategies 17 that were pursued and are 
PhYsically embodied in the land use patterns, capital stocks, environment, and skills of the 
labour force. Related to those institutions and strategies are the legacies that are primarily 
the result of protectionist policies that not only insulated business firms from foreign 
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competition, but from domestic competition as well. 18 Nonetheless, the old system, despite 
its manifest flaws, did generate economic growth", secular gains in living standards, and 
an extraordinary degree of personal economic security. Unlike in the West in general., 
Soviet growth was fuelled by a massive build-up of capital stock, near-maximum 
mobilization of the population into the work force, profligate use of energy and raw 
materials, and an almost total disregard for the environmental consequences2o of what 
amounted to a policy of production at any cost. Whatever the disputes over the numerical 
calculations, it would be generally agreed that improvements in productivity beyond those 
embodied in the capital stock and a better-educated work force contributed little, if at all 
to Soviet growth, a situation markedly different from Western growth experience . 
21 To 
maintain perspective on the emerging new economic orders in the transitional states, one 
needs to keep in mind the totality of the old monolithic order and its legacies, both good 
and bad. Also, it is this perspective that would determine the economic objective of 
transformation processes. 
HI. 16. vi. The Objective of Economic Transformation 
The new states are experiencing three types of transformations: the transformation of 
governance from dictatorial rule to rule by participatory consensus, the transformation of 
the economic system from socialist central planning to one based on private enterprise and 
markets, and the transforrnation from units in a highly integrated and centrally managed 
empire to fully sovereign nation-states. As all these intertwined revolutionary processes 
unfold in the coming years, the need to assess the progress of the three transformations 
will be ever present. Evidence of progress (or regress) will take the form of innumerable 
actions at all levels of society and in all arenas - political, economic and social. Here, we 
aim to develop a perspective focusing on the economic transformation. 
All the attempts to reform socialism resulted in failure because "they were attempting to 
eficit capitalist behaviour from socialist firms without placing them in a capitalist 
environment. ., 22 But the real breakthrough occurred in 1990 in a series of developments 
that brought a sea change on the economic reform front. 23 The harbinger of those historic 
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developments was the so-called "Abalkin Blueprint" set forth in the fall of 1989, which for 
the first time made property ownership the centrepiece of reform. 2A This theme also 
figured in a more subdued way in the more conservative programmes set forth by the 
Ryzhkov government in December 1989 and in May and September 1990. 'Me most 
radical of the programmes, however, appeared in August 1990 as the much-touted "500 
day" (Shatalin) Plan. 25Tbis programme was unprecedented both for its stress on property 
ownership and for its fast timetables for "destatizing" and privatizing state property and 
for decontrolling prices - steps that are essential to creating a market economy. The basic 
features of this plan were incorporated in more general terms in the so-called Presidential 
Plan that was adopted by the federal legislature on October 19,1990.26 It was soon 
realized that in order to achieve these objectives, the creation of a normal economy was 
imperative. 
III. 16. vii. The Creation of a Normal Econom 
The decision to institute a market economy, with its radically different institutions to 
replace the failed economic system of socialist central planning, was a recognition at long 
last of the futility of further attempts to reform socialism. The transitional economies 
(Russia, Baltic States, CIS, and Central and Eastern Europeans states) aim to join the 
international community as well-functioning market economies that can generate 
economic growth and improve living standards for the people. The goal is often put as one 
of creating a "normal economy. ý., 27 Economic theory and world experience define clearly 
the basic characteristics of a successful market economy. They are: the majority - three- 
quarters or more - of land and capital assets are in private hands with property rights that 
are clearly defined and legally protected; production is guided by consumers through 
flexible prices; the economic role of the state is limited to defining and enforcing property 
rights, ensuring macro-economic stability, and providing public goods as chosen by the 
Political process. For the new states bent on creating a market economy, this means, 
Privatization of most now state-owned property, removal of controls on prices and 
economic activity, and institution of a new role for the state. These are the challenging 
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tasks that the newly formed sovereign states would have to undertake as they try to create 
a nonnal economy. 
III. 16. viii. The Transformation Tasks 
How to create a nonnal economy during the period of transition? "The institutional 
economics has no agreed-upon theoretical model that prescribes an optimal strategy for 
transforming one economic system into another one. " The real possibility of mapping the 
transition presented a new and exciting challenge for mainstream economists. The result 
was a lively debate among Western economists, and a subdued one by Soviet economists, 
about what steps must be taken to bring about a market economy and about the sequence 
28 and speed with which they ought to be taken. Early on, the issues came to be discussed 
in terms of "Big Bang" versus gradualism and in terms of whether macro-economic 
stabilization should precede privatization or vice-versa. "In the process of proffering 
policy advice to the post-communist governments and interacting with them, Western 
mainstream economists learned much about the entrenched economic and political legacies 
of socialism, and Soviet economists learned much about the desiderata for a market 
economy. 9)29 In the meantime, the countries of Eastern Europe were providing models and 
experience in diverse transition paths and privatization schemes. Out of these debates and 
experience has come a broad consensus about what must be done to transform a centrally 
planned economy into a democratic market economy and todeal with the legacies of many 
decades of economic development under socialism. According to G. E. Schroeder 30 , these 
tasks are the following: 
1. Stabilization. Inflation must be brought under control through drastic reduction in 
budget deficits and restricted credits. 
2. Liberalization. Prices must be freed from controls, Profit seeking business firms and 
farms must be allowed to decide for themselves what to produce and how to produce 
and firms must be able to engage freely in foreign trade. The currency should be 
made convertible as soon as possible. 
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3. privatization. Most land and capital assets must be put into private hands and market 
arrangements set up for the exchange of such assets. Individuals and groups must be 
free to establish new private businesses with ease. Monopolies must be broken up. 
4. Regulation. The state must assume the role of regulator of the macro-economy and of 
business activity using instruments that promote well-functioning markets through 
their influence on decisions of individuals and fin-ns. The state itself should provide 
legal and social protection and supply public goods and services in amounts and kinds 
chosen by electorates. 
5. New institutions. Legal, accounting, and statistical systems appropriate for a market 
economy must be established and new financial institutions created, such as a central 
bank and a network of private commercial banks, insurance companies, and securities 
exchanges. 
6. Restructuring of production. The mix of goods and services produced must change 
and the land, capital and labour resources must be redeployed in accord with the 
preferences of consumers at home and abroad. The state may play a role in such 
restructuring but ought not to dictate its directions, which should come from market 
SignaiS. 31 
These are the six major sets of tasks that must be carried out by each of the transitional 
economies, if they are to create a reasonably well-functioning market economy starting 
from the physical, human, institutional, and economic legacies of central planning. Each of 
these major tasks encompasses a multitude of specific tasks and entails numerous and 
perhaps conflicting choices. "What has to be done economically is gargantuan, and the 
tasks must be accomplished through political processes that are still in formation 
everywhere. The sheer magnitude and inter-connectedness of the tasks would seem to 
require that a start be made, (not necessarily in time sequence), on almost all fronts 
simultaneously. 02 The new states will choose their own particular paths and paces of 
reform and development. Even though they have common legacies and large economic 
interdependencies, these choices will be influenced by the political, social, and economic 
Particularities in each state. We shall look into those tasks in more detail later. 
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In its last year of existence, the U. S. S. R. witnessed the culmination of the combined 
failures of courses of action it had long pursued in two critical realms - its attachment to 
within-system economic reforms and its vaunted "nationalities policies. " Once the union 
government's reins were loosened under the policies of glasnost and perestroika 33 , the 
result was a bloodless revolt of the republics that proceeded swiftly and ended in 
replacement on the world stage of the unitary Soviet state by 15 new sovereign states. 
Each is a nation-state in the sense that an indigenous ethnic group is dominant in its total 
population as is shown in the following Table. We may not be able to strictly apply this 
criteria to the case of Kazakhstan. 
Table 111.16.1. 
Co 
Ge Ru Uk Bel Mo Lit Lat Est Ge Az Ar Ka : , Uz Ky 
ý Taj Tu ý 
ogr ssi rai am Ido hu via oni org erb me zak be rgy ikis rk 
ap an ne s va ani a ia aij a nia hst kis zst tan me 
hic Fe a n an tan an nist 
Un der an 
it ati 
on 
Na Ru Uk Bel Mo Lit Lat Est Ge Az Ar Ka UZ Ky Taj Tu 
tio ssi rai oru Ido hu via oni org eri me zak be rgy ik rk 
nali an nia ssi van ani n an ian nia h k z me 
ty n an an n n 
IE 81. 72. 77. 64. 79. 52. 61. 70. 82. 93. 39. 71. 52. 62. 72. 
gh 5 7 9 5 6 0 5 1 7 3 7 4 4 3 0 
est 
Se Tat Ru Ru Uk Ru Ru Ru Ar Ru Az Ru Ru Ru Uz Ru 
co ar: ssi ssi rai ssi ssi ssi me ssi eri: ssi ssi ssi be ssi 
nd 3.8 an: an: nia an: an: an: nia an: 2.6 an: an: an: k: 2 an: 
IE 22. 13. n: 1 9.4 34. 30. n: 5.6 37. 8.3 21. 3.5 9.5 
gh 1 2 3.8 0 3 8.1 8 5 
est 
Source: Based on data given in The Fonner Soviet Union in Transition, Edited by Richard F. Kaufman 
and John P. Hardt for the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 1993. 
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in order to gain perspective On what the new states have accomplished thus far in the 
area of economic reforms, we must remind ourselves of what are the most urgent of the 
tasks of new statehood. In the area of foreign relations, the new states must now 
forrnulate their own foreign policy, establish diplomatic relations with foreign states and 
negotiate new international agreements on a wide range of matters. They must decide on 
rnatters of national defense. In the domestic political arena, the new states need new 
constitutions, laws and administrative structures suited to independence. The political 
processes need to be managed to ensure a reasonable degree of stability of government in 
order to formulate and execute policy over a broad spectrum. In the social arena, the new 
states must revamp their social systems and fon-nulate policies to deal with urgent 
problems in public health, criminal justice, and the environment. 34 
In the economic realm, the tasks are even more daunting and also more pressing, since 
they concern the daily welfare of the entire population. While pursuing the complex tasks 
of systemic reform process forward, the beleaguered governments must cope with the 
daily crises stemming from the deep recession into which their economies have been 
plunged by the collapse of the center with its ability to command, by the steep decline in 
defense spending, by the disarray in trade with former CMEA members and the former 
republics, by the introduction of separate monetary unit, by worker strikes or strike 
threats, and by ethnic strife. The new states must now manage their own public sectors 
and try to balance their own budgets. In the international arena, they must forge new 
economic relationships with other countries, interact with them through international 
35 organizations, and seek economic aid and foreign investment . 
Given the revolutionary nature of the many-faceted transformation from subservience to 
independence, the speed with which it occurred, and the excessive burden on the new 
governments, the progress on economic reform made thus far is remarkable. Human 
attitudes and habitual ways of doing things changes slowly in all societies. But there is 
much evidence that such changes are indeed taking place. 36 Although systemic 
transformation is in process at long last in all of the transitional economies, large elements 
Of the old system remain in place (particularly in CIS), a situation that could hardly be 
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otherwise, given the brevity of their independence. "As for restructuring the mix of 
production, however, much alteration is occurring willy-nilly, as defense production falls 
and conversion to civilian production is attempted, as firms and farms spontaneously or 
under government prodding alter their product mixes, as the private sector oriented 
toward consumers expands, and as such investment as is taking place in the present 
chaotic conditions gravitates toward consumer-oriented sectors. , 37 The tasks still ahead in 
establishing the conditions and institutions of a viable market economy are awesome. They 
would severely tax the political and social fabric of even the most seasoned, stable, and 
ethnically homogeneous democracy. But there is no economic reason why they cannot be 
accomplished in time. Under the best circumstances, the transformation will require many 
years, and given the physical and psychological legacies, the fun recovery of the 
economies will be slow in coming. As is already clear, the transformation process will be 
characterized by much diversity. 38 
Our analysis of the transition process of the former Soviet Union unfolds the complexity 
of the nature of the task that is ahead. The economies in transition need to follow certain 
strategies to accomplish the desired economic objective of growth and development. In 
the following chapter let us try to comprehend those transition strategies that have been 
followed by the economies in transition. 
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ECONOMIC GROWTH STRATEGIES OF TRANSITION 
E. A.; onomic growth is very much determined by the strategies a country adopts. 
Throughout the republics of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the state can no 
longer dictate economic results and the market is not yet sufficiently well established to 
provide the incentives necessary for vigorous or stable growth. In this transformation, 
economic and political reforms are inextricably intertwined. ' We shall concentrate here on 
those transition strategies and the number of issues relating to the speed and sequence of 
reform in the economies in transition. The heart of that effort, the most difficult and 
protracted part of it, is the construction of market economies on the ruins of central 
planning from the eastern part of Germany to the Pacific coast of Russia. "Making 
markets where none existed before is an enterprise of daunting scale. It is far greater in 
scope than the parallel shift from communist to democratic governance. Government, after 
all, is a full-time activity for only a handful of people in any society. The economy, by 
contrast, is the setting in which most adults in any country spend their working fiVeS.,, 2 
The transition from plan to market involves abrupt and sweeping changes in the daily 
routines of hundreds of millions of people - changes in how and where they work, what 
they buy, how they earn money to pay for their purchases, and where they live. At the 
outset we can safely state that there is no unique optimal path of transition. Much depends 
on the starting point and the events preceding it. Many countries have moved sufficiently 
far that there is little point in suggesting embarking on a new path which might involve 
retracing steps. But, while no single path should be seen as the "model" or "right" way, 
3 there are some basic elements that are central to the success of the process. Let us begin 
analysing these strategies by having an understanding of the term transition. 
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111.17. i. The ConcWtual Understandim! of Transition 
Since the present transition has no historical precedent, it would be better if we can 
familiarize ourselves with this concept as we use in our study. In the "Transition Report" 
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the term transition is defined 
in the following words. "In general terms, transition is the progression from a command 
economy to an open market-oriented economy. The transition concerns institutional 
change. It is the institutional arrangements for the allocation and generation of goods and 
resources, and the ownership incentive and reward structures that institutions embody, 
that characterise the differences between a market and a command economy. 9A Transition 
is not only an intermediate goal contributing to economic development. It may also be 
regarded as an ultimate objective in itself. The market economy, in contrast to central 
planning, gives, in principle, the individual the right to basic choices over aspects of his or 
her life: occupation and place of work, where to live, what to consume, what risks to take 
or avoid, and so on. The right to these choices may be seen as basic liberty and as a 
fundamental aspect of standard of living. Of course, the notion of liberty goes far beyond 
the elements of choice described but these choices may be regarded as basic to it. Thus the 
transition is also an end in itself. 
Individuals freely pursuing their interests and interacting in the market place together 
provide a more efficient, dynamic and creative economy than one based on centralised 
commands. "The centralised command economy may suffer more severely from political 
manipulation, corruption, the arbitrary exercise of power, poor information, cumbersome 
systems and perverse incentives. "5 In summary, since the founding of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the dominant view is that a market-based system has overwhelming 
advantages over central planning. The transition from a command to a market economy is 
the movement towards a new system for the generation and allocation of resources. It 
6 involves changing and creating institutions, particularly private enterprises. The 
transitional economies need to integrate certain basic ingredients of open market-economy 
as they strive to create a market-based system. 
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111.17. n. The Ingredients of Open Market-Economy 
As we have seen, transition is a progression towards an open market-economy. The key 
ingredients of the open market-oriented economy must be examined more closely, since 
that would enable the identification of the important dimensions of the progression. "In 
identifying the 'key ingredients' it must be remembered that there are many varieties of 
market economy which may be viewed as the 'end point' or 'target' of the transition. ,7 
The contrasts between the economies of Japan, Germany and the USA illustrate that the 
possibilities are very broad. It is important to remember that the transition is not a simple, 
linear, one-dimensional progression to a 'standard' market economy. It involves the 
designing of a new economic system which is naturally a demanding venture with a 
complex process. 
What are the key ingredients of a market economy? We shall merely outline the basic 
elements of the market economy as they are understood within a capitalist framework. 
(1) enterprises and households, which are responsible for decisions concerning production 
and consumption. These decisions are taken in response to incentive structures embodied 
in the workings of the markets in which they operate; 
(2) markets, which are the means by which goods and resources are exchanged between 
enterprises and households; 
(3) financial institutions, which are crucial players in the integration of transactions over 
time; in particular the channelling of savings and investments, the organization of 
payments, and the enforcement of individual (household and enterprise) financial 
discipfine. 8 
Integrating these basic elements of the market economy into the new economic system 
of the newly formed economies in transition is an unavoidable task. The new sovereign 
states must make all effort to bring about political stability in order to accomplish the 
economic transformation. 
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The Role of the State in the Market EconamLy 
The role of the state in a market economy remains important, although very different 
from that in a command economy. This changed role requires fundamentally different 
governmental institutions. The state plays a major role in the market economy, across 
many dimensions, which is very different from that of the command economy. Basic 
elements include: 
(a) legal and regulatory structures and governmental responsibilities concerning the 
behaviour of enterprises and financial institutions, property rights, transactions and 
contracts, and the functioning of markets; 
(b) the provision of parts of education, public health and medical care; 
(c) the provision and protection of certain public goods or services including defence, law 
and order, the environment, and elements of the infrastructure; 
(d) the provision of protection against important aspects of poverty; 
(e) a system of taxation that can support the provision of the above services. 9 The 
fulfilment of these functions by the state is a necessary step towards the system of market 
mechanism. As the very term transition implies a short-term scenario, it was believed that 
the measures which are to be taken by the economic policy makers should be radical. 
111.17. iv. The Interlocking Wheels of Transition 
Despite the lack of experience with a transition of this sort, a consensus has emerged in 
both East and West on what it involves. They broadly agree that the vehicle to reach a 
private market economy should ride on four interlocking wheels. The first is 
macroeconomic stabilization - bringing the balance of payments into rough equilibrium and 
above all correcting economic imbalances that are ordinarily expressed as overt or 
suppressed inflation. (The following chapter analyses in detail stabilization as a transition 
strategy. ) A second set of changes necessary for the transition from plan to market comes 
under the rubric "liberalization. " All involve dissolving state controls of economic activity 
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and substituting market rules and practices. They include such measures as breaking up 
the monopolistic structure of industries to foster competition and putting economic 
relations with other countries on a market basis, an important element of which is making 
local currencies convertible. Liberalization involves freeing up prices, including interest 
rates; devaluing the currency to a realistic - perhaps supercompetitive - level, and then 
managing the exchange rate under some "flex-fix" regime (such as pegging with periodic 
large devaluations, crawling peg, or frequent minidevaluations, or managed float); making 
the currency convertible for the current account (that is, for international transactions of 
goods and services); integrating with the world economy by eliminating barriers to cross- 
border movements of goods, services, capital, technology, and ideas; and reforming other 
(for example, financial and labour) markets. 71he third set of changes involves privatization 
of the economy, which we shall describe briefly later in this chapter. The fourth set of 
changes requires building the institutions necessary to sustain a market economy. This is a 
process of developing a market- supporting institutional infrastructure. This encompasses 
constitutional, legislative, legal, accounting, regulatory, fiscal, monetary, and social 
insurance reform. 10 Among the market-supporting institutional infrastructure, perhaps, the 
most important is private property. Ownership must be transferred from the state to 
private hands. Also important is the establishment of a legal framework within which 
private economic activity can take place, contracts are enforced, and private property is 
protected. Important as well is the development of a financial system that can channel 
capital, in the form of private savings, to profitable uses. And perhaps most important of 
all is the accumulation of the skills - managerial, legal, and entrepreneurial, among others - 
that are necessary to make free markets work. " Liberalization, privatization of the 
economy, and development of a market-supporting institutional infrastructure could be 
grouped together under the overall label of "marketization. " Economists also broadly 
agree on the following point: in order to move fast and maintain the momentum, the 
vehicle should initialýy befielled, not just lubricated, by massive foreign governmental 
assistance - moral, intellectual, technical, and financial. One can therefore view adequate 
external assistance'2 as the essential start-up fuel to ignite the engine, get the wheels 
moving, and build up the momentum to put the economy on the turnpike to capitalism. 
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rMus, the consensus strategy for capitalist transformation may also be described as a 
structure resting on three primary pillars: stabilization, marketization, and foreign aid. 
Economists further agree - though with more qualifications - on the essential features of 
the transitional performance of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries since 
1990, and of the former Soviet Union since 1991.13 
While economists generally agree on components that should compose the core of the 
transformation strategy, the convergence breaks down on the sequencing, speed, and 
stress (relative intensity of implementation) of these components, as well as on whether 
and how sectoralism (i. e., industrial pohcy) should shape their implementation. One 
instructive start toward understanding the debate on sequencing, speed, stress, and 
sectoralism is to separate the semantics from the economics of such catchphrases as 
"shock therapy, " "big bang, " and "gradualism, " We shall proceed to analyse these 
catchphrases in the context of transition. 
111.17. v. Shock Therapy. Big Bang, and Gradualism as Transition Stratggies 
The conventional practice is to use the terms "shock therapy" and "big bang" 
interchangeably, and contrast them with the alternative of "gradualism" (some call it a 
step-by step or conservative approach). 14 The shock therapy/big-bang strategy typically 
implies a simultaneous and rapid deployment approach on all fronts. In terms of the four 
interlocking wheels described earlier - stabilization, liberalization, privatization, and 
institutional infrastructure building - the big bang approach means exactly what it says: get 
all four wheels moving together and quickly with minimum emphasis on sectoral 
selectivism (industrial policy). By contrast, gradualism usually connotes an approach 
involving a great deal of attention to appropriate sequencing of the various components 
and subcomponents of the overall policy package, as well as differentiation in speed and 
stress of these component reforms determined in light of sectoral. considerations. 
"Shock therapy is a highly conservative Western economic doctrine emphasizing 
monetary policy. Originally developed to stabilize and invigorate an economy with 
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substantial capitalist aspects, it is here modified to convert a command economy to 
capitalism. "15 The conditions for shock therapy to succeed are quite stringent. (Moreover, 
the theory upon which it rests makes a number of questionable assumptions, especially for 
the Russian case. ) It is assumed by the theory that if monetary and pecuniary problems can 
be solved, production will be restored without central government intervention in 
production decisions. Let us analyse the case of Russia, which followed this strategy. 
Yegor Gaidar, in Russia as acting Prime Minister during 1992, initiated a transformation 
regime that is called "shock therapy" because it attempts to create the necessary 
institutions for a functioning capitalist economy and achieve macroeconomic stability in 
the shortest possible time period. This strategy recommends speed in implementation on 
two grounds. First, a market economy requires the existence of a minimum set of 
institutions coming into operation simultaneously. Liberalizing retail prices, for example, 
can have little beneficial effect upon production and allocation decisions unless enterprises 
have been privatized and thus are operated according to the dictates of profit 
maximization. A second reason given to move fast with the economic transformation is 
that the process is expected to be economically painful for most members of the 
population. The quicker the new economic regime is in place, the less time opponents will 
have to organize and the sooner it will begin to yield benefits to offset the costs of the 
transition, such as unemployment and the loss of welfare entitlements and lifetime 
savings. 16 
As a transition strategy, shock therapy is the approach generally supported by the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and such well-known academic consultants as 
Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs. In Poland, influenced by Sachs, the Balcerowicz Plan 
scrapped the gradualist approach to transformation agreed in the spring of 1989 in the 
Round Table negotiations which led to the change of regime in favour of shock therapy 
and the big bang. 17 The transformation regime is based on a monetarist philosophy and a 
free market ideology. Jude Wanniski, for example, has expressed the ideology underlying 
it most clearly in an essay on the future of Russian capitalism: "It is possible to imagine a 
future of Russian capitalism that asserts itself early in the 21st century as the envy of the 
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world.... The Russian people are now engaged in nothing less than designing the basic 
architecture of a brand new country. Why not consider all possibilities? Why not design 
the Russian system of capitalism to be the best? 1) 18 By the "best, " Wanniski means most 
unfettered by state intervention and ownership. It calls for complete displacement of the 
prior economy (of former Soviet economic institutions). 
But critics of the Gaidar transformation regime, like the Nikolay Shmelev (a Russian 
economist) and Georgi Matyukhin ý(director of the Russian Gosbank), believe that it is 
unrealistic to create a market economy in so short a time. They argue that the Western 
advisors are not famifiar with the political and economic "realities" of the Russian 
economy. The majority of Western economists who were specialists on the Soviet 
economy prior to the collapse of communism, tend to agree with the critics of shock 
therapy and would call for gradual modification of existing economic institutions, not their 
wholesale elimination (a reformist approach). There also tend to be conscious political 
economists who believe that economists recommending economic policies must take 
political constraints and realities into account in formulating economic reform. Supporters 
of shock therapy base their recommendations instead on a theoretical model of the market 
economy that they are attempting to replicate in Russia, and they see little advantage in 
attempting to salvage or modify existing institutions. They also tend to be impatient with 
political constraints. What is appealing to leaders of the transitional economies who are 
facing a leap into the unknown in the face of popular unrest, is, of course, the simple and 
quick solutions provided by the confident assertions of Western economic advisors. The 
danger is that they may be merely leaping from one obsolete, unworkable economic 
dogma to another, from the frying pan into the fire. 19 
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111.17. vi. Critigue of Shock TherMy 
The strategy of shock therapy has been criticized for the following reasons. According 
to the dictates of the model of shock therapy, unemployment should be increasing as 
industries trim and rationalize their labour forces in order to maximize profits. 
TA13LE 111.17.1. 
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Source: Russian Business Monitor, No. 1,1992, p. 25 
". The number of registered unemployed against the total able-bodied population. 
b Note: The source does not give the population figure for the Kaliningrad area (column 
1). Columns 1 and 2 for Russia are also not specified. Finally, the percent figures given in 
Column 2 refer to a total able-bodied Russian population that is not identified. The text 
states (p. 24) that the regions listed in the table represent approximately 75% of the 
Russian population. The unemployed are defined here consonant with the April 19,1991, 
Law on Employment as all "able-bodied citizens that have [no] job or earning, (excluding 
payments for public works on assignment of government employment agencies) ... 
[and 
are] ... registered 
in an employment agency as seeking an adequate (sic. ) job and ready to 
take it. " (Millar, P. 51). 
Pee 
. entially nothing has happened with respect to this criterion as seen in Table 111.17.1. 
By Western standards unemployment is zero. Enterprise managers continue to see it as 
their prime responsibility to provide for the welfare of their employees, even at the 
expense of profits. Laying workers off in order to streamline and rationalize factory labour 
force deprives workers of more than their jobs. Most employers are struggling to protect 
their workers from the ravages of shock therapy; their efforts of course, undermine 
govemment economic policies. A survey of all available data on the various independent 
states of the CIS indicates that, in general, the short-run objectives of shock therapy are 
not being attained, as shown in Table 1H. 17.2. 
Table 
. 17.2. 









Textbook x x 0 0 x x 
Russia x 0 0 0 z 0 
Ukraine z 0 0 0 z 0 
Belarus z 0 c z c 0 
Moldova x 0 N/A x c 0 
LU=zbekistan 
X1 0 N/A N/A c N/A 
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TaJikistan X 0 N/A N/A x N/A 
Turkmenist 
an 
Z 0 Z N/A N/A N/A 
Kyrgyzstan. x 0 N/A N/A c 0 
Kazakhstan x 0 z N/A c 0 
Azerbaijan x 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
Annenia N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
[ýeýorgia N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: MiHar, The Economy of the CIS, p. 52. 
' Compiled impressionistically from the following Russian and English language sources 
by Alexander Sulla: USSR Today, December 1991-January 1992; CIS Today, January- 
July 1992; FBIS Daily Reports - Central Eurasia, January-July 1992; RFE/RL Daily 
Reports, January-July 1992; RFE/RL Research Report, January 24,1992; The New York 
Times, February 13,1992; The Washington Post, February 2,6,7, and 8,1992. 
Legend: x= full; z= partial; c= minimal; 0= zero; N/A = not known. 
The textbook solution calls for an end to hoarding and queues and for rising 
unemployment in the short ran. Money wages and pensions have not been successfully 
IC. - - frozen, but they have not thus far increased at the same rate that prices have. The slower 
growth of money wages than prices is serving as an anchor -a "dragging anchor'920 that is 
preventing hyperinflation for the moment. 
Shock therapy focuses on financial and price issues, but it cannot succeed without 
privatization, demonopolization, and a well-conceived industrial policy. This last 
component is an essential but rarely discussed policy. "What is needed is something much 
more like the Marshall Plan than like shock therapy. The Marshall Plan focused on 
production and economic integration as well as on macroeconomic stabilization. It put the 
burden of organizing investment, production, and distribution on the shoulders of the 
potential beneficiaries, and it discouraged a mercantilist or beggar-thy-neighbour approach 
by beneficiaries. sý21 Unfortunately, the new independent states are reluctant now to 
cooperate freely in a common economic space. 
The Soviet economy was always a crisis management economy. The market mechanism 
is still too weak in the CIS to carry the entire burden of allocation, production, and 
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distribution. Shock therapy is creating the external features of a market economy but not 
necessarily its content. The Russian, Ukrainian, and other republic economists will have to 
gain their own seat-of-the-plants experience in the central management of a market 
economy. This will take many years. The various other republics are following at different 
rates the pace set by Russia. Most objective observers see the process as taking at least ten 
years or more if a stop-and-go approach infects policy implementation, which has been the 
fate of shock therapy experiments elsewhere in the world. The problem of a "common 
ruble space", self-conscious national and ethnic groups etc. pose a threat to Russia and 
other CIS. To the extent that the new states that compose the CIS focus on ancient 
rivalries, hatreds, and grudges, economic reform will be undercut. Shock therapy was 
initially successful in Yugoslavia until ethnic rivalries made the question of economic 
reform moot. Military conflict has superseded economic concerns. A similar development 
in the CIS would be even more destructive. Under these socio-political. scenario, a 
rejection of shock therapy is the more likely outcome. The objectives of economic policy 
will remain the same as under shock therapy, but implementation will be slowed in order 
to maintain peace among the member states of the CIS and political stability within each 
state. Politics, it has been said, is "the art of the possible. " A review of the economic 
policy in the CIS indicates that shock therapy is not within the realm of the "possible" 
politically or economically. 22 
The usage of the very term "shock therapy" is being criticized on the following grounds. 
This technical term of psychiatry is used by economists as a metaphor which involves a 
misleading analogy; and worse, it carries a false negative connotation. Psychiatrists apply 
electrical shocks as a last resort to treat patients suffering from certain types of severe 
depression and catatonic schizophrenia. Here the electrical shock is the therapy. "In other 
words, the shock is the intended means to achieve an end - relieve the symptoms, if not 
Cure the patient. By contrast, for a postcommand economy, the shock that flows from a 
simultaneous and speedy implementation of a transitional strategy is an unintended - 
though unavoidable - consequence. Unlike the objective in psychiatry, the purpose is not 
to administer the shock to treat the symptoms of the underlying disease, but to apply a 
curative therapy that unfortunately involves a shock. , 23 put Succinctly, in psychiatry the 
252 
shock is the intended therapy, whereas in the economics of transition, the shock is the 
unintended consequence of the therapy. ' 
These seemingly fine points of distinction have serious political implications. It so 
happens that observers often take this metaphor literally, and fall into the intellectual trap 
of viewing the shock as the intended therapy while interpreting the alternative approach as 
therapy without shock (the psychiatric analogy would be the painless drug therapy), and 
thus preferable. All the complex issues of sequencing, speed, stress, and sectoral activism 
are thus reduced to a choice between shock or no shock. Thus, the critics argue that it 
would be better to avoid the usage of "shock therapy" and remove this vocabulary from 
the economics of transition. Let us delve into the gradualist approach. The Economistý5 
defines gradualists as those who put priority on creating market institutions (legal, 
accounting, and regulating frameworks; autonomous commercial banks; capital markets; 
and so on) over privatization, and advocate a strong state role in ownership reform of 
large enterprises with a step-by-step approach. The Economist would label Fischer and 
Gelb - along with many World Bank economists - gradualists,, since they suggest, 61t 
seems doubtful that the private sector could handle restructuring of very large, weak 
industries, so the state will need to restructure or close diem. 9Y26 Interestingly, it is The 
Economist's version of the gradualist model that many often criticize as a painful big bang 
involving simultaneous., forceful, and speedy implementation of stabilization and 
liberalization, but with little progress on privatization and institution building. Indeed, this 
is the Polish big bang that many love to hate. Clearly, The Economist's big bang entails 
not only speedy implementation of stabilization and liberalization, but also rapid 
privatization of small and large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is the 
Czechoslovakian big-bang model which in practice did not yield the desired result. This 
debate about the dichotomy between big bang and gradualism reduced the practical 
complexities of the transition strategy into two conceptual pigeonholes. As PorteS27 has 
indicated, the paradox of the big-bang strategy is that in reality it cannot be implemented. 
There is no conceivable way privatization and structural market reforms can be 
implemented as rapidly as liberalization and stabilization. This inherent speed-gap means 
capitalism cannot be created with a big-bang. The lesson - from the post-Industrial 
253 
Revolution history of today's advanced industrial nations, as well as from experiments 
with "test-tube capitalism" since 1989 - is clear: In the real world, there is no such thing as 
capitalism with a big bang, but only gradualism of different shapes, sizes, and, of course, 
speed-28 Let us conclude this survey by quoting Fred Block, "The fantasy of one royal 
road to rational decision-making must give way to recognition of the need for constant 
adjustment and adaptation to find effective ways to make choices. , 29 
111.17. vii. Transition Strateg y With an Emphasis on Privatization 
The challenges facing privatization in the postcommunist nations are of an 
unprecedented scale. The citizens of the new democracies expect privatization to eliminate 
the public immorality that Communism generated, 30 the selfishness of living at the expense 
of the future, the problem of the "free-rider" syndrome, and questions of the legitimacy of 
the emerging property rights and relations. In the economic context of the postcommunist 
transformations, privatization means the shift from a centrally governed and state-owned 
economy to a system based on the spontaneous interactions between autonomous private 
participants. Alexander Yakovlev, a Russian lawyer, likens the restructuring of the 
postcommunist societies to the destruction of a huge, unified, state factory built on 
L, eriin's political ideals. Transformation requires not only the destruction of the state 9s 
monopoly of administrative machinery, but, more importantly, of the Communist party's 
31 
monopoly of every sector of society. In this sense, privatization means not merely the 
technical restructuring of property rights and property relations in order to make the 
economy efficient, but the razing and rebuilding of the entire political process into 
institutions which permit and encourage public participation. Privatization, therefore, is 
understood both as an end and as a means of democracy. 
Privatization of the economy requires development of a new private sector. It also 
requires reform of ownership and management of existing state enterprises (liquidation, 
restructuring, commercialization, and privatization of existing enterprises); and property 
rights reform of land and housing. 32 A key element in the transition is the restructuring and 
Privatization of state enterprises, for which an important first step is the imposition of 
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product market discipline. Two broad policy approaches to restructuring and privatization 
can be found: early mass privatization on the one hand and comprehensive financial 
restructuring before privatization on the other. Key differences between these approaches 
are the quality of governance and management provided by new owners of enterprises at 
the time of privatization and the methods of resolving any debt overhang. 33 
The first approach achieves rapid privatization, but often at the expense of ownership 
and governance quality at privatization. Ownership typically becomes dispersed among 
voucher funds, managers, workers and private investors. One potential source of 
governance is the funds that intermediate investment of vouchers; however, their ability to 
perform tasks beyond portfolio diversification has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. 
Another is the managers and workers who may become significant shareholders; although, 
in some cases, incumbent managers can be an obstacle to restructuring. Possible methods 
of resolving any debt overhang include selective debt write-downs by the government, 
high inflation, and, in cases of insolvency, legal bankruptcy proceedings for privatized 
enterprises. But, there are strong objections to mass privatization that would distribute 
shares of any given firm among many individuals and thus so disperse control as to leave 
the existing management in charge. Whether or not the authorities choose to break up 
giant firms before they are privatized, setting up competition policy can benefit not only 
from experience in the European Community, but also from recent work in industrial 
economics. 34 
The second approach aims to attract high-quality owners for enterprises at the time of 
privatization by implementing comprehensive financial restructuring before the sale takes 
place, but this is often at the expense of privatization speed. The lead agents in financial 
restructuring are either state banks or a government agency. However, there appear to be 
limits to the ability of these institutions to support those aspects of restructuring that 
require fixed investment, and private cash investors in enterprises can be difficult to 
attract. The scale of the investment demand created by new market opportunities, in 
addition, calls for the strengthening of domestic financial institutions. While domestic 
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firmcial institutions are vital to sustained growth, the internal cash flows of enterprises are 
35 likely to be a significant source of finance for fixed investment early in the transition. 
Residents of the postcommunist countries of Eastern and Central Europe have an 
opportunity, virtually unprecedented, to create forms of property ownership that are both 
private and pluralistic. They are not confined to the nineteenth-century models of laissez- 
faire capitalism and state socialism. In the free world, many varieties of capitalism emerged 
(for instance, the Reaganite/Thatcherite capitalism of the U. S. and Britain, the MITI 
capitalism of Japan, the central bank capitalism of Germany), with their differences being 
nearly as important as their common characteristics. 36 "The question is which capitalism, 
which market economy, which private property relations the postcommunist world 
wants. s, 37 It is crucial that policy-makers explicitly acknowledge that they are making 
deliberate choices among a wide array of options that can fairly be labelled private and 
market-oriented. 
HI. 17. viii. Mudfiple Forms of Private Pr2pej: U Ownership 
Just as there is an array of different forms of market economy, so private ownership of 
property can take multiple forms. "It is a great mistake to assume private ownership of 
property has just one meaning, the classical liberal idea of unlimited and absolute freedom 
by individuals to use, enjoy, or transfer their property as they wish, or that the general 
commitment to a market form of economic organization necessitates this form of property 
rights. The classical liberal form of individual ownership has probably never existed 
anywhere in the world at any time. 08 Most investment capital in the U. S. is not controlled 
by individuals. Rather, it is controlled by large financial institutions, such as pension funds, 
and insurance companies, which manage it on behalf of thousands of individual 
beneficiaries. The postcommunist world, then, has a historically unprecedented 
Opportunity to create new market modes of economic organization and new forms of 
private ownership of property that avoid the weaknesses of both state socialism and 
corporate capitalism. r1lie way to capitalize on this opportunity is to create legal and 
economic institutions that are designed to minimize three problems in particular: 
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antidemocratic processes of decision-making, paternalism and passivity, and political and 
economic domination or exclusion based on race, religion, ethnic identity, or gender. 39 
The first goal of this form of economic transformation is genuinely democratic processes 
of decision-making. "If the reinstitution of the market in the place of the command 
economy is to benefit the entire populations of the new democracies, and not just the 
already privileged classes, it must be accompanied by political freedom and truly 
democratic processes. , 40 It strives to ensure that policy decisions regarding investment of 
private capital, labour-management relations, and other basic issues that directly affect the 
material conditions of people's lives are arrived at as democratically as possible. Far from 
being incompatible, economic transformation can in fact facilitate participatory property 
relations and encourage, through active participation, civic responsibility. The relationship 
between privatization, participation, and responsibility depends, as some observers have 
recognized, on what forms private property relations concretely take. Related to 
democratization is a second goal: forms of private ownership in which individuals are as 
active in control of their assets as is feasible. It is important not to recreate a regime of 
paternalism and passivity, either through state ownership or through certain private modes 
of ownership. The reintroduction of property rights must be accompanied by an extension 
of democratic control if the transformation is to cope successfully with the core problem 
of power. The question, as Fred Block has stated, is "not capitalism or socialism, but how 
a society can create economic institutions that give maximum scope to democratic 
participation. 9A1 A third goal of economic transformation is to avoid illegitimate forms of 
exclusion and economic and social domination based on gender and racial, religious, or 
ethnic identity. This means not simply that laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, 
housing, and other key sectors be enacted but that the free market not be used as a 
mechanism for perpetuating economic domination and exclUSion. 42 
Realizing these three goals requires that policy-makers explicitly articulate participation, 
democratic control, and social inclusion as values that motivate their choices of 
institutional forms of property relations. "'Me new democracies were formed as the result 
of popular movements in which participation, democracy, and inclusion were dominant 
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characteristics. 'Me process of privatization and democratization are not categorically 
distinct from each other, but are in fact closely intertwined. The same values that animated 
the turn to democracy are as relevant to the task of privatization. 9A3 The point can be 
made more strongly: it is only through a privatized economy whose institutions are 
participatory, democratically governed, and socially inclusive that the ideal of democracy 
in the political sphere can be truly realized. 44AIso, the legaI45 as well as the econoryliC46 
perspectives are to be designed carefully as we try to formulate strategies of transition. 
These strategies could be co-ordinated through the central management of economies. 
HI. 17. ix. The Relevance of Central Management of Economies 
If central planning of economies has been discredited by the Soviet experiment, central 
management of economies has not. In fact, a major objective of economic transformation 
of the Russian and other transitional economies is to create fiscal and monetary institutions 
that will permit central management of what is expected to become a predominantly 
private enterprise economy. The other main thrust is, of course, to privatize and to create 
the conditions under which private enterprise may flourish. Central management of 
capitalist economies is, in fact, the main legacy of John Maynard Keynes. The American 
Keynesian Abba Lerner47 introduced economics to the student by presenting the economy 
as an automobile that can be steered down the highway by means of appropriate fiscal and 
monetary adjustments. Thus, depression and inflation could be prevented and a stable, 
safe, and satisfactory rate of growth could be attained by good steering. According to 
Lerner, "The instrument that can do this is as readily available as the steering wheel for 
automobiles, yet it has not been installed [in the economy] and put into operation. A8 rMS 
is an interesting metaphor to be applied to all transitional economies. As anyone would be 
frightened to death if one has to be in an automobile in which the steering wheel is as 
loosely connected to the wheels, so also any one concerned with the economy would be 
frightened if the steering wheels of fiscal and monetary policies are loosely connected to 
the wheels of the economy. 
49 
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Western economists conceive of an economy as a set of simultaneous equations in n 
variables, which require a solution that solves for all prices and quantities in the system 
simultaneously. It follows that all prices and quantities in the system are interdependent, 
which is the primary reason that reform proposals call for simultaneity in the creation of 
market institutions. We also think of this set of economy-wide simultaneous equations as 
summing to the aggregate demand components of Gross National Product (GNP), that is, 
to the aggregate final demand categories: consumption, investment, government 
expenditures and net exports, on the one hand, and to the final distributive income shares, 
Gross National Income (GNI), on the other. Western policy recommendations, including 
the shock therapy and other forms of macroeconomic stabilization, are based upon these 
concepts-50 
By following an autarkic, Marxist policy, Russia and the other CIS states missed 
developing a modem market economy. "The 1990 Shatalin Plan to transfon-n the economy 
to market principles in 500 days was unacceptable in the end to Gorbachev in 1990 
because it meant abandonment of both the Union and socialist economic principles. "51 
However, since Gorbachev's demise, all subsequent plans have been similar to the Shatalin 
Plan. They all are teleologically driven, that is, they have been based on the market 
economy as a goal, rather than being tailored to modify specific characteristics of the 
existing economic system. All, also, have called for a rapid transformation to a market 
economy. "The first step of shock treatment as being applied in Russia and several of the 
other successor states under tutelage of the IMF and certain Western economic advisors is 
a set of short-run policies designed to create a free market and to achieve macroeconomic 
stability. Ideally, they should be implemented simultaneousýy. 9952 
111.17. x. A Set of Short-Run Policies 
We have outlined the basic components and the key strategies that are necessary for an 
economic transformation, especially, during the period of transition. The success of these 
strategies depends on a number of short-run policies. Though we have already analysed a 
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few of them, here we shall just list them, following James R. Millar's analysis, as a set of 
short-run policies and the criteria for their successful implementation. 
1. liberalizing prices to achieve rational relative prices and market-clearing price levels., 
to curtail aggregate demand, make hoarding unprofitable, destroy the population's 
financial assets, and undercut privilege and blat. 
2. Freezing money wages and income to cause real wages and incomes to fall. This is 
necessary to prevent a wage and price spiral and to reduce real costs of production; in 
short, providing an anchor for the economy against hyperinflation and making the 
economy more competitive internationally. 
3. Reducing and stabilizing government expenditures by cutting subsidies and 
entitlements and reducing defense spending. 
4. Restricting aggregate demand by reducing deficit spending and raising taxes (e. g., a 
VAT tax). 
5. Tightening bank credit, controlling the money supply, and creating a true central bank. 
6. Opening the economy to the world market by floating the exchange rate to establish 
convertibility, and eventually creating a stable exchange rate. It is also necessary for 
Russia and the other new states to create domestic convertibility so that anyone within 
Russia can buy any legal goods or services for rubles, regardless of rank, position, or 
CitiZenShi P. 53 
The criteria for successful implementation of these short-run policies include: 
1. Transforming the economy from a sefler's market into a buyer's market thereby ending 
hoarding, which will occur when prices rise to levels that no one expects to be 
exceeded. Shelves will fiff up as hoarding ends, and reservation prices will fall 
sufficiently for people, enterprises, and governments to begin to stop hoarding. 
2. Establishing a rising rate of unemployment as enterprise rationalize their labour forces 
and reduce redundant labour supplies. 
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3. Stabilizing wholesale and retail prices and money wages, opening the economy to the 
world market and stabilization of the exchange rate. 
4. Making the ruble convertible. 
54 
There is evidence of a short-term supply response in Russia, but most of the short-term 
criteria have not been satisfied. Prices for a large share of consumer goods were liberalized 
in early 1992. Some critical products, such as bread, milk, vodka, etc., remained under 
strict price control, and are difficult to find and require queuing; but as a response, states 
are gradually allowing these prices to rise. As a result of high prize of uncontrolled goods, 
these goods (like champagne) have appeared for the first time in years in state retail 
outlets. Hoarding has ended for price decontrolled products. Price liberalization has , 
therefore, achieved some degree of success, and most retail (and some wholesale) markets 
are now true buyer's markets. Stores are filled with goods and private markets have 
sprung up everywhere like mushrooms because enterprises, people, stores, cities, and 
republics have stopped hoarding and begun to sell hoarded goods. This is a short-run 
effect, predicted in advance. But production has not increased and output continues to fall. 
"For shock therapy to succeed, however, what is needed is a long-run supply response, 
that will depend upon structural changes in the economy - notably privatization and 
demonopolization. "55 The success of these short-run strategies have to be translated into 
long-term perspective as the transition process takes momentum.. 
HI. 17. xi. The Long-Term Reform Success 
A- 
As we have explained, the long-term process requires privatization, demonopolization 
and the creation of an appropriate infrastructure for a modem capitalist system (e. g., legal 
protection of private property, business regulatory systems, etc. ). This will be more 
difficult and will take more time. This is a cautious growth path that the transitional 
economies are treading. Since the possibilities are open-ended, things can go wrong too. 
Following again the analysis of James R. Nfillar, we shall. list those inclusive fears with an 
adaptation of a particular strategy during the period of transition. What can go wrong ? 56 
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1. price liberalization may be constrained, with the result that hoarding continues and 
stores remain empty. 
2. Money wages (and pensions) may float along with retail prices. It is difficult for a 
government to let product prices rise to equilibrium levels because of the adverse 
impact this has on the distribution of income and wealth. Money wages must at least 
lag, but the pressures will be great to let money wages rise, to protect those on fixed 
incomes by upping pensions and other benefits, and to maintain a broad social safety 
net, all of which will make it hard to reduce, or even restrain the state budget. More 
important, raising money wages and incomes weakens the anchor against 
hyperinflation. 
3. Budget deficit may continue to rise. 
4. The central bank may fail to restrict credit. In reality there is no true central bank yet in 
any member state of the CIS to manage and allocate credit, and the monetary 
authorities cannot, in any case, prevent legislative spending from spiralling if the 
elected legislature so chooses. 
5. Privatization and demonopolization may stall, which thus far is the case. 
6. Macroeconomic stabilization may fail. Convertibility of the ruble will require a large 
stabilization fund; otherwise like a run on an uninsured bank, the fund will be 
exhausted by insatiable demand for foreign exchange. 57 
We may have to add here, that the conditions for the strategy of shock therapy to 
succeed, therefore, are quite stringent on economic grounds alone. It is assumed by the 
theory that if monetary and pecuniary problems can be solved, production will be restored 
without central government intervention in production decisions. That is, if one gets retail 
and wholesale prices right, money wages right, the interest rate right, and the exchange 
rate right, production will take care of itself. Rational economic actors (enterprise 
managers and households) will, by maximizing profits and/or utility, create an efficient and 
productive market economy. "Thus, paradoxically, shock therapy puts as much weight 
exclusively on pecuniary variables as the old command system did on quantitative 
variables. This purely monetarist solution is just as ideologically driven and one-sided as 
Soviet Marxism was. 958 But the dynamics of transition strategy can assure a degree of 
success. 
The dynamics of implementation of the transition strategy involves five related, yet 
distinct, elements: sequencing; stress (intensity with which a policy is implemented); speed 
(the pace at which a policy is implemented); sectoralism (the extent to which the state 
262 
interferes with market forces to promote 'winners' and suppress 'losers' at the level of 
sectors, industries, and enterprises); and duration (the time it takes to complete the 
implementation of various policy measures). Out of these five elements, three involve time 
in one way or another: sequencing, speed, and duration. The other two involve 
differentiation in force (stress) and focus (sectoralism). Appendix 111.17.1. illuminates this 
distinction further. Alan Gelb and Cheryl Gray9 explain a stylized phasing of various 
reform measures with the premise that the full transition in a prototype CEE/former Soviet 
Union economy will take ten years, as is shown in this Appendix. 
III. 17. xii. The RealiU of the Transitional Economies 
Most economists agree that stabilization, liberalization, privatization, and institutional 
reforms are interlocking (complementary) wheels of the same vehicle, and therefore need 
to move together. At the same time economists also agree that restructuring and 
privatization of large-scale enterprises (and some critical institutional reforms) in the 
economies of CEE and the former Soviet Union have been much too slow, and thus have 
delayed the transition and raised the level of misery by preventing price and trade 
liberalization from generating a positive supply-side response. "The usual reaction to this 
'stabliberahzation-privatization time gap' is to advocate an acceleration of privatization, if 
necessary with 'quick and dirty' methods. , 60 The presumption is that intensified efforts at 
privatization will induce a quick birth of a substantially privatized market economy where 
strong and speedy "stabliberalization" measures will bear their intended fruits. "The 
problem with this prescription is that it ignores three aspects of the reality of the 
transitional economies: privatization of large enterprises takes a long time; a substantial 
Portion of these enterprises are not viable at world prices; and the governments are not 
politicaffy capable of liquidating them imediately. iý, 6' AR this add up to a central 
conundrum of the transition strategy: a "quick and dirty" approach to privatization in a 
post-command economy shocked by rapid and comprehensive hberalization and strong 
and ongoing stabihzation measures is likely to yield dirty, not quick results. "The only way 
out of this conundrum seems to lie in following the conventional wisdom: correct the 
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speed mismatch problem, not by speeding up privatization, but by selectively slowing 
down liberalization, and to some extent softening and redesigning stabilization. 9., 62 Here, 
we shall not elaborate on how phased and selective liberalization and soft stabilization can 
be co-ordinated with inherently slow enterprise reform and privatization. However, it is of 
paramount importance at this stage to understand the transition strategy of 
macroeconomic stabilization, to which we shall proceed. 
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EEN 
TRANSITION STRATEGY WITH AN EMPHASIS ON 
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION 
The economies in transition design strategies that would lead them to achieve economic 
stability and growth. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the problem of how to 
transform a centrally planned economy into a market economy has emerged as one of the 
most compelling and challenging issues of our time. The question is salient because the 
republics of the former Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern and Central Europe are in 
the midst of a transformation process that seeks to capture the claimed efficiency 
advantages of market mechanisms for their economies. It is complex because a rapid 
transition from socialism to a market economy is historically unprecedented, and requires 
a fundamental restructuring of a nation's economic, political, social, and legal institutions, 
as well as its physical infrastructure. ' The early literature on transition concentrated on the 
issue of sequencing, interpreted as the order of priority between stabilization, 
liberalization, privatization and restructuring. In theory, each of these reform components 
reinforces the other, and therefore they should ideally be introduced simultaneously in one 
"big bang" reform. However, in practice, it has proved impossible to initiate a "big bang 11 
reform strategy. Though we cannot at this stage establish a unique optimal path of 
transition, most now argue that macroeconomic stabilization, if not a necessary condition 
for transition, greatly facilitates it. 2 Therefore, we shall analyse in this chapter the 
transition strategy with an emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization. "Stabilization 
concerns basic macroeconomic variables including inflation, balance of payments, debt, 
unemployment and output shocks. Progress in achieving macroeconomic stability will be 
an important determinant of achievements in the transition, but it is very different from the 
transition itself. For example, an unstable macroeconomic position will discourage private 
investment, hindering both transition and development. One would also expect setbacks in 
other aspects of economic development, as the provision of medical and educational 
services may be disrupted by the shocks facing large enterprises that supplied many of 
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these services in the old regime, or as fiscal shocks may disrupt public sector payments for 
the services. Such disruption would, of course, be additional to the economic problems for 
inclividuals caused by the dislocation of employment. 9.6 
it has certainly been leamed from the range of countries' experience that those that 
pressed ahead more radically on all four fronts have been rewarded not only with relatively 
rapid movement towards a market economy but also, in most cases, by more modest falls 
or earlier recovery in output. Would things have gone even better if they had gone even 
faster with these reforms? The experience of the transitional economies shows that faster 
reforms are not always preferable. Moreover, the improper sequencing of reforms is likely 
to have a significant impact on the stability of the transition to a market economy. 
"Transformation strategies typically define the final goals of reform and the nature, 
sequence, and timing of reforms most likely to achieve the designated objectives. Reform 
objectives include stability, efficiency, equity, and economic growth, and these objectives 
are believed to be most readily attainable by the establishment of a market economy. A Tbe 
necessary, although not sufficient conditions required to satisfy a stable transition to a 
market economy include monetary and fiscal institutions that promote macroeconomic 
stability, among others. The following case study follows the macroeconomic stabilization 
policies adopted by Russia and the Baltic states during the period of economic transition. 
We shall begin with Russia. "The Russian reforms now appear poised at a critical juncture, 
one that may well determine whether, and in what form, the transformation to a market 
economy will proceed. ,5 We shall follow the research paper by James A. Duran Jr., titled, 
Russian Fiscal and Monetary Stabilization: A Tough Road Ahead, as we analyse the 
Russian stabilization policies. 
111.18. i. The Big-Bang of Destabilization 
Though the various economic measures adopted during the period of transition in Russia 
were aimed at stabilization, what was truly experienced by millions of people was 
destabilization of a 'big bang' scale. The radical economic reform programme of the 
Yeltsin-Gaidar government implemented in January 1992 was but the latest stage in the 
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effort to shift from a centrally planned economy (CPE) to a market economy. Substituting 
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary instruments for the direct commands of the 
government in economic affairs was initiated in 1988. As each of the officially approved 
reform plans for the transition between systems have been debated and partially 
implemented, the rigidities inherent in the CPE have twisted the outcomes of decrees and 
statutes in unforeseen directions. "Concepts basic to 72 years' rule by Marxist-Leninists 
have so permeated the minds of political leaders, managers, and the masses that even 
supporters of market reform have difficulty understanding the scope of change required. 
Stalin denied the validity of Western 'capitalist' macro-and microeconomics for the Soviet 
'socialist' model. His deliberate 'classicide' against the private entrepreneurial classes of 
city and countryside prevented the development of a strong, independent middle class. q., 6 
Thus, when macroeconomic measures were finally introduced into the changing economic 
system, they realized that the creation of a normal economy is a challenging task that lies 
ahead. They also faced the reality that the abandom-nent of a unitary budget system alone 
cannot guarantee the building of a "normal" society and a market economy immediately. 
After changing from a unitary state budget system to a decentralized federal one in 1991, 
the central and republic ministries increased the deficit to 26 percent of the total budgets. 
(Tbe earlier government had limited its deficits to 2-3 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). ) Emission of currency in 1991 reached twice the rate of 1990. Partial reforms 
designed to move to a market economy had undermined the controls of the centrally 
planned economy (CPE). The result was fiscal and monetary destabilization of the 
U. S. S. R. in 1991. Partially, this was caused by the inherent characteristics of a unitary 
budget. 
III. 18. ii. The Characteristics of a Unitaa Budget 
A Unitary budget is central to a command economy. During the Five Year Plan (FYP) 
period, the annual plan setting the parameters for virtually every institution was the centre 
Of policy debate by top leaders and managers. Bargaining to get as much as possible while 
limiting commitments was the centre of politics on economic affairs. Within this, fiscal and 
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monetary policy were merely instruments for implementing the plan to attain its physical 
indicators. The U. S. S. R. Ministry of Finance had as its duty to calculate the numbers basic 
for the U. S. S. R. State Budget to implement the targets set by the top authorities. This 
document was a unitary one since the budgets of lower levels of government were 
included within the budgets of the next higher level. 7 The U. S. S. R. State Bank (Gosbank)., 
a department of the Ministry of Finance, kept and monitored the accounts of all 
enterprises, industrial and agricultural, and of all budgetary organizations on direct 
government payroll to ensure observance of the requirements of the plan. These accounts 
were carefully divided into two circuits. The 'cash account' was used primarily for wages 
and salaries. Since wages and prices were set by the government, control could be kept on 
the emission of currency so that demand would not unduly exceed the supply of consumer 
goods. The second 'circuit' was the noncash account of transactions among enterprises 
and between them and the government. Should subsidies be needed to ensure resources 
were available to meet planned production levels, Gosbank would provide them even to 
8 loss-making enterprises. Since the consumer prices for basic foods were kept below the 
costs of production, the state had to pour huge subsidies, by 1990 two-thirds of the total, 
into agricultural enterprises to cover the costs of production. Keeping loss-making 
enterprises going at the expense of the state may have maintained full employment and 
produced impressive physical statistics, but the wastage of capital resources was immense. 
"For the most part, budgetary and monetary policy was left to the experts in the ministries. 
Prior to 1989, the budget, a brief document, was always passed after a pro forma debate 
with the inclusion of a few pre-arranged amendments. "9 While the unitary budget provides 
a masked balanced budget, the economic performance unmasked the imbalance nature of a 
unitary budget. 
End of a Balanced Budget L4. Ah 
Since the introduction of a socialist command economic model, the myth about a 
balanced budget was very prevalent. The shadow of the budget crisis haunted the system 
to its core. "During Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure in power, 1985-1991, perestroika, 
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glasnost, and democratization, broke the 'cake of socialist custom' as developed during 
the period of authoritarian Communist rule. During his first two years, he sought to 
, perfect' the planning mechanism through uskorenie, a major campaign to raise the 
machine-building industry across-the-board to world standards. "'O Uskorenie 
(acceleration) strategy failed at great expense; also his antialcohol campaign failed. Profits 
from foreign trade also dropped significantly since the price of Russia's key export, oil, fell 
sharply on the world market. During the second stage from 1987 to 1989, laws on 
enterprise, co-operatives, leasing, and individual enterprise were passed to give greater 
autonomy to managers and to improve incentives in limited areas for entrepreneurs. 
involved were alterations in the tax laws that resulted in a significant reduction of 
revenues from profits. With greater autonomy, managers increased wages faster than the 
rate of growth of productivity. Also a source of the growth of the money supply was the 
relaxation of administrative controls on the accounts of enterprises. More cash was issued, 
especially through leaseholders and co-operatives, thus raising aggregate demand. During 
1988, deficit spending reached about 11 percent of GDP. Budget imbalance became so 
obvious. 
By mid-1988, the authorities had come to understand the necessity of dealing with the 
budget crisis. During his presentation of the proposed 1989 unitary budget on October 27, 
1988, the U. S. S. R. Minister of Finance shattered the myth that the country's budget had 
been balanced for decades. " This had ideological importance since Soviet leaders had 
long pointed to their deficit-free management of national finances as one proof of the 
superiority of the Soviet socialist system. Efforts to slow budgeted deficit spending had 
some success in 1989 and 1990. According to the IMF, deficit spending was cut to 9.5 
and 8.5 percent, respectively. 12 This was done partly by reducing subsidies to loss-making 
enterprises, who were supposed to become seff-financing by 1990. Also, sharp reductions 
were made in budgeted outlays on construction projects. The budget lines for defense 
were to be cut by 1.5 percent in 1989,7 percent in 1990, and 14.2 percent in 1991. 
However., consumer subsidies, especially for food, continued to rise steadily. On the 
revenue side, two major items, taxes on enterprise profits and foreign trade, declined as a 
Percentage of GDP. 
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The monetary system also was increasingly being destabilized after 1988 as a result of 
the relaxation of central controls. While state credits to enterprises were diminishing and 
consumer credits were minute, currency was the main form of monetary expansion. From 
1985 to 1987, the annual increase in emission ranged from 4.1 to 5.9 percent. That 
jumped to 11.8 percent in 1988,18.4 percent in 1989, and 28 percent in 1990. As a result 
of the shortage of consumer goods, a very large monetary overhang of more than R250 
billion was held by the population in savings and cash. Due to this imbalance, the potential 
for very rapid inflation was in place. 13 At the same time, there was no mechanism to avoid 
the imminent budgetary collapse. 
HI. 18. iv. Budgetary Collapse in 1991 
The replacement of the unitary budget system by a federal one in 1991 led to a collapse 
of the fiscal system. An IMF staff team, which reported in April, 1992, concluded: "The 
overall fiscal imbalance in the union as a whole (i. e., the sum of the union and republican 
deficits) dramatically deteriorated in 1991. The overall deficit is estimated at rub 482 
billion, or 26 percent of union GDP. If the impact of the frozen part of the deposit 
compensation is excluded, the deficit is reduced to 19 percent of GDP, financed mostly by 
domestic bank credit, compared with a deficit of the general government budget of the 
former U. S. S. R. of rub 85 billion in 1990, or about 8.5 percent of GDP. A deterioration of 
this magnitude reflects virtually unprecedented loss of fiscal control, the counterpart of 
which was the strengthening of inflationary pressures and further increases in undesired 
money imbalances. , 14 A federal formula of Gorbachev, "a strong centre and strong 
Republics" needed the impetus of fiscal corrections. In April 1990 a law was enacted by 
the U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet on basic principles that would govern relations between the 
centre and the constituent union republics in which fiscal arrangements were to be 
fundamentally changed. The unitary state budget would be replaced by a federal system 
whereby the two levels developed their budgets independently. Gorbachev reiterated his 
Commitment to this new system in his Presidential Guidelines for economic reform issued 
it, October 1990.15 Gorbachev projected that 1991 would be a transitional year during 
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which a new Treaty of Union would be negotiated with clauses providing for a 'common 
economic space' with institutions to maintain an essential uniformity in fiscal, banking, and 
monetary policy. Especially crucial was Gorbachev's concession that the 'single channel' 
for tax collection would continue to be under the control of the republiCS. 16 Lack of 
effective power by the centre to enforce the agreement soon became clear. Republics 
retained a higher proportion of shared revenues than agreed, amounting to 5.9 percent of 
GDP. Most of what was collected was not forwarded to the centre. Lower authorities also 
changed expenditure rules on investment, subsidies, and social welfare programmes 
without prior consent of the centre. Monetary reform to combat the illegal profits of the 
'mafia' by demonetizing large denomination bill undermine faith in currency. Rumours of 
further monetary reform, growing shortages of consumer goods due to production 
breakdowns and the end of COMECON, as well as higher prices all led to panic buying. 
Demand was far outrunning supply. Faith in money as a store of value was being 
undermined. Barter was becoming widespread at both the enterprise and individual levels. 
Central revenues were so reduced on the eve of the coup that due to lack of resources the 
Council of Ministers refused to implement the increase in pensions and benefits for July 1 
by the U. S. S. R. Congress and President Gorbachev. 17 After the August coup failed, the 
centre was largely stripped of power in a series of constitutional amendments. The Council 
of Presidents, union and republic, were to reach decision only on the basis of consensus. 
Republics sharply reduced transfers of revenue to the centre. They unilaterally took 
jurisdiction over all union enterprises on their territory as the central ministries were being 
dissolved. The key economist of the Committee for the Management of the Economy, G. 
Yavlinskiy, devoted himself to negotiating a treaty to maintain a 'common economic 
space. ' Much time was spent in seeking consensus on more than 20 specialized 
agreements in different economic sectors. 18 However, no deal could be reached on co- 
ordinating fiscal and monetary policy. The economy had entered a deep recession with a 
fall in GDP of 17 percent in 1991. '9 Symptoms of the economic crisis included sharp 
reductions in output and labour productivity, inflation, huge budget deficits, sizeable 
diversions of state resources into the underground economy, 20 and a flight from currency 
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into costly barter transactions. There was not much room left to manoeuvre the economy 
back to normal. 
III. 18. v. Liberalization Process 
While the Russian government would have preferred to maintain the union, Yeltsin and 
his ministers understood that the economy was degenerating so rapidly that they needed to 
act decisively to keep the support of the public. On October 24, Boris Yeltsin announced 
that, if necessary, Russia would act alone in December. The "big-bang" programme 
designed by a young group of economists around Deputy Premier Yegor Gaidar featured 
two measures that could be implemented rapidly by state action. On December 16, most 
prices would be 'liberalized, ' i. e. freed from government control. In addition, an austere, 
balanced budget policy with harsh cuts was to be implemented during 1992. Key 
reformers in the U. S. S. R. central government, including Yavlinskiy, described the Russian 
decisions as premature since the institutional infrastructure for a market economy was not 
yet in place. In November, 1991, the central fiscal system collapsed. With the U. S. S. R. 
government virtually broke "21 the Russian government moved to take over 
federal 
institutions, including the fiscal and banking systems. The budgets of the U. S. S. R. and the 
Russian Federation were merged for the last quarter of 1991 at an added cost of R43.5 
billion for the republic. The other republics refused to pay anything. 22 After that point, 
Gorbachev was an "Emperor without clothes. , 23 Even the military payroll was met by 
Russia. These liberalization measures loosened government control over budgets and 
monetary emissions, and thereby created even greater macroeconomic imbalances. When 
finally the Soviet leaders were prepared to revitalize the moribund economy by 
abandoning central planning, and by initiating more radical policies to effect a painful but 
necessary transition to a market economy, they found themselves in that process 
dismantling the Soviet Union itself. 
HI. 18. vi. Implications of Termination of U. S. S. R 
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When viewed from the perspective of seventy years of authoritarian centralized control 
over all facets of political and economic activity, the scope and speed of the recent reforms 
initiated in the Soviet Union are nothing less than extraordinary. Most important among 
these was the demise of U. S. S. R itself. After the overwhelming vote for independence in 
the Ukrainian referendum of December 1, Yeltsin and his ministers realized that the 
struggle to preserve the old union was over. in order to maintain the 'common economic 
space' so basic to the continued operation of the interdependent economies, the Belarus, 
Ukrainian, and Russian presidents at a summit held in Minsk formed on December 8 the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and terminated the existence of the U. S. S. R. 
The other republics, except for the Baltics and Georgia, joined within two weeks. 
Gorbachev played no role in these negotiations. On December 25-26,1991, the U. S. S. R. 
ceased to exist because the U. S. S. R. President, legislature, courts, and Gosbank chairman 
abdicated their powers. 2A 
The socio-political and economic plot of this well-knitted historic novel, as it unfolded 
during 1990-1991, shattered the realities of millions of lives into a mere socialist dream. 
Apart from the social and political upheaval, the economic front experienced the worst 
catastrophic fall. The overall outcome of this debacle was fiscal and monetary 
destabilization. According to the IMF, the overall central and republic 1991 deficit 
reached 19 percent of GDP, but this omit another 7 percent owed to depositors holding 
frozen savings accounts. Whereas under the unitary system only the centre could run a 
deficit, in 1991 several republics did so. Russia had a deficit of 11.5 percent, Ukraine-14 
percent, and Kazakhstan-18 percent. These three account for about 80 percent of the 
former union's GDP. Most of the smaller republics kept their deficit below 5 percent and 
some even ran surpluses. Emission of currency had grown by 106 percent in a single year 
25 and broad money (M2) by 77 percent. The successor states of the U. S. S. R. had major 
problems to face as they gained their new independence. Their presidents recognized that 
the Russian economy was so dominant on the territory of the former Soviet Union that 
they would have to pursue the same general course of economic reform whether they lilwd 
it or not. At their request, implementation of price liberalization was delayed by Russia to 
January 2,1992. Time was needed to prepare the necessary administrative measures. 
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Within a short span of years, political leaders have adopted, and large segments of the 
public have accepted, an entirely new agenda for their economic and political future. The 
fundamental decision to abandon central planning and replace it with market mechanisms 
for organizing economic activity has been made, and will be difficult to reverse. 26 
III. 18. vii. Gaidar's Radical Reform 
On January 2,1992, Russia, the largest and most influential member of the newly 
created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), embarked on a closely observed 
economic experiment whose consequences are shaping the nation's political and economic 
future. With a view to stabilize the economy, fiscal and monetary measures were 
introduced. Inheriting a severe crisis, the Yeltsin-Gaidar Russian government, in 
consultation with IMF experts, implemented two sets of policies that could be done 
quickly by central government decrees. The first was 'liberalization' of the economy, i. e. 
freeing prices, 27 the commodity markets, and foreign trade from most government 
controls. The second commitment was to strict fiscal and monetary policies focusing on 
virtually eliminating the budget deficit, strict reduction of credits to enterprises (the 
economy), and stabilization of the exchange rate. Commitment to carry out structural 
reforms through privatization, land reform, and development of market infrastructure 
remained strong, but these measures by their very nature would take several years to 
realize. 28 Transfer to an efficient market system could not occur without the freeing of 
prices, a 'big-bang', so that they would reflect relative scarcity. Such action would also 
result in the reduction of the heavy burden of subsidies from the state budget. The first 
consequence of price liberalization was to bring the previously suppressed inflation into 
the open by permitting state prices to reflect the demand pressure exerted by the "ruble 
overhang. 1., 29 When the wage fund exceed total consumption expenditures, consumers 
found themselves with excess cash balances whose cumulated sum formed the "ruble 
Overhang. " By May, 1992, central regulation of 95 percent of retail prices on consumer 
goods and services by the center had been lifted. Due to rigidities inherited from the CPE, 
consumer prices did not drop to market-clearing levels even though consumption dropped 
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by more than 40 percent. For the first six months of 1992, the consumers' cost of living 
had increased by approximately 1,000 percent. 30 Since major inflation was expected, only 
a quarterly, not an annual, budget was attempted for the first months of 1992. Price- 
liberalization facilitated sharp cuts in producer and consumer subsidies. 31 
Revenue projections were optimistic. Revisions of the individual income and the 
enterprise profits taxes had already been enacted to adapt the revenue system to one 
compatible with a market economy. A new measure was to replace CPE turnover and 
sales taxes by a Value-Added Tax (VAT) and by reforming export levies. IMF studies 
show that it takes about 24 months to establish efficient administration of such a new tax. 
Box taxpayers and collectors have to be trained. 32 The imposition of heavy export taxes as 
well as licensing and quota problems were to cause a sharp drop in the level of activity 
relating to foreign trade and revenues. 33 Emission of currency soon began to present 
dangers. The government has had to expand the total supply of currency by approximately 
seven times in 1992, from R263 billion to approximately R1.86 trillion (due to wage rise, 
34 and shortages of cash). At the heart of the problem has been the failure of enterprises,, 
many of them monopoly suppliers, to reduce prices to market-clearing levels. Retail sales 
dropped by more than 40 percent, but prices continued to rise despite decreasing demand. 
Also, retail charges for various consumer goods radically differed from region to region 
within Russia, showing a poorly developed, monopolized and regionalized distribution 
network that did not operate on market principles. Price setting by the center has been 
replaced by government authorities protecting their local markets or by enterprises and 
distributors continuing to operate monopolies at lower levels. 35 
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I11.18. viii. Banking Practices Undermine Fiscal Polic 
The central bank is yielding to enterprise interests by expanding noncash credits to 
accommodate the inter-enterprise arrears with newly created credit. Inter-enterprise 
arrears increased from 40 billion rubles to more than 3.2 trillion rubles during 1992. By 
accommodating interenterprise debt the central bank avoids the immediate consequences 
of enterprise failures, but it effectively reinstate the "soft budget" constraints demanded by 
leaders of the enterprises. The central bank justifies the accommodation of interenterprise 
debt as being necessary to provide working capital to enterprises. Without this working 
capital, the enterprise sector could implode, leading to massive unemployment and a 
radical collapse of output. The growth of interenterprise arrears has made it increasingly 
difficult to distinguish viable from nonviable enterprises . 
36 Huge quasi-fiscal inter- 
enterprise bank debt has undermined the purpose of an austere budgetary policy, denying 
direct support to the economy. Under the old Gosbank clearance system, enterprise 
accounts had been credited when invoices were received. Unfortunately, many managers 
and bankers have continued to operate in the same old way. The banking system of the 
U. S. S. R. had begun to be reorganized in 1987-88 into a three-tier reserve system. The 
CPE Gosbank had essentially been a monobank that performed various monetary and 
control functions as directed by Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance. In 1988, the 
Gosbank's role began to change toward that of a traditional central bank with duties for 
supervising the banking system and setting global parameters. Also beginning in 1988 with 
the emergence of co-operative banks and subsequently of joint-stock commercial banks, 
the state banking system began to have competition. U. S. S. R. legislation on banks and 
banking activity formalized the existing three-tier system in December , 1990.37 Yet by 
1991, the year the budgetary system was decentralized, central regulation of banking and 
credit policy for the whole U. S. S. R. was also fundamentally undermined. After the coup, 
negotiations among the republics to co-ordinate fiscal, monetary, and credit policies have 
repeatedly broken down, a major factor in destabilizing the ruble zone. After the U. S. S. R. 
Gosbank was terminated at the end of 1991, the CBR began to implement the radical 
economic programme through the macroeconomic levers it controlled. 
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III. 18. ix. Moderating and DegRening Reform 
Political pressures and deepening economic recession caused the Yeltsin-Gaidar team to 
moderate the austerity which was basic to their fiscal policy. Effort was made to broaden 
support by including pro-reform moderates from the managerial elite in the government as 
key actors in meeting critical immediate problems and preparing a second-stage reform 
programme to be implemented through 1996. To deal with the increasingly serious 
problem of insolvency, heavy additional commitments were made . 
38 Effort was made to 
'deepen' the reform programme by broadening practical activity to develop the institutions 
basic to a market economy. On July 3,1992, Acting Premier Gaidar introduced a lengthy 
"Programme for Deepening Economic Reforms by 1995-1996. " He made it clear that the 
budget would not be the source of salvation for weak enterprises - "our financial state is 
hopeless. ý., 39 He asserted that major progress had been made during the first stage of 
liberalization and fiscal stabilization to deal with the immediate crisis. The second stage 
would be focused on building the economy on the basis of private property, i. e. 
implementing privatization. The third would be focused on reconstructing the main 
branches of the economy, attaining stable growth of 3-4 percent of GDP, and developing a 
positive balance of trade by stepping up exports. Many decrees were issued to deal with 
related fundamental reform issues and to thwart various crises. Loss-making businesses 
will be shut down and undergo privatization in a form that will develop owners with long- 
term stakes in industry and the power to make managerial decisions. The government 
clearly recognizes that the population lacks the resources to pay much into the treasury for 
these properties. Privatizing major enterprises will be at best a medium-ten-n programme. 40 
The latest development of the reform effort is given in Appendix 111.18.1, where Michel 
Camdessus, the IMF's managing director, praised Russia's "bold and ambitious , 41 
economic reform programme, and said he believed the Russian economy may begin to 
grow again during the year 1995, after four years of steep decline. 
III-18. x. Making the Ruble Internally Convertible 
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Another stabilization measure that was taken during the period of transition was making 
the ruble internally convertible. On July 2,1992, the Russian government took the risky 
step of introducing limited internal convertibility at a floating unitary exchange rate for the 
ruble. " (For details of internal convertibility, see Appendix 111.18.2. ) It was a key element 
of a comprehensive programme proposed in May by the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations to restructure and liberalize foreign trade over the next eighteen months and also 
43 a guideline set in consultation with IMF . Without fiscal and monetary discipline in place, 
stabilization of the currency's value is very unlikely. hfflation is approaching the 
hyperinflationary level; the balance of trade is seriously deteriorating. During the second 
half of June, 1992, hard currency in the central foreign exchange reserves has become so 
short that the CBR had to stop its interventions in the auction market, the Moscow 
interbank Currency Exchange (MICE), aimed at bringing the value of the ruble up toward 
R80 per dollar. That had cost an estimated $500 million through June. 44 Moscow is so 
short of funds that it has had to negotiate for a moratorium on the payment both of 
principal and of interest on its international debt in order to have the cash flow to maintain 
essential imports. Moreover, major disputes over co-ordinating fiscal, banking, credit, and 
monetary policies basic to maintaining a common ruble zone with other CIS states 
threaten to be more disruptive to commerce than was the breakdown of economic 
relations with Eastern Europe. In the last week of July, 1992, ruble stabilized around 
45 R161. The rapidly accelerating inflation has resulted in part from the monetary expansion 
arising from the maintenance of a ruble zone without adequate monetary controls. Fiscal 
deficits continue to be financed by the creation of cash and noncash components of the 
money supply. This monetary expansion, and not the reforms themselves, has created a 
monetary system exhibiting symptoms of acute dysfunction. The ruble is not viewed as a 
viable store of value, and is rapidly being displaced as a medium of exchange by goods and 
foreign currencies. With inflation rampant, it became impossible to create the 
Preconditions for establishing the ruble as a fully convertible currency. 46 As hyperinflation 
becomes more likely, the continued erosion of the ruble's value, both domestically and 
internationally, appears inevitable. The macroeconomic instability calls into question the 
ability and desirability of maintaining a common currency zone for the C. I. S. In short., 
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unless monetary stability and a functioning monetary system are rapidly re-established, the 
entire reform movement may be dealt a setback from which it is unlikely to recover. 
Moreover, the monetary instability reduces the likelihood that the ruble can attain the 
status of a convertible currency, and thereby denies the economy the benefits of 
international trade and competition. 47 
111.18. xi. International Trade 
Action was required to encourage international trade in order to increase the state's hard 
currency. During the early years of transition (especially from 1992 onwards) capital 
flight, estimated at $5 billion-$20 billion., had occurred because the previous hard-currency 
and export control system had cut heavily into profits and encouraged barter. Exporters of 
energy and raw materials, 70 percent of the total trade, were required to sell to the CBR 
for the foreign exchange reserve 40 percent of their foreign earnings at the commercial 
rate of R55 per dollar, far below the official quasi-market rate., which varied from R90 to 
R110 in 1992. Another 10 percent had to be surrendered by all exporters at the quasi- 
official rate to support CBR intervention in the auctions. 48 The new floating unitary rate is 
much more attractive to those involved in foreign trade and the proportion of hard 
currency coming onto the market is expected to be much greater than in the past. To 
ensure that the government gets its share of profits from international trade, new measures 
designed to centralize control of exports, have been put in force. Export licensing of 
"strategic commodities" has been streamlined so as to concentrate control of "specially 
registered foreign trade firms, " most of which are state-owned . 
49Recentralization of the 
gold and diamond complex is estimated to have cost R500 million. Independent 
commercial firms are squeezed out. 50 However, requiring all to use the unitary rate may 
have a quite devastating impact on many producers dependent on supplies imported for 
the central reserves and heighten inflation. Until July 1, the charge of purchases of these 
goods and commodities by Russian enterprises was set at the special rate of R5.4 per 
dollar. "At current prices this rate is estimated to represent a hidden subsidy of R500 
billion at the cost of the budget. Charging the unitary ruble rate will significantly raise the 
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costs of producers and, consequently, prices. Half of the food industry and 40 percent of 
fight industry will have their costs increased four-to six-fold. Enterprises in most industrial 
sectors will have to reduce sharply reliance on imports. 9`51 
18. xii. Deterioration in CIS Economic Relations 
A major threat to fiscal and monetary stabilization is the increasing breakdown of 
economic ties among the CIS states. Already, the loss of markets and suppliers in Eastern 
Europe since 1990 has led to the disruption of production due to lack of key components. 
A similar breakdown within the CIS would be far more devastating. Gorbachev and his 
successors have all understood this reality. Since 1990, many general agreements have 
been signed with provisions for central institutions strong enough to ensure co-ordination 
of fiscal, banking, credit, and monetary policy in a "common economic space.,, 52 If Several 
states sharing a common currency engage in major deficit-spending and large emissions of 
cashless credits, that can have significant inflationary impact on others that pursue austere 
policies. With economic resources shrinking due to the recession, all of the member states 
have reacted by instituting degrees of economic autarchy at the cost of their immediate 
CIS neighbours. 
PV 
E,. amples of Russian policies that have alienated the other Republics are numerous. 
Division of assets of the former U. S. S. R. has been on the agenda of most of the summit 
meetings. Basically, the Russian Federation took over the central banks in November 
1991. While under Russian control, all the hard currency of the other republics and their 
enterprises were spent servicing foreign debts. After the Gosbank went broke in 
December, these accounts were frozen. The new sovereign governments desperately need 
the foreign exchange to pay their dues to international organizations such as the IMF and 
World Bank as well as to stimulate foreign trade. Many of their enterprises have been 
seriously handicapped in conducting businesses due to their inability to draw funds frozen 
in their accounts. "The Russians acted unilaterally on this despite the obligation in basic 
CIS documents that major decisions should only be reached by consensus. 9.953 
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i[I. 18. xiii. The Ruble Zone 
The other states also blame the current severe shortage of cash on unilateral Russian 
policy decisions on emission of currency. Since Russia has the only mint, its Central Bank 
was able to control its distribution. "The resulting shortage of rubles in the other states 
was proportionately greater than in Russia. Fearful of riots by unpaid workers, leaders of 
other republics introduced surrogate money in the form of coupons. So great has been the 
shortfall that even local authorities within Russia did so. As the situation continued to 
worsen, the determination of the leaders of other republics to control their own national 
money supply has grown stronger. qi54 By June, Russian leaders in both the executive and 
legislative branch reached the decision that their Republic had to have its own national 
money. An article in Commersant, entitled, "The Ruble Zone: Rubleless and Rudderless", 
55 
provides the details on the diversity of policies being pursued in the other states. 
Budgetary, credit, and monetary differences are so great that it would be difficult to 
ensure co-ordination. It makes little sense to have a state like TaJikistan with its 40- 
percent deficit financing in the ruble zone when a conservative fiscal and monetary policy 
is the goal. Yeltsin signed a decree on June 21, mandating that states wishing to remain 
within the ruble zone must co-ordinate their fiscal, credit, and monetary policies with 
Russia. 56 This was a signal to most republics to leave the ruble zone. Not to do so would 
mean losing the right to control their own fiscal and monetary policy. The difficult task of 
organizing a new, reliable settlements system among the republics will for a time severely 
handicap trade just as it did with Eastern Europe. 57 
With a fall since 1989 of 30 percent or more in GDP, political pressures from the 
populace and other vested interest groups are threatening to undermine the political 
stability gained by the first popular election of a Russian head of state. However, the 
regime is not yet nor about to attain budget and monetary stability. All this could have 
dramatic effects on the consumer cost-of-living index as well as on government 
expenditures and revenues. The banking and credit system is changing, but is far from 
having the capacity to provide the financial services for a modem, large-scale market 
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economy. A combination of Russian assertiveness and its poor fiscal and economic 
condition are major factors in the progressive break-up of the common CIS economic 
space. Due to an extraordinary degree of economic interdependence, trade among the 
states of the former Soviet Union will continue to be large-scale, but all the other republics 
are reaching out to foreign partners who have real money and world-level expertise. Their 
leaders recognize that, to be truly independent, they must have the means to control their 
fiscal and monetary policy. Thus the deterioration and disappearance of the ruble zone was 
knminent. 58 
HI. 18. xiv. Stabilization and Recovea 
The illusion that there is some "magic key" to prosperity is past. As stabilization 
happens, slight recovery begins. Major structural reforms will be under way to build the 
bases for a competitive economy on the basis of true market prices by 1996. The task that 
the citizens of the former Soviet states face in changing economic systems is one that wilI 
take decades to complete. "Despite the flaws in the reforms to-date, the change in the 
approach by the leadership to macroeconomic policy is remarkable. For the West, the 
chaffenge is to find ways to assist the process that are prudent and effective. Stabilization 
of the Russian fiscal and monetary system is an essential condition for large-scale aid from 
the West. However, aid for specific projects, humanitarian purposes, and technical 
assistance is essential to building a strong base for what is to the Russians a new economic 
system .,, 
59 As the process of stabilization and recovery takes root in the economies of 
transition, it is good to look at those economies who have tried to develop monetary and 
fiscal institutions to cope up with the growing demands of creating a market economy. 
The experience of the Baltic states is a good guide in this direction. 
Ill. 18. xv. The Baltic Eaenence 
Iti our analysis we have pointed out the four components of transition as stabilization., 
liberalization, privatization and restructuring and developing of institutions. At various 
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stages we have briefly discussed the role of liberalization and privatization. In this chapter., 
we are looking at the stabilization process within the framework of the Russian-Baltic 
economies. As we enter into the Baltic experience, we are also privileged to place in a 
position to understand the mechanism and working of the fourth component of transition, 
namely, the restructuring and developing of the institutions; here, mainly fiscal institutions. 
Financial instability has emerged as perhaps the most burdensome problem associated with 
the transition from state socialism to market-oriented economies in Eastern Europe and 
the former U. S. S. R. "Because monetary and fiscal policies played only passive roles in the 
traditional Soviet-type economic systems, policymakers in the Soviet successor states have 
had a particularly difficult experience in designing and implementing prudent monetary and 
fiscal policies. , 60 The three Baltic states represent a special example because they were 
afforded a significant measure of economic autonomy from the U. S. S. R. some two years 
before the fortnal dissolution of the Soviet Union. A survey of the Baltic experience with 
fiscal policy in the early stages of transition would enable us to deal with issues and 
problems that are likely to arise throughout the former Soviet region. 
A major component of the economic reform programmes in the Baltic states is the 
development of new fiscal institutions and policies. Fiscal policy was primarily used as a 
tool for the allocation of resources toward national goals. A secondary goal was the 
redistribution of wealth from rich areas to poor . 
61 Almost totally neglected was the 
stabilization aspect of fiscal policy. All three of these aspects of fiscal policy take on 
heightened importance in market economies with significant private sectors. In fact, during 
the transition period from a Soviet-type to a market economy, fiscal policy is bound to 
play an especially important role that will shape the outcome of other policy issues later. 62 
'Me experience of reform in East/Central European countries confirms this notion. 
III. 18. xvi. The Creation of a Fiscal System 
For the first time in nearly half a century the Baltic governments must manage their own 
national budgets and create fiscal systems that are both durable and flexible enough to see 
them through the difficult transitional stage. The development of fiscal policies and 
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institutions in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia from 1989 through 1991 is reviewed here. By 
late 1989, a decision had been taken in the Baltic states to design and implement totally 
independent fiscal systems. As the Baltic governments gradually took control over their 
republic budgets, they faced many policy problems and administrative tasks that previously 
had been Moscow's responsibility. 63 Among the most important of these were: 
1. Projecting revenues and spending needs (As Moscow's agents, Baltic officials and 
bureaucrats were not, for the most part, experienced in the practice of financial 
analysis and programming. ). 
2. Re-establishing spending priorities and limits as well as revenue sources for each level 
of government (As national-level fiscal authorities, the Baltic governments had to 
establish a fiscal regime that promoted efficiency within the fiscal federal system) - 
3. Ensuring that planned revenues were adequate to cover planned expenditures 
(Macrostabilization is especially important in terms of government credibility. On one 
hand, three major all-Union spending programmes, financing capital investment., 
subsidizing non-food items - especially electricity, and subsidizing food items 
represented serious budgetary strains. On the other hand, it was already apparent in 
1989-90 that the Baltic economies were beginning to show signs of serious economic 
downturn that would reduce output, profits, and hence tax remittances. ) 
4. Structuring taxes so that they were progressive (income elastic) and taxed taxpayers 
with like incomes and assets at the same rate (Meeting the tests for vertical and 
horizontal equity, respectively. ) 
5. Encouraging economic development from both domestic and foreign sources (This 
often involves tax holidays and public investment in the economic infrastructure, and 
perhaps above all, stability in the political and economic framework, including tax 
legislation. ). 
6. Creating convenient, transparent, payment systems to maximize compliance (This is 
very important given the primitive administrative and tax collection systems in the 
Baltic states and the large black markets in which incomes could be hidden. ). 
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7. Creating the necessary tax administration institutions (This has proved at least as 
important as having the proper taxes. ). 
These seven points are not peculiar to the Baltic states. The two dynamics that defined 
the political-economic landscape in the Soviet region at the time (disintegration from the 
central command structure and radical economic reform) took their toll on fiscal policy 
64 
forrnation throughout the U. S. S. R . 
111.18. xvii. The Two Kgj Issues: Insulation and Transfer 
In terms of economic disengagement from the Soviet Union, Baltic officials were 
constantly testing the waters with unilateral declarations of authority and jurisdiction over 
policy and real assets on their territories. The resolution of these questions naturally had a 
fundamental impact on both the size and structure of the potential revenue base and on 
spending requirements. Two key issues motivating Baltic policies at this time were: (1) 
insulating the Baltic economies from the economic and financial chaos exported from 
Moscow, and (2) negotiating acceptable amounts of transfer funds from the Baltic budgets 
to the all-Union budget. These issues resolved into the following considerations. Battling 
economic chaos: 
1. Importing inflation and macro instability from Moscow. 
2. Financing economic activity in the midst of a Union-wide economic depression. 
I Managing the various economic blockades and trade stoppages that occurred in 1989- 
91. 
4. Meeting social obligations that Moscow either could not or would not fulfil. 
Negotiating Transfers to the Union Budget: 
1. Changing revenue and spending plans in mid-stream. 
2. Dealing with a situation in which Moscow insisted on shares of various revenue 
sources, making it virtually impossible to negotiate a simple lump sum that would have 
given the Balts more freedom to determine spending and taxes internally. 
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The on-going efforts to establish independent fiscal systems in the Baltic states in 1990 
and 1991 required a series of budgetary revisions. The inability to negotiate a satisfactory 
arrangement with Moscow provoked all three Baltic governments to withhold their 
contributions to the U. S. S. R. budget in 1991.65 
111.18. xviii. Fiscal Policv Formation 
The Baltic drives toward establishing market-oriented systems have also created 
problems for fiscal policy formation. The two most important factors in this regard are the 
movement toward a private economy and the shift away from Soviet-administered prices 
toward market-oriented prices. The emergence of a private economy brings several 
challenges from the standpoints of economic development, economic stability, and the 
breadth and depth of the social safety net. First, encouraging the nascent private sector 
requires that disincentives to investment be avoided if possible. The corporate income tax 
is widely regarded as a drag on investment, but it carries several deceivingly seduced 
advantages, especially for newer, less established economies. One advantage of the 
corporate tax is that corporations, as compared with other taxpayers, usually keep detailed 
financial records that can be used for audits. 66 There are also fewer corporations to keep 
track of than there are personal income taxpayers. 67 Finally, personal income taxpayers 
vote, while corporations do not, a nontrivial issue in emerging democracies. These factors 
often lead to the conclusion that corporations might tolerate higher tax rates relative to 
income than personal income taxpayers. Nevertheless, especially in poor economies trying 
to foster entrepreneurship and privatize state-owned enterprise, excessive corporate 
income taxes tend to hold back growth. 68 As a result, policies on corporate income taxes 
are still in flux in all three Baltic states. 69 While many Baltic officials charged with 
developing tax policy recognize the importance of guaranteeing low and stable corporate 
tax rates, political concerns dictate that they play "the corporate tax card" very carefully 
so as not to create the impression that business is enjoying tax benefits at the expense of 
individuals or social programmes. The emergence of a sizeable private sector also requires 
new tax policies and administrative (collection and audit) techniques. Likewise, the 
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emergence of a private sector suggests new considerations for government spending 
patterns - This shift Of spending responsibilities has obvious implications for revenue 
generation as well. 70 Finally, shifting to an economy with a significant private sector also 
gives the Baltic governments a natural way to begin the process of integration with 
Western Europe. This process implies harmonizing fiscal policies with Western 
economies, especially those to which Balts become most open. An important, though 
problematic, dimension of Europe 92 was the fiscal han-nonization and integration. If the 
Balts want to be part of this integration process, they cannot ignore the fiscal issues, 71 
like the introduction of VAT. The switch to free prices is beginning to have several 
consequences (both static and dynamic) for tax policy, but none of them need be difficult. 
After the initial price adjustment, however, it should be possible to stabilize tax revenues 
and expenditures in the absence of outside shocks. 72 
With the Baltic declarations of independence in August 1991, the complex issue of "who 
owns whom and who pays whom" became more immediate and practical, creating 
difficulties for the Baltic governments. Theoretically, all enterprises on Baltic territory are 
now subject to the Baltic states' jurisdiction and should pay taxes to their Baltic 
governments. A comparison of the budgets of the three Baltic states is difficult because of 
the lack of symmetry in their budget formats. Budget income is easier to look at than 
expenditures. Table Ill. 18.1 outlines the different tax schemes of the three Baltic states as 
A- - mey stood at the end of 1991. 
Table 1111.18.1 
Tax Schemes in the Baltic Countries in 1991 
Type of Tax Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Corporate income 70% State 70% State Local Corps pay to 
tax 30% Local 30% Local local budgets. 
(20% in Riga) Others pay 80% to 
State, 20% to local 
budgets. 
Personal income tax Local 20% State 40% State 
80% Local 60% Local 
VMue-added tax No I 
No No 
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Turnover tax 70% State State State* 
30% Local 
Excise tax State State State* 
Social security tax State State 
Natural Resource State and Local 25% State State 
tax 75% Local 
Land tax Local (very small) Local Local 
Customs duties State few and small few and small 
Vehicle tax Local No Local 
Capital tax In special cases Property tax No 
Local 
Activity license Off budget State ? No 
Pollution tax Environment Fund (Covered under State 
natural resource 
tax. ) 
Performance tax Local No (under No 
discussion) 
Official filing tax Local No No 
Enterprise No No State 
registration 
Foreign investment No No State 
tax 
Oil products tax State Paid to the State No 
road fund. 50% 
slated for State 
roads and 
determined by State 
government; 
25% for regional 
roads; and 
25% for rural roads. 
Hard currency tax No No State 
Source: John E. Tedstrom: "Problems of Fiscal Policy Reform During The Transition: A 
Baltic Case Study" p. 231; Documentation from Finance Ministries of the three Baltic 
states and interviews with respective Balt officials. 
* The Lithuanian budget does not distinguish between the excise and the turnover tax 
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An important contribution to economic policy in the Baltic area would be the 
stabilization of fiscal and monetary reform legislation. The budgets of the Baltic states for 
1991 are presented in Tables A, B, and C of Appendix 111.18.3. Standardizing the 
reporting systems would be a significant contribution both to Balts concerned with Baltic 
tax policy and for outsiders, as well as contribute to Baltic economic integration. 73 
IH. 18. xix. Considerations for the Future 
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, all of the Soviet successor states face the 
fon-nidable challenge of developing and implementing their own economic reform 
programmes. Fiscal policy reform constitutes one of the key elements in those 
programmes. Using fiscal policy as a stabilization tool is new to the Soviet successor 
states, but their experience with runaway budgets in the last three years of their Soviet 
period and the prospect of hyperinflation looming over the entire ruble zone has generated 
a good deal of appreciation on their part for the importance of a balanced budget. 
Unfortunately, the experience of reforming East/Central European countries is not 
encouraging and paints a picture of both falling output that constricts the real tax base and 
rising social needs that increase the requirement for spending. "Two chief pressure points 
for state spending are likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. One is local pressures. 
Public opinion in the Baltic states has already indicated the degree to which Balts believe 
that they deserve to have a standard of living on par with Scandinavia. 9.974 A second 
influence for public spending will come from the outside. Aid and investment will flow to 
the former republics only under certain conditions. 
IH-18. xx. Complicated Versus Simple Taxes 
'Me basics of tax policy formation and not the nuances should guide the development of 
new tax systems in the Soviet successor states. Taxes should be broad to capture as many 
types of taxable incomes as possible. Tax rates should be low to encourage investment, 
increase productivity, and encourage compliance. Taxes should be simple and transparent 
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so that taxpayers know what they are paying and why. Taxes should meet tests for 
horizontal and vertical equity. 
Experience in other emerging market economies has shown that developing appropriate 
tax administration institutions and systems is at least as important as the tax policies 
themselves. Without a comprehensive, unified budget, it is impossible to execute a unified 
fiscal policy. Effective tax assessment and collection is essential to the success of any 
budget programme. Once a culture of tax evasion develops, it is virtually impossible to 
overcome. Many small countries have neglected the problem of administrating tax 
collection policies to guard against inflation. In high-inflation economies, this can be very 
costly to the budget as delinquent taxpayers pay the flat penalty in weaker currencies. The 
higher the rate of inflation, the more the need for inflation-sensitive penalties. Another 
concern for emerging or reforming economies is unemployment. Finally, it is important 
that the various departments of the Ministry of Finance that are concerned with tax 
administration have adequate communications with each other. In the Baltic states this 
may be a particular challenge given both the compartmentalism of the economic 
bureaucracy of the Soviet-type economy and the rapid pace at which the Baltic states are 
reforming their economic institutions and policies. 75 
HI. 18. xxi. The Primaa Importance of Managing Fiscal Polipj 
Fiscal policy affects and is affected by numerous other aspects of the overall reform 
effort, including privatization, price policy, and policy on industrial development in 
particular sectors of the economy. Fiscal policy was always of secondary importance in the 
Soviet-type economies. In many respects, fiscal policy in the Soviet period was based on 
political considerations and tended to ignore economics. To the extent that fiscal policy 
represents an essentially new field for both government bureaucrats and academic analysts, 
there is a good deal to learn before the world can expect competent fiscal management 
from the Baltic states. To date, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been careful not to 
mismanage the transitional period and have established a number of the comerstones of a 
full, independent, and effective fiscal system, with the help of international and foreign 
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organizations to develop efficient tax administration institutions and competent tax 
adminlStration personnel. Although many obstacles remain, there is good reason for taking 
an optimistic view of the outlook for the Baltic economies. 76 
The experience of Russia and the Baltic States brings out the important role of 
macroeconomic stabilization as a strategy for economic transition from a command 
economy to a market economy. But a caution is to be noted. "A stabilization package in 
the context of inherited inertial inflation and increasingly rigid inflationary expectations can 
create a vicious cycle of pohcy-performance gap: budget deficit cuts, tight money, and 
currency devaluation-> falling output (and employment) and higher inflation---> "recession- 
induced" fiscal deficits and "inflation-driven" loss of price competitiveness (currency 
revaluation) --> additional budgetary tightening, partial monetization of the deficit, and 
further currency depreciation --> deeper recession and higher inflation -> widening budget 
deficit and currency overvaluation --> new rounds of macroeconomic tightening and 
currency devaluation --> deeper economic contraction and higher inflation -) ... 
?, ý, 77 
Furthermore, stabilization measures produce additional inflationary shocks in economies 
of transition. In a transitional economy with 'increasingly rigid inflationary expectations, ' 
stabilization measures running ahead of enterprise and other institutional (e. g., fiscal, 
financial) reforms can further destabilize the economy - add to economic contraction, 
investment slump, inflationary spiral, and external deficits - so that eventually even 
stronger measures are necessary. The unique and complex conditions of Russia and other 
successor states of the Soviet Union call for significant modifications and extensions of the 
alternative strategy, especially at the stage of formulating concrete steps and implementing 
them. This strategy is designed on 'an imperfectly co-ordinated growth-oriented approach 
where demand-friendly stabilization and supply-friendly liberalization is encouraged. 978 
Obviously, capitalism in today's most advanced industrialized countries took centuries to 
develop, and even then the state always remained intimately involved in shaping its 
evolution and ensuring its survival. Our analysis outlines the relevance of macroeconomic 
stabilization as a primary condition for the emergence of capitalism. Once stabilization is in 
place, the other components of transition can be implemented much easily and that would 
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enable the dynamics of market mechanism to interact freely. At this stage, the economies 
in transition would be applying economic growth models that would bring about the 
desired growth. The economies in transition is a new phenomenon in the history of 
political economy. The transition is from a socialist system to a capitalist system. This is a 
new vision of economic growth and development and its realization depends on a new 
perspective of the knowledge sector of a new growth model. We shall proceed to design a 
vision-solution growth path. 
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THE VISION-SOLUTION GROWTH PATH 
The foundation of the history of the political economy is based on a vision -a vision of 
the world where allocation of resources , production of goods and services, and 
distribution of wealth can be done for the benefit of all human beings. This vision often 
contradicts with the reality in which one finds himself or herself. While the vision provides 
the long-term objective, various solutions have to be designed to achieve this objective. 
The economic history is full of solutions to solve the economic problems and still we find 
ourselves in a world of huge gap between the developed and developing economies; we 
include here the economies in transition into the category of developing economies. We 
have tried capitalist economic growth models. We have also tried socialist growth models. 
There were some attempts with a mixed economy growth model. Besides the success- 
failure scenario of these models, we need to look a little farther. Of course, we need all the 
components of these models. Without those basic components, economic growth would 
have never taken place and any growth that we have is due to the availability of those 
basic components and its intelligent utilization. In our research work, we have termed all 
those basic economic growth models in relation to each of those components as micro 
knowledge and we have developed a new knowledge sector, namely, macro knowledge. In 
the following, we shall try to integrate these macro-micro knowledge into our vision- 
solution economic growth model. 
Ill. 
The Vision Growth Path 
The composition of place of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European 
economies shows us the emergence of transitional economies. There is a movement from 
an embryonic stage to the stage of birth; from a desire to be themselves to its historical 
Wilment. Along with the vision of a new sovereign state, it needs to develop a new 
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economic thought; a new economic thought that resonates the way of thinking of the 
people. Each transition economy adopts a strategy with the various components of 
transition to varying degrees. Our analysis also reveals the success and limitations of each 
strategy and the effectiveness of the application of each of the components of transition. 
Any growth strategy has to be designed with a long-term vision. A vision provides a 
spectrum and a perspective. 
We have seen in the final chapter of the section two, the introduction of an ideology 
(Marxist-Leninist) as a micro knowledge. The adherents of this ideology hoped that it 
would in course of time replace the macro knowledge. But, that did not happen. Not only 
macro knowledge proved successful and strong, but it dumped the micro knowledge as an 
alien element. The experience of micro knowledge as an oppressive ideological economic 
system did not fit into the normal way of thinking of the people. Not only it stagnated 
economic growth but it deprived human growth. It denied human dignity and human rights 
which are the comer stone of any economic success and foundations of socialist principles. 
Even after the overthrow of this micro knowledge as an ideology and as an economic 
system, we note the presence of the 'old guards. ' They still adhere to the defunct micro 
knowledge. But it is a false attachment to the accustomed micro knowledge. Though it 
has proved its inability to provide any viable economic solution, 'the system-elite of the 
socialist bourgeois' class are finding it difficult to part with an economic system which 
strengthened their position. The success of macro knowledge became real due to the 
emergence of 'democrats and liberals', who represent the people. They were able to 
develop a true detachment from the accustomed micro knowledge. Though the clutch of 
the micro knowledge seemed so strong, it did not have the power to demoralize the macro 
knowledge on which the way of thiiýg of all people were built. That is how the 
democrats and liberals realized their hope of a new vision. This vision is based on the 
longing of the human person for freedom, democracy, and basic human rights. This vision 
challenged their views of the existing micro knowledge as an economic system which only 
degrades the person and stagnates any growth and development. This existential 
realization of a negative growth spurred the peoples' movements in all the oppressed 
economies. The liberative vision was provided by the macro knowledge. It is to this macro 
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knowledge that people unanimously responded with hands and feet; hearts and minds. rrhis 
macro knowledge vision has to be integrated into the visionary growth model. 
First IntMration: New Freedom 
The foremost experience of transitional economies is the new fought-gained freedom. It 
is macro knowledge that provided this vision of freedom during the oppressive regimes of 
historical socialism. The concept of freedom as an inherent knowledge of all peoples and 
nations is particularly alive in proletarian regimes because of its conspicuous absence. 
Though the proletarian revolution was brought about by this peoples' longing for 
freedom, during the course of its institutionalization, it stifled this very longing to be free. 
When the concept of freedom becomes an institutionalized mockery of the way of thinking 
of the people, people bear it for a period but not too long. That is the power of macro 
knowledge. Whenever the inherent knowledge is stifled, it comes out with vengeance and 
repossesses itself. People, on the whole, begins to experience the freshness of new 
freedom. This freedom is social, economic, political, religious and cultural. The political 
expression of this freedom is the emergence of democratic institutions. This new found 
freedom enables an economic agent to grasp the economic vacuum of one's nation and 
makes one feel the necessity of being able to come out of this stagnant state and begin on 
a new vision of economic growth. 
Second Integration: New Rights and Duties 
With the earned freedom of macro knowledge, comes the new rights and duties and 
responsibilities. The violation of human rights issues traumatizes, anyone who dares to 
look into the historical socialist regimes. The socialist economic growth path denied the 
human rights and ultimately, human growth. (Though here we mention only the experience 
of historical socialism, we must not forget the dictatorial and other non-democratic forms 
of socio-political systems which constantly deny freedom, democracy, and human rights. ) 
The awarding of human rights to human beings in the transitional economies is of absolute 
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importance. Denial of human rights results in deprived human conditions which stifle all 
forms of human growth. 'Me potential of human capital formation is fully utilized in a 
person with endowed human rights. Only this person can consider the duties and 
responsibilities as a citizen. Slaves have no duty to the state unless it is imposed on them. 
Any form of human slavery deprives human capital formation of a nation. Only from a 
truly dignified human being, the state can expect a duty in return. The macro knowledge 
vision of any nation and people integrates well the human dignity and human rights and 
duties of a citizen. The micro knowledge which tries to eliminate this natural order of 
human dynamics retards economic growth. The economic growth of a nation depends 
very much on the acknowledgement and endowment of human d4pity and human rights in 
all its varied dimensions. 
III. 19. iv. Third Integration: New Initiatives 
A nation which experiences freedom and people who enjoys their rights begin to take 
initiatives as his/her duty. New initiatives in all forms of socio-economic and political 
decisions is the first step in this transitional stage. At this stage, the relevance of macro 
knowledge is very crucial. Old experience of micro knowledge could enable the economic 
agent to choose the new direction so that his/her choice is not in conflict with the macro 
knowledge. These initiatives strengthen the take-off dynamics. The dynamics of economic 
growth need all forms of new initiatives for further development especially to a market 
mechanism. 
The role of macro knowledge in the transitional stages of growth process need to be 
outlined clearly. As we have outlined the format of macro knowledge in our earlier 
sections, it is of great significance to emphasize its influence on the economic behaviour. 
Economic growth happens as we integrate the elements of macro knowledge or it 
collapses sooner or later. We cannot ignore the relevance of this inherent knowledge in 
our economic decisions. The new pillars of transitional economies must be rooted and 
grounded on the macro knowledge of the nation, if it has to make the transition smoothly 
and into a healthier global atmosphere. In our solutionary growth model we shall outline 
306 
the elements of macro knowledge which are necessary for transition to a new economic 
world order. 
As we emphasize the crucial role of macro knowledge, let us not ignore the role of 
micro knowledge. The role of micro knowledge in the transitional stages of growth 
process is of paramount importance. If macro knowledge is the pillar, micro knowledge is 
the beam that is going to build the economic structure. Therefore the length and breadth 
and weight and height of applied micro knowledge must be in relation to the foundation of 
macro knowledge. Therefore, as we have noted earlier, macro and micro knowledge are 
not competing genes in our model. 'I'hey are not trying to overcome one over the other. 
Whenever that was the motive, the result was stagnation and negative growth and 
retarded development. The macro knowledge of a nation and the micro knowledge that is 
developed within or brought from outside ought to move unidirectionally to produce 
growth and long-term development. This interaction between macro and micro knowledge 
during the transitional period is to be monitored by policymakers, both of governmental 
and non-governmental entities, as they decide on the priority issues. The priority issues 
during the new stage of development is given in the Appendix 111.19.1. The integral 
economic development of a nation is to be streamlined by opting for the new economic 
thought for integral economic growth. We shall proceed to build the new solution-growth 
economic model for transitional and developing economies. 
1H. 19. v. 
The Solution Growth Path 
The vision of the people of the socialist political regime for a "common future" in a 
global village resulted in the collapse of the socialist economic system and the emergence 
of economies in transition. Their vision which grew out of the existing macro knowledge 
call for a new understanding of an economic system which would respect their freedom 
and human rights. Any introduction of a new micro knowledge for the promotion of the 
welfare of the people and for the economic growth and development must be based on 
these new, hitherto unintegrated, variables. We design the solutionary growth model by 
integrating these new variables into the model of economic growth. The insight and the 
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guide to venture into this economic modelling is derived from the works of Paul Romer 
and Janos Kornai. "The key point is the methodological conception itself, whereby we 
njay introduce into macro-models and growth models, as appropriate, unconventional 
latent variables for the description and explanation of complex phenomena, even if it might 
not be possible to observe and measure them directly. "' The economic modelling that we 
undertake identifies a growth influencing knowledge sector and we integrate into this 
knowledge sector the hitherto unintegrated macro knowledge variables, namely, freedom., 
democracy and human rights. We hope this win also contribute to the new attempts at 
creating alternate economic growth models. 
111.19. vi. The Premises 
We divide the knowledge sector into two: macro knowledge sector and micro 
knowledge. sector. 
While macro knowledge provides an inherent incentive for economic growth and 
development, micro knowledge account for the tangible (measured) progress. (In this 
sense, following Romer's model2, micro knowledge is endogenous rather than 
exogenous. ) In an economic system, this would mean that micro knowledge as well as 
macro knowledge are endogenous. (If we consider macro knowledge as exogenous: This 
is because of the individuality of the human person and also because of his/her selfish 
motives. Rather than having a collective endogenity, then, we notice an individualistic 
exogenity. ) 
While micro knowledge is motivated by market incentives (following Romer), macro 
knowledge is not, because of its inherent nature. While the development of micro 
knowledge needs market incentives, integration of macro knowledge into economic 
policies does not incur market incentives. 
While developing micro knowledge incurs cost, the nature of macro knowledge renders 
it costless. (Following Romer, developing new and better instructions is equivalent to 
incurring a fixed cost. This property is taken to be the defining characteristic of 
308 
technology. ) 3 But in our model, macro knowledge is not something to be developed and 
therefore it is neither income-incurring nor income-generating-public good. But it controls 
the minds and therefore the decisions of economic agents. 
HI. 19. vii. Main Properties 
The main characteristic features of the model are the following: 
We describe a dynamic-macro system. The economy is examined at the national 
macro-level. 
With the aid of the model we shall describe both long-term and short-term processes 
and shall examine their interactions. 
2. While micro knowledge determines the real sphere, macro knowledge determines the 
control sphere. In its aggregate form the model describes the real sphere: production, 
investment, trade and consumption and their success or failure depends on the use of 
micro knowledge. At the same time it describes, exogenously, the control sphere 
which guides the real sphere. In other words, the macro knowledge elements in the 
model determines and represents the behaviour of decision-makers. 
3. In describing the real sphere we apply several different simplifying assumptions; the 
growth of the real sphere of any economic system can be described using this 
particular block of the model. In contrast to this, the description of the control sphere 
is system-specific and country- specific. 
4. The analysis is less non-native but is descriptive. We shall try to understand - to 
describe and to explain -a few properties of the economies in transition as they 
venture into a new economic system. Economic policy is not considered as something 
existing outside the system and controlling it from there - listening to economists' 
recommendations, following the advice of normative models, or personal judgement. 
Economic policy is an endogenous part of the system. 4 The model tries to reflect the 




5. This is a study in pure theory. On the plane of pure theory a much greater degree of 
simplification is possible and necessary than that acceptable in a statistically based 
econometric model. (Actual analysis of the economic history of the country concerned 
would probably make it clear that further variables and equations need to be 
incorporated, certain relationships will have to be modified, the lag structure of the 
model transformed and so on. ) 
6. The structure of the model is suitable for representing endogenously the transitions 
from one historical period to the next. The transition to 'ordinary' or 'normal' 
conditions, is possible only within a stable institutional system and under more or less 
stable external conditions. ' 
For the construction of the model we shall employ several assumptions, in the course of 
the discussion. 
HI. 19. viii. The Variables and Description of the Model 
In the following we shall examine the model's variables and describe the dynamics. At 
the present stage of research it is the model itsetf that should be regarded as the main 
result of the work accomplished so far, much more so than the analysis based on it. We 
shall try to demonstrate that 'there exists a relatively simple formalism, which can be used 
to describe certain regularities of growth, and its self-regulation in the process of transition 
to a new free economy. ' During the period of transition, the economic growth is 
determined by the people who prefers to opt for a market to a planned economy. As the 
force of the people changes an economic system, so the new model of economic growth 
would focus on people-oriented variables. The sequence is now adjusted to the logic of 
economic exposition and clarification. 
'Me explanation of macro knowledge variables as economic variables is a new attempt. 
So far, while explaining economic growth and development models we have just 
concentrated on the basic economic variables. But a historical analysis of economic 
development pattern of nations prove that this approach does not tackle the problem. 
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Today's developmental problems are not merely economic. It is social and political and 
cultural too. nerefore the new growth economic models need to integrate these hitherto 
unintegrated variables into its framework. As we analyse the way of thinking of a people 
and a nation, we will come across various but unique macro knowledge variables. We shall 
consider in our model just three macro knowledge variables which have found consensus 
across nations. They are freedom, democracy and human rights. nese variables have 
been appropriately interwoven into our model. Particularly, special preference has been 
given to the macro knowledge of freedom while modelling this new growth economic 
thought for the transitional and developing economies. 
III. 19. ix. Freedom as a Vital Component of Human Developmen 
Societies all over the world have struggled for centuries to build consensus through 
systems of deliberation and negotiation. Almost every country has forms of community 
decision-making based on dialogue and consensus at the local level. At the national level, 
however, political systems are based more on majority rule. Almost half of the world's 
countries today have elected forms of government, and many other countries are moving 
in this direction. Democracy and freedom rely, however, on much more than ballot box. 
The expansion of democracy has been accompanied by a greater acknowledgement of 
human rights. Governments in every country are surrounded by a host of groups and 
institutions that help build and sustain the democratic process. "Such groups can survive 
even the severest forms of political repression. Trade unions in Eastern Europe, women's 
organizations in Latin America, students in Asia - all have helped keep freedom alive and 
played their part in the struggle for democracy. They have shown that freedom is 
something not just to be given or taken - it has to be lived. ý6 The concept of freedom has 
to be concretized, thus, through democracy by exercising political freedom and through 
protection of basic human rights. 
III. 19. x. The Freedom-Development Debate 
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The link between freedom and development is seldom in dispute. What is often disputed 
is the causality - whether more freedom leads to more development or more development 
leads to more freedom. This might reflect the diversity of historical experience and the 
many policy options available. If growth is seen, however, not an end in itself but as a part 
of human development, democracy cannot be set aside. Thus, political freedom is an 
essential element of human development. Some scholars have argued that freedom is a 
necessary condition to liberate the creative energies of the people and to pursue a path of 
rapid economic development. "What is clear is that the economically better-off countries 
today (as measured by GDP or the HDI) also have a large measure of freedom. v, 7 People 
now see freedom as an essential element in human development, not as an optional extra. 
There exists a genuine desire across the world for both economic progress and political 
freedom. At the national level, people are becoming more educated and conscious of their 
rights. At the global level, human rights monitors and the rapidly expanding media 
networks provide a steady flow of information on human rights violations. Human cruelty 
can no longer be hidden in dark and distant comers of the planet. 8 This changing 
international culture and public awareness also affects international development co- 
operation. 
Ul. 19. xi. A System of Classification of Freedoms 
Societies clearly differ in their notions of freedom a nd in how they perceive and establish 
the link between freedom and development. One widely used distinction is that between 
individual and collective rights. One important difference concerns the emphasis societies 
may place on the freedom of the individual and that of collectives - as the family, the tribe, 
the community, or the country. While some rights are enjoyed by every person 
individually, others apply to specific groups of people, such as freedom from gender, 
ethnic or racial discrimination. All individuals freedoms need to be interpreted so that 
freedom for some does not curtail the freedom of others or impair collective national 
interests. Another forrn of classification of freedoms could be based on economic and 
social rights., which were endorsed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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(adopted in 1948). 'Me International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
adopted in 1966 and the Declaration on the Right to Development adopted in 1986, 
emphasized both political rights and economic and social rights. For many people, 
economic and social rights are just as important as political freedom, or more so. Political 
democracy will always be fragile until basic economic rights are guaranteed. Therefore, 
economic and social rights should be included in any freedom index. It is certainly true 
that any comprehensive definition of human freedom must include economic, social, and 
political rights. The human development index (HDI) is an attempt to measure economic 
and social rights and the extent to which they are realized. 
A new political freedom index (PFI) could look specifically at political rights. Many 
international agreements have been adopted on civil and political rights. Analysing the 
rights enshrined in these documents show considerable congruence. They can be grouped 
into five broad clusters, reflecting values common to all cultures, all religions and all 
stages of development. They are personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, 
political participation, and equality of opportunity. 10 An illustrative checklist of indicators 
of political freedom is given in Appendix HI. 19.2. These five clusters can also be related to 
the main institutions of society that protect - or abuse - human rights. The legislature 
represents political participation; the executive branch has a critical role in equality of 
opportunity; the judiciary is responsible for rule of law and the physical integrity of the 
individual; and the 'fourth estate', civil society and the press, are important barometers of 
freedom of expression, including freedom of association and movement. The relevance of 
human development, universal applicability, and freedom from any cultural bias could be 
considered as the criteria while creating indicators of political freedom. 
A tentative attempt was made by different experts to construct a political freedom index. 
The overall conclusion is that "political freedom and human development seem to move in 
tandem. "" This conclusion is also supported by the following Table. 
Table 1111.19.1 
Lbie: Political Freedom Index (PFI) Aggregates 








High HDI 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.9 7.8 84.1 
Medium 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.5 49.6 
HDI 




High 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.7 7.6 83.7 
Income 
Middle 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.4 60.8 
Income 





High 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.5 8.2 89.7 
Political 
Freedom 
Reasonable 5.6 6.1 6.6 6.5 6.3 62.0 
Political 
Freedom 
Modest 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 5.2 35.8 
Political 
Freedom 





World 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.4 61.0 




D oping ' 4.9 4.9 5.1 4.9 5.8 51.3 evel i 
Countries 
Source: Human Development Report 1992. 
The Distribution of Freedom: Data were collected for 104 countries representing 92% of 
the world's population. Of these, about a third had high freedom (a 75% score or above), 
another third had reasonable freedom (50-75%), and the remaining third modest to low 
freedom (50% or less). But given the current political trends in the world, it is clear that 
an increasing number of countries will be moving to higher scores. 
The Link with Human Development: Political freedom and human development do seem 
to move in tandem. Countries with a high HDI have an average PH of 84%, while 
countries with a low HDI have an average PFI of 48%. 
The Link with Levels of Income: There also appears to be a link between a country's per 
capita income and the extent of its democratic freedoms. For high-income countries, the 
average PH is 84%, for middle-income countries 61%, and for low-income countries 
43%. But the Table also shows that, as income levels fall, freedom does not decline 
correspondingly. Even poor nations can enjoy a high level of political freedom. 
Progress to Date: Political participation (through elected legislatures) and equality of 
opportunity are the areas in which the world has progressed the most. Physical integrity of 
the individual, on the other hand, is an area where human rights abuses still occur most 
frequently. 12 
The overall conclusions that flow from the Table and the analysis should be treated with 
great caution, since this was only a first step in this direction. More research is needed to 
investigate further the interrelationship of freedom and development; to investigate the 
interrelationship between individual and collective rights as well as that between political 
rights and economic and social rights. Appendix HI. 19.3. presents "the tide of freedom" as 
it happened recently, and it brings out the interrelationship as well. It is necessary to 
understand more fully how development relates to human rights, democracy and freedom 
and vice versa. 
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111.19. xii. Macro KnowIfte of Freedom 
The phenomenon of the macro knowledge of freedom plays a central role in our way of 
thinking and therefore in the formulation of this model. Although the model analyses the 
national economy at the macro-level, we must set out from the microeconomic 
foundations in order to deal with this new economic growth variable, freedom. We could 
describe the 'vocabulary' freedom as a category comprising a large group of phenomena. 
Freedom is a summary expression referring to numerous elementary presence or absence 
of freedom events. Its measurement involves particular difficulties. Freedom is too 
precious to be reduced to a number. It cannot be done by straightforward summation, 
since it is obvious that we cannot directly add up the indicators of events and processes 
that are qualitatively totally different. Therefore, if we wish to represent freedom 
phenomena within a macromodel, we must use some indirect methods of measurement. 
The first task is to assemble a large number of partial presence or absence offi-eedom 
indicators. The political freedom index is a guide in this direction. We could also assemble 
a large number of protection or abuse of human rights indicators. In the present study, 
concerned with the formulation of a theoretical model, it is sufficient to observe that 'a 
comprehensive and regular observation of partial presence or absence of freedom 
indicators is possible. ' There is no theoretical or methodological obstacle to the 
organization of such observation. All partial presence or absence of freedom indicators are 
measured in their own units. Only two general properties are stipulated in defining them. 
1. Higher values of any partial absence of freedom indicator show more intensive 
oppression and mal-development, while lower values show less intensive economic 
growth. 
2. Each partial presence of freedom indicator is non-negative, while the absence of 
freedom indicator is always negative. 
In a real economic system the partial absence of freedom indicators are not, of course, 
perfectly correlated but there are several circumstances that create quite a strong positive 
correlation between them. For instance, the absence of a democratic process is positively 
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correlated to the absence of freedom. The violation of basic human rights is, again, 
positively correlated to the absence of freedom. For all these reasons, it is reasonable to 
expect that positive correlation between different units of absence of freedom and mal- 
development indicators should be considerable. If we could detect this correlation, then 
the economic policy could be redirected to enhance the relationship between economic 
growth and freedom. We shall proceed to analyse the microeconomic variables to 
understand the national economy at the macro-level. 
111.19. xiii. Household Demand and Purchases 
The demand of the household depends on a number of explanatory factors: consumer 
prices, past and present nominal incomes, the accumulated wealth of the household., 
expectations concerning the future etc. 13 Let us consider all these factors as given and 
constant, so that we can express household demand as a function of a single explanatory 
variable, namely absence or presence of freedom. In Figure 1, we show the effect on the 
household demand and purchases as a function of absence of freedom. 
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In Figure 2, we show the effect on the household demand and purchases as a function 
of presence of freedom. Let us denote the demand of the household sector by HD, and its 
actual purchases by H. The freedom index is denoted by Z. In a regime where there is a 
conspicuous absence of freedom, the household demand and purchases fall because of the 
negativity approach to human living due to their denial of human rights and this in turn 
retards economic development. This is the experience of many under-developed 
economies. Therefore, it is imperative for the economies in transition to make sure that 
households experience a conspicuous presence of freedom as they go about fulfilling their 
economic activities. This is crucial because of the need to develop a positive approach to 
human living that would in turn give the oil necessary to ignite the engine of economic 
growth mechanism. During the transition period, this indicates that the household sector 
buys more than normal if presence of freedom is more intensive than normal, and 
conversely. 
I[I. 19. xiv. The Firms' Demand and Purchases 
In a free-market economic model, firms' budget constraint is hard and therefore bind its 
purchasing intention. Survival of the firm depends on the rational decisions and choices. 
While this is a micro knowledge understanding of a firm's working dynamism, what we 
need to equally emphasize during the period of transition, is the necessity of creating a 
dynamic economic atmosphere where macro knowledge of freedom prevails for the 
entrepreneurs to engage in economic activities. As we have shown in the household's 
demand and purchases, we could depict the firm's demand and purchases as a function of 
absence or presence of freedom. Figure 3 shows the effect on firm's demand and 
purchases during a period of absence of freedom. 
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Similarly, we can show the effect on firm's demand and purchases during a period of 
presence of freedom, as shown in Figure 4. 'Me resulting situation can be described as a 
positive correlation between freedom of the entrepreneurs and economic growth. The 
firm's demand for current inputs for production is rationalized but increases constantly in 
relation to the prevalence of free economic atmosphere. 
From the theoretical point of view, there is a remarkable analogy with the familiar 
properties of demand functions as discussed in standard MiCroeConomiCS. 14 We have the 
downward-sloping purchases functions H and Y yet not as functions of the purchase price, 
but of a non-price variable, namely, the absence of freedom. The loss caused by the 
prevalence of the absence of the freedom is the 'price' the buyer has to pay. But during 
the transition period, this effect can be reversed by creating an atmosphere of freedom. 
Then, we will have an upward-sloping purchases functions and the non-price variable, 
namely, the presence of freedom will have a positive effect. The gain caused by the 
prevalence of the presence of freedom is the growth that the economy would be 
experiencing. The more intensive the absence of freedom, the higher this 'price' for 
development, therefore, the more the investor will refrain from his original investing 
intention. Conversely, as the intensity of the presence of freedom increases, the economic 
activity increases, and the economic growth would show an upward trend. 
1H. 19. xv. Production 
In our model, byproduction we mean the gross output; output produced to cover not 
only final consumption, but also the current inputs required for production. During the 
period of transition, there is a surge in the household demand for consumer goods as well 
as an increase in the firms' demand for inputs, especially as the economies in transition 
move from a tight centrally-command planned economy to a free-market economy. 
'Mough there is a general decline in the volume of production of goods and services in the 
initial stages of transition, as we have noticed in the newly formed republics of former 
Soviet Union and other East and Central European economies, we notice that production 
slowly picks up and economic growth becomes positive. This has happened in those 
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economies of transition where stabilization is pursued through democratic means. It is the 
macro knowledge of suffering for the newly won freedom that kept the transition going, 
rather than choosing for hasty options. The prevalence of political-social and economic 
freedom determines the production process. As a matter of fact, both explanatory factors, 
final consumption and current inputs, are adversely affected in a regime of production 
decisions where a conspicuous effect of the absence of freedom prevails. As impatient 
buyers press the producer to supply as much as possible and as soon as possible under a 
shortage economy of the socialist system, the same phenomena could be repeated in the 
initial stages of transition if the decision-makers do not give due weight to the macro 
knowledge of basic needs. During this cumbersome period, it is important to foHow, on 
the one hand stringent stabilization policies and on the other hand, responding to the 
discontent of the public by turning the incompetent production apparatus to a competent 
production path. In this way, production grows as transition stabilizes and the result is 
economic growth. 
We can notice a unique characteristic in the politics of the historical socialist regime, 
where, the politicians press the party-supporters to eliminate the enemies as many as 
possible and as soon as possible. This instilled fear that existed from top to bottom of this 
economic system crippled the people and their economic growth psychologically. During 
the period of transition a macro knowledge of reconciliation is to be introduced to replace 
this fear-complex which stifles any human growth (as is done in the new South Africa). 15 
As the absence of freedom coincides with the violation of human rights, the presence of 
freedom must not only endows people with human rights but enables them to regain the 
lost self-confidence. Though this is a political process, the economies in transition need to 
undertake this in order to put the production process in the hands of a confident nation. 
The social anarchy that we notice in many transitional, developing and developed 
countries is to be tackled by pursuing the macro knowledge of reconciliation between 
peoples of the various social strata of the population and between genders; this is 
imperative because of the nature of the social anarchy which leads to the destruction of the 
whole production process. 
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111.19. xvi. Investment 
The analysis of investment is of prime importance in any discussion on economic growth 
models and is considered as the 'core' of the model. "It may not be exaggerating to say 
that all macro-theories that neglect a genuine investigation of investment effectively turn 
their back on the most important question. , 16 Investment is a dynamic process. The 
implementation of a project goes on for years and, therefore, a micro-level investment 
decision entails long-term obligations. This is why it is indispensable - even at the cost of 
some increased complexity in the model's structure - that we should try to represent the 
lags that characterize the investment processes and the associated production processes. 
This is particularly important in examining the growth problems of the economies in 
transition since, as is well known, the protracted implementation of investment projects 
would be quite frequent. 17 
The existing capitalist models of economic growth where investment plays a crucial role 
have been explained in the first section of our study. We have also analysed the socialist 
economic growth models where investment is considered as almost the only pillar 
necessary for development. Both of the economic systems considered the role of 
investment as crucial. Yet by following these models we could not bring about a better 
world. During the period of transition, the economies in transition, would be following a 
capitalist-market oriented growth economic model. As we have explained in section one, 
these models involve the introduction of a micro knowledge model which is based on 
physical capital, human labour, technological progress, human capital and research and 
development. We have been trying to develop the knowledge sector that resulted out of 
R&D. The existing R&D mostly concentrates on developing the micro knowledge sector. 
Our attempt here is to show the existence of the macro knowledge sector as a priori to 
micro knowledge sector and we try to synthesize both these parallel sectors in our model 
of economic growth. As is already pointed out and still not irrelevant for countries in 
transition that, huge investment is needed for capital formation and technology 
development. At the same time, recent research studies have shown that an equally huge 
325 
investment is needed for the formation of human capital. It is the formation and availability 
of human capital that is going to transform the countries in transition as well as developing 
and developed economies. We accept the new economic growth theories as has been 
explained in section one. Here, we shall not further elucidate those elements of growth 
economics. What we shall explain in relation with investment is the relevance of macro 
knowledge variables. 
Economies in transition look for investment from internal and external sources. Capital 
flight from potential internal investors and investment into transitional economies from 
external investors remain as a paradox in the history of economic growth discussion. 18 
While capital flight has been huge, the external investment remained at a very low level in 
the transitional economies. As we have seen the positive or negative correlation between 
the household-firm demand function to the prevalence of the macro knowledge of 
freedom, we could also examine the phenomenon of investment within the background of 
the macro knowledge of freedom. Investment increases as the presence of freedom 
intensifies and decreases as the absence of freedom strengthens. As the stabilization 
process deepens, capital flight reverses into a form of re-investment. Foreign direct 
investment strengthens as the presence of freedom is concretised through democratic 
institutions. International assistance flows smoothly as the human rights record is 
straightened. On the whole, a general normal-ordinary prevalence of freedom is necessary 
for healthy growth of investment and thereby economic growth and development. 
[In a sense, our model does not contain or explain the normal variables or elements of 
economic theory, like the aggregate capital, fixed and current assets, (and within the latter 
between input and output stocks). As regards fixed capital, it is represented by the well- 
known 'vintage' model. We do not aggregate fixed capital of different vintages, but treat 
each vintage seperately. '9 We assume that investments are only made by agents of market 
economy and are exclusively for productive purposes. All investments from other sources 
or for other purposes are disregarded. When we consider a single vintage, we note that the 
expenditure on each project has its own particular dynamics; one lasts longer, the other 
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one a shorter time; in one much expenditure is incurred at the beginning, in another in the 
middle of the gestation period, and so on. '01 
III. 19. xvii. Investing in Human CaDital 
We shall make a few notes on the importance of investing in human capital. As has been 
discussed already, new research studies have shown that any economic growth depends 
directly on the formation of human capital and its availability. Development of technology 
and skilled labour result directly from investing in human beings. Therefore, investing in 
human capital formation could be considered as a dynamic investment which generates 
various forms of micro knowledge. At the same time it is important to note that human 
beings are not just a means to an end. They are an end in themselves. This teleological 
vision of a human person takes precedence over the mere objective of economic 
development. Therefore, while framing strategies for the formation of human capital, it 
should be done within the framework of the macro knowledge of freedom, democracy and 
human rights. While investing in human person enables one to grow and develop his/her 
potential, it must be done in an atmosphere of freedom. Coercive methods of human 
capital formation not only retards the economic growth but retards the dignity of the 
human person and thereby result in human rights violation. During the process of 
transition new educational and R&D policies must be framed so that the new generation 
may begin experiencing the prevalence of freedom in and out of the class rooms. This free 
thinking atmosphere is perennial to the strategies of human capital formation for economic 
growth. 
We assume that technical progress is positively correlated with the human capital 
formation. While technical progress implies a constant rate of progress, it is the 
development of human capital that determines change in the employment and productivity 
possihilities latent in the techniques introduced by successive vintages. In reality, the 
technical parameters are not independent of each other. They grow together as human 
capital formation increases. Their interrelations are treated in detail in theories of 
Production and growth. However, we do not deal with these interrelationships here. 21 We 
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wish, with the aid of our model, to focus attention primarily on the development of the 
volume of investment. As the human capital formation takes momentum, the volume of 
investment increases in a free market economy. 22 (ref. Barro) This is because of the 
endogenous nature of investment in a free market structure and the control that the 
prevalence of human capital can exert on the volume of investment. The deepening of 
human capital formation, technological progress and investment, during the period of 
transition, must happen within the prevalence of macro knowledge of freedom if it is to 
play a role in the progress of people oriented development. 
The simple structure given above seems adequate for the present theoretical analysis, for 
it makes clear our main point about the solutionary growth path where a causal direction 
is described in the framework of macro knowledge to explain the necessity of integrating 
these new variables for economic growth and development. The inter-relations of the 
traditional economic variables and the new macro knowledge variables are appropriately 
interwoven into our model. Definitely, there would be many signal-reactions as we 
process this model into the transition-growth path. We could analyse the 'signal-reaction' 
that would emulate out of this model by following a mechanism of feedback. If we are 
able to read the signal-reactions, we could feed it back into the model so that the model 
could be corrected in case of necessity by a feedback praxis approach. Let us describe the 
feedback mechanism. 
IR. 19. xviii. Necessitv of Feedback Mechanism 
We shaH explain. the feedback mechanism within the framework of the consumption 
function, investment function, and macro knowledge function. When we consider the 
feedback to understand the consumption function, we notice the following. In formulating 
economic policy, it must be taken into account that the population expects its 
consumption to rise, now and in the future, at the customary rate. Accordingly, the first 
feedback reflects the behaviour of the central economic policy-makers and planners. "If 
the growth of consumption remains below its usual rate, the scale of investment will be 
reduced so as to leave more of the national income for consumption. If, on the other hand., 
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the population 'lives too well', or the growth of consumption has accelerated unusually, 
larger volumes of investments can be started, since it is considered justified to divert some 
of the resources devoted to household consumption. , 23 It can be verified empirically that 
this kind of feedback exists, though not necessarily in the very simple form that appears in 
the model. T. Bauer calls this kind of reaction 'a cycle symmetrical with consumption. '24 
When we consider the feedback to understand the investment function, we notice the 
following. The second feedback influences upper-, medium-, and lower-level decision- 
makers alike. It involves an understanding of the investment commitment. "If economic 
managers feel they have over-committed themselves in the past, they will now hold back 
new investment starts. q125 Above-normal shortage intensity therefore induces the decision- 
makers to restrain new investment starts. It is good to recall here the characteristics of the 
socialist system that we have discussed in section two of our study, and inquire whether 
socialist managers applied this feedback understanding into their economic decisions. 
When we consider the existence of an insatiable demand for investment goods in the 
socialist economies, the system-specific characteristics - like the expansion drive, and the 
concomitant investment hunger, and the lack of self-imposed limit, etc., - could be 
explained because of the insensitivity to signal-reactions and the inability to feed it back 
into the socialist economic system. In this socialist scenario, as we have seen, the volume 
of investment does not depend on the financial state of the firm's sector, its present and 
future profits, accumulated or additional savings, the condition of the state budget, or any 
expected constraints on sales. It would be a mistake to omit these factors from a growth 
model of a capitalist economy. The decision-makers and the policy implementers of the 
transition economies could apply this feedback mechanism of the investment function as 
they make investment decisions for economic growth. 26 
When we consider thefeedback to understand the macro knowledge function, we notice 
the following. The third feedback is based on the macro knowledge variables, namely 
freedom, democracy and human rights. "The positive experience of existential freedom, - 
by upholding democratic institutions, and by respecting basic human rights and by 
providing basic needs of the people - determines further growth. " The negative experience 
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of freedom is detrimental to any growth. 'Me integral economic development is directly 
related with the presence or absence of the macro knowledge variables. The household 
demand, firms' demand, consumption and investment functions etc. react positively to the 
prevalence of macro knowledge variables. As the macro knowledge variables are 
intensified, the economic growth takes an upturn, especially in economies which follow a 
transitional process. 
The economies in transition as well as developing and developed countries must be 
sensitive to the signal reactions of the market as well as of the people. Responding to 
these signal reactions, after careful analysis of each issue, is important especially in the 
period of transition. Since this is a period of lot of experiments in socio-economic and 
political restructuring, this period is more vulnerable than in any other situation. The 
feedback mechanism enables the decision makers to respond to the signal reactions. What 
should be fed back into the system, how it should be done etc. are to be decided on the 
basis of macro knowledge variables. 
HI. 19. xix. EmplqjýMent 
The fixed capital created by investment vintage starts and contributes and ends and this 
could be considered as the economic life of a fixed capital. 27 In this environment labour 
demand is determined by the job-creating effect of the various investment vintages, 
summing over the vintages in operation in a particular year. During the 'extensive growth 
period', as we have explained in the historical socialist regime, the labour supply-reserve 
could be considered practically unlimited. Accordingly actual employment, coincides with 
labour demand. Also as we have discussed, the 'intensive growth period' experiences the 
exhaustion of labour reserves. "It is a characteristic of the extensive period that while the 
market for products is a 'sellers' market' with chronic shortage, the market for labour is a 
'buyers' market' with substantial labour reserves. ý. 928 
The economies in transition experienced a general decline in labour demand immediately 
after the collapse of the planned regime. Appendix Ill. 19.4 gives details about the 
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problems related with labour demand; also it provides the number of official total 
employment and total unemployment in the transition countries. This is mainly due to the 
structural adjustment that these economies in transition were forced to undertake to 
transform their economies to a market economy. This is also due to the failure of the 
micro knowledge legacy of an economic system, where forced employment and irrational 
payment scheme kept a full employment model. In the new atmosphere of freedom, people 
choose to exercise their human rights by demanding the right wages and right atmosphere 
of employment. Transitional economies though fail initially to provide all these new 
demands, at least were able to provide a free atmosphere for the new economic system 
that would enable to address these demands in a more rational way. As investment 
environment is created through opting for the macro knowledge of freedom, employment 
opportunities too would rise in this same manner. 
111.19. xx. Real Waizes and Household Savines 
The household does not react separately to nominal incomes and the consumer price 
level. Its decisions about spending and saving depend exclusively on their joint effect; that 
is, on real wages. (We disregard other types of incomes because we assume that during 
the early transition period the generation of other fon-ns of incomes remain insignificant. ) 
The normal value of real wage fund equals the initial real wage rate (i. e., the yearly total 
real wage per employee) multiplied by the growth factor of the normal real wage fund: 
The per capita normal wage fund multiplied by employment determines the normal real 
wage fund. 29 
In the control of the real wage fund central policy on living standards and the pressure 
on real wages exerted by employees both have some effect. The actual real wage fund may 
deviate from its normal value as a consequence of a feedback mechanism. The logic of the 
feedback is then as follows: if in the previous year actual household consumption lagged 
behind its normal value, the present year's real wages would rise at a higher rate. The 
complement of the normal spending ratio of the household is the normal household 
savings ratio. In a socialist planned economy, this already includes a certain amount of 
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forced saving caused by shortage, since some forced saving occurs even at the normal 
level of shortage. "Household savings depend on the normal wage rate and its growth rate 
(these are exogenous parameters); in addition, savings depend on the adjustment of real 
wages determined by the difference between actual and of normal consumption paths, on 
employment, and finally, on shortage intensity. ý. t 30 Accumulated savings influence 
household demand and purchases. But as we have seen in our analysis that the socialist 
model is motivated by investment at the expense of consumption and saving. Above all, 
wages played only a passive role. 
In our model, we place wages and household savings as playing a crucial role. ne 
economies in transition need to develop financial institutions which would stabilize the 
economy in general and would help mobilize savings of the household for economic 
reconstruction. This is possible again within the framework of well-knit democratic 
institutions where free movement of stocks and assets is possible, as in a market economy. 
Savings is the key player in the transition period because of the nature of the household 
consumption at this stage. 31 
HI. 19. xxi. Input-QuIput Relations 
Let us examine the relation of input-output in our model. If we had been content merely 
to use the standard macro-equation, Y=C+I (national income is equal to consumption plus 
investment), with investment treated as exogenous, the model would certainly be much 
simpler. But then it could hardly be used satisfactorily as a description of the internal 
motion and regulation of economy, or for analysing interrelations between short-and long- 
term changes. Nor would it be suitable for demonstrating the specific inertia of the 
investment process, resulting from its characteristic reaction lags. 32 In our analysis of the 
relation between input-output, the production/labour ratio could be termed as technical 
productivfty. The deten-nination of technical productivity depends not just on the 
availability of labour and technology, but as we notice in the economies of transition, it is 
very much related with the incentives that are provided in a free market economy. The 
feedback mechanism enables us to correct this measure of technical productivity; for 
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instance, according to whether the actual demand for goods and services is stronger or 
weaker than normal. In a planned socialist economy, if it is stronger, productivity declines 
because of the frequent disturbances in materials and spare-parts supply, technological 
improvisations entailed by forced substitutions, etc. This need not be the case in a 
transitional economy where market forces play a crucial role. If the demand for goods and 
services is stronger, productivity increases in a capitalist economy because of its ability to 
respond to the signal reactions in the market and its willingness to feed it back into the 
economic system. In this scenario, the technical productivity adjusted to allow for the real 
effects on demand could be called as above-standard productivity. We recall the fact that 
standard productivity, multiplied by actual employment, determines normal production. 33 
HI. 19. xxii. Stocks 
It is useful to explain here the importance of distinguishing between output and input 
stocks. This is not a distinction related to the physical properties of the product, but it is 
concerned with who disposes of the stock: whoever produced it as an output, or someone 
else wanting to use it as an input. As one of the properties of the model, we want the 
'interactions between stock and flow variables to be displayed consistently in the model. 934 
Therefore, in contrast to many other models, we strictly separate production and sales on 
the output side, and purchases and use (productive consumption) on the input side. This 
separation in terms of flow variables is reflected in the stock variables, by their separation 
into two different stocks: the output stock is inserted between production and sales, and 
input stocks come between purchases and productive consumption. Although in practice 
this separation is not always easy to make, experience suggests that it is not impossible. 35 
Output stocks and input stocks play different roles in the signal system of the economy. 
'Me control of production responds to output stocks, while the control of purchases 
responds to input stocks. In different socio-economic systems we can observe 
fundamentally different regularities in the ratios of output and input stocks. In the socialist 
eCOnomy we note that conditions of 'suction' prevail: 'pulling out' the output stock from 
the warehouses of the producer-seller. 36 Under conditions of 'suction' output stocks are 
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usually no more than the minimum quantity implied by the time necessary to complete 
transactions, plus a barely saleable frozen stock. As opposed to this, input stocks are large 
as a consequence of the hoarding tendency stimulated by shortage and other 
characteristics of the socialist economic system. In a capitalist economy (on average over 
the cycle) the proportions tend to be different. The system is demand-constrained, and this 
may lead to the expansion of output stocks. At the same time, material purchases and the 
supply of other inputs are quite smooth; therefore, it is not usually necessary to hoard 
input stocks. (The capitalist firm may try to hoard input stocks if it expects a rise in input 
prices. ) 'The above propositions are supported by empirical data, but they can also be 
confirmed by deduction from the behavioural. regularities, that assert themselves in the two 
different mechanisms. Appendix 111.19.5 shows that the share of output stocks in total 
stocks is two or three times larger in capitalist countries than in socialist countries. TIlis is 
a guide to the transitional economies., as they try to integrate the macro knowledge 
variables. The economies in transition, as they follow market mechanisms, would have to 
follow the capitalist economy approach to stocks. 
The characteristic element of competition is introduced into the model. During the 
period of transition, as the household's and firm's demand and purchases are subjected to 
the mechanisms of the market, it is natural to notice the emerging competition among the 
households and firms for goods and services. Here, we must draw attention to the fact that 
an explicit 'rationing scheme' is not built into our model. (During the transition period, 
though, there exists a rationing scheme). The share of consumption is greatly influenced 
by the two main distributional parameters in the model: the initial real wage rate and the 
normal growth factor of the real wage fund . 
37The share of accumulation is affected by a 
series of parameters: the normal growth factors of the investment volume and of the 
investment commitment, stock norms, etc. Aside from the effect of these parameters the 
"various feedback mechanisms functioning in the model ensure that the allocations cannot 
deviate persistently from its normal proportions. , 38 If too much output is allocated to one 
area in some year, feedbacks ensure that in the following year less should be allocated 
there, and more to other areas. This kind of autonomous movement, including internal 
control mechanisms, takes place in our model. (We note that our macromodel can only 
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illustrate the extremely complicated reality in a very simplified way. ) However, in 
connection with 'autonomous movement' and 'internal control', we must be beware of a 
, decentralized' and one-sided interpretation of these concepts. In constructing the model 
we consider the economic policy-maker, the planner, and the central manager as 
endogenous parts of the system. Thus the behavioural. regularities and feedback 
mechanisms described in the model represent the combined reactions of all the levels 
participating in multi-level control . 
39 The above analysis enables the economies in 
transition to introduce their own 'autonomous movement' and 'internal control' that 
would fit with the new principles of market mechanism. Following the macro knowledge 
dimension of our model, it would be appropriate to introduce the various forms of micro 
knowledge as an autonomous movement based on the macro knowledge variables of 
internal control, that would lead the economy into a growth path. 
BI. 19. xxiii. The Conditions for the Existence of a Growth Path 
We have reached the end of the description and interpretation of the model. The micro 
knowledge and macro knowledge variables have been interwoven into the transition 
growth path. What we want to show now is that "the system is able to move along a 
feasible path and to grow. " This is possible if the following conditions are met. (Since we 
do not follow an econometric model, these conditions are to be understood theoretically. 
In mathematical form the model would be a set of non-homogeneous difference 
equations. ) The system follows a feasible path, if each of its variables assumes a non- 
negative value for each year t ýý 1. This can be shown by considering a system that follows 
the Harrod-Neumann path 40 (the N-H path), if each of its reproducible stock and flow 
variables grows at a uniform and constant rate, (that is: volume of investment vintage, 
production, firms' purchases, household purchases, output stocks and input stocks) and 
where the general growth factor is > 1. (The system follows a normal path if the actual 
value of each control variable equals its normal value. ) The name Harrod-Neumann path 
derives from the fact that it was Harrod for aggregate models, and von Neumann for 
disaggregated ones, who developed the pioneering models whose most characteristic 
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common feature is growth at a constant rate. As production and capital in Harrod's 
model, and as the production of all sectors in von Neumann's model grow at a uniform 
and constant rate, so, in the framework of the present model, all production, investment, 
trading and stock variables grow at a uniform and constant rate, when the system moves 
along the Harrod-Neumann path. The following proposition can be made. "Given the 
assumptions of our model there exists a feasible normal path and the normal path is 
necessarily a Harrod-Neumann path. " It is the speciji"c propeny of our model that its 
normal path is an H-N path. The underlying economic assumption is as follows: "We wish 
to use our model to describe a system in which a uniform rate of expansion of investment 
activity, and thereby economic growth, is regarded as normal during the period of 
transition from a socialist economic system to a capitalist economic system. Ultimately, 
this is possible, if and only if, the economies in transition opt to integrate micro knowledge 
and macro knowledge variables. It is especially the macro knowledge variables of 
freedom, democracy, and human-rights which would lead the many other normal variables 
in this growth model (and, under certain conditions, all of its reproducible stock and flow 
variables) along the Harrod-Neumann path. " As we have shown in our model, the uniform 
and constant growth of the economy depends on the positive presence of macro 
knowledge variables. Even if the other micro knowledge variables deviate in the initial 
stage of transition from the growth path, (as we have noticed in our earlier analysis) as the 
intensity of the macro knowledge variables is felt, a convergence path emerges and 
ultimately becomes a H-N path. 41 
Another condition, in the language of our model, expresses the fact that 'technical 
progress is Harrod-neutral. 142 This means that a unit of investment creates fewer jobs from 
vintage to vintage, and this is compensated by the fact that productivity is higher for each 
newly created job than for the jobs created by earlier vintages due to the increasing 
intensity and prevalence of the presence of macro knowledge variables. Therefore, as the 
transition dynamics takes momentum., the incremental 'output-capital ratio' is constant. In 
other words, the ratio of the output-increment which can be produced by the investment 
vintage, to the estimated investment expenditure required to complete the investment 
vintage is constant over time. Harrod-neutrality also indicates that technical progress has a 
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, labour- augmenting' character. On the normal path the growth of the reproducible stock 
and flow variables (general growth factor) is equal to the product of the growth factor of 
the non-reproducible resource (that is of the employed population), and that of 
prodUCtiVity. 
43 Another condition that we should note is that the growth factor of the 
non-nal real wage rate must be equal to the growth factor of vintage productivity. This is 
necessary in order that along the normal path total household consumption should grow in 
accordance with the general growth f actor. 
44 These conditions support our proposition of 
the existence of a feasible normal path which has Harrod-Neumann properties. At the 
same time we note that macro knowledge variables as control process determine these 
movements. 
Another characteristic of the nature of the model is that macro-variables represent 
collections of millions of microsignals. 45 In recent years it has become increasingly clear to 
theoretical economists that non-price signals play an important role in economic systems. 
In the present model, we have been trying to take a step forward by formalizing, in the 
framework of a macro-model, the generation of non-price signals and their 'feedback' as 
part of the decision control process. In this sense, within the scope of our model, the 
46 terms, 'normal path' and 'non-Walrasian long term equilibrium' are synonyms. (It has to 
be recognized that value-judgements are bound to be associated with the concept of 
equilibrium: equilibrium is 'good 9, disequilibrium. 'bad' in the eyes of most people, within 
or outside the profession. On the other hand, the terms 'normal state' or 'normal path' 
seem to be free of any valuejudgement; that is, neutral. ) Given the non-Walrasian 
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it is an intellectually attractive experiment to present different regimes, on the same 
diagram, as different points in a given co-ordinate system, or as definite regions of the co- 
ordinate plane. Maavaud identifies in his diagrams points or areas corresponding to 
Walrasian equilibrium, Keynesian and 'classical' unemployment, etc. 47 In this scenario, 
when we consider a socialist system we notice the following. "A semi-monetized economy 
in which prices and money do not genuinely influence the macrovariables of production, 
investment, and employment cannot properly be described in terms of its money being 
stable or inflated, or price increases being repressed or pennitted. "48 The main 
characteristic features of this system, as we have summarized earlier in our study - 
chronic shortage, strong expansion drive, quantity drive, unrestrainable investment spirit - 
can be observed when the price level is stable. But they would also persist if the price level 
began to change and a slow or accelerating inflation evolved. Since our model does not 
follow this line of thought, we cannot apply Malinvaud's approach. Therefore, we have 
fortnulated other behavioural regularities, other signal systems, and other feedback 
mechanisms. The present study does not attempt to judge, whether the model of Barro, 
Grossman and Malinvaud offers an appropriate way of distinguishing between alternative 
states of a capitalist economy, that is, for developing a typology of capitalist 'regimes' 
differing from each other in certain essential features. It seems certain, however, that the 
description of a socialist economy can hardly be pressed into the same theoretical 
framework. 49 Since we concern ourselves with transition growth path, we shall try to 
understand the mechanism of the control and stability of our system in order to establish a 
feasible normal path. 
III-19. xxiv. Control and Stabili 
... We advance the proposition that a feasible normal path exists in our system. Yet the 
structure of the model allows the system to move along other paths. 'Whether or not the 
system follows the normal path depends on the control process. ' The model can be 
reformulated according to the standard terminology of mathematical control theory, but 
here we Emit ourselves to the descriptive model that we develop. "Controllability means 
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that whatever state the system is in, there is a path for the control variables which drives 
the system to any assigned feasible state within a finite time period. "50 Such an assigned 
state could be an appropriate point along the normal path. In this case controllability 
means that, if the system departs from its normal path, a suitable choice of the control 
variables can help to drive it back to the normal path within a finite period. The macro 
knowledge variables push it into the normal path. 
We shall make an endogenous description of the control. A considerable volume of 
literature on growth theory deals with the question of control, yet in most cases the 
analysis is conducted 'outside the model. '51 Therefore, these are not 'fed back' into the 
model: they do not act as feed back signals. The present model tries to take a step forward 
in this respect. As it evolves over time, the system itself generates signals which, 'fed 
back' into the same system, will influence its subsequent development. If it has any merits, 
it is rather the undertaking itself: to build a growth model with endogenous control of real 
process; and in such a way as to model the interactions between long and short-term 
52 control. The desirability of intensifying research along these lines has encouraged our 
present attempt. The division of the knowledge sector into micro and macro knowledge 
sectors and integrating the variables of both these sectors into an endogenous model of 
economic growth has been our main objective. While micro knowledge variables have 
been traditionally developed and endogenized into the growth models, macro knowledge 
sector remained an 'outsider'. Though recently there has been an openness and attempt at 
speaking about the macro knowledge variables of freedom, democracy, human rights, etc. 
in the economic development discussions, no model has been developed yet along these 
lines. Our attempt at endogenizing the micro and macro knowledge variables into 
economic growth models would encourage further research into this area. 
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111.19. xxv. IControl 
by Norms 
rMe macro knowledge variables could be considered as norms that control the dynamism 
of an economic growth model, especially in the period of transition. In this sense , our 
model presents a specific form of control, which we call control by norms. "Studying the 
norms gives us a profound insight into the nature of the system. If we really know what is 
regarded as 'normal' in a system, we know quite a lot about that systeM. "53 In our analysis 
of the historical socialism we have come across various norms that control its economic 
system. Generally speaking, those norms were anti-macro knowledge socialist principles 
our analysis of the macro knowledge variables helps us to understand this phenomenon as 
an 'insider. ' Norms are fixed by habit, convention, tacit or legally supported social 
acceptance, or conformiy. 54 In this sense, they are cultural and conventional and part of 
macro knowledge. They tend to perpetuate themselves, and the longer they are valid, the 
more deeply rooted they become; the inertia of society then ensures their effectiveness 
over an extended period. This has been the core problem with the developmental 
economics thinking. The economists were developing model after model based on the 
variables of micro knowledge designs. Even when the various applied micro knowledge 
designs were discarded or pronounced ineffective, by the macro knowledge standards, 
they continued in the same path. Here, macro knowledge encounters pseudo-macro 
knowledge through the medium of micro knowledge. 
Our working hypothesis is as follows: 'in a given historical period social norms are 
unchanged over time. '55 Of course, this does not mean that they are, in the mathematical 
sense, uniquely defined. If they appear in the model as uniquely determined constants, this 
is only for the convenience of model construction. In practice, we ought to formalize them 
rather as intervals or as means of probability distributions. Norms are not fixed for ever, 
and sometimes they can change rather dramatically. This is what we experience in the 
emergence of transitional economies particularly. If that happens, it indicates a transition 
to a qualitatively different period, or, to another 'regime. ' The logic can also be reversed: 
the constancy of the most important norms can be regarded as a basic criterion for 
periodizing history for constructing the typology of different 'regimes. ' This is an 
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important task all economies should undertake irrespective of the level of economic 
growth and development. This praxis approach would allow economies to see for 
themselves past-present and future trends in their own history of economic development. 
Based on this experience they would know the macro knowledge variables that promoted 
their economic growth and those variables that retarded the process of development. They 
will know what to keep and what to reject for the purpose of integral growth and 
development. But for J. Kornai, "In this approach to social phenomena, we do 'not ask' 
what is useful, what is desirable, or what is optimal. We merely enquire about what exists. 
What is normal, 'regular', and 'natural' about this system? This is the typical way of 
formulating a question in a descriptive-explanatory theory. 966 This existential approach of 
economic theorizing must be complemented by a readiness to reject concretely those 
norms that do not enhance the process of growth and development. This is what we have 
witnessed in the collapse of socialist regimes. The economies in transition are designing a 
new norm based on the macro knowledge systems of each nation and this is an ongoing 
process which policyrnakers must be aware while formulating policies for national 
development. 
One of the attractions of this approach is that it suggests obvious possibilities for testing 
the theory empirically. Norms can be recognized, first of all by observing the means and 
trends exhibited by time series and cross-section data on various recurrent phenomena or 
on phenomena occurring in a number of different places. Of course, not all mean values 
should be regarded as norms. "A mean is justifiably treated as a norm only if there exists 
some control mechanism that drives the actual value of the variable toward its normal 
value. , 57 This idea introduces us to the subject of the stability of control that would be 
introduced by the policyrnakers. The model presents the joint outcomes of decision 
processes taking place at all the upper and lower levels of control, and does not separate 
the influence of the democratically elected central government from that of lower-level 
decision makers. During the transitional stage this form of stability must be achieved at all 
levels by the co-ordinating effort of legislative as well as executive measures. As for the 
resulting joint effect itself, the model describes it in a deterministic framework. The 
control process responds to the impulses affecting it by applying certain 'rules of the 
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game. ' Reality, of course, is much more complicated than that. First, the effect exerted by 
the new central governments of economies in transition do not directly merge with the 
other components of control immediately; but their role is exceedingly important and 
responsible. Secondly, neither the centre, nor the lower-level decision-makers are mere 
executors of given rules, since they all have some scope for choice. As the scope for 
choice increases, the macro knowledge variables of freedom, democracy and human rights 
play a crucial role in determining policies for economic growth and development. While 
this control mechanism could assist, it could also inhibit the process of economic growth if 
there exists any conflicting interests. 58 The formulation of our model could be used for an 
examination of certain features of behaviour in the fields of economic policy and planning. 
During the transitional stage it would be appropriate to follow a praxis approach of 
observing, analysing and applying the macro knowledge variables of each nation to its 
chosen dynamic models of economic growth path. 
HI. 19. xxvi. Examination of Stabili 
An examination of stability is suitable to understand the movement of an unstable 
economic growth path to a stable economic growth path or to understand the process of 
converging to the equilibrium path. Although the concept is borrowed from the 
mathematician's vocabulary, stability in this sense is also of great importance for 
theoretical economics. In the framework of the model "an examination of stability answers 
the following question: do the control rules and the behavioural regularities formulated in 
the model guarantee that the system, having once departed from the normal path, will 
eventually return to it or approach it? If the answer is negative, it is doubtful whether there 
is any sense at all in talking about norms, normal values, or a non-nal path. If the answer is 
positive, and the system is stable in a wider or narrower sense, the use of these categories 
is both sensible and justified. Then can we say that the norms are asserted. The actual path 
is close to the normal path, fluctuates around it and cannot completely break away from 
969 As we have noted in our analysis, that the socialist economies swayed away from the 
equilibrium path notably because of the inability to integrate into their economic system 
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the macro knowledge variables. If we already have some understanding of stability 
conditions, it is also useful for us to know what can cause 'instability. ' For example, what 
constellations of parameters lead the system, once it leaves the normal path, never to 
return to it? The economies in transition could converge to a stable economic path as the 
stability conditions grow deeper into its new systems of transformation in the socio- 
political and economic regularities. 
After these introductory remarks, let us now examine the stability of our own model. 
The difficulty of making precise statements about the stability of 'imperfectly behaved' 
multivariable dynamic systems is well known. " What interests us is precisely the effect of 
feedback. Feedback is said to improve control if it is operative. With the introduction of 
suitable feedback this type of stability remains and 'convergence is accelerated. ' If, for 
example, something causes the system to depart from its normal path, it will return to it 
more quickly with feedback than without it. The stability properties of the model are 
worth further study, with both analytical and simulation methods. In any case, nothing can 
be said that prevents us from using the model. The concepts of 'norm' and 'normality' can 
be interpreted within the framework of the model, since the control mechanisms built into 
it are - at least for suitable parameter values - able to keep the motion of the system in the 
neighbourhood of its own norMS. 61 For the economies in transition, this means that the 
feedback parameters must be based on the macro knowledge variables which constitute 
the framing of a workable norm. 
HI. 19. xxvii. Remark on Methodolpjgy 
We shall make an additional remark on methodology. In economic applications of 
mathematical control theory the following fine of thought is usually pursued: "The 
description of a real sphere is given. Furthermore, the sets of economic policy targets and 
instruments are also given. The question is then to determine the control rules that best 
serve the given economic policy objectives. The control equations of the model are not 
specified in advance, but their determination is exactly the 'result' of the research. 9ý62 
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to ask whether the control has such desirable properties as 
stability, rapid convergence etc. Of course it has, since the researcher was seeking a 
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control for which he postulated in advance that it should have these properties. This is the 
normative approach to the modelling of economic control. Yet we wish to develop a 
descriptive approach, in which the corresponding train of thought goes as follows: We 
observe in reality and seek to describe in the model not only the real sphere but also the 
control sphere. The model of the latter must reflect-in more or less detail- the way in 
which control takes place in reality. What are the decision rules, and how and to what 
signals do the decision-makers react? The composition of place that we have designed in 
the beginning of this section could be described as a real sphere while the control sphere 
would be the macro knowledge variables. 63 
Thus, during the period of transition, we could build into the model some equations 
reflecting to some degree the empirically observable control mechanism, and then ask how 
the system functions and study its stability properties. We do not put the rabbit in the top 
hat beforehand just to be able to pull it out triumphantly afterwards. We do not construct 
a control block knowing in advance that it could ensure stability. But what we would like 
to do is to describe the existential economic reality and then introduce the macro 
knowledge variables as a control system that would bring about the stabilization and that 
would put the economy into the path of economic development. In the circumstances, 
therefore, our stability results must be considered all the more valuable. 
Finally, the most important property of the model is the way in which it describes the 
economies in transition. What happens in the system depends on the economic 
management. The philosophy of the present model enables a new venture into economic 
management. The operation of the economic systems of the republics of former Soviet 
Union, Eastern and Central European countries, reveals some characteristic regularities. 
They are democratically elected governments and therefore represents the public 
aspirations for a better economic management. 'Mere is a general consensus among these 
people about the need of a market economy. This new awareness is built upon the macro 
knowledge system of each nation. Therefore, at each level of decision-making "the 
behaviour of the decision-maker is in a certain sense 'regular': definite impulses and 
signals lead to definite consequences. 9-, 64 At the time of the collapse of the socialist regime, 
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the decision-maker was the people and their collective will. During the period of transition 
it is the responsibility of the newly elected governments to bring about the necessary 
transformation. In this sense, the governments are not lifeless screws in a piece of 
machinery. They have a choice and a responsibility. The economies in transition would 
succeed or collapse according to the fulfilment of their choice and responsibility. 
Therefore, the economic policy and planning operate on an economy-wide basis and exert 
extremely strong social effects particularly during the period of transition. 
That is why two different approaches are necessary in economics: the normative and the 
descriptive. Normative models have a say in economic policy and in the determination of 
national economic plans before definite decisions are made. 'Mey help to reveal the 
alternatives for choice and to forecast the consequences of decisions. On the other hand, 
for the descriptive-explanatory theory a series of past decisions is already available: by 
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analysing these, it tries to discover whether they exhibit any common regularities. What 
our model has to offer in this respect is only partially satisfactory. We need to develop an 
in-depth transitional analysis to see a better description. What is really important is 
actually to undertake the task of describing, with a formalized theoretical model, the 
internal regularities in the growth of a transitional economy under the guidance of the 
macro knowledge system. This would result in the integration of micro and macro 
knowledge sectors in the process of economic growth and development. 
1H. 19. xxviii. Comparative Perspectives 
Here, we shall clarify clearly the perspective that our model develops. Our objective is to 
develop a complementary model that would enhance the growth models that we have 
designed in section one of our study. Therefore, our perspective does not deviate from the 
relevant determinants of economic growth; rather we stress the need to have a strong 
physical capital accumulation, technological progress, human capital formation. Our model 
has no reason to compete with other models which have proposed these determinants of 
economic growth. Our model differs only when regimes opt to accumulate the ingredients 
of economic growth at the expense of democratic principles based on the macro 
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knowledge of freedom and human rights. A comparative perspective based on a general 
scenario of economic growth may be useful. 
The description of our vision-solution growth model challenges the prevailing 
perception of alternative options of development. Often while raising the eye-brows, 
politicians debate the issue of freedom; economists the issue of economic growth and 
development. While some critiques opt for development under any form of political 
structure, others abhor it. Anti-critiques of these proponents suggest freedom first, 
followed by economic growth. 66 As our model suggests, what we need is a closely knit 
parallel structure. It is neither thesis-anti-thesis or critique-anti-critique scenario. 
Somehow, a few economists have developed the view, either under pressure or as a 
beneficiary of the system, that under military-dictatorial regimes and distorted political 
structures, economic growth is possible. And they point to East-Asian tigers or dragons as 
67 examples. This is a distorted understanding of the Asian development strategies. This is 
an unacceptable legitimization of oppressive regimes. If such political structures were so 
benevolent, how is it that people rejected such structures and their leaders. If we want to 
understand the Asian development strategies, it would be better to look into their cultural 
legacies, rather than branding the regimes with a narrow rode' of measurement and 
upholding it as victorious. As social scientists, economists and other academicians have a 
duty to correct these mistaken acceptance of such regimes as an excuse for promoting 
development. As we have seen in our analysis of former Soviet Union, East and Central 
European states, merely judging economic performance on the basis of published data 
would not bring out the negative social cost of publicized success stories. Should we 
continue to promote such regimes as models of economic growth and development? 
Lessons from history point to the opposite. Intolerable human suffering and environmental 
catastrophes that we have had during this century under these wrong regimes cannot be 
supported even in the name of economic development. The question is: developmentfor 
whom? If it is for people and human good, it is time that we firmly design models that 
would engage in a form of dialogue between development and freedom, democracy and 
human rights. This is the new path suggested by the United Nations Development 
Organizations and other non-governmental grass-root, and international organizations 
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. The new philosophy of political economy is based on these macro knowledge 
determinants of growth economics. Eastern Europe has opted to be on this growth path. 
"If Eastern Europe successfully negotiates development, willingly accepting the necessary 
austerity that the process calls for, without recourse to authoritarianism, then the 
implications for the rest of the globe will be enormous. Knowledge that economic success 
and political liberty can together grow from the otherwise unhappy condition of 
underdevelopment will be greeted with great acclaim. , 68 We have followed in our research 
this new direction of the political economy. This new direction has to be strengthened by 
the following internalization strategy of development. 
]JI. 19. xxix. Primaix-SecondaCy-Tertiarl Growth Path 
Our solutionary growth path has attempted to integrate micro knowledge sector and 
macro knowledge sector into the general framework of a knowledge sector as a 
component of economic growth. While various forms of micro knowledge have been 
developed by economists concerned with the theory of growth, there was really no 
attempt made on the macro knowledge sector. We design the solutionary growth path by 
giving particular attention to the macro knowledge sector. Throughout our study we have 
noticed the almighty power of macro knowledge. Therefore we could consider the macro 
knowledge variables of freedom, democracy and human rights as primary solutions in our 
solutionary growth path. Any people-oriented development path has to be treaded on 
these new crucial variables. As the economy is set on the primary solutionary path, there 
emerges the secondary solutionary path. The role of privatization, stabilization, 
liberalization, and legalization are to be concretized through the implementation of land 
reform, investment initiatives, provision of employment opportunities, etc. Once the 
economy is set on the secondary solutionary path, there emerges the need for tertiary 
solutionary path as a supportive system to the primary and secondary paths. The role of 
conscientization process, empowering mechanism, and welfare dynamics could be 
considered as tertiary solutions at this stage of development. We cannot explain here these 
dynamics in detail. The conscientization process could be described as an immersive 
educative dynamics whereby people become more and more aware of their rights and 
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responsibilities as a citizen; this in itself could be described as a mechanism of 
empowerment. Welfare dynamics need to be designed according to the fulfilment of 
people's duties and responsibilities. The primary, secondary and tertiary solutions just 
described could be expanded and interpreted according to the demands of the economies 
in transition and the various stages of development of developing countries. 
The new model of solutionary growth path that we have developed enables us to 
understand the process of economic development from one's own culture. There is no 
imperialist or colonialist or utopian ideological approach. (The economic theories of Adam 
Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Marx and Keynes, while on the one hand enlightened the 
interrelations and complexities of economic dynamism, on the other hand they have helped 
to justify the creation of a culture of colonization and enslavement and exploitation of the 
many, of the human and non-human resources, for the economic advantage of the very 
few. ) The process of understanding the dynamism of applied economic and non-economic 
variables must happen, if integral development is the objective of a nation. Though we 
have placed enormous emphasis in our model on macro knowledge variables, a word of 
caution is necessary. Our development efforts would be futile if the macro knowledge 
sector is not sufficiently supported by the introduction of micro knowledge sector. The 
economies in transition in their early stage though lag in investing in R&D, they must give 
a special consideration in developing R&D particularly in the key sectors of production. 
The role of R&D is crucial not only for developing various forms of micro knowledge but 
it helps tremendously to strengthen the macro knowledge variables. The knowledge sector 
of every nation is composed of micro and macro knowledge sectors. The understanding of 
the macro knowledge sector and the development of micro knowledge sector as the new 
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Q. i. THE GLOBAL GROWTH PATH 
Our survey of economic growth models, with a view to understand the prospects and 
policies, projections and analysis, is necessitated by the demand of having a comprehensive 
review of world economic developments since the collapse of historical socialism. Our 
surveillance of economies in transition as part of a global economic system is based on the 
experiences of nations that followed either market economy models or planned economy 
models. The analysis has benefited from the research works of so many scholars of both 
capitalist and socialist convictions and of their critiques. The vision-solution growth model 
that we have developed is rooted and grounded on the historical experiences of peoples 
and nations. As the economic gap between peoples and nations widens on a global scale, 
the prospects of human development looks bleak and gloom as has been pointed out in the 
1994 Human Development Report. "Behind the blaring headlines of the world's many 
conflicts and emergencies, there lies a silent crisis -a crisis of underdevelopment, of global 
poverty, of ever-mounting population pressures, of thoughtless degradation of 
environment. This is not a crisis that will respond to emergency relief. It requires a long, 
quiet process of sustainable human development. Sustainable human development is 
development that not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits 
equitably; that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that empowers 
people rather than marginalizing them. It is development that gives priority to the poor, 
enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions 
that affect their lives. It is development that is pro-people, pro-women, pro-jobs and pro- 
nature. "' Ilere is an urgent need today to establish a more integrated, effective and 
efficient development system to promote the world-wide movement towards sustainable 
human development. It is this vision that resulted in the formulation of our model that 
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would enable economies in transition to restructure and strengthen their transformation 
goal and formulate their own operational development strategies. 
our objective of modelling a new economic growth thought for developing economies 
with particular reference to economies in transition, is based on the conviction that the 
global crisis that we face today is not merely economic but it is socio-political and religio- 
cultural. We cannot address the economic development issues just by having an economic 
policy whitepaper. As a social science, economics, has to integrate other areas of human 
development process, if it is to have a lasting development impact. An alienated and 
isolated approach to economic development issues, though promote the welfare of a few, 
leaves a large majority of a global village underdeveloped. Industrial, developing and 
transition economies of a global economic system need to cooperate to strengthen the 
global expansion as has been pointed out in the report of the forty-third meeting of the 
Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the IMF. The following points of the 
"Declaration on Cooperation to Strengthen the Global Expansion" of IMF are relevant to 
explain the global growth path. The immediate prospects for economic growth in the 
world economy are better than they have been at any time in this decade. But serious 
policy challenges remain. For the industrial countries the most important are to sustain 
economic growth, reduce unemployment., and prevent a resurgence of inflation. Growth in 
the developing countries (and in particular, in the poorest countries) must be maintained 
and extended. The economies in transition must be integrated into the international 
economy and set firmly on the path of sustainable growth. If the signatories of the 
Uruguay Round trade agreements abide by their commitments, it would enhance world 
economic prospects by deepening global economic integration. The recent success of 
many developing economies illustrates once again the validity of a strategy based on 
steadfast implementation of strong programmes of macroeconomic adjustment and 
structural reform. The impressive turnaround in several economies in transition also attests 
to the benefits of macroeconomic discipline and structural reforms. As we have noted in 
our analysis, experience has demonstrated the central importance of early fiscal reform and 
firm monetary discipline in the early stages of the transformation process to achieve 
financial stability. This needs to be accompanied by institution building, price and external 
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sector liberalization, enterprise restructuring and privatization, and financial sector reform. 
Social safety nets that are well targeted and cost efficient are also necessary, to alleviate 
the adverse impact of higher open unemployment. ' The improved economic outlook is a 
sign of the recovery of world activity and trade. Overall, world output is projected to 
expand by 3.5 percent in 1995, twice as rapidly as in 1990-93. Progress in the 
implementation of policies consistent with the strategy for sustained global expansion has 
helped to strengthen conditions for a revival of world activity. 
While the world economic activity is designed according to the capitalist-socialist 
systems based on certain forms of ideologies, it is relevant to inquire into the missing link 
of development. Neither capitalism nor socialism were able to bring about an equitable 
global village. The emergence of economies in transition and their desire to be on the 
capitalist path called into question the viability of historical socialism. The experience of 
industrial economies shows that capitalist mode of allocation, production and distribution 
better address the need of the people. More and more developing economies and new- 
born economies in transition place themselves in this capitalist path of growth. This would 
mean that the capitalist market economic mechanism would force these economies to 
adopt economic growth models that resonates the theoretical growth path that we have 
followed in the first section and would abandon the applied growth models that we have 
discussed in the second section of our investigation. This would also mean a deeper 
understanding of the knowledge sector that we have identified in our research. The new 
global growth path of all economies would have to be based on this dual knowledge 
sectors of micro knowledge and macro knowledge. While the development of various 
forms of micro knowledge is having a greater impact on the research intensive sector of 
growth strategies, it is of paramount importance that we turn our attention equally to the 
development and integration of macro knowledge variables into the growth models of our 
new times. Our attempt at identifying macro knowledge variables of freedom, democracy 
and human rights and their integration into a vision-solution growth model is a step 
towards this new direction. The intensity of the presence of freedom, practice of 
democracy and experience of human rights would enhance the economic growth and 
therefore permanent development. Our desire for further economic growth must be based 
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on a vision of a common future that would enhance the human development of all peoples 
in our planet. 
NOTES 
1. UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford, p. iii. 




cators of Economic Development Based on the 1994 UNDP 
&ep-ort 
The PeoPle 
Economy Population (000) 1993 Growth rate M p. a. ) Life expectancy at 
1985-93 birth (years) 1992 
Afghanistan 22,143 2.5 43 
Albania 3,421 1.8 73 
Algeria 26,882 2.6 67 
American Samoa 53 
Andorra 63 4.6 
Angola 10,020 3.0 46 
Antigua and Barbuda 67 0.7 
74 
Argentina 33,483 1.2 71 
Armenian/h 3,731 1.4 70 
Aruba 67 0.4 
Australia 17,707 1.5 77 
Austria 7,937 0.7 77 
Azerbaij an/h 7,435 1.4 
71 
Bahamas, The 266 1.8 72 
Bahrain 544 3.1 70 
Bangladesh 116,702 2.2 55 
Barbados 260 0.3 75 
Belarus/h 10,319 0.4 71 
Belgium 10,061 0.3 76 
Belize 205 2.6 69 
Benin 5,194 3.2 51 
Bermuda 62 1.3 
Bhutan 1,532 2.2 48 
Bolivia 7,064 2.3 59 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,383 0.1 
71 
Botswana 1,402 3.4 68 
Brazil 156,406 1.9 66 
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Brunei 281 3.2 74 
Bulgaria 8,459 -0.8 71 
Burkina Faso 9,830 2.8 48 
Burundi 5,974 2.9 48 
Cambodia 9,633 3.2 51 
Cameroon 12,611 3.0 56 
Canada 27,815 1.3 78 
Cape Verde 398 2.6 68 
Caymen Islands 30 
Central African Republic 3,249 2.7 47 
Chad 6,131 2.5 47 
Channel Islands 144 1.0 77 
Chile 13,813 1.6 72 
China 1,175,359 1.4 69 
Colombia 35,682 69 
Comoros 528 3.7 56 
Congo 2,508 3.3 51 
Costa Rica 3,267 2.7 76 
Cote Ovoire 13,358 3.8 56 
Croatia 4,788 0.4 73 
Cuba 10,896 1.0 76 
Cyprus 726 1.1 77 
Czech Republic 10,323 0.0 72 
Denmark 5,191 0.2 75 
Djibouti 572 4.9 49 
Dominica 72 -0.3 72 
Dominican Republic 7,447 1.9 68 
Ecuador 11,258 2.4 67 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 55,745 2.3 62 
El Salvador 5,479 1.8 66 
Equatorial Guinea 447 2.3 48 
Eritrea/i 
Estonia/h 1,546 0.1 70 
Ethiopia/i 53,297 3.0 49 
Faeroe islands 48 
Fiji 759 0.9 72 
Finland 5,072 0.4 75 
France 57,650 0.6 77 
359 
French Guiana 133 
French Polynesia 213 2.7 68 
Gabon 1,235 2.7 54 
Gambia, The 1,019 3.7 45 
Georgia/h 5,456 0.4 72 
Germany/i 80,769 0.6 76 
Ghana 16,261 3.2 56 
Gibraltar 32 
Greece 10,376 0.5 77 
Greenland 57 
Grenada 91 -0.1 71 
Guadeloupe 405 1.7 74 
Guam 142 2.0 72 
Guatemala 10,021 2.9 65 
Guinea 6,269 2.9 44 
Guinea-Bissau 1,043 2.1 39 
Guyana 812 0.3 65 
Haiti 9,839 1.9 55 
Honduras 5,581 3.0 66 
Hong Kong/k 5,865 0.9 78 
Hungary 10,280 -0.5 69 
Iceland 264 1.2 78 
India 900,543 2.1 61 
Indonesia 187,151 1.8 60 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 61,422 3.6 65 
Iraq 19,755 3.2 64 
Ireland 3,569 0.0 75 
Isle of Man 71 
Israel 5,281 2.9 76 
Italy 57,840 0.2 77 
Jamaica 2,415 0.8 74 
Japan 124,845 0.4 79 
Jordan/I 4,102 5.9 70 
Kazakhstan/h 17,169 1.0 68 
Kenya 25,376 3.0 59 
Kiribati 76 2.0 58 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 23,051 1.9 71 
Korea, Rep. 44,056 1.0 71 
360 
Kuwait 1,461 -2.9 75 
Kyrgyz Republic/h 4ý512 1.6 66 
Lao PDR 4,511 2.9 51 
Latvia/h 2,588 -0.1 69 
Lebanon 3,855 2.3 66 
Lesotho 1,899 2.6 60 
Liberia 2,373 0.9 53 
Libya 5,039 3.6 63 
Lithuania/h 3,747 0.7 71 
Luxembourg 397 1.0 76 
Macao 391 3.2 73 
Macedonia, FYR/m 2,191 1.0 72 
Madagascar 12,728 3.1 51 
Malawi 9,303 3.3 44 
Malaysia 19,032 2.4 71 
Maldives 236 3.3 62 
Mali 9,234 2.8 48 
Malta 362 0.7 76 
Marshall Islands 53 3.9 
Martinique 369 1.0 76 
Mauritania 2,137 2.7 48 
Mauritius 1,111 1.1 70 
Mayotte 98 
Mexico 86,712 1.8 70 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 110 2.4 63 
Moldova/h 4ý356 0.5 68 
Mongolia 2,372 2.8 64 
Morocco 26,721 2.4 63 
Mozambique 16,916 2.6 44 
Myanmar 44,704 2.2 60 
Namibia 1,565 3.0 59 
Nepal 20,390 2.6 54 
Netherlands 15,277 0.7 77 
Netherlands Antilles 196 0.9 77 
New Caledonia 177 2.0 70 
New Zealand 3,462 0.8 76 
Nicaragua 3,985 2.6 67 
Niger 8,440 3.2 46 
361 
Nigeria 104,893 2.9 52 
Northern Mariana Is. 53 
Norway 4,310 0.5 77 
Oman 1,719 3.9 70 
Pakistan 122,829 3.1 59 
Panama 2,563 2.0 73 
Papua New Guinea 4,148 2.3 56 
Paraguay 4,651 2.9 67 
Peru 22,801 2.1 65 
Philippines 65,77,5 2.3 65 
Poland 38,446 0.4 70 
Portugal 9,848 -0.6 74 
Puerto Rico 3,608 0.8 74 
Qatar 520 5.3 71 
Reunion 620 1.5 74 
Romania 22,761 0.0 70 
Russian Federation/h 148,537 0.4 69 
Rwanda 7,490 2.9 46 
San Marino 24 
St. Kitts and Nevis 41 -0.4 68 
St. Lucia 158 1.8 70 
St. Vincent 110 0.9 71 
Sao Tome and Principe 125 2.4 68 
Saudi Arabia 17Y392 4.4 69 
Senegal 8,054 3.0 49 
Seychelles 70 0.9 71 
Sierra Leone 4,468 2.6 43 
Singapore 2,867 1.9 75 
Slovak Republic 5,345 0.4 71 
Slovenia 1,993 0.6 73 
Solomon Islands 346 2.9 62 
Somalia 8,543 3.1 49 
South Africa 40,677 2.4 63 
Spain 39,125 0.2 77 
SriLanka 17,622 1.3 72 
Sudan 27,255 2.8 52 
Suriname 405 0.0 69 
Swaziland 888 3.8 57 
362 
k 
Sweden 8,712 0.6 78 
Switzerland 6,977 1.0 78 
Syrian Arab Republic 13,394 3.3 67 
TaJikistan/h 5,684 2.8 69 
Tanzania/n 26,743 3.0 51 
Thailand 58,824 1.6 69 
Togo 4,026 3.6 55 
Tonga 93 -0.3 68 
Trinidad and Tobago 1,282 1.3 71 
Tunisia 8,609 2.1 68 
Turkey 59,461 2.1 67 
Turkmenistan/h 3,949 2.5 66 
Uganda 18,026 3.2 43 
Ukraine/h 52,141 0.3 70 
United Arab Emirates 1,723 3.2 72 
United Kingdom 58,040 0.3 76 
United States 258,063 0.9 77 
Uruguay 3,147 0.6 72 
Uzbekistan/h 21,969 2.4 69 
Vanuatu 161 2.8 63 
Venezuela 20,780 2.5 70 
Viet Nam 70,881 2.4 67 
Virgin Islands (U. S. ) 99 -1.1 75 
West Bank and Gaza 1,769 3.8 67 
Western Samoa 163 0.5 65 
Yemen, Rep. 13,436 4.4 53 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 10,675 0.8 72 
Zaire 40,997 3.3 52 
Zambia 8,527 3.1 48 
Zimbabwe 10,638 3.1 60 
The Economy 
Economy GNP/a (millions of US$/a 1992 US$/a 1993 GNP pE 
US$) 1993 Real grc 
M198 
Af zhanistan c L7-- 
363 
I 
Albania 1,167 340 




Antigua and Barbuda 425 6,100 6,390 
Argentina 244,013 6,170 7,290 
Armenian/h 2y471 870 660 
Aruba 
Australia 309,967 17,730 17,510 
Austria 183,530 22,790 23,120 
Azerbaijan/h 5,424 880 730 
Bahamas, The 3,059 11,670 11,500 
Bahrain 4,283 7,940 7,870 
Bangladesh 25,882 220 220 
Barbados 1,620 6,210 6,240 
Belarus/h 29,290 3,210 2,840 
Belgium 213,435 21,360 21,210 
Belize 499 2,380 2,440 
Benin 2,189 410 420 
Bermuda f 
Bhutan 253 170 170 
Bolivia 5,472 750 770 
Bosnia and Herzegovina c 
Botswana 3,630 2,450 2,590 
Brazil 471,978 2,810 3,020 
Brunei f 
Bulgaria 9,773 1,410 1)160 
Burkina Faso 2,928 310 300 
Burundi 1,102 210 180 
Cambodia c 
Cameroon 9,663 830 770 
Canada 574,884 21,070 20,670 
Cape Verde 347 840 870 
Caymen Islands f 
Central African Republic 1,263 410 390 
Chad 1,249 220 200 
Channel Islands f 
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Chile 42,454 2,780 3,070 6.1 
China 581,109 480 490 6.5 
Colombia 50,119 1,350 1,400 2.3 
Comoros 272 530 520 -2.2 
Congo 2,318 1,110 920 -1.9 
Costa Rica 7,041 2,010 2,160 2.6 
Cote Ovoire 8,397 680 630 -5.2 
Croatia 9 
Cuba 9 
Cyprus 7,539 10,300 10,380 5.2 
Czech Republic 28,192 2,590 2,730 -2.0 
Denmark 137,610 26,310 26,510 1.1 
Djibouti 448 780 
Dominica 193 2,570 2,680 4.8 
Dominican Republic 8,039 1,070 1,080 0.3 
Ecuador 13,217 1,100 1' 170 0.8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 36,679 650 660 0.7 
El Salvador 7,233 1,200 1,320 1.2 
Equatorial Guinea 161 340 360 1.5 
Eritrea/i c 
Estonia/h 4,703 3,170 3,040 -5.2 
Ethiopia/i 110 100 -1.8 
Faeroe Islands f 
Fiji 1,626 2,050 2,140 2.5 
Finland 96,220 22,690 18,970 -0.3 
France 1,289,235 22,630 22,360 1.8 
French Guiana e 
French Polynesia f 
Gabon 5,004 4,220 4,050 -1.7 
Gambia, The 372 370 360 1.0 
Georgia/h 3,071 1,020 560 -16.4 
Germany/j 1,902,995 23,360 23,560 1.9 
Ghana 7,036 460 430 1.3 
Gibraltar e 
Greece 76,698 7,390 7,390 1.3 
Greenland f 





Guatemala 11,092 1,000 lPlIO 0.8 
Guinea 3,170 490 510 1.3 
Guinea-Bissau 233 220 220 1.6 
Guyana 285 320 350 0.6 
Haiti c -3.4 
Honduras 3,220 570 580 0.0 
Hong Kong/k 104,731 15,710 17,860 5.3 
Hungary 34,254 3,190 3,330 0.0 
Iceland 6,236 24,300 23,620 0.1 
India 262,810 310 290 3.0 
Indonesia 136,991 680 730 4.8 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2,230 -0.7 
Iraq 9 
Ireland 44,906 12,850 12,580 4.8 
Isle of Man 0 e 
Israel 72,662 13,460 13,760 2.3 
Italy 1,134,980 20,790 19,620 1.9 
Jamaica 3,362 1,390 1,390 3.1 
Japan 3,926,668 28,690 31,450 3.6 
Jordan/I 4,893 1,130 1P190 -5.9 
Kazakhstan/h 26,490 1,880 1,540 -4.6 
Kenya 6p743 330 270 0.3 
Kiribati 54 710 710 -1.3 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 9 
Korea, Rep. 338,062 7,220 1,670 8.1 
Kuwait 34,120 18,380 23,350 0.8 
Kyrgyz Republic/h 3,752 1,020 830 -2.1 
Lao PDR 1,295 260 290 2.1 
Latvia/h 5,257 2,610 2,030 -4.5 
Lebanon 9 
Lesotho 1,254 610 660 0.8 
Liberia c 
Libya e 
Lithuania/h 4,891 1,710 1,310 -6.4 
Luxembourg 14,233 35,800 35,850 2.7 
Macao e 
Macedonia, FYR/m 1,709 780 
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Madagascar 3,039 230 240 
Malawi 2,034 230 220 
Malaysia 60,061 2,830 3,160 
Maldives 194 700 820 
Mali 2,744 310 300 
Malta e 
Marshall Islands 9 
Martinique e 
Mauritania 1,087 540 510 
mauritius 3,309 2,800 2,980 
Mayotte e 
Mexico 324,951 3,510 3,750 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 9 
Moldova/h 5,160 1,450 1,180 
Mongolia 943 400 
Morocco 27,645 1,050 1,030 
Mozambique 1,375 70 80 
Myanmar C 
Namibia 2,594 1,670 lY660 
Nepal 3,174 170 160 
Netherlands 316,404 20,850 20,710 
Netherlands Antilles e 
New Caledonia e 
New Zealand 44,674 12,660 12,900 
Nicaragua 1,421 350 360 
Niger 2,313 290 270 
Nigeria 32,988 330 310 
Northern Mariana is. 9 
Norway 113,527 26,280 26,340 
Oman 9,631 6,380 5,600 
Pakistan 53,250 420 430 
Panama 6,621 2,470 2,580 
Papua New Guinea 4,637 990 1,120 
Paraguay 6,995 1,410 1,500 
Peru 34,030 1,350 1,490 
Philippines 54,609 790 830 
Poland 87,315 1,950 2,270 
Portugal 77,749 7,510 7,890 
367 
h 
Puerto Rico 25,817 6,700 7,020 1.8 
Qatar 7,871 15,760 15,140 -0.7 
Reunion e 
Romania 25,427 1,170 11120 -6.5 
Russian Federation/h 348,413 2,820 2,350 -5.0 
Rwanda 1,499 250 200 -3.5 
San Marino f 
St. Kitts and Nevis 185 4,120 4,470 5.2 
St. Lucia 480 2,900 3,040 4.3 
St. Vincent 233 2,040 2,130 4.6 
Sao Tome and Principe 41 370 330 -1.8 
Saudi Arabia 7,780 -0.9 
Senegal 5,867 780 730 -0.3 
Seychelles 444 5,750 6,370 4.0 
Sierra Leone 647 160 140 -0.6 
Singapore 55,372 16,970 19,310 6.1 
Slovak Republic 10,145 2,040 1,900 -2.6 
Slovenia 12,566 6,700 6,310 
Solomon Islands 261 720 750 2.5 
Somalia c -2.3 
South Africa 118,057 2,830 2,900 -1.5 
Spain 533,986 14,230 13,650 3.1 
Sri Lanka 10,658 560 600 2.6 
Sudan c -0.2 
Suriname 488 1,280 1,210 2.2 
Swaziland 933 1,080 1,050 3.8 
Sweden 216,294 27,500 24,830 0.1 
Switzerland 254,066 36,730 36,410 0.7 
Syrian Arab Republic 9 -2.1 
Tajikistan/h 2,686 600 470 -7.8 
Tanzania/n 2,521 100 100 1.4 
Thailand 120,235 1,840 2,040 8.4 
Togo 1,325 400 330 -3.4 
Tonga 150 1,510 1,610 1.5 
Trinidad and Tobago 4,776 3,990 3,730 -2.7 
Tunisia 15,332 1,760 1,780 2.2 
Turkey 126,330 2,030 2,120 3.0 
Turkmenistan/h 1,380 -1.6 
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Uganda 3,486 180 190 1.9 
Ukraine/h 99,677 2,360 1,910 -3.9 
United Arab Emirates 38,720 22,640 22,470 0.5 
United Kingdom 1,042,700 18,110 17,970 1.3 
United States 6,387,686 23,830 24,750 1.2 
Uruguay 12,314 3,470 3,910 3.0 
Uzbekistan/h 21,100 1,000 960 -1.6 
Vanuatu 198 1,230 1,230 0.2 
Venezuela 58,916 2,920 2,840 1.0 
Viet Nam 11,997 170 4.8 
Virgin Islands (U. S. ) f 
West Bank and Gaza 9 
Western Samoa 159 960 980 -0.1 
Yemen, Rep. c 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 9 - 
Zaire C -0.8 
Zambia 3,152 370 370 1.8 
Zimbabwe 5,756 580 540 -1.1 
GNP per capita, 1993 Number of GNP (US$000,000) Population GNP per 
economies 1993 (000,000) 1993 capita, (US$) 
1993 
LOW 59 1,165,000 3,094 380 
Lower-middle 69 1,635,000 1,099 1,490 
Upper-middle 42 2,153,000 498 4,320 
High 39 19,304,000 834 23,150 
World 209 24,257,000 5,525 4,390 
GNP per capita growth Number 
rate, 1985-93 economies 












of GNP (US$000,000) Population GNP per 
1993 (000,000) 1993 capita, (US$) 
1993 
1,862,000 995 1,870 
1,757,000 328 5,360 
12,803,000 1,048 12,220 
890,000 112 7,950 
6,711,000 2,853 2,350 
233,000 189 1,230 
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Share of investment in Number of GNP (US$000,000) Population 
GDP, 1985-93 economies 1993 (000,000) 1993 
Less than 15% 28 131,000 336 
15%-19% 48 11,566,000 1,149 
20%-24% 36 5,280,000 793 
25%-29% 26 1,559,000 1,293 
30% or more 28 5,429,000 1,785 
No data 43 291,000 167 
Population growth rate, Number of GNP (US$000,000) Population 
1985-93 economies 1993 (000,000) 1993 
More than 3% 37 518,000 437 
2.2%-3.0% 57 737,000 976 
1.5%-2.1% 26 1,962,000 1,571 
1.0%-1.4% 20 2,321,000 1,372 
Less than 1% 58 18,664,000 1,129 


















Life expectancy from Number of GNP (US$000,000) Population GNP per 
birth, 1992 economies 1993 (000,000) 1993 capita, (US$) 
1993 
Less than 55 37 142,000 495 290 
55-64 29 814,000 1,628 500 
65-69 41 2,269,000 2,050 1,110 
70-72 40 1,520,000 462 3,290 
72 or more 48 19,503,000 886 22,000 
No data 14 8,000 4 1,900 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994. 
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Appendix 1.2.1 
A Production Possibility Curve 






rMe Figure shows all the possible combinations of two goods which can be produced 
at any one time, given existing resources. If all resources are devoted to producing good 
X, then ON can be produced. If, however, all resources are used to produce good Y, 
then OM units can be produced. If a combination of X and Y is desired, then all possible 
combinations are shown by the line MN which is drawn convex to the origin. This line 
shows both factor combination and factor substitution. It shows how a country's 
factors of production can be combined in different ways in order to vary the pattern of 
output. It also shows how factors can be substituted for each other in order to produce 
less of one good and more of another. Foe example, suppose good Y represents 'tanks' 
and good X represents 'tractors'. The PPC can now be used to give some interesting 
insights into the 'peace dividend' resulting from the end of the cold war and the 
switching of war industries into peaceful uses. Producing half as many tanks will not 
necessarily double the amount of tractors. In the language of economics, we can say this 
is because the factors of production are not 'perfectly mobile', or that one factor is not a 
'perfect substitute' for another. In other words, tank factories, machines designed for 
tank production, and people trained to build tanks, cannot be instantly switched to 
tractor production: factories will need reorganizing, machines will need redesigning, 
modification or even rebuilding, and workers will need to be retrained. Thus the law of 
'diminishing returns' operates as factors are switched from one use to another, and the 
output of tractors rises less than proportionately to the falling output of tanks. 
The PPC represents a 'frontier' or 'boundary' in the sense that given the current 
availability of resources and technical knowledge, a country cannot produce on a point 
to the right of the PPC. The PPC is therefore a 'short-run' diagram: in the long run the 
productive capacity of a country can be increased, thus shifting the PPC to the right. It 
is often assumed that the natural tendency is for the PPC of any country to shift in this 
way, but there are circumstances when it could shift to the left--where a country is laid 
waste by warfare, disease or natural disasters, for instance. 
The PPC can also be used to examine the output of more than two goods. The vertical 
axis could, for instance, represent 'all capital goods' and the horizontal axis could 
represent 'all consumption goods'. The PPC then becomes a useful tool for exammmg 
the opportunity cost of investment; that is, the sacrifice necessary for a country's 
citizens to be willing to invest. A greater expenditure on capital goods involves the 
sacrifice of present consumption, and depends on people being willing to wait for 
consumption goods. The extent to which people are willing to make this sacrifice 
depends on what sociologists call 'deferred gratification patterns' or what economists 
call people's 'time preferences'. Do people prefer consumption immediately, or would 
they prefer consumption at a higher level tomorrow? Some bars of chocolate now, or 
more bars of chocolate in the future? If the promise of 'chocolate tomorrow' is 
convincing enough, then people might be willing to invest in chocolate-making 
machinery now in order to enjoy a higher rate of consumption later. It could be argued 
that this is what has enabled planned economies such as the former Soviet Union to 
industrialize so rapidly in the twentieth century. Power stations, railways, hospitals and 
nuclear weapons were built at the expense of chocolate bars, denim jeans, hamburgers 
and conditioning shampoo. It could further be argued that the recent move towards a 
market economy results partly from the strain of the central planners attempting to 
impose time preferences which were not always shared by the mass of the population. A 
movement from point A to point B on the PPC diagram would represent actual 
economic growth; a shift of the PPC to MIN, would represent potential growth, but 
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would not represent actual growth unless the combination goods being produced moved 
from B to C 
Source: Charles Smith, Economic Developmen4 Growth And We6(are, (1994), pp. 5-8) 
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Switzerland 6.5 21.330 15.403 77 99 0.966 
United States 243.8 18,530 17,615 76 % 0. %I 
Norway 4ý2 17.190 15,940 77 99 0.983 
United Arab Emirates 1.5 15,830 12,19 1 71 60 0,792 
Japan 122.1 15.760 0.135 78 909 0.9% 
Sweden 9A 15,550 13,790 77 99 0.997 
Canada 25.9 15,160 16.375 77 99 0.903 
Denmark 5.1 14,930 15,119 76 99 0.971 
Kuwait 1.9 14.610 13.843 73 70 0.839 
Finland 4.9 14.470 12,795 75 99 OW 
Gcrmany, ' Fed. Rep. 61.2 14.400 14.730 75 OW 
France 55-6 12,790 13, %[ 76 0.974 
Austria 7.6 11.980 12,386 74 0. %1 
Netherlands 14,7 11.960 12,661 77 0,984 
Belgium 9,9 11,480 13,140 75 99 0,966 
Australia 16.2 l('100 11,782 76 99 0.978 
United Kingdom 56.9 10,420 12,270 76 99 0.910 
Italy 57.4 10.350 10.682 76 97 0.966 
Hong Kong 5.6 8,070 13,906 76 as 0.936 
Singapore 2.6 7.940 12.790 73 86 0.8" 
New Zealand 3.3 7,750 10.541 75 99 0, %6 
1 srael 4.4 6,800 9,182 76 95 0.957 
Saudi Arabia 12.6 6,200 9.320 64 55 0.702 
Ireland 3.6 6.120 8.566 74 99 0. %l 
Spain 381 6,010 9.999 77 95 0.965 
Afiddle-income economies 
Oman 1.3 5,810 7,750 57 30 0-535 
Libya 4.1 5,460 7,250 62 66 0.719 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.2 4,210 3,664 71 96 0.885 
Greece 10.0 4.020 5,500 76 93 0149 
Venezuela 183 3,230 4.306 70 87 0.861 
Port ugal 10.2 2.830 5.597 74 85 0.899 
Gabon 1.1 2,700 2,068 52 62 0-525 
South Korea 42A 2,690 4,832 70 95 0,903 
Algeria 23.1 2,680 2.633 63 50 0.609 
Yugoslavia 23.4 2.480 5,000 72 92 0.913 
Argentina 31.1 2,390 4.647 71 96 0.910 
Panama 2.3 2.240 4. OD9 72 89 0.893 
Hungary 10.6 2,240 4,500 7( 99 0.915 
Uruguay 3.0 2.190 5,063 71 95 0.916 
Brazil 141.4 2.020 4.307 65 78 0,794 
Poland 37.7 1,930 4,000 72 98 0.910 
South Africa 33.1 1,890 4, " 1 61 70 0,731 
Mexico 81.9 1,830 4,624 69 90 0.976 
Malaysia 16.5 1,810 3.949 70 74 0-8W 
Syrian Arab Rep. 11.2 1.640 3.250 66 60 0.691 
Costa Rica 2.6 1.610 3,760 75 93 0.916 
Jordan 3.8 1ý560 3,161 67 75 0,752 
Mauritius 1.0 1.490 2.617 69 83 0.789 
Peru 201 1,470 3,129 63 85 0.753 
Chile 12.5 1.310 4.962 72 98 0.931 
Colombia 29.5 1.240 3.524 65 Be 0.901 
Turkey 52.6 1,210 3,781 65 74 0.751 
Tunisia 7.6 1,180 2,741 66 55 0.657 
Botswana 1.1 1,050 2,496 59 71 0.646 
Ecuador 9.9 1.040 2,687 66 83 0.758 
Paraguay 3.9 990 2.603 67 B8 0.794 
Cameroon 10.9 970 1.381 52 61 0.474 
Guatemala RA 950 1,957 63 55 0.59.1 
Jamaica 2.4 940 2,506 74 82 Oý824 
Congo, Peoplc*s Rep. 2.0 870 756 49 63 0.395 
El Salvador 4ý9 860 1,733 64 72 0.651 
Thailand 53.6 850 2,576 66 91 0.783 
Nicaragua 3.5 830 2,209 64 88 0.743 
Honduras 4.7 810 1,119 65 59 0.563 
Ivory Coast 11.1 740 1,123 53 42 0.393 
Dominican Rep, 6.7 730 1,750 67 78 0.699 
Papua New Guinea 3.7 700 1.843 55 45 0,471 
Egypt 50.1 680 1,357 62 45 0.501 
Morocco 23.3 610 1,761 62 34 0.489 
Yemen Arab Rep. 9-5 590 1.250 52 25 0.328 
Philippines 58.4 590 1,979 64 86 0,714 
Zimbabwe 9.0 580 1.184 59 74 0.576 
Bolivia 6.7 580 1.390 54 75 0.549 
Senegal 7.0 520 1,068 47 28 0.274 
Albania' 3.1 2,000 72 85 0.790 
Bulgaria* Wo 4.750 72 93 0.918 
Cuba' 10.3 2,500 74 96 0.877 
Czechoslovakia* 15.6 7.750 72 98 0931 
Iran 47.0 3.300 66 51 0.660 
Iraq 17.1 2,400 65 89 0ý759 
Lebanon 2.8 2.250 68 78 0.733 
Mongolia 2.0 2.000 64 90 0.737 
North Korea* 21.4 2,000 70 90 0.789 
Romania 22.9 3,000 -; 1 96 0.863 
USSR$ 283.1 6,000 70 99 0.920 
Low-income economies 
Liberia 2.3 450 %9 55 35 0.333 
Indonesia 171.4 450 1,660 57 74 0.591 
Mauritania 1.9 440 W 47 t7 0.206 
Yemen, PDR 2.3 4? 0 1 (M ltý Al A 140 
Sri Lanka 16.4 400 2,053 71 87 0.789 
Ghana 13.6 390 481 55 54 0.360 
Nigeria 106.6 370 668 51 43 0.322 
Lesotho 1.6 370 1,595 57 73 0,590 
Haiti 6.1 360 775 55 38 0.356 
Pakistan 102.5 350 1.585 59 30 0.423 
Sudan 23.1 330 750 51 23 0.255 
Kenya 22.1 330 794 59 60 0.481 
Central African Rep. 2.7 330 591 46 41 0.258 
Benin 4.3 310 665 47 27 0.224 
Sierra Leone 3.8 300 490 42 30 0.150 
Rwanda 6.4 300 571 49 47 0.304 
India 797-5 300 1,053 59 43 0.439 
Togo 3.2 290 670 54 41 0.337 
Somalia 5.7 290 1.000 46 12 0-20D 
China 1,068.5 290 2.124 70 69 0.716 
Uganda 15-7 260 511 52 50 0.354 
NiW 6.9 260 452 45 14 0.116 
Zambia 7.2 2SO 717 54 76 0.481 
Burundi 5.0 250 450 so 35 0.235 
Mali 7,8 210 543 45 17 0.143 
Madagascar 10.9 210 634 54 68 0.440 
Burkina Faso 8.3 190 500 49 14 0.150 
Tanzania 23.9 [so 405 54 75 0.413 
Mozambique 14.6 170 500 47 39 0.239 
Laos 3.8 170 1,000 49 94 0.306 
Nepal 17.6 160 722 52 26 0.273 
Malawi 7.9 160 476 48 42 0.250 
Bangladesh 106.1 160 883 52 33 0.319 
Zaire 32.6 ISO 220 53 62 0.294 
Chad 5.3 150 400 46 26 0.157 
Bhutan 1.3 150 700 49 25 0.236 
Ethiopia 44.8 130 454 42 66 0-282 
Afghanistan 15.2 1.000 42 24 0-212 
Angola' 9-2 1.000 45 41 0.304 
Burma 39.3 752 61 79 0.561 
Guinea 6.5 500 43 29 0.162 
Kampuchea, Dem. 7.7 1,000 49 75 0.471 
Namibia* 1.7 1.500 56 30 0.404 
Vietnam 65. D I 
ý000 
62 80 0.608 
Notes: PPP-adj ý converted into US$ by purchasing power parties rather than by official 
exchange rates. *= not listed in the World Bank source (for the non-markct economies 
GNP comparisons are especially difficult and my classification is approximatc)ý other 
entries with .. are 
listed but reliable GNP per capita data are unavailable (classification by 
group is by the World Bank); ', German data are for the pre-unification Federal Republic. 
Sources: col. I United Nations, Demiograp*ic Yearbook 1987, pp. 193_7ý Col. 2 World 
Bank, World Development Report 1989, pp. 164-5. cots 3-6 United Nations Develop- 
ment Programme. Human Development Report 1990. 
TABLE 5.3 
HDI ranking for developing countries 
GNP per GNP per 
GNP capita rank GNP capita rank 
HDI HDI per capita minus HDI HDI HDI per capita minus HDI 
value rank rank ranka value rank rank rank, 
Barbados 0.894 20 34 14 Morocco 0.549 ill 101 -10 
Hong Kong 0.875 24 22 -2 El Salvador 0.543 112 97 -15 
Cyprus 0.873 26 30 4 Bolivia 0.530 113 119 6 
Korea, Rep. of 0.859 32 36 4 Gabon 0.525 114 42 -72 
Uruguay 0.859 33 53 20 Honduras 0.524 115 123 8 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.855 35 46 11 Viet Nam 0.514 116 150 34 
Bahamas 0.854 36 26 -10 Swaziland 0.513 117 96 -21 
Argentina 0.853 37 43 6 Maldives 0.511 118 132 14 
Chile Oý848 38 66 28 Vanuatu 0.489 119 93 -26 
Costa Rica 0.848 39 75 36 Lesotho 0.476 120 124 4 
Singapore 0.836 43 21 -22 Zimbabwe 0.474 121 118 -3 
Brunei Darussalann 0.829 44 29 -15 Cape Verde 0.474 122 112 -10 
Venezuela 0.820 46 55 9 Congo 0.461 123 100 -23 
Panama 0.816 47 70 23 Cameroon 0.447 124 ill -13 
Colombia 0.813 50 91 41 Kenya 0.434 125 146 21 
Kuwait 0.809 51 28 -23 Solomon Islands 0.434 126 115 -11 
Mexico 0.804 52 51 -1 Namibia 0.425 127 84 -43 
Thailand 0.798 54 82 28 Sio Tom& and Principe 0,409 128 138 10 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.796 55 40 -15 Papua New Guinea 0.408 129 108 -21 
Qatar 0.795 56 20 -36 Myanmar 0.406 130 149 19 
Malaysia 0.794 57 61 4 Madagascar 0.396 131 162 31 
Bahrain 0.791 58 33 -25 Pakistan 0,393 132 140 8 
Fiji 0.787 59 74 15 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.385 133 157 24 
Mauritius 0.778 60 65 5 Ghana 0.382 134 133 -1 
United Arab Emirates 0.771 62 10 -52 India 0.382 135 147 12 
Brazil 0.756 63 52 -11 Me d'lvoire 0.370 136 117 -19 
Dominica 0.749 64 62 -2 Haiti 0.354 137 141 4 
Jamaica 0.749 65 87 22 Zambia 0.352 138 134 -4 
Saudi Arabia 0.742 67 31 -36 Nigeria 0.348 139 145 6 
Turkey 0.739 68 78 10 Zaire 0.341 140 160 20 
Saint Vincent 0.732 69 77 8 Comoros 0.331 141 131 -10 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.730 70 47 -23 Yemen 0.323 142 126 -16 
Syrian Arab Rep. 0,727 73 94 21 Senegal 0.322 143 114 -29 
Ecuador 0.718 74 102 28 Li beria 0317 144 130 -14 
Saint Lucia 0.709 77 57 -20 Togo 0.311 145 136 -9 
Grenada 0.707 78 67 -11 Bangladesh 0.309 146 159 13 
Libyan Ajab Jamahiiriya 0.703 79 41 -38 Cambodia 0.307 147 164 17 
Tunisia Oý690 81 85 4 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0.306 148 170 22 
Seychelles Oý685 83 39 -44 Nepal 0.289 149 166 17 
Paraguay 0.679 84 90 6 Equatorial Guinea 0.276 150 154 4 
Suriname 0.677 85 48 -37 Sudan 0.276 151 137 -14 
Iran, 151amic Rep. of 0.672 86 64 -22 Burundi 0.276 152 158 6 
Botswana 0.670 87 58 -29 Rwanda 0.274 153 152 -1 
Belize 0.666 88 69 -19 Uganda 0.272 154 168 14 
Cuba 0.666 89 110 21 Angola 0.271 155 120 -35 
Sri Lanka 0.665 90 128 38 Benin 0.261 156 142 -14 
Oman 0.654 92 38 -54 Malawi 0.260 157 156 -1 
South Africa 0.650 93 60 -33 Mauritania 0.254 158 127 -31 
China 0.644 94 143 49 Mozambique 0.252 159 173 14 
Peru 0.642 95 98 3 Central African Rep. 0.249 160 135 -25 
Dominican Rep. 0.638 96 107 11 Ethiopia 0.249 161 171 10 
Jordan 0.628 98 99 1 Bhutan 0.247 162 165 3 
Philippines 0.621 99 113 14 Djibouti 0.226 163 125 -38 
Iraq 0.614 100 59 -41 Guinea-Bissau 0.224 
164 167 3 
Korea, Dem. Rep. of 0.609 101 109 8 Somalia 0.217 165 172 7 
Mongolia 0.607 102 103 1 Gambia 0.215 166 144 -22 
Lebanon 0.600 103 83 -20 Mali 0.214 167 
155 -12 
Samoa 0.596 104 105 1 Chad 0.212 168 161 -7 
Indonesia 0.586 105 121 16 Niger 0.209 169 148 -21 
Nicaragua 0.583 106 139 33 Sierra Leone 0.209 170 163 -7 
Guyana 0.580 107 151 44 Afghanistan 0.208 171 169 -2 
Guatemala 0.564 108 106 -2 Burkina Faso 0.203 172 153 -19 
Algeria 0.553 109 72 -37 Guinea 0.191 173 129 -44 
Egypt 0.551 110 122 12 
a. A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the GNP per capita rank, a negative the opposite 
Top performers 
TOP ten Absolute Top ten Absolute Top ten Absolute Top ten Absolute 
performers increase in performers increase in performers increase in performers increase in 
1960-70 HDI value 1970-80 HDI value 1980-92 HDI value 1960-92 HDI value 
Japan 0.19 
Spain 0.184 
Hong Kong 0.176 




Botswana 0.256 Malaysia 0.463 
Singapore 0.163 Brazil 0.166 
Cyprus 0.154 Tunisia 0.159 
Greece 0.15 Algeria 0.153 
Barbados 0.146 Portugal 0.148 
Malaysia 0.141 Jordan 0.148 
Jamaica 0.132 Korea, Rep. 0.143 
Of 
Portugal 0.128 Hungary 0.133 
HDI values by region, 1960-92 
Thailand 0.247 




















Iran, Islamic 0.366 
Rep. of 
1960 1970 1980 1992 Absolute increase 
in HDI value 
1960-92 
All developing countries 0.26 0.347 0.428 0.541 0.281 
Least developed countries 0.165 0.209 0.251 0.307 0.142 
Industrial* 0.799 0.859 0.889 0.918 0.119 
World 0.392 0.46 0.519 0.605 0.213 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2 0.255 0.306 0.357 0.156 
Middle East and North Africa 0.277 0.363 0.480+ 0.631 0.354 
South Asia 0.202 0.248 0.29 0.376 0.174 
South Asia excl. India 0.188 0.231 0.27 0.358 0.17 
East Asia 0.255 0.379 0.484+ 0.653 0.397 
East Asia excl. China 0.416+ 0.547 0.686> 0.861 0.446 
South-East Asia and Oceania 0.284 0.373 0.469 0.613 0.329 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.467+ 0.568 0.682 0.757 0.29 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.504 0.586 0.654 0.735 0.231 
excl. Mexico and Brazil 
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TABLE 5,6 
Top perform ers in human development, 1960-92 
Top ten Absolute Top ten Absolute Top ten Absolute Top ten Absolute 
performers increase performers increase performers increase performers increase 
1960-70 in HDI value 1970-80 in HDI value 1980-92 in HDI value 1960-92 in HDI value 
Japan 0.190 Syrian Arab Rep. 0.239 Botswana 0.256 Malaysia 0463 
Spain 0.184 Malaysia 0.216 Thailand 0.247 Botswana 0463 
Hong Kong 0.176 Matta 0.187 Korea, Rep. of 0.193 Korea, Rep. of 0.462 
Singapore 0.163 Brazil 0.166 Tunisia 0.191 Tunisia 0.432 
Cyprus 0,154 Tunisia 0.159 Egypt 0.191 Thailand 0.424 
Greece 0.150 Algeria 0.153 Turkey 0.190 Syrian Arab Rep. 0.408 
Barbados 0.146 Portugal 0.148 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.175 Turkey 0,406 
Malaysia 0.141 Jordan 0.148 China 0.169 China 0.396 
Jamaica 0.132 Korea, Rep. of 0.143 Indonesia 0.168 Portugal 0-378 
Portugal 0.128 Hungary 0.133 Morocco 0,166 Iran, Islamic Rep, of 0.366 
Top ten performers in human development, 1960-92 
1992 
Human development index 1960 
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ANNEX TAM A5.2 
Sow industrial countries rank an human development indicators 
Real GDP GNP 
Population Mean News- per per 
Life per Maternal years of Overall Tertiary paper Televi- capita capita 
HDI expectancy doctor mortality schooling enrolment enrolment arculation sions (PPP$) (US$) 
1992 1992 1990 1988 1992 1991 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 
1 Canada 1 6 17 9 2 1 2 19 2 5 8 
2 Switzerland 2 2 25 6 7 10 21 6 19 2 1 
3 Japan 3 1 24 23 15 11 20 2 3 4 2 
4 Sweden 4 3 10 9 9 20 is 4 10 10 3 
5 Norway 5 9 20 2 3 7 5 1 14 11 4 
6 France 6 11 8 16 4 5 6 20 18 6 10 
7 Australia 7 10 16 5 5 17 11 16 8 14 15 
8 USA a 17 15 16 1 2 1 16 1 1 7 
9 Netherlands 9 6 13 18 12 17 10 13 7 13 13 
10 United Kingdom 10 13 27 14 6 15 19 a 13 is 16 
11 Germany 11 16 10 13 8 11 8 9 4 3 8 
12 Austria 12 15 2 14 10 25 12 11 9 8 11 
13 Wgium 13 14 4 2 11 9 7 14 11 9 12 
15 Denmark 14 20 12 2 13 7 13 10 5 7 6 
16 Finland 15 18 13 21 14 3 3 3 6 16 
5 
18 New Zealand 16 19 22 24 16 5 4 12 12 17 18 
19 Israel 17 12 8 6 17 11 14 is 23 18 
19 
21 Ireland 18 21 25 1 20 11 18 22 22 
20 20 
22 Italy 19 8 1 6 22 15 17 25 15 
12 14 

























27 Czechoslova a 
31 Hungary 23 27 7 25 18 25 26 18 17 
24 23 





48 Bulgaria 25 25 6 26 24 21 16 7 2 
49 Poland 26 26 18 21 21 17 24 24 21 
26 26 


















76 Albania 28 23 
Note- Twenty-eight indusiial countries have been given ranks that reflect their c omparative performance in the selected aspects of 
human cleveicipmeni illustrated in this 
i 
table. To make the rdnks co mparaMe across indicalom counims ha ve been ranýed only i(they have estimate s for all the in clirator5 
Co untries with equal perf n ormance 
an indicator are given the same rank. 
now aeveioping countries rank on human development indicators (continued) 
Real GDP GNP 
Daily Mean per per 
Life Access to Inf ant calorie Child Adult years of capita capita 
HDI expectancy safewater mortality supply malnutrition literaq sftoling Radios (PPPS) (US$) 
1992 1992 1988-91 1992 1988-90 1990 1992 1992 1990 1991 1991 
133 Lao People's Dem, Rep. 61 75 81 69 34 78 61 50 63 55 so 
134 Ghana 62 58 61 56 79 65 52 44 26 75 63 
135 India 63 52 67 64 43 96 71 56 74 68 72 
136 C6te Ovoire 64 70 40 65 22 29 60 66 57 58 48 
137 Haiti 65 57 78 62 70 60 61 69 86 76 69 
138 Zambia 66 90 70 59 82 64 40 52 74 72 59 
139 Nigeria 67 67 66 68 77 80 66 75 51 62 70 
140 Zaire 68 71 85 66 64 75 42 72 71 95 80 
142 Yernen 69 68 40 77 76 67 76 82 93 61 55 
143 Senegal 70 76 73 55 69 49 79 82 65 56 47 
144 Liberia 71 62 59 89 63 51 75 61 35 78 57 
145 Togo 72 63 51 60 61 46 72 73 43 82 62 
146 Bangladesh 73 66 77 78 71 97 82 64 as 67 80 
147 Cambodia 74 74 80 81 67 82 81 65 65 64 87 
148 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 75 73 64 73 80 59 61 63 93 91 95 
149 Nepal 76 65 75 71 46 95 92 62 93 69 88 
151 Sudan 77 72 74 71 88 77 91 87 30 66 63 
152 Burundi 78 77 52 76 86 70 66 89 82 89 83 
153 Rwanda 79 83 45 79 91 72 65 79 82 85 78 
154 Uganda 80 96 95 74 87 62 68 76 65 70 91 
155 Angola 81 89 84 88 92 79 74 74 82 73 91 
156 Benin 82 87 58 63 51 56 95 88 72 59 67 
157 Malawi 83 92 62 93 83 56 73 68 38 79 79 
158 Mauritania 94 80 40 82 37 40 85 89 57 74 56 
159 Mozambique 85 83 91 95 94 94 87 70 86 77 97 
160 Central African Rep. 86 81 96 75 93 73 78 78 78 88 66 
161 Ethiopia 87 85 89 84 96 88 69 77 48 97 93 
162 Bhutan 88 79 87 90 55 83 77 93 97 90 88 
164 Guinea-Bissau 89 94 79 92 65 54 80 89 88 81 88 
165 Somalia 90 85 49 94 90 86 93 93 88 so 95 
167 Mali 91 91 76 96 39 53 84 89 88 94 77 
168 Chad 92 82 97 84 97 71 88 93 34 96 83 
169 Niger 93 88 55 87 62 93 90 96 82 92 73 
170 Sierra Leone 94 97 67 94 84 63 96 82 38 71 93 
171 Afghanistan 95 94 93 97 95 89 89 82 65 84 93 
172 Burkina Faso 96 78 38 82 68 68 97 96 93 86 76 
173 Guinea 97 93 46 91 58 58 94 82 98 93 60 
Note. Ninety-seven developing countries have been given ranks that reflect their comparative performance in the selected aspects of human development illustrated in 
this table To make the ranks comparable across indicators, countries have been ranked only it they have estimates for all the indicators. CountriesvAh e"I perkwrv%ar&e 
in an indicator are given the same rank 
, T76 
Awmdi&ý 
The 1[juman Develol2ment Index and Some Other Indicators. 
Selected Countries, 1992 (Rank out of 160 countries) 
Rank mil ). / 160 A verage 
, ountriev annual Life 
I dull inflation expeclaric *v Illerac%, rate at birth 
GNP pc Rank on Rank on rate /9w 1980-W) 1990 
Country HDI (us S) HDI GNP PC HDI (;, *v P P( (I/r) lyears) 
Japan 0.981 25 430 1 1 1 3 9911 Ls 78,6 
UK 0.962 16 100 2 3 10 11 99.0 5's 7ý 7 
Germany 0.955 22 320 3 2 12 10 991) 2,7 75.2 
Rep. of Korea 0,871 5 400 -1 h 1-1 Q 1*3 5A 70.1 
Singapore 0,848 11 160 5 4 40 M. () 1.7 74.0 
Brazil 0,739 2 680 7 sq 54 XI ý1 
284 3 65.6 
Saudi Arabia 0.687 7 050 7 67 33 61-4 --t 2 64 5 
Thailand 0.685 1 420 9 ? )y 79 91.0 1.4 66 1 
Sn Lanka 0.651 470 9 11) 76 120 Sh, 4 11.1 70,9 
China 0.612 370 11) 11 74 1 U) 73 3 5.9 70.1 
Cameroon 0.313 960 11 9 119 89 54.1 56 51.7 
Tanzania 0268 tio 12 14 126 ISK ISSO -15 8 
514.0 
Uganda 0.192 220 13 13 131 141 48. A 107 0 52.0 
Sierra Lcone 0.062 240 14 12 119 1.45 20 7 %1 42.0 
SouRcF UNDP. Human Developmew Reporf. 1992 




1960 1970 1980 1992 1960-92 
All developing countries 0.260 0.347 0.428 0.541 0.281 
Least developed countries 0.165 0.209 0.251 0.307 0.142 
Inclustriala 0.799 0.859 0.889 0.918 0.119 
World 0.392 0.460 0.519 0.605 0.213 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0200 0.255 0306 0.357 0.156 
Middle East and North Africa 0.277 0.363 Oý480+ 0.631 0.354 
South Asia 0.202 0.248 0.290 0.376 0.174 
South Asia excl. India 0.188 0.231 0.270 0.358 0.170 
East Asia 0.255 0.379 0.484+ 0,653 0.397 
East Asia excl. China 0.416+ 0.547 0.686> 0.861 0.446 
South-East Asia and Oceania 0.284 0.373 0.469+ 0.613 0.329 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.467+ 0.568 Oý682 0.757 0.290 
excl. Mexico and Brazil 0.504 0.586 0.654 0.735 0.231 
+ Region moving from low to medium human development. 
> Region moving firom medium to high human development. 
a. Excluding Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
uistribution of countries by human development group, 1960-92 
1960 1970 1980 1992 
High human development 16 23 30 40 
Medium human development 22 26 28 32 
Low human development 76 65 56 42 
Total 114 114 114 114 
377 
Main HDI Rankings, 1993 
overall Top Ranked Countries Top Developing Countries 
1. Japan 1- Barbados 
2. Canada 2. Hong Kong 
3. Norway 3. Cyprus 
4. Switzerland 4. Uruguay 
5. Sweden 5. Trinidad and Tobago 
6. United States 6. Bahamas 
7. Australia 7. S-Korea 
7. France 8 Chile 
9. Netherlands 9. Costa Rica 
10. Britain 10. Singapore 
11. Iceland 11. Brunei 
12. Germany 12. Argentian 
13. Denmark 13. Venezuela 
14. Finland 14. Dominica 
15. Austria 15. Kuwait 
16. Belgium 16. Mexico 
17. New Zealand 17. Qatar 
18. Luxembourg 18. Mauritius 
19. Israel 19. Malaysia 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993. 
HDI ranking for 
HDI value HDI rank GNP per ca:. *ta GNP per capita rank 
rank minus HDI rank* 
Canada 0.932 1 11 10 
Switzerland 0.931 2 1 -1 
Japan 0.929 3 3 0 
Sweden 0.928 4 4 0 
Norway 0.928 5 5 0 
France 0.927 6 13 7 
Australia 0.926 7 18 11 
USA 0.925 8 9 1 
Netherlands 0.923 9 16 7 
United Kingdom 0.919 10 19 9 
Germany 0.918 11 12 1 
Austria 0.917 12 14 2 
Belgium 0.916 13 15 2 
Iceland 0.914 14 8 -6 
Denmark 0.912 15 7 -8 
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i 
Finland 0.911 16 6 -10 
Luxembourg 0.908 17 2 -15 
New Zealand 0.907 18 24 6 
Israel 0.9 19 25 6 
Ireland 0.892 21 27 6 
Italy 0.891 22 17 -5 
Spain 0.888 23 23 0 
Greece 0.874 25 35 10 
Czechoslavakia 0.872 27 56 29 
Hungary 0.863 31 55 24 
Malta 0.843 41 32 -9 
Portugal 0.838 42 38 -4 
Bulgaria 0.815 48 76 28 
Poland 0.815 49 79 30 
Romania 0.729 72 89 17 
Albania 0.714 76 86 10 
Successor states of 
Lithuania 0.868 28 63 35 
Estonia 0.867 29 43 14 
Latvia 0.865 30 47 17 
Russian Fed. 0.858 34 48 14 
Belarus 0.847 40 49 9 
Ukraine 0.823 45 68 23 
Armenia 0.801 53 73 20 
Kazakhstan 0.774 61 71 10 
Georgia 0.747 66 80 14 
Azerbaijan 0.73 71 92 21 
Moldova, Rep. of 0.714 75 81 6 
Turkmenistan 0.697 80 88 8 
Kyrgyzstan 0.689 82 95 13 
Uzbekistan 0.664 91 104 13 
Tajikistan 0.629 97 116 19 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994 
APPENDIX 11.8.1 
Models: The task is to generalize the experience of the socialist countries. Like so many 
other scientific works, it employs models for the purpose of generalization. IThe word 
69 model" must be understood here in a wider sense. Economists of today are inclined to 
reserve this technical term of the philosophy of science exclusively for models expressed 
in the language of mathematics. While a mathematical formalization is one possible way 
of creating a model, it is certainly not the only one, and it has both advantages and 
drawbacks. There is a trade-off between accuracy and rigor, on the one hand, and the 
wealth of the description of reality, on the other. 'Verbal' models ("ideal-types" or 
6t prototypes"), provides richer descriptions and analyses closer to real life, because it is 
able to build on the reader's association of ideas. It makes it simpler to make the 
frequent change between the various levels of abstraction and the various combinations 






aThe year of attaining power in armed uprisings has been defined either by the year the uprising began 
(e. g., Soviet Union, 1917) or the year of its victory (e. g., Yugoslavia, 1945; North Vietnam, 1954). In 
the case of the Eastern European systems formed in a peaceful way it has been defined by the year of the 
fusion of Communist and Social Democratic parties. 
b Countries are referred to by the names that reflect their geographical position, not by their official 
names. For instance, the country officially called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is referred 
to as North Korea; the Gen-nan Democratic Republic, as East Gen-nany; and so on. 
'Figure for 1987. 
d Rural population. 
'Certain countries (e. g., Burma, Cape Verde, Guinea, Madagascar, Sao Tome, and Seychells) are 
borderline cases and are not included in the table. It is difficult to say whether or not they could have 
been counted as socialist countries in 1987 according to the criterion applied by J. Kornai, in his 
research. 
APPENDIX 11.9.3. 
Extensive and Intensive Methods 
Let us now examine the relations between the production factors and output in the 
growth process. There is a vast amount of general theoretical writing on this field. 
Several important attempts have been made to clarify the extent to which methods of 
analysis devised for the capitalist system, primarily aggregate production functions and 
the growth models based upon them, can be applied to the socialist system. The greatest 
difficulty is caused by the lack of data, or the unreliability of them. 
Let us list the factor-output relationships under two main groups. The first group 
contains the effects caused by the growth of some factor. For instance, the stock of 
capital or the total labour expended on production grows, and that causes output to 
grow proportionally. The second group covers the effects caused by the growth of the 
productivity of some factor. For instance, more efficient use is made of capital or labour, 
and that causes output to grow. "This distinction and the accompanying terminology are 
quite widespread among Western writers, but writers in the socialist countries prefer to 
use another pair of expressions, distinguishing between 'extensive' and 'intensive' 
methods. The two pairs of expressions are synonymous: factor growth equals extensive 
methods, and factor-productivity growth corresponds to intensive methods. " In what 
follows, the "Eastern" terminology is usually adopted. Strict dividing lines between 
various extensive or intensive methods can only be drawn in the framework of abstract 
analysis. In practice, they normally appear together. 
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Source: JKornai (1992, pp. 6-7), based on the following sources: Columns 4-5: World Development 
Report (1988, pp. 221-23) and Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office, Budapest) 
(1989, pp. 9,14-15). Coloumn 6: R. Summers and A. Heston (1988, Tables 3 and 4). Coloumn 7: G. 
Balo and 1. Lipovecz, eds. (1987). 
Dominance of Extensive Methods The 
The dominance of extensive methods is explained primarily by the fact that the 
socialist system usually comes to power in backward, slow-growing countries that make 
poor use of their resources from the extensive point of view. Therefore, there are 
numerous opportunities for extending the utilization of them. 
1. Growth in the number of employed: The number of people employed quickly grows. 
The two phenomena combined, namely, a high investment ratio plus a constant, fast 
growth of employment, are the two main factors explaining the high growth rate under 
the classical system, especially in the first one or two decades. 
2. More shifts and lengthening of working hours: Although the volume of investment is 
huge, fixed capital is comparatively scarcer than manpower, which is abundantly 
available for a while. The lengthening of working hours can also be one of the factors 
that help to speed up the rate of growth. 3 After a time, the reserve of labour runs out. 
When this happens, it becomes the most important factor behind the deceleration of 
growth. (The formulation, that when the reserve of labour is exhausted, the "period of 
extensive growth" ends and the "intensive period" begins, is now considered as 
inaccurate. ) 
3. Growth in the area fan-ned: Hitherto uncultivated areas can be turned to farmland. 
This potential likewise runs out after a while. 
4. Wider exploitation of mineral wealth: extensive expansion in the use of mineral 
wealth; but the potential eventually runs out. 
The situation that results resembles war-time conditions under other systems. Even in 
peace-time, classical socialism has a 'mobilization economy'. A "war-consciousness" is 
instilled constantly by the official ideology: building the economy is a battle against 
backwardness and enemies without and within, from which no one and nothing can 
withdraw. The struggle demands mobilization of all able-bodied men and all material 
resources. 
The Discussion of Intensive Methods 
Let us now turn to the discussion of various intensive methods, with the advance 
comment that they appear in combination with each other in the practice of forced 
growth. 
1. Intensity of labour: Socialists before and after the revolution believe that workers 
freed from the rule of capitalism wiH work far more willingly, industriously, and 
intensively than the hired wage-earners of capitalism. There are signs of this, at least, in 
the revolutionary-transitional period of socialist rule. But in many people this initial 
enthusiasm gives way to apathy and an expectation that they will have to work only as 
much as they are paid for. At this point effective operation of the material and moral 
incentives designed to prompt the workers to more intensive work and discipline 
becomes the deciding factor. There are many serious problem with this. The system does 
not find sufficiently effective incentive schemes. 
2. Technical progress: Considerable technical progress takes place under the classical 
socialist system. Thorough examinations have shown that although technical 
development really takes place, its contribution to growth is rather modest. Even this 
moderate progress slows down in the later stages of the classical system. New 
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Vý, %, +, e), ohnologies and products introduced in the capitalist countries are taken over, imitated, 
usually after a long delay. 
I Development of manpower skills: Although part of technical progress in a sense, 
rnanpower development is worth considering as a separate point. It is typical under 
forced growth that production, primarily industry, absorbs large masses of unskilled, 
inexperienced labour. Although ultimately, in the longer term, skill increases, the 
qualitative development of manpower lags much behind the fast-growing demand for it 
in production. 
4. organizational improvement: the more organized and disciplined the production and 
product flow to users are, the less time is lost in this way. Under classical socialism, the 
standard of management and the internal organization of production are backward. So 
this is an intensive method that contributes little to production growth. 
5. Quantity at the expense of quality: The capitalist property forms and market co- 
ordination provide a strong incentive to improve quality. As Schumpeter's theory points 
out, entrepreneurs are in a winning position if they can capture the market with a new, 
better, and more modem product. The quality improvement is provided by internal 
incentives on a micro level, not by central measures. These inner motive forces are 
absent from the classical socialist system. Everyffiffig pushes an economic leader toward 
quantity in this quantity-quality trade-off. Both the plan and direct, bureaucratic control 
place the quantitative instructions at the fore: quantity is measured, where possible, in 
physical indices or aggregate, crudely weighted indices of volume with no capacity to 
reflect finer distinctions. Improvement of quality is customarily mentioned in official 
statements, but bureaucratic co-ordination is neither able nor very eager to enforce it. 
CerWnly, quantitative growth at quality's expense is among the intensive methods that 
contribute greatly to the high rate of growth that features in the official statistics. 
6. Overintensive use of service capacity: More residents are squeezed into a housing 
area, more patients into a hospital ward, and more students into a classroom than is 
desirable for a good standard of provision. The development of transportation and 
telecommunications is badly neglected, which means that the trains and roads are 
overcrowded, and there are too few telephone lines. As just one example to illustrate the 
overintensive use of capacity, the following table shows the load on the railroad systems 
of certain socialist and certain capitalist countries. The difference is remarkable. The 
overburdening of transportation and service capacities, coupled with the perpetuation or 
enhancement of congestion, allows the economic leadership to provide investments and 
other resources to the service sector as meagrely as possible and to allocate investment 
funds to sectors with a high priority. 
Table. 111.9.3. A 
Overloading of the Railroad Systems: Intemational Comparison, 1979 
Freight Traffic Densities 
(millions of ton-kms per km) 
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Source: J. Kornai (1992, p. 185), compiled by G. Kwon on the basis of United Nations (1981, tables 6, 
8B). 
Note: The index means the volume of freight carried per total length of railroad lines measured in km. 
The volume of freight is measured in units of I ton carried a distance of I km. 
To sum up, under conditioný 
complemented by intensive met 
general qualitative conclusion is 
Kornai. 1992, pp. 180-86). 
APPENDIX 11.9.4 
; of forced growth, extensive methods predominate, 
hods, which have sometimes han-nful effects. This 
supported by numerous econometric analyses. (In. I 
Icies. Fluctuations in Growth Phenomenon of C 
The following are the three kinds of fluctuation: 
1. "Calendar" pulsation. This is connected most directly with the annual plans. Since 
there is a strong material and moral incentive to fulfill the quantitative targets of the 
annual plan, the pace of work speeds up toward the end of the year. The following Table 
gives figures for the end-of-year spurt, when production is speeded up irrespective of 
cost, human exhaustion, and the decline of quality. At the start of the following year, 
performance suddenly dives again. 
Table III. 9.4. A 
End-of-Year Spurt: Intemational ComparisOn Table 
Country December Production as a Proportion 
(Years of Observation) of Average Monthly Production a in 
Following year (percent) 
384 
Capitalist countries 
Source: J Rosto wski and P. Auerbach (1986, pp. 297,301). 
Note: The data refer to manufacturing. 
'Average for months 1 -11 of the following year. 
2. Endogenous investment fluctuation: This is more pronounced in the smaller Eastern 
European countries, in China, and in Cuba in certain periods. The following Table and 
the Figure show a conspicuously high degree of fluctuation in investment. 
Table 11.9.4. B. 
Fluctuation of Total Investment in Fixed Assets in China 
Year Annual Rate of Change (percent) Year Annual Rate of Change (percent) 
1951 106.9 1969 62.9 
1952 85.7 1970 49.1 
1953 110.3 1971 13.4 
1954 12.1 1972 -1.1 
1955 2.5 1973 6.1 
1956 52.8 1974 5.7 
1957 -6.0 1975 17.6 
1958 84.5 1976 -3.9 
1959 
- - 
31.9 1977 4.6 
T 960 
- 
13.2 1978 22.0 
T961 
-62.5 1979 4.6 
1962 -44.1 1980 6.7 
1963 33.7 1981 -10. 
1964 42.2 1982 26.6 
1965 30.7 1983 12.6 
1966 17.5 1984 24.5 
385 
-- 
1967 -26.3 1985 41.8 
1968 -19.3 1986 12.2 
Source: J Komai (1992, p. 190), calculated on the basis of of the following sources: 1950-82: H. Chang 
(1984, p. 1287); 1983-86: Statistical Bureau, Peoples's Republic of China (1987, p. 60). 
386 
Ejore II. 9.4. A 
est in Poland: Fieur 
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The following Table offers an international comparison of variation coefficients that is 
used as a measure of fluctuation around the long-term average growth rate. 
TABLE 11.9.4. C 
Fluctuation of Investment: Intemational Comparison, 1960-89 
Coefficient of Variation of Annual 
Average Growth Rate of Investment (percent) 
Source: J. Komai (1992, p. 191), calculation by P. Mihalyi, based on data from the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, Common Data Bank. 
Note: The coefficient of variation is the ratio of standard deviation and the mean. Western figures are 
based on data expressed at constant 1985 prices and U. S. dollar exchange rates. Eastern data are 
calculated at constant prices of various years. 
'Mere are successive stages of sudden braking, slowdown and stagnation, cautious 
revival, and unbridled expansion, after which the braking and a similar succession of 
phases return. Then the cycle recommences, repeating itself constantly. At first sight, 
there are marked similarities between the cyclical fluctuations of the capitalist and 
socialist systems, but more careful examination reveals profound differences. In 
capitalist economies the slowdown and contraction is usually connected with the 
inadequacy of demand. Production has expanded too fast for the present and the 
predicted future demand. Business prospects become uncertain. The economic decision 
makers, when they realize this, suddenly slow down. This braking is a decentralized 
Process; no one "above" gives an order. The panic spreads horizontally, on the market. 
In socialist economies, however, the process is centralized. The brake is applied by 
central control, and the instruction to decelerate passes vertically down the levels of the 
hierarchy. Inadequate demand is not among the factors that provoke it. On the contrary, 
the leaders deciding to apply the brake sense an inadequacy of resources available to the 
accelerated process of growth. 71lie entire cycle takes place amid conditions of rush, 
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expansion drives investment hunger, investment tension, and chronic shortage. These 
mark the conduct of decision makers at all levels in the bureaucracy. They would like to 
invest as much and as fast as possible; meanwhile, they meet constraints at the peak of 
the cycle that rule out further acceleration. One might put it like this: the top leaders 
receive signals notifying them of the obstacles to further acceleration. 
Three groups of signals can be identified. "First, imports and indebtedness cannot 
increase limitlessly. In many cases, particularly in the smaller countries of Eastern 
Europe, they have proved to be effective limits to further acceleration. Second, the 
investment tension becomes intolerable. Economic and technical leaders, feel that ever 
more common interruptions, delivery problems, and delays are unbearable. Third, the 
expansion of investment cuts deeply into personal consumption, exceeding the public's 
tolerance limits. Discontent grows, becoming audible, and endangers the power of the 
ruling elite. ýý 12 Then the panic is strongest and the braking most drastic. 
3. Changes in political line: A change in the political power relations or the stance taken 
by the leader can lead to sudden, dramatic turns even during the same person's period in 
power. Examples include the transition from War Communism to the NEP under Lenin, 
from slow development of co-operatives to swift and aggressive collectivization under 
Stalin, from the liberal policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom" to the "Great Leap 
Forward" under Mao. In other cases the sharp change comes when an old leader dies 
and his successor takes a new policy course. Whatever the case, these sudden changes 
of line have far-reaching effects on the economy, producing great swings in a whole 
range of indices. 
The various kinds of fluctuation just described are not mutually exclusive. One thing 
can certainly be said: socialist planning has belied the hope that it would produce smooth 
growth free of the fluctuations, standstills, and setbacks of capitalism. Although the 
fluctuations under socialism are induced by different mechanisms and have different 
consequences than those under capitalism, wave motions exist and cause damage of a 
great many kinds. (In J. Kornai, 1992, pp. 186-193). 
APPENDIX 11.14.5 
Measurement of Agygrggate Quiput 
The official statistics of the socialist countries contain numerous distortions. These are 
not merely caused by inaccuracies of measurement; they are tendentious in seeking to 
present a more favourable result than the true one. The concern here is primarily with 
the main factors distorting the aggregate indices of output measured by value. The 
difficulties are surveyed in the following Table, which gives the calculations for the total 
output of several socialist countries. 
Table 111.14.5. A 
Official and Altemative Estimates of Growth 
International Comparison 
1961-70 1971-80 1981-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria 
NMP (official) 7.7 7.0 3.7 5.3 4.7 2.4 -2.0 
[_GDP I -1 6.8 3.4 4.2 6.0 2.6 -1.9 
389 
(extended 
official) 5.8 2.8 0.8 4.9 -0.9 2.0 GNP 
(alternative) 
China 
NMP (official) 4.0 5.8 10.0 7.7 10.2 11.1 3.5 
GDP (official) - 5.5 10.1 8.3 11.0 10.9 3.6 
GNP - 5.8 9.2 7.8 9.4 11.2 - (alternative) 
Czechoslovaki 
a 
NMP (official) 4.4 4.7 1.8 1.8 2.7 2.6 1.2 
GDP 4.7 1.7 3.2 2.7 2.2 1.2 
(extended 




NMP (official) 4.3 4.8 4.5 4.3 3.6 2.8 2.0 
GDP 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.3 3.1 2.3 
(extended 




NMP (official) 5.4 4.6 1.2 0.9 4.1 -0.5 -1.6 
GDP (official) 5.3 4.7 1.8 1.5 4.1 -0.1 0.2 
GNP 3.4 2.6 0.7 2.2 1.1 1.1 - 
(alternative) 
Poland 
NMP (official) 8.4 5.4 -0.8 5.2 2.0 4.8 0.1 
GDP 5.3 0.1 4.2 2.0 4.1 -1.0 
(extended 




NMP (official) 8.4 9.4 3 . 0a 3 . 0a 0.7 
a 
-2.0' -7.9' 
GDP 9.1 3.2 2.3 0.9 -0.5 -5.8 
(extended 




NMP (official) 6.9 5.0 3.2 2.3 1.6 4.4 2.4 
GNP (official) 7.6 b 5.5 3.7 3.3 2.9 5.5 3.0 
GNP 4.9 2.6 1.9 4.0 1.3 1.5 - 
(alternative) 
I I I I I I I 
Source: J Konwi (1992, pp. 194-195), compiled by J. Arvay, based on P. Marer et al. (199 1). 
Note: Official data originate from the statistical yearbooks of the given country or from reports 
submitted by national authorities to the World Bank. Extended Official estimates were made by 
consultants to the World Bank, taking into account the level and growth rate of official NMP and the 
relation between NMP and GDP in periods where such data were available for a given country or the 
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ratio in other countries. Therefore, any distortions embedded in official growth rates are included in the 
extended GDP growth rates, too. Alternative estimates are from Central Intelligence Agency (1989). 
These estimates in most cases use officially published physical quantity indicators that are then 
weighted by factor costs or ad usted factor costs of the products. The CIA volume is based on several i 
sources, including the data of T. Alton and his associates in the Research Project on National Income in 
East Central Europe. 
11 in Romania the national accounts data for 1980-89 are the considerably revived figures published in 
1990. 
b 1966-70. 
Row 1 contains the official statistics, and the other rows alternative estimates. It is enough to point 
out one common characteristic: all the alternative estimates show a lower rate of growth than the 
official figures. Numerous quantitative examinations will have to be re-examined in light of the new, 
more accurate data. (In J. Kornai, 1992, pp. 193-197). 
Aggendix 111.15.1 
NATO Sumynit (London. 5-6 July 1990) 
'NATO declares formal end to the Cold War. ' Main NATO decisions are the following. 
Peace declaration: 'fhe Warsaw Pact states are invited to sign a joint declaration with 
NATO committing them to non-aggression. 
Gorbachev invitation: President Gorbachev and other East European leaders are invited 
to address the North Atlantic Council. 
Conventional forces: CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) negotiations to be 
intensified. When the treaty is signed, NATO will give a commitment on troop levels in 
united Gen-nany and seek a new agreement on further cuts. 
Nuclear strategy: NATO to make nuclear arms 'weapons of last resort' - moving away 
from the 'flexible response' doctrine. NATO to withdraw all US nuclear shells from 
Europe if the USSR reciprocates. 
Stronger CSCE: New CSCE institutions are to include: a secretariat, a body to monitor 
elections, a conflict prevention centre and an Assembly of Europe. (From The Times, 7 
July 1990). 
Appendix 111.15.2 
The Warsaw Pact. 1935 
(Signatory States: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
USSR) 
Key Statements including the following: The Contracting Parties, 
Reaffirming their desire to create a system of collective security in Europe based on the 
participation of all European states, irrespective of their social and political structure, 
whereby the said States may be enabled to combine their efforts in the interests of 
ensuring peace in Europe; 
Taking into consideration, at the same time, the situation that has come about in Europe 
as a result of the ratification of the Paris Agreements, which provide for the constitution 
of a new military group in the form of a 'West European Union', with the participation 
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of a remilitarized West Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, thereby 
increasing the danger of a new war and creating a threat to the national security of 
peace-loving States: 
Being convinced that in these circumstances the peace-loving States of Europe must 
take the necessary steps to safeguard their security and to promote the maintenance of 
peace in Europe; 
Being guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; In the 
interests of the further strengthening and development of friendship, co-operation and 
mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and 
sovereignty of States and of non-intervention in their domestic affairs; 11 various 
Articles have been drawn ... In the event of the establishment of a system of collective 
security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty 
concerning collective security, a goal which the Contracting Parties shall steadfastly 
strive to achieve, the present Treaty shall cease to have effect as from the date on which 
the General European Treaty comes into force. 
(Source: The Times Guide to Eastern Europe, pp. 265-266). 
Appendix 111.15.3 
The Helsinki Conference on Securill and Co-operation in Europe WSCE). 1973- 
75 
This conference was originally proposed by Soviets. No general peace conference had 
ever taken place following World War 11, and the Soviet Union saw such an assembly as 
a means to consolidate, or 'legitimize', the favourable strategic position it had attained 
in Europe as a result of the war. The advent of detente, coming on the heels of Brandt's 
Ostpolitik, made the atmosphere favourable to such talks. Preliminary negotiations 
began in 1972. Eventually on 3 July 1973 the representatives of 35 nations (all the 
European states - except Albania - with the USA and Canada) sat down for talks in the 
Finnish capital. Far from being a speedy 'summit' though, the talks dragged on and on. 
The Final Helsinki Document was not signed until 1 August 1975. 
While the Soviet Union wanted the Conference to concentrate on security matters, and 
was prepared for some general statements on economic and cultural co-operation, the 
West wanted a broader overall programme for the improvement of pan-European 
relations. Western nations felt that for real detente to be achieved, the rights of 
individuals would have to be secured. This meant: 
1. A minimum consensus on the development of human rights. 
2. Liberalization as regards exchanges of people and ideas. 
The Soviet side was hostile to the thrust of Western. moves. The Western. emphasis upon 
the freedom of the individual in relation to the state contrasted with the notion that had 
developed in state socialist societies that such freedoms as the individual possessed were 
inextricably linked - and even conditional upon the individual's duties and obligations to 
state and community. Eventually, however, Soviet resistance to discussion on human 
rights was overcome by Western persistence. There was agreement to consider 
humanitarian and cultural questions on the conference agenda as a separate item. The 
Swiss delegation had proposed the idea of dividing the agenda into three 'baskets': the 
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first dealing with questions relating to Security in Europe; the second dealing with co- 
operation in the field of economis, of science and technology and of the environment; 
and the third dealing with human rights (co-operation in humanitarian and other fields). 
The Soviets were forced to recognize that the security and stability they so earnestly 
desired could not be guaranteed by weapons on inter-governmental treaties alone. It was 
dependent also upon their willingness to take the aspirations of individual citizens into 
account. Further the Western nations made clear that they were not prepared to talk 
about peace and security without reference to human rights. -The Soviet Union adopted 
the principles of the Final Act (Helsinki Accord) into its 1976 Constitution, thereby 
strengthening their universal validity regarding standards of international conduct. 
Fimlly, it should be emphasized that the Final Act establihed a basis for continuing 
dialogue on the matters dealt with. It initiated a process for seeking information and 
exchanging views on the issues raised by the conference, as well as monitoring 
compliance. Subsequently, Helsinki 'follow-up' conferences [such as those at Belgrade 
(1977), Madrid (1979), Stockholm (1984-5), and Vienna (1986)] were held to review 
the working of the agreement. 
[Sources: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, HMSO 
Cmnd. 6198; V. Mastny, Helsinki Human Rights and European Security: Anaýysis and 
Documentation, Duke University Press, Durham, 1986; T. Buergethal (ed), Human 
Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord, Al-lanheld, Osman, New Jersey, 
1977; in 'The Times Guide to Eastern Europe, London, 1990.1 
CSCE Paris Summit (19 November 1990) 
A joint declaration was issued by the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
The signatories stated: 
That they no longer regarded themselves as adversaries and would seek ffiendly 
relations with each other. 
That, mindful of the obligations under the UN Charter and their commitment to the 
Helsinki Final Act, they would refrain the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
the political independence of any state. 
That the security of each state was linked to the security of all participating in the 
Conference. 
That each state had the right to be a party to a treaty of alliance. 
That they approved the intensification of political and military contacts to promote 
understanding and confidence. 
That they were determined to agree to disarmament agreements and welcomed the new 
negotiations between the US and the USSR and the reduction of short-range nuclear 
forces. 
That they would work with other CSCE states to enable the body to make an even 
greater contribution to security and stability in Europe. 
[Source: Adapted from The Independent, 20 November 1990, in The Times Guide to 
Eastern Europe. ] 
ADDendix 111.15.4 
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The Pentagonale Initiative: Poficl Document (Venice. Aygust 1990) 
Reasons for the establishment of the Pentagonale Initiative. 
The Pentagonale Initiative is a new form of co-operation for promoting joint efforts9 
taking into consideration the emergence of a new era in Europe. It is a follow-up to the 
former quadrilateral co-operation established in Budapest on 10 and 11 November 1989 
between Italyq Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. It assumed the pentagonal form in 
Vienna on 20 May with the accession of Czechoslovakia. The co-operation takes into 
account the following: 
The established tradition of co-operation between the five countries and their mutual 
bilateral co-operation. 
The major changes which have occured in East-West relations. 
The revolutionary changes that took place recently in the Central and East European 
countries. 
The Pentagonale Initiative is a contribution towards creating security and stability for 
the change-over from the old to new order, particularly by pursuing various 
objectives ... The Pentagonale Initiative is a component of a much broader European 
architecture. In this context, the five participating countries recognize the essential role 
of CSCE in setting up a lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation in 
Europe and they attach special importance to the activity of the European Community 
and other European organizations. The Pentagonale Initiative therefore represents a 
level of co-operation which will be helpful in bringing those member countries not yet 
participating in - or candidates to - the EC, closer to the European Community ... The 
Pentagonale Initiative has no rigid institutional structures, and is designed to be flexible 
and pragmatic. 'Me various projects can be carried out by all or by some of the 
participants ... The Pentagonale Initiative also 
foresees a regular exchange of views 
between the five member states on matters of a political nature and of common interest. 
Wherever possible, joint initiatives will be carried out within the latitude permitted by 
the international obligations of each member state in this respect. 
(Source: The Times Guide to Eastern Europe, London, 1990, pp. 275-276. ) 
Appendix 111.16.1 
NElestones in Economic PoligX and Performance during the Gorbachev Era. 
9 March 1985: Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary, makes economic 
revitalization a top priority 
Gorbachev outlines initial strategy: short-run reliance on human factor to improve 
productivity and weed out incompetents; in longer term, counts on organizational 
changes and modernization of industrial base. 
Gorabachev presses antialcohol. campaign, cleans house in Council of Ministers and 
Central Committee economic departments. 
November 1985: Draft guidelines for 1986-90 plan feature acceleration in industrial 
and agricultural growth, give special prominence to machinery sector as prime 
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mover in modernization campaign; plan depends on unrealistic assumptions about 
conservation and productivity. 
February 1986: At Communist Party congress, Gorbachev proclaims "reasonable 
sufficiency" guideline for defense programs. 
Leadership reorganizes foreign trade apparatus, establishes guidelines for setting up 
joint ventures between Soviet enterprises and foreign partners. 
Leaders criticize failure to improve quality of output, set up system of state quality 
inspection. 
Glasnost and democratization in economy encounter government and party 
resistance. 
Investment surges while per capita consumption stagnates. 
State budget deficit begins to climb. 
June 1987: Supreme Soviet and Central Committee approve, guidelines for "new 
economic mechanism" to include enterprise self-financing, narrower scope of state 
plans, price and wage revisions, greater freedom to engage in international trade. 
October 1987: Ryzhkov sets out program for expanding defense industry 
involvement in civil production 
" Plan reflects new emphasis on consumer. 
" New quality control program disrupts industry. 
" Investment program falls far behind beacuse of confusion in construction and 
machinery shortages. 
" State budget deficit continues to climb. 
" January 1988: Broad implementation of reforms approved in 1987 begins. 
" Fall 1988: Gorbachev raises 1989 targets for production of consumer goods, 
announces cuts in defense outlays and state investment, takes defense sector with 
greatly increased support for civilian economy, stretches out reform process. 
" State budget deficit continues to climb. 
" January 1989: Implementation of 1987 reforms expands to entire economy, 
contributes to disruption of traditional supply relationships. 
October 1989: Abalkin reform program calls for gradual transition from state to 
other forms of ownership, development of market-oriented financial system. 
December 1989: Supreme Soviet approves Ryzhkov reform and stabilization 
program - watering down of Abalkin program. 
Economy sputters as production of energy and basic materials falls; transportation 
and distribution problems, exacerbated by strikes and ethnic tensions, interfere with 
supplies. 
Investment program stalls as unfinished construction rises. 
* Spending on defense declines, led by cuts in weapons procurement. 
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Open and repressed inflation evident; shortages intensify, leading to rationing in 
many localities. 
International financial position deteriorates as U. S. S. R. borrows to pay for increased 
imports of consumer goods and industrial equipment 
August 1990: Shatlin reform program calls for market determination of output and 
prices, increase in republic authority over economic policy and reforms. 
October 1990: Gorbachev reform program is adopted, providing for gradual 
elimination of state controls over output and prices, sale or transfer of property to 
owners other than state, eventual convertibility of ruble to hard currency. 
" Central and republic governments at logger-heads over wide range of economic 
issues, including reforms. 
" Regional autarky disrupts economic ties. 
" Soviet economy passes from stagnation to decline. 
" investment and defense spending continue to fall. 
" Inflation accelerates, shoppers sweep stroe shelves clean, shortages of energy and 
industrial materials worsen, barter proliferates. 
Source: The Former Soviet Union in Transition, pp. 31-33. ] 
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Source: Alan Gelb and Cheryl Gray, "The Transformation of Economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Issues, Progress and Prospects, 11 World Bank Policy Research Paper, no. 17, Washington, D. 
C., 1991; See also Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, "The Pý-ocess of Socialist Economic 
Transformation, " Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 4,199 1, pp. 10 1- 104. 
ADDendLx 111.18.1 
Russian Reforms since 1992 
The following report of The Times April 13,1995 shows further the effects of 
deepening reforms: Three times since 1992, Russia has obtained loans from the 
international Monetary Fund to support macro-economic reforms and to stabilize the 
rouble. Each time the Russian Government has failed to live up to its solemn promises of 
monetary discipline, reduced budgetary deficits and economic liberalization. This week 
the IMF board approved a further $6.8 billion standby loan to see Russia through the 
1995 budget year. In terms of the Russian economy, even $6.8 billion is small, sufficient 
to cover only about a third of its projected budget deficit (and about equal to the 
military bill for the Chechenia operation). Economists argue with reason that Russia 
could finance the entire budget itself, if it liberalised its oil and gas industries and taxed 
them at close to world levels: Gazpron, the gas monopoly is scandalously protected on 
both counts. Russia still pays vast subsidies - accounting half this year's planned 
spending - to state-owned industrial, mining and agricultural monopolies; and far too 
little of that money goes into overhauling them. Privatization of Russia's collective 
farms is almost completely stalled and uneconomic mines stay mi production without 
paying their miners. But the need for such reforms is precisely what justifies the IMF's 
decision. The loan, and the monitoring that accompanies it will give Russia's small band 
of genuine reformers much-needed leverage. Mr. Yeltsin; s eagerness to close the IMF 
deal has already yielded some results. Under a law passed in January, it is illegal for the 
government to finance the deficit by printing money. The same month the Central Bank, 
put under much firmer management following last October's rouble crisis, actually cut 
the money supply. Under a new decree, any overshooting of spending targets must be 
approved by President, Government and Parliament. That will fend off demands for 
additional state subsidies. Provided Russian targets mean something this time, the worst 
could just be over. Russia's economy may at last have stopped declining, and the 
country could even move into modest growth by late summer. Falling inflation and rising 
tax revenues would make it politically easier for the government to live up to its 
promises of further structural reforms. That would release up to $2 billion more in 
World Bank finance, and coax back some of the $24 billion officially estimated to be 
salted away in Western. accounts by Russian investors and enterprises. The first $1 
billion will be paid to Russia this month, followed by $500 million on a monthly basis. 
Nfichel Camdessus, the IMF's managing director, praised Russia's "bold and ambitious" 
economic reform programme, and said he believed the Russian economy may begin to 
grow again this year, after four years of steep decline. 
Three strokes of economic bad news in Russia: The rouble slipped below 5,000 to the 
dollar for the first time, the Finance Minister admitted that revenues are $1.4 billion 
short for the first quarter of this year, and thousands of Russian miners and workers in 
Siberia and the Far East staged a one-day strike to demand the release of government 




Under the Communist system, foreign trade was actually controlled by state-owned, 
sectoral. foreign trade organizations (FTOs) which arranged trade, including negotiating 
terms, pricing and the handling of foreign currency, for deals predetermined by the plan. 
Local money in centrally planned economies (CPEs) was not even 'goods convertible' in 
the internal economy. This system had to change with the demise of socialist economic 
system and during the period of the systemic change, the administrative barriers to trade 
fell. As transitional economies (TEs) wish to integrate themselves as quickly and as fully 
as possible into the global economy, special attention must be paid to the external 
economy. Openness to the world economy helps to provide a system of relative prices 
and much needed competition for domestic producers. Thus the movement towards 
convertibility is one of the high priority issues in the early transition process. However, it 
is not possible, and not even desirable to move directly to full convertibility in TEs. A 
process of convergence between domestic and global prices must first take place, and 
this is bound to be gradual. 
Internal or domestic convertibility is a term which has been used during the first years 
of transition to explain the first stage of TEs' external economic reform. It simply means 
that duly registered resident economic agents can obtain foreign exchange (convertible 
currency = CC) at the prevailing exchange rate of merchandise and related transactions 
by using local money (LM). In turn, all agents without exception must surrender all CC 
earnings to the proper authorities - in practice to the local banking system - at the 
prevailing exchange rate. This rate may be fixed or floating, but the point is that virtually 
the entire supply of CC is available for transaction purposes at a rate determined by the 
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Source: Tauno Tiusanen - Richard Berry, "The Eastern Market., The Investment Climate in 
Transitional Economies, " Rastor-Julkaisut, Helsinki, 1995, pp. 3-6 
EX ppend* 111.18.3 
Table 111.18.3. A 
00 Latvian National Budget for 1991 
(Thousands of Rubles) 
Budget Item National Budget Percent of National Budget 
Income 
Corporate Income tax 411,608 14.19 
Turnover tax 1,111,456 38.31 
Excise tax 715,500 2,4.67 
Personal Income tax 241,081 8.31 
Land tax 22,265 0.77 
Property tax 66,682 2.30 
Road tax 211,000 7.27 
Fines for late payment of taxes 52,083 1.80 
Fees for using natural and labour resources 16,300 0.56 





Grants and Subsidies to local budgets 517,563 17.84 
Expenditures 
State capital investment 379,130 11.70 
Financing national economy 754,744 23.29 
Social cultural measures 684,018 21.11 
Science 72,430 2.24 
Financing state bureaucracy 223,794 6.91 
Other expenditures 1,126,319 34.76 
Total 
LLL I 3,240,435 I 
100.00 
Proble of Fiscal Policy Reform Du ng e Tran ition: A Baltic Ce Source: John E. Tedstrom: ", M ri Th s as 
Study" p. 232; Documentation from Finance Ministries of the three Baltic states and interviews with 
respective Balt officials. 
0 ADDendix 111.18.3 
Table 111.18.3. B 
ithuanian Budget for 1991 
(Thousands of Rubles) 
401 
Budget Itern State Percent of 
State budget 
Local % Local 
budgets 






605,000 10.70 255,000 17.18 860,000 12.05 
Excise 
(turnover) 
3,800,000 67.23 0 0.00 3,800,000 53.25 
Personal 
income 
479,893 8.49 719,817 48.51 1,199,710 16.81 
Land tax 0 0.00 347,249 23.40 347,249 4.87 
Vehicle tax 0 0.00 5,500 0.37 5,500 0.08 
State filing tax 0 0.00 101,870 6.86 101,870 1.43 
Customs 
duties 
3,000 0.05 0 0.00 3,000 0.04 
Fees for using 
state property 
376,000 6.65 0 0.00 376,000 5.27 




375,600 6.64 0 0.00 375,600 5.26 





Education 399,857 8.09 725,617 33.04 1,125,474 15.77 
Culture 121,579 2.46 50,149 2.28 171,728 2.41 
Health care 308,292 6.24 442,320 20.14 750,612 10.52 
Sports 6,500 0.13 1,940 0.09 8,440 0.12 
Social Security 297,770 6.03 322,040 14.66 619,810 8.69 
Science 257,261 5.21 0 0.00 257,261 3.60 




76,000 1.54 0 0.00 76,000 1.06 
National 
economy 
1,805,763 36.55 224,551 10.22 2,030,314 28.45 
Ecological 
maintenance 





72,264 1.46 42,096 1.92 114,360 1.60 
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Legalorgans 19,434 0.39 0 0.00 19,434 0.27 
Internal 195,665 3.96 0 0.00 195,665 2.74 
organs 
State-wide 534,769 10.82 0 0.00 534,769 7.49 
programs 
Payments to 350,624 7.10 0 0.00 350,624 4.91 
enterprises 
Other 72,338 1.46 73,218 3.33 145,556 2.04 
expenditures 
Capital 320,900 6.50 314,296 14.31 635,196 8.90 
investment 
Housing 2,223 0.04 0 0.00 2,223 0.03 
projects 
Total 4,940,196 100.00 2,196,227 100.00 7,136,423 100.00 
Source: John E. Tedstrom: "Problems of Fiscal Policy Reform During The Transition: A Baltic Case 
Study"p. 233; Documentation fi-om Finance Ministries of the three Baltic states and interviews with 
respective Balt officials. 
Appendix 111.18.3 
Table 111.18.3. C 
Estonian State Bujget and Budget Supplements for 1991 
(Rubles) 






Total Percentage Share 
Turnover tax 640,000,000 +307,313,00 
0 
947,313,000 34.9 
Excise tax 605,800,000 -9,200,000 596,000,000 22.0 
Corporate income tax 167,300,000 +632,700,00 
0 
800,000,000 29.4 
Natural resource 19,670,000 19,670,000 0.7 
Oil products tax 173,500,000 173,500,000 6.4 
Customs duties 10,000,000 10,000,000 ý0.4 







Transfer to local budgets 228,300,000 +72,100,000 
Budget surplus to local budgets +128,900,00 
0 
Source: John E Tedstrom: "Problems of Fiscal Policy Reform During The Transition: A Baltic Case 
Study"p. 234; Documentation from Finance Ministries of the three Baltic states and interviews with 
respective Balt ofji-cials. 
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ApRendix 111.19.1 
List of Priority Issues during the Transition Stage of Development 
We only list here the priority issues during the new stage of development. 
" The problem of people and culture and integral leaming 
" The problem of production and technology and self-sufficiency 
" The problem of scarce-resources and utilization and sustainable growth 
" The problem of real investment and firms and employment opportunities 
" The problem of real wages and prices and inflationary tendencies 
" The problem of comparative advantage and internal and intemational. trade 
" The problem of currency and financial institutions and exchange rate mechanism 
" The problem of ecology and environment and space 
" The problem of defence and nuclear capability and super powers 
" The problem of basic needs and human dignity and human rights 
" The problem of economic integration into global market 
" The problem of new world order 
" The problem of privatization and land reforms 
" The problem of democratic-market oriented legal system 
" The problem of conscientization and empowerment mechanism 
" The problem of welfare dynamics 
The problem of R&D and patent rights 
" The problem of foreign aid and ODA 
" The problem of transitional stage to permanent growth] 
Appendix H1.19.2. 
An Illustrative Checklist of indicators of Political Freedom 
1. Personal Security 
a. Arbitrary arrest and detention: Are there arrests without a warrant or probable cause; 
detention without prompt hearing before a court or other independent body; 
unreasonably long detentions before trial or conviction; arrests and detentions of people 
for their political beliefs? Is there any incommunicado detention? 
b. Torture or cruel treatment or punishment: Are there acts of torture (mental or 
physical)? Is there cruel, unusual or degrading treatment or punishment? Are there 
inhumane prison conditions? Does police brutality exists? 
c. Arbitrary killing: Are there any executions without due process of law by the police, 
security forces or state officials? Are there any killings by non-governmental forces with 
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government acquiescence or compliance? Are there killings, either of civilians or of 
captured or wounded combatants, in violation of the laws of war? 
d. Disappearances: Are persons abducted and held in unacknowledged detention by 
order of, or with the complicity of the State or opposition forces, without their family or 
friends having any knowledge of where they are and how they are faring? Do family 
members have effective judicial or administrative mechanisms of determining 
whereabouts and status of abducted persons? 
2. Rule of Law 
a. Fair and Public Hearings: Are there fair and public hearings in the determination of all 
criminal charges? Is every person charged with an offence tried without undue delay, 
and with adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence? 
b. Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal: Is the judiciary free of outside 
pressure or influence? Is there corruption in the judiciary? Is the procedure for selecting 
judges an open one in which opinions outside the executive can be heard? Do judges 
have security of tenure? 
c. Legal Counsel: Does everyone have the right to capable and independent defence 
counsel in the determination of any criminal charge against him or her? Does everyone 
have the right to have legal assistance assigned to him or her in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment by the defendant if he or she lacks 
the necessary means? Is there a right to consult with counsel immediately on arrest, 
before interrogation begins? 
d. Review of Conviction: Does everyone convicted of a crime have the right to have his 
or her conviction and sentence reviewed by an independent judicial tribunal? 
e. Failure to Prosecute: Do state prosecutions also prosecute government officials, or 
members of pro-government forces, who violate the rights and freedoms of other 
persons? 
3. Freedom of Expression 
a. Restrictions in Law and Practice: Is freedom of expression a constitutionally or legally 
protected right? Are there legal restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression other 
than what is necessary to protect the rights of others? Is there prosecution of journalists 
or others for infringement of such laws? Are the punishments prescribed severe in 
proportion to the offence? 
b. Media Censorship: Is there direct censorship of any of the media? Is there indirect 
censorship by such means as withdrawal of government advertising revenue, licensing 
laws, or restrictions on the supply of materials? Are there threats to, or harassment of, 
publishers, editors or journalists? Is there destruction of media outlets by State or non- 
State forces? Has the government shut down any newspapers on the grounds of their 
legitimately expressed views? 
c. Media Ownership: Is the media (particularly TV and radio) wholly or partly owned by 
the government? If so, do the media tend to reflect or favour government policy? IS 
independent ownership of the media permitted? 
d. Freedom of Speech: Is there any censorship of mail, phone-tapping or government 
surveillance? Are there any restrictions on freedom of speech? Are there government 
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controls on book publishing or the arts, other than to safeguard public morality or in the 
legitimate interests of national security or public order? 
4. Political Participation 
a. Political participation: Is there freedom of association and assembly? Are multiple 
parties allowed in law and in practice? Is there violence against, or harassment of, 
political opponents? 
b. Free and Fair Elections: Is there a universal adult franchise? Are there procedural 
irregularities by government, such as the exclusion or intimidation of voters, the rigging 
of votes, or violence against candidates or opponents of government? Do the voting 
procedures permit political parties and independent observers to monitor balloting and 
vote counting? 
C. Continuity of the Democratic System: Are free elections a recent introduction or a 
long-standing tradition? What are the prospects of a democratic system continuing? Do 
elections occur at reasonably regular intervals? 
d. Community and Local Decision-Making: Are political decision-making powers 
decentralized? How much public participation is allowed in local bodies and at the 
community level? 
5. Equality of Opportunity 
a. Legal Guarantees: Are there constitutional or statutory guarantees of equality, 
regardless of gender, race, colour, descent, tribe, religion or national or ethnic origin? 
b. Violence against, or harassment of, particular groups: Does the State always 
prosecute those responsible for violence or harassment (State or non-State) against 
particular groups? 
c. Political Participation: Are any groups excluded from, or hindered from, participation 
in voting or government? Does the State support or condone this, or does it make 
serious efforts to combat it? 
d. Economic Participation: Are there inequalities in pay and employment as a result of 
discrimination? Are there discriminatory restrictions on economic participation? Does 
the State support or condone discrimination, or does it make serious efforts to ensure 
equal treatment? 
Source: Human Development Report 1992, UNDP, Oxford Universiýy Press, p. A 
ADixndix 111.19.3 
The Tide of Freedom 
Transitions from autocratic to democratically elected political systems have come in 
waves over the past decade. The first was swept through Latin America. It began in 
Peru in 1980 with the completion of a transition to an elected government after 12 years 
of military rule. In the following years, South America's military regimes fell one by one: 
Argentina in 1983, Brazil and Uruguay in 1985, Chile in 1988 and Paraguay in 1989. 
There have been more than 180 coups in 157 years in Bolivia, but democratic, civilian 
rule was restored (only) in 1982. 
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Haiti is undergoing the region's most painful transition. Violence and coups have 
plagued the country since the Duvalier regime was ousted in a 1986 military coup. The 
latest setback occurred in December when Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first 
democratically elected president, was overthrown and forced into exile. (By American 
intervention, Aristide has been reinstated as the president in 1995). 
The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded a wave of transitions in the (Central) and 
Eastern European countries and what was the Soviet Union. Radical political changes 
begun in Poland in 1988 were consolidated. Other countries followed: Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania either began or 
completed transitions to democratic rule in 1990. In 1991, Albania held its first 
multiparty elections in 68 years. That same year, the republics of the former Soviet 
Union experienced rapid political change towards democracy. 
There was little political change in post-independence Africa until the late 1980s, but 
since then the transformations have been dramatic. Elections were held in Namibia in 
1989 and the new government guided the country into independence in 1990. In 1991, 
multiparty elections were held in Benin, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
Zambia. The military government in Nigeria has committed itself to transfer rule to 
civilians through elections in 1992. 
Many other African countries also moved towards ending single-party systems: Angola, 
Burkina Faso, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Niger and Tanzania. And 
opposition forces in such other countries as Cameroon, Madagascar and Zaire are 
pressing for political change. 
Political change has transformed many countries in Asia over the past several years as 
well. In 1985, Filipinos poured into the streets to overthrow the Marcos government 
and, shortly thereafter, held a democratic presidential election. In 1990, Mongolians 
ratified a new constitution that established a multiparty system. 
During 1991, Nepal held its first democratic elections in 30 years. Hong Kong took its 
first steps towards democracy with direct elections to its legislature, and Samoa held its 
first elections with universal adult suffrage. Pakistan and Bangladesh switched from 
martial law regimes, to elected parliamentary systems. Warring factions in Cambodia 
signed a peace accord, and an international efforts is under way to help smooth the 
transition to a multiparty system. 
In the Middle East., election fever gripped Jordan at the end of the decade, and in 1991 a 
national charter legalized a multiparty system. Algeria's democratic transition is still 
incomplete. Multiparty elections are scheduled for November 1992 in Yemen. 
Close to a third of humankind still lives in countries that place restrictions on political 
freedom and participation. But the world today is a much freer place than it was three 
decades ago. 
[Human Development Report 1994 cites Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Iraq, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Sudan and Zaire as countries in crisis. I 
Source: Human Development Report 1992, UNDP, Oxford Universiýy Press, p. 28; Also see, Human 




One of the results of the reforms in the transition process was a contraction in 
employment. Between 1990 and 1992, employment declined continuously in all 
transition economies. In 1993, the rate of decline in employment slowed in most east European countries (as shown in the table), but it was still significant, with the falls 
ranging from 3 to 7 per cent, with the exception of Poland and Slovakia where the decline in employment was relatively small. In the CIS countries, where the transition 
process started later and has been much slower, the decline in employment was again 
rather modest in 1993, as in previous years, with a weighted average fall of 2 per cent. 
The contraction in employment accelerated somewhat in the Baltic states in 1993, 
reaching nearly 5 per cent for the region as a whole. The cumulative decline in 
employment over the period 1990-1993 was much more moderate in the CIS countries 
and the Baltic states - nearly 6 and 9 per cent respectively - than the 16 per cent in Eastern Europe, in spite of the much greater reduction in output in the former two 
groups. There was no significant improvement in the labour markets of the majority of 
the transition economies in the first half of 1994. In eastern Europe, despite the 
economic upturn in several countries, the level of employment continued to fall in the 
first half of 1994, albeit at rates which moderated somewhat over the two quarters. The 
level of unemployment reached a peak by the end of the first quarter of 1994 and 
declined slightly thereafter. However, unemployment rates in most countries continued 
to be very high. Significant labour market slack and the high and increasing incidence of 
long-term unemployment suggests that even a strong recovery in eastern Europe could 
not be expected to reduce unemployment to tolerable levels in the foreseeable future - (In 
most of these countries, more than 40 per cent of the unemployed had been out of work 
for at least 12 months at mid-1994, in spite of their short history of open 
unemployment. ) In the CIS countries, the rise in unemployment gained momentum in 
the first half of 1994, even though official unemployment rates still remain extremely low 
(not exceeding 2 per cent on average) both compared with the countries of eastern 
Europe and vis-a-vis the very steep falls in output. The low open unemployment in these 
countries can be only partly explained by the shortcomings of the official unemployment 
statistics. Among other major reasons are the behaviour of enterprises and the economic 
policies pursued by the majority of governments, which have tried to avoid large-scale 
lay-offs, given the probable social and political implications of mass unemployment. 
Transition Countries: Total Employment. 1990-1994 
(Annual average percentage change 






Albania -0.7 -5.8 -16.6 -6.8 -27.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -2.9 
Bulgaria -6.1 -13.0 -8.1 -6.0 -29.5 
Croatia -3.9 -7.1 -10.2 -3.7 -4.0 -3.5 -22.8 
Czech Republic -0.9 -5.5 -2.6 -2.6 -5.4 -4.6 -11.1 
Hungaryc -3.1 9.6 9.3 -5.9 -3.0 -2.6 
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Poland -4.0 -5.9 -4.2 -0.6 -1.6 -1.2 -14.0 
Romania -1.0 -0.5 -3.0 -3.8 -8.1 
Slovakia -2.6 -7.0 -7.5 1 -0.4 -0.8 -16.6 
Slovenia -3.9 -7.8 -6.6 -3.0 -2.6 -2.0 -19.7 
The FYR of Macedonia -1.5 -3.0 -4.6 -5.5 -6.7 -13.8 
Yugoslavia(FR) -3.0 -3.0 -3.4 -5.2 -4.7 -4.1 -13.9 
Eastern Europeý -2.9 -5.6 -5.3 -3.0 -15.8 
CETE-4 -3.2 -6.5 -5.1 -1.9 -15.7 
SETE-8 -2.5 -4.3 -5.5 -4.5 -15.8 
Armenia 1.9 2.6 -5.6 -3.0 -1.4 -2.1 -4.4 
Azerbaijan -0.3 4.0 -5.4 -1.2 -2.9 -3.0 -3.1 
Belarus -1.0 -2.5 -2.6 -1.3 -2.0 -1.9 -7.2 
Georgia 3.7 -10.1 -21.2 -2.2 1 ** -28.1 
Kazakhstan 1.3 -0.9 -1.8 -5.8 -6.4 -6.7 -7.2 
Kyrgyzstan 2.8 -1.0 6.1 -8.4 -6.0 -1.0 -1.1 
Moldova -1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 -2.9 
Russian Federation -0.4 -2.0 -2.0 -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -6.0 
Tajikistan 3.1 1.7 -3.1 -3.0 -2.7 -2.6 -1.5 
Turkmenistan 2.8 1.9 0.1 4.4 1.9 9.5 
Ukraine -0.6 -1.2 -4.0 -2.3 -7.8 
Uzbekistan 4.2 4.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 7.8 
cis 0.1 -1.2 -2.7 -2.1 -5.7 
Estonia' -2.1 0.4 -14.7 -4.0 -19.5 
Latvia 0.1 -0.8 -3.7 -5.9 -4.5 -3.2 -10.1 
Lithuania -2.6 2.4 -2.2 -4.2 -2.9 -2.2 -6.6 
Baltic States -1.6 0.9 -5.2 -4.7 -10.3 
Total Transition Countriesd 1 -0.7 -2.4 
1 
-3.4 1 -2.4 1 -8.6 
Source: National Statistics, in UN's Economic Bulletin for Europe, vol. 46,1994, pp. 41-42. 
' Percentage change over the same period of preceding year. 
b Cumulative change over the period. 
' End of year. 
d Excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
' Since 1992 data refer to end of year. 
Unemplo3ane : 'I'he available statistics suggest that unemployment in eastern Europe 
appears to have reached a peak in early 1994 at about 7.5 million people, as is shown in 
the following table. In spite of the continued sharp downward trend in output in the CIS 
countires, official unemployment remains very low. From 1.2 million at the end of 1993, 
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the number of registered unemployed has risen to 1.9 million in August 1994, with 
unemployment rates varyiyng between 0.3 and 2 per cent, except in Armenia where the 
rate reached nearly 7 per cent. In the Baltic states, registered unemployment was rather 
stable during the first eight months of 1994. Unemployment rates, although increasing 
slightly, still remained very low when steep falls in output are taken into consideration. 
These low registered unemployment rates, both in the Baltic states and in the CIS 
countries, indicates that substantial employment restructuring still lies ahead. 
Transition Countries: UnemplQyment 1992-1994 
(Thousands and per cent of labour force, end of period) 
Une mplo ment (tho usa nds) Une MPI oyme (per cent 
y nt 
19 94 19 94 19 94 19 94 
1992 1993 Marc June July Augu 1992 1993 Marc June July Augu 
h st h st 







Bulg 577 626 615 509 514 497 15.6 16.4 16.1 13.3 13.4 13.0 
aria 
Croat 261 243 246 235 237 233 17.8 16.9 17.4 16.9 17.1 17.4 
ia 




Hung 663 632 611 550 556 551 12.3 12.1 12.2 11.0 11.1 11.0 
ary 
Polan 2509 2890 2951 2933 2982 2965 13.6 16.4a 16.7 16.6 16.9 16.8 
d 
I 
Rom 929 1165 1291 1213 1206 1182 8.2 10.4 11.5 10.8 10.7 10.5 
ania 
Slova 260 368 370 360 370 367 10.4 14.4 14.8 14.4 14.8 14.6 
kia 
Slove 118 137 131 123 126 125 13.4 15.5 14.8 14.1 14.4 14.3 
nia 
1 















CET 3567 4075 4117 4003 4074 4047 11.3 13.3 13.5 13.2 13.4 13.4 
E-4 
SET 3202 3368 3436 3245 3254 3217 14.0 15.0 15.3 14.5 14.5 14.4 
E-8 
Affne 56 103 107 112 113 113 3.5 6.2 6.6 6.8 6.9 6.9 
nia 
Azer 6 20 21 22 23 23 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
baija 
n 
Belar 24 66 82 88 90 97 0.5 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 
us 
Geor 19 40 1.0 2.0 
gia 
Kaza 34 41 48 52 54 56 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 
khsta 
n 
Kyrg 2 3 4 7 8 9 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
yzsta 
n 
Mold 15 14 17 17 18 19 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 
ova 









Ukrai 71 84 99 93 92 92 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
ne I 
Uzbe 9 13 19 19 19 19 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
kista 
n 
CIS 819 1240 1558 1754 1826 1908 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Eston 15 16 20 18 17 15 1.9 2.6 3.6 3.3 3.2 2.9 
iaý 






21 30 29 60 58 60 1.0 1.6 1.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 









Source: National statistical publications and direct communications to UN/ECE secretariat, in UN's 
Economic Bulletin for Europe, vol. 46,1994, pp. 42-46. 
' Since December 1993 a new labour force estimates has been used to calculate the unemployment rate. 
The unemployment rate for December 1993, based on previous labour force data, was 15.7 per cent. 
b Labour force includes onlu the social sector in agriculture and excludes private shop owners. 
Therefore, unemployment rates are biased upwards. 
' Excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
d Data cover only the number of unemployed receiving benefits. 
' Since June 1994 a new system of reporting the number of registered unemployed was introduced. 
Why is official unemployment so low in the CIS countries? The exceptionally low 
official unemployment figures in the CIS countries, both relative to the fall of output and 
to other transition countries, can be explained basically by two sets of reasons. The first 
is of a technical nature and relates to general deficiencies of the registered 
unemployment statistics, including a system of registration which is rather complicated 
and sometimes confusing, insufficiently developed employment services networks, 
especially in rural areas, and low levels of unemployment benefit which do not create 
incentives to register. As a result, many of the jobless prefer to look for work 
independently, rather than through the intermediation of labour offices. The second set 
of reasons for low unemployment rates in the CIS countries relates to a combination of 
the specific economic policy stance adopted by the governments of these countries and 
of a distorted structure of incentives in state owned or newly privatized enterprises. 
According to the report of Economic Commission for Europe (1994), economic growth 
is likely to strengthen in eastern Europe and inflation will continue to fall, but 
unemployment will remain high. No major changes can be expected on the labour 
markets, with employment levels likely to stabilize in 1995 and unemployment rates 
remaining high. While economic growth will absorb some proportion of job-seekers, 
especially through the creation of new job opportunities in the private sector, the inflow 
of newly unemployed people is likely to continue unabated because of the continued 
labour shedding by state enterprises, due to restructuring, and the outflow of manpower 
from agriculture. As a result, the rate of turnover of the unemployed seems to have 
settled at a very low level in transition countires, and a large pool of permanently jobless 
people is likely to become a distinct feature of these economies for quite a long time. 
High and persistent unemployment will remain one of the most important and difficult 
policy challenges in the transition countries over the medium term. There is no 
immediate solution to this problem; given its magnitude and the scarcity of budgetary 
funds, the appropriate policy should employ a combination of measures, including public 
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works programmes, decisions aimed at improving labour mobility across regions 
(housing) and sectors (trafi-ting), and incentives for entrepreneurs to create new j obs. 
Appendix 111.19.5 
Composition of Stocks (international comparison) 
Country Date Share of output stocks in total stocks (percentages) 
GDR 1963 15.4 
Hungary 1976 11.9 
Poland 1975 17.0 
Austria 1976 32.1 
Canada 1970 31.3 
Japan 1975 53.2 
Sweden 1977 38.2 
C- Suurce: A. Chikan and M. Nagy, "Adelekok a keszletnovekedes es keszletstruktura kapcsolatanak 
kerdesehez, " [Data concerning the relationship between growth and the structure of stocks], 
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